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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • G.S Pathak, B.K Acharya and R.K Acharya, for Applicant;
  • L.N Chhangani, Government Advocate
Judges
  • Kailash Wanchoo
  • Mr. Jagat Narain
Acts
  • Sec. 41 of the Evidence Act
  • Rule 10, of Order 1
  • Order 1, Rule 10
  • Order 1, Rule
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • G.S Pathak, B.K Acharya and R.K Acharya, for Applicant;
  • L.N Chhangani, Government Advocate
Judges
  • Kailash Wanchoo
  • Mr. Jagat Narain
Acts
  • Sec. 41 of the Evidence Act
  • Rule 10, of Order 1
  • Order 1, Rule 10
  • Order 1, Rule
See more information ...
Smart Summary

High Court Revision — Summary of Judgment (Jagat Narayan, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Collector of Udaipur, acting in the capacity of the Advocate-General under the Government of Rajasthan, instituted a suit under section 22, G.P.G., seeking relief in respect of a temple endowment at Nathdwara. The suit named Goswami Govindlalji Maharaj (defendant No. 1), who was the manager of the deities, other members of an ad hoc management committee (defendants 3–12), and three deities installed in the temple, among the defendants. A scheme for the management of the temple was filed with the plaint and the plaintiff sought that the scheme be made effective under section 92, C.P.C.

All defendants except defendant No. 7 accepted the plaint's allegations and consented to the proposed scheme. Defendant No. 7 opposed the scheme and the plaintiff applied for his removal from the array of defendants.

Goswami Shri Ghanshyamlalji (the present applicant) applied under Order 1, Rule 10, C.P.C. to be impleaded as a party. He claimed to be a descendant of the founder (Shrimad Vallabhacharya), asserted that the trust might be private rather than public, sought to propose amendments to the scheme to preserve traditional worship practices, and claimed a proprietary/spiritual interest that made him a proper party.

The District Judge rejected the application for impleader on two principal grounds: (1) the applicant could bring a separate suit to vindicate any private rights, and (2) the applicant's asserted interest was "remote, illusory and future". The present revision challenges that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the applicant (Goswami Shri Ghanshyamlalji) should be impleaded as a party to the suit under Order 1, Rule 10, C.P.C. to enable the court to frame an appropriate scheme for management of the temple and its properties.
  2. Whether a decree in a suit under section 92, C.P.C. operates as res judicata so as to bar claims to private rights (including claims by non‑parties) in respect of the same property.
  3. Whether adding a new defendant in a suit under section 92, G.P.C. (G.P.G. in the opinion) — by way of impleading a person who applies to be joined under Order 1, Rule 10 — requires the prior sanction of the Advocate‑General because it would alter the nature or enlarge the scope of the suit.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

  • The applicant is a direct descendant of the founder of the endowment and is therefore vitally interested in both spiritual and temporal management of the temple; this makes him a proper party to the suit.
  • The trust may be private rather than public; he seeks a determination on that question so that his private rights (including participation in Sewa and Puja) can be protected.
  • The proposed scheme is defective in aspects relating to traditional worship; he wishes to propose modifications to preserve the peculiar form of worship.
  • If not joined, a decree under section 92 could bar him from vindicating his private rights by a separate suit (reliance placed on authorities such as Ramadas vs. Hanumantha Rao and Anjuman Islamia vs. Latafat Ali).
  • Cited Suresh Singh vs. Legal Remembrancer to U.P. Government as directly analogous authority supporting joinder of a descendant/relative of the founder as a defendant in a section 92 suit.

