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citation codes

Case Number

D.B Civil Revision No. 354 of 1982

Attorney(S)

K.K Sharma, for Petitioner;
B.P Agarwal, for Respondents

Judges

M.B Sharma
I.S Israni, JJ.

Acts

Sub-section (2) of Section 2 and Section 20(1) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (for short 'the U. P. Act').
provisions of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act')
U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (3 of 1947)
provisions of Section 26 and Section 13
Sub-section (1) of Section 2
S. 14 of the U. P. Act.

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Revision Petition (Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950)

Factual and Procedural Background

The revision petition arises from an eviction dispute over a shop in village Chhipa-Badod. The owner, Shyam Lal, let the shop to the petitioner Kishan Lal and filed a suit for eviction on January 4, 1972 at a time when the provisions of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 ("the Act") were not applicable to Chhipa-Badod. The trial court dismissed the suit on December 12, 1974. On appeal, the Additional District Judge, Baran decreed the suit on November 27, 1975. The petitioner filed a second appeal to the High Court; during pendency Shyam Lal died and the appeal abated on May 15, 1981 because his legal representatives were not on record.

Execution proceedings were initiated by Shyam Lal on February 3, 1976; those proceedings were stayed by the High Court during the second appeal. Following Shyam Lal's death (May 14, 1980), his legal representatives filed successive execution petitions, some of which were dismissed for failure to obtain a succession certificate. After obtaining the succession certificate, they filed execution petition No. 1/1982. Meanwhile the Act was extended to Chhipa-Badod. On May 15, 1982 the tenant filed objections under Sections 13 and 26 of the Act; the Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate rejected those objections on July 29, 1982, holding Sections 13 and 26 inapplicable to a decree passed before the Act's operation. The petitioner filed the present revision petition challenging that order.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether a decree for eviction passed prior to the applicability of the provisions of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 for a particular area can be executed by the executing court and, if so, in what circumstances?
If it is permissible for the executing court to proceed with execution of such a decree and to hold an inquiry about the satisfaction of the grounds contained in Section 13 of the Act, what is the scope of such an inquiry?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as presented by Shri K. K. Sharma)

Section 13 prevents execution of an eviction decree unless the executing court is satisfied that one of the grounds enumerated in Section 13 exists; because the original decree pre-dated the Act’s applicability in Chhipa-Badod, those grounds were not considered and thus the decree is not executable.
Section 26 expressly provides that a decree passed before commencement/extension of the Act shall not be executed except on any of the grounds in Section 13; hence the decree should be set aside and the landlord must file a fresh suit on grounds under Section 13.
"Satisfaction of the Court" must mean satisfaction of a court that conducts a full inquiry into Section 13 grounds (argued as meaning a court other than the executing court); if the executing court alone decides, the tenant would be deprived of a proper appellate right.
Section 14 (comparative hardship) must be considered and evidence recorded; such evidence does not exist on the file because the original proceedings occurred before the Act applied, and the tenant should be given full opportunity to disprove grounds for eviction.
Relied upon authorities said to support tenant-favouring interpretations (cited: Kanhaiya Lal v. Nemi Chand; Chand Basha v. Pyari Bi; Mohammad Ismail v. Suraj Narain Pd.; other decisions referenced).

Non-Petitioners' Arguments (as presented by Shri B. P. Agarwal)

