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Case Number

D.B Civil Writ Petition No. 540 of 1952

Attorney(S)

B.S Sharma and N.L Jain, for Applicant;
R.K Rastogi, for Opposite party No. 2;
R.A Gupta, Government Advocate

Judges

Mr. Jawan Singh Ranawat

Acts

SECTION 62 MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
ARTICLE 226 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
Section 62, Indian Motor Vehicles Act,

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Smart Summary

Case Summary: Khandari Babu v. Regional Transport Authority, Udaipur Region & Messrs. Ratan Singh Awat Ram

Factual and Procedural Background

The petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was filed by Khandari Babu (son of Kilu Mal) of Kotah city. The petitioner owned bus No. RJL 529 and held a permit to ply it on the Kotah–Deikhera–Khanpur route in Kotah and Jhalawar districts granted by the Regional Transport Authority (RTA), Udaipur Region. The petitioner alleged he expended about Rs. 1,200 on repairing the route to make it motorable. On 3-10-1952 the RTA granted a temporary permit (valid until 31-12-1952) to Messrs. Ratan Singh Awat Ram (opposite party No. 2) which, according to the petitioner, was practically for the same route covered by his permit. The petitioner contended that the RTA disregarded the provisions of Section 62, Motor Vehicles Act, and that the grant caused him considerable loss; he sought a writ setting aside the temporary permit and restraining opposite party No. 2 from plying on the Kotah–Khanpur route.

The RTA filed a reply admitting the petitioner's permit but explained the temporary permit was issued to meet the public necessity because one bus was considered insufficient for traffic on the route. The RTA stated the decision was based on recommendations from local Gram Panchayats (Dhulet, Kanwas, Awa) and a non-official member of the RTA; the petitioner was present and opposed the action. Steps were being taken for grant of a non-temporary permit and, meanwhile, a temporary permit with restrictions (one trip per day and departure only after the petitioner's bus left the station) was issued. The RTA argued the petitioner should have availed statutory appeals and had delayed in approaching the High Court.

Opposite party No. 2 filed a reply broadly on the same lines as the RTA.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the Regional Transport Authority validly exercised its discretion under Section 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act in granting a temporary permit to opposite party No. 2 for the route covered by the petitioner's permit.
Whether the temporary permit was issued in disregard of Section 62 because it was actually to meet a permanent need (i.e., whether a "particular temporary need" within the meaning of Section 62 existed).
Whether the High Court should interfere by issuing a writ under Article 226 when the statute provides a scheme of permits and statutory remedies such as appeals are available.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

The learned counsel for the petitioner argued there was no "particular temporary need" as required by Section 62, Indian Motor Vehicles Act, to justify issuance of a temporary permit to opposite party No. 2 on a route covered by the petitioner's permit.
To support this contention the petitioner relied on the following authorities (as cited in the opinion): Rama Vilas Service Ltd. v. The Road Traffic Board, Madras (AIR 1948 Mad 400); Motilal v. Govt. of the State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1951 All 257); Shah Transport Co., Chhindwara v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1952 Nag 353).

Respondents' Arguments (Regional Transport Authority and Opposite Party No. 2)