Respondents' / Government Advocate's Arguments

  • The District Judge's decision was correct because the applicant could bring a separate suit to protect private rights; joinder was unnecessary.
  • Addition of the applicant would alter the nature and enlarge the scope of a suit under section 92 and, if so, prior sanction of the Advocate‑General would be required (relying on Kaidar Nath vs. Kishan Das and related authorities where plaintiffs sought to add defendants without such sanction).
  • Some earlier authorities were invoked to contend that a judgment in a suit under section 92 operates broadly to bind and bar subsequent private claims.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ramadas vs. Hanumantha Rao Invoked for the proposition that a judgment in a suit under section 92 may operate as res judicata in relation to private rights. The court considered the case but explained limits: the Madras decision was an authority that a section 92 decree bars private claims not in denial of the public nature of the trust; it does not establish that section 92 bars claims that deny the public character of the trust.
Anjuman Islamia vs. Latafat Ali Discussed the character of a section 92 decree (Desai J.'s view that it might be a judgment in rem). The court declined to accept Desai J.'s broader view that such a decree is a judgment in rem, citing section 41 of the Evidence Act and adopting the more limited view expressed by Malik C.J. that a section 92 decree is binding but does not preclude a non‑party from asserting that the property is private.
Baba Suraj Gir vs. Bramh Navain Used to show that a stranger may assert a title paramount to the trust even after a scheme under section 92 has been settled. The court treated passages in the decision as obiter but noted they support the proposition that Madras authority does not control claims denying the public nature of the trust.
Suresh Singh vs. Legal Remembrancer to U.P. Government Held that a close relation of the founder seeking to be added as a defendant in a section 92 suit should be impleaded so the court may finally and completely adjudicate issues arising in the suit. The court held this case to be on all fours with the present matter and relied on it as supporting joinder of the applicant; it found the District Judge's attempt to distinguish Suresh Singh untenable.
Kaidar Nath vs. Kishan Das Authority for the proposition that when a plaintiff seeks to add a defendant which substantially alters the scope of a section 92 suit, prior sanction of the Advocate‑General may be necessary. The court distinguished this line of authority: the constraint applies where the plaintiff seeks to enlarge the plaint without the Advocate‑General's sanction, not where an external person seeks impleader under Order 1, Rule 10.
Abdul Rehman Bapu Saheb vs. Cassum Ebrahim Background authority on cases where a plaintiff sought to implead additional defendants without obtaining Advocate‑General's sanction. Referenced to explain that the precedents relied upon concerned plaintiffs' unilateral additions, which is different from an application by a person seeking to be impleaded under Order 1, Rule 10.
Vydianadayyan vs. Sitaramayyan Rule 10 of Order 1: supports the idea that Rule 10 enables the court to try questions once for all material parties and third parties. The court cited this to underscore that Rule 10 permits joinder to permit full adjudication of material questions in the suit.
Secretary of State in M. Murugesa Mudalsar Followed the principle of Rule 10 in enabling comprehensive adjudication of material questions. The court relied on the cited followings to support the position that Rule 10 is designed to facilitate determination of material issues affecting parties and third parties in one proceeding.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through the following analytical steps, staying within the factual and legal material before it:

  1. Consideration of res judicata argument: The Court reviewed authorities relied upon by the applicant (including the Madras decision and Anjuman Islamia) and explained their limited application. It observed that the Madras case supports the proposition that a section 92 decree bars private claims that do not deny the public nature of the trust, but it does not establish that section 92 bars private claims that challenge the public character of the trust. Observations in Baba Suraj Gir were noted as obiter but consistent with that limitation.
  2. Evaluation of the "judgment in rem" contention: The Court rejected the broader contention (espoused by Desai J. in Anjuman Islamia) that a section 92 decree should be treated as a judgment in rem in the same sense as those enumerated in section 41 of the Evidence Act. The Court relied on Malik C.J.'s formulation in Anjuman Islamia that, while a section 92 appointment will be binding on parties and others as regards appointment of a trustee/mutwalli (subject to fraud or want of jurisdiction), it does not preclude a non‑party from asserting that the property was never a public trust and was private property.
  3. Necessity of joinder under Order 1, Rule 10: The Court concluded that it was not necessary to resolve the broader question whether section 92 bars claims denying the public nature of the trust. Instead, it found on the facts that the applicant was a person whose joinder was necessary to enable the Court to frame a proper scheme. The applicant, as a descendant of the founder, had a direct, vital interest in spiritual and temporal management; his presence would assist the Court in assessing defects and possible improvements to the proposed scheme.
  4. Reliance on analogous authority: The Court found Suresh Singh v. Legal Remembrancer to be directly analogous: in that case a close relation of the founder was added as a defendant to ensure comprehensive adjudication. The Court held that the District Judge's distinction of Suresh Singh was untenable.
  5. Response to the Advocate‑General sanction argument: The Court distinguished authorities that require prior sanction of the Advocate‑General when the plaintiff seeks to enlarge the plaint without such sanction. The Court explained the different legal position when a third party makes an application under Order 1, Rule 10 to be impleaded. There is no textual limitation in Rule 10 that precludes joinder of such a person in a section 92 suit; therefore prior sanction of the Advocate‑General was not required in this instance. Moreover, the Court held that joinder would not alter the essential character of the suit: the applicant sought a determination whether the trust was public or private and proposed amendments to the scheme, which are matters appropriately determined in the section 92 proceeding.
  6. Practical considerations: The Court emphasized the practical utility of joinder — if the applicant were not added he would be forced to bring a separate suit possibly against defendants who had already agreed to the scheme (and thus might not contest his claim), and the Collector (plaintiff) would not be a party to that separate litigation. It preferred resolution of the question within the present suit so that the Court could "effectually and completely adjudicate" material questions once for all.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The revision is allowed; the order of the District Judge rejecting the applicant's request for impleader is set aside and the applicant (Goswami Shri Ghanshyamlalji) is to be joined as a defendant in the present suit, with costs.