Sections 13 and 26 cannot be read to prevent the execution of decrees merely because the decree pre-dated extension of the Act; the decree came into existence prior to the applicability of these provisions in that area.
Section 27 also has relevance but Section 26's text governs execution; the words "commencement" and "extension" have distinct meanings in Section 2 and cannot be used by the landlord to avoid Section 26's restrictions once the Act extends to an area.
The executing court, on the material already on record, can and should satisfy itself regarding the existence of any of the Section 13 grounds; the landlord is not required to bring fresh proceedings.
Relied upon various authorities in support (some cited in the text include decisions reported at (1987) 4 SCC 382; AIR 1966 SC 1003; and state law reports).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court in this Opinion
Kanhaiya Lal v. Nemi Chand, 1986 WLN (UC) 156	Held that a decree for eviction passed before Act's applicability could not be executed against tenant except on grounds in Section 13; in that case the courts set aside decrees and allowed landlord liberty to sue afresh.	The Court distinguished this authority because it arose in second appeal (not in execution proceedings) and therefore found it not directly relevant to the execution-stage situation in the present matter.
Chand Basha v. Pyari Bi (Madras High Court, 1978)	Referred to as a supportive authority favouring tenant protection under rent-control type enactments.	Cited by the petitioner as supporting the proposition that pre-existing decrees cannot be executed without satisfaction of Section 13 grounds; the Court considered it among several supportive authorities but relied primarily on local statutory interpretation and other Rajasthan authorities.
Mohammad Ismail v. Suraj Narain Pd., AIR 1951 Patna 635	Referred to by petitioner as supporting tenant-protective construction of rent-control provisions.	Cited by petitioner; the Court noted it as part of petitioner’s supporting authorities but addressed applicability via statutory construction and local precedents.
H. Shiva Rao v. Cecillia Pereira, AIR 1987 SC 248	Supreme Court observation: rent control legislation is beneficial to tenants and restrictive of landlords' rights; ambiguous expressions should be construed to fulfill the object of the legislation.	The Court relied on this authority to justify a beneficial construction of the Act where ambiguity exists — i.e., interpretive approach favouring tenant-protective purposes when construing ambiguous provisions.
Ramji Lal v. Ramkrishan, AIR 1975 Raj 167	Division Bench held that Section 13 comes into play as soon as the Act becomes applicable to an area; tenant protection applies to pending matters once Act is in force there.	The Court cited this Rajasthan Division Bench decision as supportive precedent for applying Sections 13 and 26 to a matter once the Act is extended to the area; it helped establish that the executing court must apply Section 13 after extension.
Narayan Chand v. Krishna Kumar, 1967 Raj LW 312; Umed Ram v. Rameshwar Prasad, 1972 WLN (UC) 873	Local authorities reflecting similar holdings that once the Act applies, Section 13 protections operate to protect tenants in pending matters or upon extension.	Used to corroborate the view that Section 13 applies when the Act becomes operative in an area and protects tenants against eviction except on enumerated grounds.
Nand Kishore Marwah v. Samundri Devi, (1987) 4 SCC 382 : AIR 1987 SC 2284	Addressed restrictions under a different (U.P.) rent-control Act concerning institution of suits and the effect of statutory time-limits when Acts come into force; not directly on point.	The Court observed that this Apex Court authority dealt with a different issue (restriction on institution of suit under the U.P. Act) and therefore was of no help to respondents on the present question.
Jagjivan Singh v. Sitaram, AIR 1954 Rajasthan 43	Held that the executing court can satisfy itself regarding Section 13 grounds in one of two ways: (a) accept trial-court's prior decision (res judicata) if Section 13 was adjudicated in favour of landlord; or (b) decide the question itself if it was not raised/decided.	The Court relied on this precedent as authoritative on the procedural duty of the executing court and adopted its two-pronged approach as the correct test for execution-stage inquiries under Section 26.
Chand Shankar v. Bohresukh Lal, AIR 1951 Allahabad 383	Interpreted similar wording in Section 14 of the U.P. Act and supported the view that executing/trial-stage courts must apply the statute as it stands.	Referenced to support the proposition that courts must interpret statutory provisions as written and not based on speculative concerns about consequences such as loss of appellate rights.
Other statutory report references (ILR references, AIR 1966 SC 1003, AIR 1954 Rajasthan 43, etc.)	Various authorities cited by counsel in argument to support differing positions on scope and application of rent-control statutes and pending matters.	The Court noted these citations as part of the parties' submissions; the opinion relied chiefly on statutory text and the highlighted precedents summarized above for its conclusion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by examining the relevant provisions of the Act, particularly Section 2 (which provides for statewide extension with staged commencement of different sections), Section 13 (conditions under which a court may evict a tenant), Section 26 (restrictions on executing decrees for eviction passed prior to the Act's commencement/extension), and Section 27 (provisions for pending matters).

Key analytical steps the Court took, based on the opinion text:

Statutory interpretation: The Court interpreted Section 2(2) to mean that while Sections 1–4 and 27–31 come into force immediately statewide, the remaining provisions (including Sections 13 and 26) come into force in specific areas on dates notified by the State. The Act's beneficial purpose (tenant protection) and its staged applicability were emphasized.
Applicability to facts: The Act was extended to Chhipa-Badod while the execution proceedings were pending. The Court concluded that once the provisions of the Act (including Section 13) become applicable to an area, Section 26 governs the execution of pre-existing decrees: such decrees cannot be executed except on grounds enumerated in Section 13.
Evaluation of competing contentions: The Court rejected the landlord's attempt to derive advantage from semantic distinctions between "commencement" and "extension" as used in different provisions, holding those distinctions immaterial to the effect of Section 26 once the Act is extended to an area.
Precedential support: The Court relied on Rajasthan authorities (e.g., Ramji Lal v. Ramkrishan; Jagjivan Singh v. Sitaram) to support the conclusion that Section 13 protections apply upon extension and that the executing court has a duty under Section 26 to ensure one or more Section 13 grounds exist before execution.
Duty of executing court (procedural scope): Relying particularly on Jagjivan Singh, the Court articulated two routes by which an executing court may be satisfied that a Section 13 ground exists: (a) accept a prior adjudication on Section 13 (res judicata) if the trial court has already decided it in favour of the landlord; or (b) if the question was not raised or decided earlier, the executing court must decide it itself by recording statements of the parties and any necessary witnesses.
Rejection of petitioner’s appeal-right argument: The Court dismissed the petitioner’s submission that having the executing court decide Section 13 would unfairly deprive the tenant of appellate remedy, holding that courts must interpret and apply the law as they find it and that speculative concerns about appellate consequences do not alter statutory interpretation.
Procedural directions: Because the matter was old, the Court directed expeditious disposal by the executing court, including recording statements and any necessary evidence, and fixing at least two hearing dates every 15 days until disposal.