The RTA contended the temporary permit was issued to meet the necessity of the public because one bus was insufficient for traffic on the route; the decision was based on local Gram Panchayats' recommendations and a non-official member's recommendation.
The RTA stated it applied conditions to the temporary permit (one trip per day; departure only after the petitioner's bus) so as to protect the petitioner's interests and to ensure the temporary permit would carry only passengers who could not travel by the petitioner's bus.
The RTA argued the petitioner had statutory remedies (appeal) available and delayed in approaching the High Court; opposite party No. 2 relied on a reported Assam High Court decision (Chandi Prosad v. Regional Transport Authority, Gauhati — AIR 1953 Assam 74) to support its position.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd., Kumbakonam, Tanjore District (AIR 1952 SC 192)	Explains scope of writs under Article 226: High Court may issue writs where subordinate bodies act wholly without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, in violation of natural justice, refuse to exercise vested jurisdiction, or where there is an error on the face of the record producing manifest injustice; but the High Court is not to act as a court of appeal examining correctness of decisions on merits.	The court relied on these principles to hold that it would not substitute its judgment for that of the Regional Transport Authority on a discretionary decision under Section 62 unless there was mala fides or the decision was in utter disregard of law.
Rama Vilas Service Ltd. v. The Road Traffic Board, Madras (AIR 1948 Mad 400)	Cited by petitioner to support the proposition that a temporary permit must meet a particular temporary need and that a transport authority must exercise its own discretion (observations of Gentle C.J. on what is a particular temporary need appear in the reported judgment).	The court treated the observations in the Madras case as obiter dicta in the context because that case involved the RTA following Government directions and not exercising its independent discretion; the court distinguished the present facts from that case.
Motilal v. Government of the State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1951 All 257)	Cited by the petitioner in support of the argument that issuance of temporary permits must satisfy the statutory conditions and that absence of a particular temporary need may render such grant improper.	The court acknowledged the citation as supporting the petitioner's argument but did not rely on it to overturn the RTA's decision; instead the court found the RTA had applied its mind to Section 62 and exercised discretion within its jurisdiction.
Shah Transport Co., Chhindwara v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1952 Nag 353)	Cited by the petitioner to challenge the lawfulness of issuing a temporary permit where no particular temporary need exists.	The court recorded the citation as part of the petitioner's authorities but did not apply it to invalidate the RTA's order on the facts before it, finding that the RTA had considered and decided the question of temporary need.
Chandi Prosad v. Regional Transport Authority, Gauhati (reported as AIR 1953 Assam 74)	Relied upon by opposite party No. 2; the Assam High Court decision contained views that dissented from the Madras observations on what constitutes a particular temporary need.	The court noted the Assam decision and that it dissented from the Madras observations, but the High Court in the present case did not express an opinion on the correctness of those conflicting statements of law because it was satisfied the RTA had exercised its discretion lawfully.
Observations of Gentle C.J. in the Madras case (referred to in the opinion as 'AIR 1843 Mad 400' and related to AIR 1948 Mad 400)	Statements on what is a "particular temporary need" and the requirement that a Regional Transport Authority exercise its own discretion and not act under government direction; characterized in this opinion as obiter dicta in that Madras case.	The court described those observations as obiter and distinguishable on the facts (that Madras case involved a refusal to exercise discretion and action pursuant to Government directions), and therefore did not consider them controlling in the present proceedings.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by identifying the nature of the Regional Transport Authority as a quasi-judicial body entrusted with discretion under Section 62 of the Indian Motor Vehicles Act to grant temporary permits when conditions specified in the section are satisfied.

The court emphasized the limited scope of judicial intervention under Article 226: High Courts may interfere where the subordinate authority acts without jurisdiction, in excess of it, mala fide, or in violation of law or natural justice, producing manifest injustice; however, the High Court should not function as an appellate body re-evaluating the merits of discretionary administrative decisions.

Applying these principles, the court noted:

The question whether a "particular temporary need" exists under clause (c) of Section 62 is primarily for the Regional Transport Authority to determine.
The RTA had considered the matter, heard the petitioner (who was present and opposed the grant), relied on local recommendations, and imposed protective conditions on the temporary permit to safeguard the petitioner's position (one trip per day; departure only after petitioner's bus).
The petitioner did not allege mala fides or that the RTA acted in utter disregard of the statutory provisions.

The court observed that while arguments were advanced on whether the need was temporary or permanent, it was unnecessary to decide that factual question because the court could not substitute its view for the RTA's discretionary judgment in the absence of jurisdictional error or mala fides.

The court further explained that in some circumstances a permanent need may give rise to a particular temporary need (examples given in the opinion: vehicle breakdown creating a temporary necessity for replacement; an increase in traffic creating an immediate need until non-temporary permits can be arranged), and that temporary permits for periods not exceeding four months may properly be used to meet such exigencies.

On the present facts the court found that the RTA had applied its mind to Section 62, reached the conclusion that a particular temporary need existed, and imposed restrictions aimed at protecting the petitioner; accordingly there was no ground for interference.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The application of the petitioner is dismissed with costs.

Consequences and implications:

The temporary permit granted to opposite party No. 2 by the Regional Transport Authority will stand (the court found no jurisdictional fault or mala fides warranting interference).
The petitioner was ordered to pay costs; the counsel's fee was fixed at Rs. 50/-.
The court did not set aside or modify the RTA's exercise of discretion and did not lay down any new legal principle beyond reaffirming the settled position that courts will not ordinarily substitute their view for a transport authority's discretionary decision under Section 62 unless jurisdictional error or mala fides is shown.

This summary is confined to the content and reasoning supplied in the provided opinion and does not add information beyond that text.

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Khandari Babu v. Regional Transport Authority, Udaipur

1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by one Khandari Babu, son of Kilu Mal, of Kotah city, against the Regional Transport Authority, Udaipur Region, and Messrs. Ratan Singh Awat Ram.

