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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Second Appeal — Dr. Ram Kumar)

Factual and Procedural Background

Mahadeo Lal (respondent No. 1) sued for a mandatory injunction against Thakur Bhim Singh (respondent No. 2) and Dr. Ram Kumar (appellant) concerning a narrow strip of land (156½ ft. × 11 ft.) on which the appellant had constructed buildings. The trial court, by decree dated 29-4-52, ordered Dr. Ram Kumar to demolish the constructions within one month or, in the alternative, to pay Rs. 257/- to the plaintiff within one month, failing which the decree for mandatory injunction would become absolute.

The defendants did not pay by the stipulated date. On 2-7-52 the appellant applied for an extension of time, and the presiding officer, without issuing notice to the plaintiff, passed an order on 7-7-52 extending the time to 7-8-52; the appellant deposited Rs. 257/- on that later date. The decree-holder filed an execution application on 3-7-52 for recovery of costs and demolition; routine attachment proceedings were ordered by the presiding officer. The execution proceedings were later stayed by the court on an application made (according to the order-sheet) by the lawyer of defendant No. 2, again without issuing notice to the decree-holder.

The appellant filed an appeal against the trial decree on 2-7-52; that appeal was dismissed on 10-11-52 with the trial court's order affirmed. The decree-holder learned during the course of the appeal of the earlier ex parte order of 7-7-52 and, on 18-11-52, appealed that order and filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act alleging late knowledge (first learning of the 7-7-52 order on 4-11-52). The appellate court allowed the Section 5 application and set aside the 7-7-52 order, holding that the executing court had no power to extend the time fixed by the decree under Section 148 or under Section 151 of the CPC.

The present judgment is in a second appeal by the judgment-debtor (Dr. Ram Kumar) challenging that appellate order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the decree-holder (plaintiff) had knowledge of the executing court's order dated 7-7-52 (such that the Section 5 Limitation Act application should not have succeeded).
  2. Whether the Civil Judge / executing court had power to extend the time fixed by the decree for payment (i.e., whether an executing court can enlarge the period fixed under a decree under Section 148 or under its inherent power under Section 151 CPC).
  3. Whether, where the trial court's decree (fixing a period of time for a condition) is subsequently confirmed by an appellate court without variation, the period for performance should be reckoned from the date of the trial court's decree or from the date of the appellate decree (i.e., effect of merger of the trial decree in the appellate decree on the time-limit).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The plaintiff had actual knowledge of the executing court's order dated 7-7-52; reliance was placed on an allegation in a memorandum of appeal signed by an advocate (Shri B.K. Bhargava) suggesting awareness.
  • The learned Civil Judge had the power to extend the time granted under the decree — appellant relied on Krishnarao v. Balvant (AIR 1925 Bom 404) for the proposition that an executing court can relieve a party against consequences of default under the decree.
  • Because the trial court's decree merged in the appellate court's decree dated 10-11-52, the one-month time should be reckoned from the date of the appellate decree (i.e., the appellate confirmation should be treated as extending or re-fixing the time).