Implications:

  • The immediate and direct effect is that the applicant will be added as a defendant to the pending section 92 suit and will have the opportunity to participate in the framing and amendment of the proposed scheme for management of the temple.
  • The decision resolves the specific procedural dispute in this case and orders joinder; the opinion does not purport to lay down a categorical rule barring or permitting all similar applications in all contexts and the Court expressly declined to decide the broader question whether section 92 decrees bar private claims that deny the public nature of a trust. The Court therefore did not declare a new general precedent on that wider point.
Show full summary ...

    Goswami Shri Ghanshyamlalji v. The Collector, Udaipur

    JAGAT NARAYAN, J.

    This revision application arises out of a suit under sec. 22, G. P. G. brought by the Collector of Udaipur, in exercise of the powers of the Advocate-General conferred on him by the Government of Rajasthan against Goswami Govindlalji Maharaj and some other defendants including three deities Shri Nathji, Shri Navnit Priyaji and Shri Madan Mohanlalji installed in the temple at Nathdwara. Goswami Govindlalji Maharaj defendant No. 1 is the present manager of the deities. Defendants 3 to 12 are members of an ad hoc committee of management who manage the affairs of the temple along with defendant No. 1. A scheme of management was filed along with the plaint and it was prayed that this scheme might be given effect to under the provisions of sec. 92, C. P. C. In their written statements all the defendants except No. 7 accepted all the allegations made in the plaint and expressed their agreement to the proposed scheme. Defendant No. 7 opposed the scheme and the plaintiff filed an application praying that he may be removed from the array of defendants.

    2. The present applicant Goswami Shri Ghanshyamlalji filed an application before the District Judge in whose court the above suit was pending under O. 1, R. 10, C. P. C. praying that he may be impleaded as a party. He is admittedly one of the descendants of Shrimad Vallabhacharya, who founded the endowment in suit. His case is that the trust in question is not one of a public nature to which sec. 92, G. P. G. is applicable. He claims that it is a private trust. The applicant also alleges that the proposed scheme is defective and he wishes to put forward suggestions for its improvement, so that the worship of the deity may be carried on in accordance with the traditions in the peculiar form in which it has all along been performed. He claims that being a direct descendant of the founder he is entitled to participate in the Sewa and Puja and being interested in the spiritual and temporal management, he is a fit and proper person to be impleaded as a party so that he may have say in the matter of the framing of a scheme of management.

    3. The application was opposed on behalf of the plaintiff and the learned District Judge rejected it mainly on the ground that it was open to him to bring a separate suit to vindicate his private rights. As for the applicant's contention that he was interested in the management of the temple being a direct descendant of the founder, the learned District Judge dismissed it by saying that his interest was "remote, illusory and future".

    4. Against the above order the present application was filed, which has been opposed on behalf of the Collector and some of the defendants in the suit. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.

    5. First, it was contended on behalf of the applicant that he is a necessary party to the present suit as the decree passed in it will debar him from vindicating his private rights by a separate suit. In support of the proposition that the judgment in a suit under sec. 92 operates as res judicata so far as private rights of any sort are concerned reliance was placed on Ramadas vs. Hanumantha Rao (1) and the observations of Desai J. in Anjuman Islamia vs. Latafat Ali. (2).