2. Briefly the case of the petitioner is that he owns bus No. RJL 529, and holds a permit for plying it on Kotah-Deikhera-Khanpur route in Kotah and Jhalawar districts granted to him by the Regional Transport Authority, Udaipur Region, that the petitioner, after getting his permit for plying stage carriage, spent about Rs. 1200/- in the repairing of the route in order to make it motorable, that the Regional Transport Authority Udaipur Region, in complete disregard of the provisions of Section 62, Motor Vehicles Act, on 3-10-1952 granted a temporary permit to Messrs. Ratan Singh Awat Ram, who are opposite party No. 2, which is to remain valid up to 31-12-1952, that the temporary permit of opposite party No. 2 is practically for the same route as that of the petitioner's permit, that the petitioner has been put to a considerable loss on account of the grant of temporary permit in favour of the opposite party No. 2, and that the order of the Regional Transport Authority granting a temporary permit in disregard of the provisions of Section 62, Motor Vehicles Act, is illegal. The petitioner prays that an appropriate writ or direction be issued setting aside the temporary permit issued by the opposite party No. 1, and restraining the opposite party No. 2 from plying the bus on Kotah-Khanpur route.

3. A reply has been filed on behalf of the Regional Transport Authority, and it is admitted that the petitioner holds a valid permit for plying his bus on Kotah-Deikhera-Khanpur route. It is further stated that a temporary permit was granted to the opposite party No. 2 in order to meet the necessity of the public at large, as one bus was not considered sufficient to meet the need of the traffic on the route covered by the permit of the petitioner. The action of the Regional Trans-

port Authority in this behalf was based on the recommendation of the Gram Panchayats of that locality, e.g., Dhulet, Kanwas and Awa, and of one of the non-official members of the Regional Transport Authority. At the time the question of issuing temporary permit was considered by the Regional Transport Authority, the petitioner was also present, and he had opposed the proposed, action. Necessary steps for the grant of a non-temporary permit were taken, and in the meantime, in order to give relief to the travelling public, a temporary permit was issued. The action of the Regional Transport Authority in so acting was within the scope of their powers. The Regional Transport Authority, in order to further safeguard the interests of the petitioner, imposed restrictions on the temporary permit that the opposite party No. 2 would make only one trip per day, and would start his bus after the petitioner's bus had left the station. By these conditions the opposite party No. 2 was made to carry only such passengers as could not, travel by the bus of the petitioner. The petitioner, if he had felt aggrieved from the order of the Regional Transport Authority, should have gone in appeal, and as other remedy was open to him, he is not entitled to any relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is also stated in the reply that the petitioner came to court after much delay.

4. The reply of Messrs. Ratan Singh Awat Ram, opposite party No. 2 is almost on the same lines as that of the Regional Transport Authority,

5. The learned counsel of the petitioner in his arguments has vehemently urged that there was no particular temporary need in the meaning of Section 62, Indian Motor Vehicles Act, to entitle the Regional Transport Authority to issue a temporary permit in favour of the opposite party No. 2 on the route which was covered by the permit of the petitioner. In support of this argument, -- 'Sri Rama Vilas Service Ltd. v. The Road Traffic Board, Madras', AIR 1948 Mad 400 (A); -- 'Motilal v. Govt. of the State of Uttar Pradesh', AIR 1951 All 257 (PB) (B) and -- 'Shah Transport Co., Chhindwara v. The State of Madhya Pradesh', AIR 1952 Nag 353 (C), have been cited. In reply the opposite party has put reliance on an un-reported judgment of the Assam High Court in -- 'Chandi Prosad v. Regional Transport Authority, Gauhati', since reported in AIR 1953 Assam 74 (D), a copy of which has been produced by the opposite party No. 2.

6. It may be noted that the Regional Transport Authority, while exercising its powers of issuing temporary as well as non-temporary permits is a quasi judicial Authority, and if that Authority acts without jurisdiction or refuses to act when it has got jurisdiction under the law, or acts illegally or with material irregularity, a writ of 'certiorari' may lie against it.

Under Section 62, Indian Motor Vehicles Act, a Regional Transport Authority has been given discretion to grant temporary permits, if the conditions therein specified are satisfied. Clause (c) of Section 62, it is admitted by both the sides, is relevant for the purposes of this case. Clauses (a) and (b) of the said section do not apply to it. Clause (c) of Section 62 is that a temporary permit might be issued to meet a particular temporary need. Whether in a given case there is a particular temporary need or not is for the Regional Transport Authority to decide, and this court would not interfere unless the decision of that Authority is mala fide, or is in utter disregard of the provisions of law. In this connection the observations of his Lordship Chandrasekhara Aiyar J. in--'G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd., Kumbakonam, Tanjore District', AIR 1952 SC 192 (E) may be quoted with advantage:

"Such writs as are referred to in Article 226 are obviously intended to enable the High Court to issue them in grave cases where the subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers act wholly without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or in violation of the principles of natural justice, or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them, or there is an error apparent on the face of the record, and such act, omission, error, or excess has resulted in manifest injustice. However extensive the jurisdiction may be, it seems to us that it is not so wide or large as to enable the High Court to convert itself into a Court;

of appeal and examine for itself the correctness of the decisions impugned and decide what is the proper view to be taken or the order to be made."

the transport authorities and naturally depends on several circumstances which have to be taken into account. The Regional Transport Authority and the Provincial Transport Authority are entrusted under Section 42 with this power. They may be described as administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial functions in the matter of the grant of permits."

x x x x "Thus we have before us a complete and precise scheme for regulating the issue of permits, providing what matters are to be taken into consideration as relevant, and prescribing appeals and revisions from subordinate bodies to higher authorities. The remedies for the redress oi" grievances or the correction of errors are found in the statute itself and it is to these remedies that resort must generally be had. As observed already, the issue or refusal of permits is solely within the discretion of the transport authorities and it is not a matter of right."