Respondent's Arguments

  • The order dated 7-7-52 was passed ex parte without notice to the plaintiff; the plaintiff first learned of that order only in November and thus the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was properly entertained.
  • The executing court had no power to extend the time fixed by a decree; specific provisions of the CPC (Section 148) govern extension and there is no room for exercise of inherent power under Section 151 to vary a decree.
  • Where a trial court's decree fixed a definite date for performance and the appellate court confirms the decree without variation, the time fixed remains reckoned from the trial court's decree; the appellate confirmation does not necessarily enlarge or re-fix that time.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Krishnarao v. Balvant, AIR 1925 Bom 404 Authority relied on by appellant for the proposition that an executing court can relieve a party from consequences of default under a decree. The court considered the decision but expressly disagreed with it and declined to follow it; held that the executing court had no power to extend time fixed by a decree.
Bem Prasad v. Om Prakash, AIR 1938 All 497 Cited in support of the proposition that an executing court cannot vary the terms of a decree. The court relied on this authority to support its conclusion that the Civil Judge had no power to extend the time for payment fixed by the decree.
Kunwarpal Singh v. Antoolal, ILR (1955) Madh B 67 Cited for the proposition that an executing court cannot vary the terms of the decree (cited by respondent). The court referred to this decision in holding that the Civil Judge lacked power to extend the period fixed by the decree.
ILR 23 All 152 (Privy Council) — Bhup Indar Bahadur Singh v. Bijai Bahadur Singh Discussed principle concerning operative decree for mesne profits and effect of appellate confirmation on periods enforced by decree. The court analyzed this decision: it was held there that the operative decree was the ultimate appellate decree for mesne profits, but the Privy Council did not lay down a broad rule that confirmation by an appellate court necessarily enlarges time fixed by a lower court. The court relied on this to reject the appellant's merger argument.
SATVAJI v. SAKHARLAL, AIR 1914 Bom 132 Cited by parties regarding whether time for payment should be reckoned from trial or appellate decree. The court reviewed this decision and stated it did not accept the broader reasoning in that case; the court was unable to subscribe to its view and distinguished it from the present facts.
Raja Sashikanta v. Raja Sarat Chandra, AIR 1921 Cal 699 Interpreted the meaning of "decree" (old Section 211 CPC) and the operative effect of appellate decrees. The court observed this decision's basis (interpretation of “decree” under old Section 211) and held it had no application to the facts of the present case.
Lala Gobind Prasad v. Lala Jugdip Sahay, AIR 1925 Pat 369 Earlier authority addressing related issues of decree-operation and time. The court noted that reasoning in that case was not examined in later decisions; it did not follow that authority here, observing subsequent contrary treatment.
Wasawa Singh v. Lal Singh, 48 Pun R. 1908 (FB) Authority dealing with whether appellate decree incorporates time fixed by lower court and how time should be calculated. The court cited this decision as supporting the proposition that where an appellate court affirms a decree, the time fixed remains that fixed by the lower court (time to be calculated from the original decree), and quoted the reasoning approvingly.
Joseph John v. Varkey Thomas, AIR 1957 Trav-Co 94 (FB) Listed among authorities relied upon by respondent on timing/merger issues. Cited by respondent; the opinion does not record detailed analysis of the decision beyond its being relied upon for the respondent's position.
Panchu Sahu v. Md. Yakub, AIR 1927 Pat 345 Authority cited by respondent regarding effect of appellate confirmation on timing. Listed among cases placed reliance upon by respondent; the court did not separately analyze its reasoning in detail in this opinion.
Mahankali v. Subba Rao, AIR 1918 Mad 919 Cited by respondent among authorities on merger/period reckoning. Referred to as one of the cases on which respondent relied; the court did not elaborate on its application beyond noting reliance.
Aminabi v. Sidu, ILR 17 Bom 547 Cited by respondent in list of authorities on the issue. One of several decisions cited by respondent; the court recorded the citation but did not analyze it in detail in the text.
Jaggar Nath Pande v. Jokhu Tewari, ILR 18 All 223 Cited by respondent among numerous authorities on the effect of appellate confirmation. Cited by respondent; the opinion records the citation as part of respondent's supporting authorities.
Chiranji Lal v. Dharam Singh, ILR 18 All 455 Cited by respondent regarding timing/merger questions. Included in respondent's list of authorities; the court did not separately analyze it in the written opinion.
Bhola Nath Bhuttacharjee v. Kanti Chundra Bhuttacharjee, ILR 25 Cal 311 Cited by respondent among authorities on merger/operation of decrees. Recorded as relied upon by respondent; no detailed discussion in this opinion beyond citation.
Ramaswami Kone v. Sundara Kone, ILR 31 Mad 28 Cited by respondent in support of its position. Included in the respondent's list of cases; no separate exposition in the opinion text.
Ghanslryamlai v. Ram Narain, ILR 31 All 379 Cited by respondent on related decree/merger issues. Listed among respondent's authorities; the court did not individually analyze it in this judgment.
Antulal v. Kunwarpal Singh, AIR 1958 (Madh.) Pra. 7 Cited by respondent (and related to Kunwarpal/Antoolal authorities). Included among respondent's citations to support its position; the opinion does not separately analyze the decision's reasoning here.
Jairam Nagoji v. Khaja Obedulla, AIR 1947 Nag 81 Cited by respondent in the compilation of authorities on the issue. Recorded as one of the respondent's citations; not separately discussed in detail in the opinion.
Naguba Appa v. Namdev, AIR 1954 SC 50 Authority establishing that mere filing of an appeal does not suspend the trial court's decree; a party must comply with trial court directions unless altered by appellate court. The court quoted this decision approvingly for the proposition that filing an appeal does not suspend a decree and thus a party remains bound to comply with the trial court's directions unless altered by the appellate court.
Chandri Abdul Majid v. Jawahir Lal, AIR 1914 PC 66 Deals with effect of dismissing an appeal for want of prosecution and whether that is the same as confirmation by the appellate court. The court distinguished this authority: it was relied upon for the limited proposition that dismissal for want of prosecution does not amount to judicial confirmation of the lower court's decree; used to distinguish facts of other cases.