    6. In the Madras case the plaintiff's father was dismissed from the office of Dharam Karta in 1902 and died in 1905. In 1903 a suit was filed by the first defendant and another under sec. 539, C. P. C. and a scheme of management was framed under which the defendants were appointed trustees of the temple. The plaintiff was a minor at that time. He brought the suit on attaining majority asking for re instalment in office of Dharam Karta on the ground that his family held the hereditary trusteeship on the temple. It was found that the plaintiff did have a hereditary right to be appointed trustee. It was held that "a scheme framed under sec. 539 is binding on all (whether worshippers or not) including even one who might have claimed a hereditary trusteeship and have brought a suit to enforce such a right before the settlement of the scheme and a decree framing a scheme is a bar to a suit by such a person, even though the denial of such a right of suit might act very prejudicially to his interests and even though his application to be made a party to the scheme might have been rejected". It is nowhere mentioned in the judgment that the plaintiff claimed any private right in denial of the public nature of the trust. On the other hand from the observations that "even if the suit could by stretch of language be considered to allege a breach of the trust by the court which framed the scheme, the plaintiff could not bring the suit under sec. 539 for he alone is interested in his own claim and under that section the suit must be brought by two or more persons having an interest in the trust and there is no reason to suppose that any one would join the plaintiff in a suit framed to benefit the plaintiff alone" it is clear that the private rights claimed were not in denial of the public nature of the trust. This case, therefore, is only an authority lor the proposition that a suit under sec. 92 bars all claims to a private right not in denial of the public nature of the trust. It cannot be regarded as an authority for the proposition that it is a bar to putting forward private rights even in denial of the public nature of the trust. In Baba Suraj Gir vs. Bramh Navain (3) in which the above Madras case was followed, it was observed that "we can readily understand, that, even when a scheme has been settled by the Court under sec. 92, Civil P. C. , a stranger may come in for the purpose of asserting a title which is paramount to the trust altogether and in that sense he may claim to have the whole scheme displaced upon the ground that there never ought to have been a scheme at all because the property was never the subject of a trust for charitable or religious purposes". These observations are no doubt obiter, but they show that their lordships of the Allahabad High Court were also of the opinion that the Madras case did not apply to rights put forward in denial of the public nature of the trust.

    7. In Anjuman Islamia vs. Latafat Ali (2) Desai J. observed "bower defines a judgment in rem as one which 'declares, defines, or otherwise determines the status of a person, or of a thing, that is to say, the jural relation of the person, or thing, to the word generally'. (See Bower on res judicata, P. 132.) Accord-ding to one or more of these definitions the judgment in a suit under sec. 92, C. P. C. appointing a particular person as mutwalli, would be a judgment in rem". The above observations were not merely obiter but were not subscribed to by Malik C. J. , the other learned judge who constituted the Division Bench which dealt with the above case. With all respect to Desai J. we are unable to accept the above observations as correct. Sec. 41 of the Evidence Act enumerates all the classes of judgments which are judgments in rem. They are the judgments of courts of Probate, Matrimony, Admiralty and Insolvency. It may be noticed that every decision of these courts is not a judgment in rem. Only such adjudications as are upon the status of some particular subject matter mentioned in the section are judgments in rem. All that was held by Malik C. J. in the above case was that "a suit under sec. 92 is a suit by members of the public interested in the trust, for safeguarding the interests of the trust, and an appointment of a mutwalli by the District Judge made in such a suit must be held to be binding so long as the order cannot be challenged on the ground of fraud or want of jurisdiction or some such similar ground. To hold otherwise would lead to this difficulty that a person appointed a mutwalli by the District Judge in a suit under sec. 92, can claim to be a mutwalli only against those who are parties to that suit and his right to act as mutwalli would be subject to a challenge by every other third party". He made it clear however that "it does not mean that after a decree in a suit under sec. 92, it is not open to a person interested in the property and not a party to the suit to claim that the property was his private property and there was no public trust which could be made a subject-matter of a suit under sec. 92, or that it is not open to a person, who is the real trustee, to claim that a decree has been obtained behind his back against persons who were not the real trustees and were not in charge of the property. But where there is a public trust and the District Judge has appointed a person as trustee in a suit brought against the then trustee, it is not open to a third party to claim that the District Judge should not have appointed the person so appointed by him but should have appointed some others who had a better claim. To that extent a decree under sec. 92 of the Code, is binding not only on those who are parties to the suit but also on others".