7. Coming to the facts of the present case, we would like to note that it was for the Regional Transport Authority to decide whether there was a particular temporary need to enable it to issue a temporary permit under the provisions of Section 62, Motor Vehicles Act. This Court would not sit as a Court of appeal over the judgment of the Regional Transport Authority given in exercise of its discretion under Section 62, Motor Vehicles Act.

Lengthy arguments were addressed to us on the point whether in the present case there was or was not a particular temporary need within the meaning of Section 62 of the said Act, but we do not think it necessary to enter into this question. The judgment of the Regional Transport Authority on this point may or may not be correct in the opinion of this Court, but this Court would not be entitled to interfere simply because this Court may take a different view from the one adopted toy the Regional Transport Authority. The Regional Transport Authority, in the present case, did consider the matter, and did decide whether there was or was not a particular temporary need. It has not been agitated by the petitioner that the exercise of jurisdiction, in the present case, by the Regional Transport Authority was mala fide.

The only point urged is that the Regional Transport Authority disregarded the conditions specified in Section 62 in issuing a temporary permit.

A temporary permit had been issued, it is said, for a permanent need, and there being no particular temporary need, the Authority had no jurisdiction to grant such a permit under Section 62 of the said Act. We may note that the Authority did apply its mind to the provisions of section 62 in deter mining whether there was a particular temporary need or not, and it came to the conclusion that, under the circumstances of the case, there was such a need.

We may in passing refer to the observations of Gentle C. J. in-- 'AIR 1843 Mad 400 (A)' which has been followed in -- 'AIR 1951 All 257 (B)', which have been stressed by the learned counsel of the petitioner. Those observations are, as it appears from the judgment, obiter dicta. In that Madras case the Regional Transport Authority did not apply its mind to the question of grant of permits, but acted in pursuance of the directions of the Government. Under the law, the Regional Transport Authority had to exercise its own discretion, and it could not refuse to exercise its discretion which was given to it under the law simply because of certain directions of the Government. That was, therefore, a case of refusal to exercise a jurisdiction and of making a misuse of the provisions of section 62 to circumvent the procedure provided for the grant of non-temporary permits. The facts in the present case are much different, and that decision would not apply to the circumstances of this case. Nevertheless the observations of Gentle C.J. do appear on the subject as to what is a particular temporary need. Those observations have been dissented from in the case of -- 'AIR 1953 Assam 74 (D)' by Thadani C. J. and Deka J. of the Assam High Court. We would not like to express our opinion on this point, as in the present case we are satisfied that the Regional Transport Authority had exercised its discretion under the law, and did not disregard the provisions of section 62.

A permanent need may also, under certain given circumstances, give rise to the existence of a particular temporary need. For instance, if a particular bus, which is to run on a particular route at given times, goes out of order, and has either to be repaired or replaced, then during that interval the need may be a particular temporary need, even though that need is simply to keep the continuous permanent need fulfilled. Similarly, there may be increase of traffic on a particular route, and the authority may take steps to grant non-temporary permits for the plying of more vehicles as stage carriages on that route, and in the meantime, if the need is considered immediate, take action to issue temporary permits, for a period not exceeding four months. The need in such a case may be non-temporary need, but till arrangement can be made to meet it, action may be called for to meet the temporary exigency of increase in traffic. Till suitable arrangements are made for grant of non-temporary permits, the arrangement for issue of temporary permits would be to meet a temporary need, and it would also be particular, because that particular want shall be met by grant of such temporary permits which it is not possible to meet by non-temporary permits.

8. We are, therefore, of opinion that there is no case for interference in the order of grant of temporary permit to opposite party No. 2 in the present case.

9. The application of the petitioner is, there fore, dismissed with costs. The counsel's fee is fixed at Rs. 50/-.

Khandari Babu v. Regional Transport Authority, Udaipur

Case Summary: Khandari Babu v. Regional Transport Authority, Udaipur Region & Messrs. Ratan Singh Awat Ram

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

Respondents' Arguments (Regional Transport Authority and Opposite Party No. 2)

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Khandari Babu v. Regional Transport Authority, Udaipur

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