Note: The table includes every precedent expressly cited in the opinion. For several cases the opinion records only that they were relied upon by a party; where the opinion itself analyzed or applied the precedent, that application is summarized in the third column.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed the three principal contentions in turn and applied statutory provisions and procedural rules from the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) and the Limitation Act as follows.

1. Knowledge of the Plaintiff about the 7-7-52 order: The court examined the record (order-sheets and orders) and concluded the orders of 7-7-52 were passed ex parte without notice to the plaintiff. The memorandum of appeal that suggested plaintiff's knowledge was unsigned by the plaintiff and signed by an advocate; the court found that statement to be a mistake. The plaintiff's lawyer filed an application on 4-11-52 to set aside the ex parte order, and the appellate court properly allowed the decree-holder's application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act (on the ground that the plaintiff first learned of the order in November). The court therefore rejected the appellant's contention that the plaintiff had prior knowledge.

2. Power of the Civil Judge / executing court to extend time: The court examined the statutory framework. It noted that Section 148 CPC specifically permits the court to enlarge a period "from time to time" for acts prescribed by the Code. Because the Code contains this specific provision, there is no room for an executing court to rely on inherent power under Section 151 to vary or extend the terms of a decree. The court explained the limits of a civil court's jurisdiction: a civil court's jurisdiction in an original suit ends when the judgment is dated and signed in open court under Order 20 Rule 3; Order 20 Rule 6 requires the decree to agree with the judgment. The court observed that alteration of the judgment/decree after signature is permissible only under Section 152 (clerical/arithmetical mistakes) or by review under Order 47 (neither of which applied here). Therefore, an executing court cannot vary the decree by extending the period fixed for payment; doing so would amount to varying a decree, which is impermissible. The court thus rejected Krishnarao v. Balvant and relied on authorities such as Bem Prasad v. Om Prakash and Kunwarpal Singh v. Antoolal to support the principle that an executing court cannot vary the terms of a decree.

3. Effect of merger in appellate decree on the reckoning of time: The court acknowledged that the trial court's decree of 29-4-52 merged in the appellate decree of 10-11-52 and that after the appellate decree was passed that was the operative decree. However, because the appellate court confirmed the trial decree without variation, the substantive requirement—i.e., that the Rs. 257/- had to be paid by 29-5-52—remained unchanged. The court held that mere filing of an appeal does not suspend the trial decree nor does confirmation by the appellate court necessarily re-fix or enlarge the time for performance; the time prescribed by the trial court must still be reckoned from the trial court's decree when the appellate court confirms without variation. The court analyzed and distinguished several authorities on this point (including ILR 23 All 152 (PC), AIR 1914 Bom 132, AIR 1921 Cal 699 and others), explaining where those decisions were inapplicable or where their reasoning was not accepted. The court quoted and relied on Naguba Appa v. Namdev (AIR 1954 SC 50) and earlier Federal Bench decisions to reinforce the proposition that filing an appeal does not automatically relieve a party from complying with the time fixed by a trial court's decree.