    8. It is however not necessary for purposes of the present revision to decide whether or not private rights in denial of the public nature of the trust claimed on behalf of persons not parties to suits under sec. 92 would also be barred by the decree, as we are satisfied that the applicant is a person whose presence before the court is necessary in the present suit to enable it to frame a proper scheme for the management of the temple and its properties. Being a descendant of the founder, he is vitally interested in the temple's spiritual and temporal management. As has been mentioned above, all the defendants except No. 7 have already given their consent to the proposed scheme. An application for removing defendant No. 7 from the array of parties has already been moved on behalf of the plaintiff. If the applicant is joined as a defendant, he will be able to apprise the court of the other aspects of the case, if any.

    9. The case of Suresh Singh vs. Legal Remembrancer to U. P. Government (4) which was cited on behalf of the applicant before the learned District Judge is on all fours with the present case. It was a suit under sec. 92 in which the plaintiff proposed a scheme for the management of a trust impleading only the Deputy Commissioner, who was incharge of the trust property, as a defendant, who did not object to the proposed scheme. A close relation of the founder of the trust moved the lower court to be added as a defendant on the ground that he possessed the necessary qualification for being appointed as one of the trustees and if he was not so added the scheme would go un-challenged and would be accepted by the court, in which case he would have no right of appeal. It was contended by the applicant that he was entitled to have some voice in the settlement of the scheme for the management of the trust created by his ancestors. It was held that

    "such a person should be added as a defendant in the suit in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved in the suit"
    . The learned District Judge sought to distinguish the above case on grounds which are clearly untenable. It is unnecessary to specify them as even the learned Government Advocate has not relied on them.

    10. The learned Government Advocate contended that the addition of the applicant would alter the nature of the suit and would enlarge the scope of the litigation and could not be done without the previous sanction of the Advocate-General. In support of this contention he referred to the single judge case of Kaidar Nath vs. Kishan Das (5), in which the learned Chief Justice of the Punjab High Court held that "in a suit under sec. 92, G. P. C. if the scope of the suit is substantially altered or enlarged by the addition of a new defendant, previous sanction of the Advocate-General is necessary". Cases on which he purported to base his decision were all cases in which the plaintiff sought to implead an additional defendant without obtaining the sanction of the Advocate General. See Abdul Rehman Bapu Saheb vs. Cassum Ebrahim (6). The consideration in a case where a person applies to the Court for being impleaded under Order 1, Rule 10 is different from that in a case where the plaintiff himself applies for the addition of a party as a defendant without obtaining the sanction of the Advocate-General. The plaintiff himself cannot enlarge the scope of the plaint beyond what the Advocate General has sanctioned. But there is no limitation or exception contained in rule 10 of order 1, where a person seeks himself to be impleaded as a defendant. If it had been intended that the court could not add such a person as a party in a suit under sec. 92 a specific exception would have been made in this behalf in the rule. Further there will be no alteration in the nature of the suit by the addition of the applicant as a defendant. The first fundamental requirement of a suit under sec. 92, G P G ii that the trust should be a public one. The applicant wants a determination of the question as to whether the trust in suit is a public or private one. The plaintiff wants a particular scheme to be approved by the court and the applicant wants to point out the detects in the proposed scheme and suggests modi" fications. The scope of the litigation will certainly be enlarged by raising the former question. One of the objects of Rule 10, of Order 1 is to enable the court to try and determine once for all material questions, common to the parties and to third parties and not merely questions between the parties to the suit. See Vydianadayyan vs. Sitaramayyan (7) followed in secretary of State in M. Murugesa Mudalsar (8). If the applicant is not impleaded m this suit he will have to bring another suit to establish his rights with regard to the same property. If he brings that suit now, he can only bring it against the defen-danti of the present suit who may not be interested in contesting it since they have already agreed to surrender their rights of management in favour of the proposed scheme. It is better that the issue be tried in the present suit in the presence of the Collector who is interested in denying the claim of the appli-cant. In every view of the case therefore he is a proper party to the present

    11. We accordingly come to the conclusion that the learned District Judge should have allowed the application of the applicant for being joined as a party under Order 1, Rule 10. This is a fit case in which this Court should exercise its power of revision. We accordingly allow this application with costs and direct that the applicant be joined as a defendant to the present suit. .

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    Comments

    Goswami Shri Ghanshyamlalji v. The Collector, Udaipur
    (Feb 3, 1958)