Based on this analysis, the court concluded: (a) the 7-7-52 order was ex parte and rightly set aside by the appellate court under Section 5 Limitation Act; (b) the Civil Judge lacked power to extend the time fixed by the decree; and (c) the one-month period had to be reckoned from the trial court's decree (29-4-52), notwithstanding that the trial decree merged in an appellate decree which confirmed it without variation.

Holding and Implications

Holding: APPEAL DISMISSED.

The court dismissed the second appeal and confirmed the order of the lower appellate court which had set aside the executing court's ex parte order of 7-7-52 and held that the executing court had no power to extend the time fixed by the decree. The court directed that the parties shall bear their own costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The appellant's challenge to the appellate court's setting aside of the 7-7-52 order and to the appellate court's view on the executing court's power failed; the appellant remains bound by the consequence that the original time fixed by the trial court (to deposit Rs. 257/- by 29-5-52) governed performance and the later ex parte extension was invalid.
  • On precedent and legal principle: The court clarified and applied the limits of executing courts' powers under the CPC (notably Section 148, Section 151, Order 20 Rules and Section 152) and rejected reliance on an authority that had suggested broader executing-court discretion. The opinion records disagreement with some earlier decisions and distinguishes others, but the judgment itself does not state that it is laying down a new binding precedent beyond its application of existing statutory provisions and the reasoning explained above.

Disposition: Appeal dismissed; parties to bear their own costs.

    Dr. Ram Kumar v. Mahadeo Lal And Another

    1. This is a judgment-debtor's execution second appeal against an appellate order of the District Judge Jhunjhunu. The facts which have given rise to it are these. Mahadeo Lal respondent No. 1 brought a suit for mandatory injunction against Thakur Bhim Singh respondent No. 2 and Dr. Ram Kumar appellant in respect of a piece of land 156 ½ ft. × 11 ft. on which the appellant had made some constructions. The trial court passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff on 29-4-52. Under this decree Dr. Ram Kumar was directed to demolish his constructions standing on the land in dispute within one month failing which they were to be removed at his expense on the plaintiffs applying to the court for execution. In the alternative the defendants were given the option of paying Rs. 257/- by way of compensation to the plaintiff within one month failing which the decree for mandatory injunction was to become absolute.

    2. Neither of the two defendants paid nor tendered the sum of Rs. 257/- to the plaintiff during the period stipulated in the decree. On 2-7-52 on the re-opening of the courts after the vacation the appellant filed as application to the court explaining various circumstances in which he was unable to deposit the money by 29th May, 1952 and Prayed for extension of time granted under the decree to enable him to deposit the money. On that date the presiding officer was on leave and the application was ordered to be put on 7-7-52. On this application without issuing notice to the plaintiff the preying officer passed an order extending the time granted under the decree upto 7-8-52 and on that date the appellant deposited Rs. 257/-.

    3. The decree-holder filed an application on 3-7-52 for the execution of the decree. This application was also but up before the presiding officer on 7-7-52 on his return from leave. There were two prayers in the application namely the recovery of the amount of costs and the demolition of the constructions. The presiding officer does not appear to have applied his mind to the application and signed a routine order written by his clerk for warrant of attachment to be issued.

    4. There is another order on the order-sheet of the execution file below the above order in which it is mentioned that the lawyer of defendant No. 2 deposited Rs. 257/- and prayed for stay of execution proceedings. The court stayed execution proceedings on this application without issuing notice to the decree-holder.

    5. On 2-7-52 the appellant filed an appeal against the decree passed by the trial court. This appeal was dismissed on 10-11-52 and the order of the trial court was affirmed.

    6. It was during the course of the arguments of this appeal that the learned counsel for the plaintiff learnt for the first time about the order of the court dated 7-7-52 extending the time for depositing the money. An appeal was then preferred against the order dated 7-7-52, on 18-11-52 along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in which it was alleged that the plaintiff had knowledge of the order dated 7-7-52 for the first time on 4-11-52. The appellate court allowed the application under Section 5 Limitation Act and set aside the Order dated 7-7-52 on appeal holding that the court had no power to extend the time fixed for depositing the money under the decree either under Section 148 of the CPC or under Section 151 of the CPC.

    7. Against the above order the present second appeal has been preferred. Three points have been urged on behalf of the appellant.

    8. The first contention on behalf of the appellant is that the plaintiff had knowledge of the order dated 7-7-52. Reliance is placed on an allegation made in the memorandum of appeal preferred by the plaintiff in the High Court in which it was mentioned that the executing court had overruled the plaintiffs objection that it could not go behind the decree. This memorandum of appeal was not signed by the plaintiff but was signed by one Shri B.K Bhargava, an advocate, who preferred a second appeal in the High Court. Having perused the material on record I am satisfied that this statement by Shri B.K Bhargava in the memorandum of appeal was made under a mistake. An examination of the order-sheets and the orders passed by the court on 7-7-52 goes to show that they were all passed ex parte. As soon as the plaintiff's lawyer learnt about the order dated 7-7-52 he filed an application on 4-11-52 to the executing court setting aside the order dated 7-7-52 which was passed ex parte. This application is paper No. 4/1 in miscellaneous file No. 19/1952 which is part of the file of original suit No. 5/1951. In this application it was asserted that the order dated 7-7-52 was passed without giving any notice to the plaintiff and behind his back. The appellate court therefore rightly allowed the application of the decree-holder under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

    9. The next contention on behalf of the appellant is that the learned Civil Judge had power to extend the time granted under the decree. Reliance was placed on Krishnarao v. Balvant, AIR 1925 Bom 404. It was held in that case that although an executing court cannot modify or vary the terms of the decree, if has power to relieve a party to a decree against the consequences of his default in not observing the obligations imposed upon him by a decree. With all respect I am unable to agree with this decision. The learned Civil Judge purported to extend time under Section 148 read with Section 151 of the CPC. Since the Code contains specific provision for extension of time under Section 148 of the CPC there is no scope for the exercise by the court of its inherent power under Section 151 of the CPC. Section 148 runs as follows:

    “Where any period is fixed or granted by the Court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by this Code, the Court may, in its discretion, from time to time, enlarge such period, even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired.”

    10. The use of the expression “from time to time” indicates that to act under this section the court must have a case before it in regard to which it has jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of a civil court in regard to an original suit begins from the date when the plaint is filed and it terminates on the date on which the judgments is dated and signed in open court under Order 20 Rule 3, that is, its jurisdiction terminates so far as the decision of any question between the parties which is decided in the decree. The language of Order 20 Rule 3 is imperative and it states that when the judgment is once signed, it shall not afterward be altered or added to, save as provided by Section 152 or on review. Moreover Order 20 Rule 6 states that the decree shall agree with the judgment and therefore in this period after pronouncing the judgment and before signing the decree the court has no jurisdiction to alter anything which it has decided in its judgment other than in accordance with Order 20 Rule 3. Section 152 provides for clerical or arithmetical mistakes in the judgment or decree and the alteration in the period fixed for the payment of the money does not come under this description.

    11. Turning now to Order 47 dealing with review none of the provisions are applicable to the present case. Moreover no application for review of the judgment was made. Such an application is required to bear proper court-fee stamp. Notice has to be issued to the opposite party before a review application can be decided. Extending time granted under the decree would therefore amount to varying the decree. It is well known that an executing court cannot vary the terms of the decree. In this connection a reference may be made to the following two decisions: Bem Prasad v. Om Prakash, AIR 1938 All 497; Kunwarpal Singh v. Antoolal, ILR (1955) Madh B 67. I accordingly hold that the learned Civil Judge had no power to extend the time for the payment of the money stipulated in decree.

    12. The last contention on behalf of the appellant is that as the decree of the trial court merged in the decree of the appellate court dated 10-11-52 the time of one month given under the decree of the trial court should be reckoned from the date of the decree of the appellate court. In this connection the following decisions were referred to: Bhup Indar Bahadur Singh v. Bijai Bahadur Singh, ILR 23 All 152 (PC); Satvaji v. Sakharlal, AIR 1914 Bom 132, Raja Sashikanta v. Raja Sarat Chandra, AIR 1921 Cal 699, Lala Gobind Prasad v. Lala Jugdip Sahay*, AIR 1925 Pat 369. On behalf of the respondent reliance was placed on the following decisions: Wasawa Singh v. Lal Singh, 48 Pun Re 1908 p. 172 (FB), Joseph John… v. Varkey Thomas…., (S) AIR 1957 Trav-Co 94 (FB), Panchu Sahu v. Md. Yakub, AIR 1927 Pat 345, Mahankali v. Subba Rao, AIR 1918 Mad 919; Aminabi v. Sidu, ILR 17 Bom 547, Jaggar Nath Pande v. Jokhu Tewari, ILR 18 All 223, Chiranji Lal v. Dharam Singh, ILR 18 All 455, Bhola Nath Bhuttacharjee v. Kanti Chundra Bhuttacharjee, ILR 25 Cal 311, Ramaswami Kone v. Sundara Kone, ILR 31 Mad 28, Ghanslryamlai v. Ram Narain, ILR 31 All 379, Kunwarpal Singh v. Antoolal, ILR (1955) 4 Madh-B 67, Antulal v. Kunwarpal Singh, AIR 1958 Madh. Pra. 7, Jairam Nagoji v. Khaja Obedulla, AIR 1947 Nag 81, Bern Prasad v. Om Prakash, AIR 1938 All 497.

    13. In ILR 23 All 152 (PC) the question before the Judicial Committee was whether the plaintiff was entitled to mesne profits upto the expiry of the period of three years from the decree of the trial court or upto the expiry of three years from the date of the appellate decree of lie Judicial Committee and it was held that the operative decree was the decree of the Privy Council and that in reversing the High Court's and restoring the trial court's decree the Judicial Committee had declared that the decree-holder was entitled to mesne profits for the usual statutory period subsequent to its own decree. The decision in that case was affected by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to future mesne profits. Their Lordships did not lay down the broad proposition that where time is prescribed by the decree of the lower court for the performance of a condition precedent and the appeal court simply confirms the decree of the lower court, it must be assumed that the time for performing the condition has necessarily been enlarged.

    14. The decree of the trial court dated 29-4-52 certainly merged in the decree of the appellate court dated 10-11-52 and after the latter decree was passed that was the only decree which was operative. The decree of the trial court stood to the effect that the sum of Rs. 257/- should be paid within a month of the date of that decree or else the decree for mandatory injunction would become absolute. In other words the present appellant was required to deposit the money by 29-5-52 under the decree of the trial court. This decree was confirmed by the appellate court without any variation. That means that the decree of the appellate court is also to the effect that unless the sum of Rs. 257/- was paid by 29-5-52 the decree for mandatory injunction would become absolute. The mere fact that an appeal has been preferred does not prevent its being executed or enlarged the time for its performance. The judgment of the appellate court did not enlarge the time fixed under the decree of the trial court. The time of one month will therefore be reckoned from the decree of the trial court even though that decree has merged in the decree of the appellate court.

    15. In AIR 1914 Bom 132 the first appellate court passed a decree that on the plaintiff paying a sum of Rs. 203-1-8 to defendants 1 to 6 within six months from the date of the decree he shall be put in possession of the property. Both parties appealed against the decree. The decree of the first appellate court was however confirmed by the High Court. Within six months from the date of the High Court's decree the plaintiff deposited the amount payable by him. It was held that the deposit was made within, time. Reliance was placed on earlier decisions of the same Court in which the following reasoning was given:—

    “Both parties must be held equally bound or equally benefited by the result of this second appeal, and if the original respondents would have become entitled to execute the decree of the High Court in case it had reversed the decision of the lower courts, we do not see any reasons which prevents the present appellant from claiming his right to execute the decree of the High Court in his favour.”

    16. The reasoning which I have given above and which has been given in a number of cases referred to above on behalf of the respondent was not examined in the above case. With all respect I am unable to subscribe to the view taken in it.

    17. The decision in AIR 1921 Cal 699 is based on the interpretation of the word “decree” as used in Section 211 of the old CPC. It was held relying on the authority of the Privy Council case in ILR 23 All 152 (PC) referred to above that “decree” under Section 211 signifies the ultimate decree which alone has operative force and is capable of execution. The decision in this case has no application to the facts of the present case.

    18. In AIR 1925 Pat 369 also the reasoning given in the cases in which a contrary view was taken was not examined. A subsequent Division Bench of the same Court did not follow this decision in AIR 1927 Pat 345. It took the same view which has been taken by me in this case. In 48 Pun Re 1906 (FB) it was held that the decree of an appellate court dismissing the purchaser's appeal on the ground that the price fixed by the court below in a pre-emption suit was correct but silent as to time for the payment of pre-emptive money, must be construed to have incorporated all the terms of the decree confirmed including the provision fixing the date or time for payment, and that in such cases the time allowed must be calculated from the date of the original and not of the appellate decree. The learned Chief Justice observed in his judgment:—

    “The judgment of this Court of 15th July, 1903 is taken then as affirming the decree of the lower Appellate Court, and embodying the terms of that decree.

    That being so, taking the actual terms of the decree of the Divisional Judge, the decree of this Court should have fixed the 25th April, 1903 as the time for payment of the price, but it is argued that as the Divisional Judge allowed from 16th March to 25th April, a period of some forty days, for payment, that the decree of this Court, if it embodies the terms of the decree of the lower Appellate Court, must also allow forty days for payment. In my opinion to do this would be to effect a change in a most material part of the decree of the lower Appellate Court. Even where a definite period is expressly allowed (without a certain date being fixed), the result still is that the price must be paid by a certain fixed date, and for the Appellate Court to alter that date is not to maintain the decree of the Lower Court, but to change it in a most material particular.”

    19. It will be profitable to quote the following observation of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Naguba Appa v. Namdev, AIR 1954 SC 50:—

    “It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the decision of the High Court was wrong inasmuch as an appeal having been preferred from the trial court's decree in the pre-emption suit, the pre-emptor was justified in not depositing the amount within the time fixed by the decree. This argument cannot be sustained. Mere filing of an appeal does not suspend the decree of the trial Judge and unless that decree is altered in any manner by the court of appeal, the pre-emptor is bound to comply with its directions. In our opinion, the High Court was right in holding that the pre-emptor's suit stood dismissed by reason of his default in not depositing the pre-emption price within the time fixed in the trial Court's decree.”

    20. The above case is however distinguishable as the appeal was dismissed for default and the only executable decree was the decree of the trial court in view of the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Chandri Abdul Majid v. Jawahir Lal, AIR 1914 PC 66 in which it was observed:—

    “The order dismissing the appeal for want of prosecution did not deal judicially with the matter of the suit and could in no sense be regarded as an order adopting or confirming the decision appealed from. It merely, recognised authoritatively that the appellant had not complied with the conditions under which the appeal was open to him, and that therefore he was in the same position as if he had not appealed at all. To put it shortly, the only decree for sale that exists is the decree, dated the 8th April, 1893, and that is a decree of the High Court of Allahabad. The operation of this decree has never been stayed, and there is no decree of His Majesty in Council in which it has become merged.”

    21. For reasons given above I dismiss the appeal and confirm the order of the lower appellate court. In the circumstances of the case, I direct that parties shall bear their own costs.

    KE/J/D.H.Z

    22. Appeal dismissed.

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    Dr. Ram Kumar v. Mahadeo Lal And Another
    (Mar 22, 1961)