Holding and Implications

Holding: It is the duty of the executing court under Section 26 to satisfy itself that one or more of the conditions enumerated in Section 13 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 are fulfilled before executing a decree for eviction in an area to which the Act has been extended.

Direct implications and consequences:

The executing court may accept a prior trial-court adjudication on Section 13 as res judicata if that issue was earlier raised and decided in favour of the landlord; otherwise, the executing court must itself inquire into the existence of Section 13 grounds by recording statements of the parties and such witnesses as it considers necessary.
The executing court is to conduct the inquiry promptly: the matter should be disposed of expeditiously, and the court is directed to fix at least two hearing dates in every 15-day period until final disposal.
The petitioner’s request to set aside the decree and require the landlord to file a fresh suit was rejected as unnecessary where the executing court can and must examine Section 13 grounds during execution proceedings.
The petition was disposed of in accordance with these directions, with no order as to costs.

The opinion focuses on statutory interpretation and procedural direction for execution-stage inquiries; it does not purport to lay down an entirely novel doctrine beyond applying existing statutory text and relevant precedents to the facts before the Court.

Disposition

The revision petition was disposed of in accordance with the directions recorded in the opinion (executing court to inquire into Section 13 grounds and proceed expeditiously), with no order as to costs.

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Kishan Lal v. Shyam Lal

1. This revision petition has been referred by learned single Judge for decision to larger Bench and formulated following two questions:

1. Whether a decree for eviction passed prior to the applicability of the provisions of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') for a particular area can be executed by the Executing Court and if so in what circumstances?

2. In case it is found that it is permissible for the Executing Court to proceed with the execution of such a decree and to hold an inquiry about the satisfaction of the grounds contained in Section 13 of the Act, what is scope of such an inquiry?

2. The brief facts out of which the present revision petition has arisen are that Shyam Lal owner of a shop situated in village Chhipa-Badod let out his shop on rent to the petitioner Kishan Lal. Shyam Lal filed a suit for eviction of the petitioner on January 4, 1972 under the provisions of the Act were not applicable to Chhipa-Badod. This suit was dismissed by the Munsiff Chhabra on December 12,1974. Shyam lal filed an appeal in the Court of Additional District Judge, Baran who decreed the suit vide his judgment dated November 27, 1975. The petitioner, therefore, preferred second appeal in this Court during pendency of which Shyam Lal died. Since the legal representatives of deceased Shyam Lal were not on record the appeal of the petitioner abated on May 15, 1981. In the meanwhile Shyam Lal had also filed an application on Feb. 3, 1976 for execution of the decree of eviction in the Court of Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate, Chhabra. However, further proceedings in the execution petition were stayed by this Court in the second appeal. Shyam Lal died on May 14, 1980 during the pendency of the execution petition. Thereafter the legal representatives of Shyam Lal who are also non-petitioners in this revision-petition, filed another execution petition No. 4/81. Both these execution petitions were dismissed on the ground that the legal representatives had not obtained succession certificate. After obtaining succession certificate the legal representatives filed fresh execution petition No. 1/1982. In the meanwhile the provisions of the Act become applicable to Chhipa-Badod. The warrant for possession and attachment was issued in the said execution-petition. On May 15, 1982 objections were filed on behalf of the petitioner that the decree for eviction was in executable in view of the provisions contained in Sections 13 and 26 of the Act. Learned Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, Chhabra vide this order dated July 29, 1982 rejected the objections holding the provisions of Sections 13 and 26 of the Act were not applicable to the decree as they can be applicable only to such decrees which were passed before coming into force of the operation of the Act in the year, 1950. Aggrieved by this order the present revision petition has been filed by the, petitioner.

3. The contention of Shri K. K.Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner is that in view of Section 13 of the Act the decree for eviction passed in favour of non-petitioners cannot be executed and that Executing Court cannot go beyond the decree-holder can it amend the same (sic). It is, therefore, urged that the decree-holders should file a fresh suit for eviction on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 13 of the Act to obtain any decree for eviction against the petitioner. It is pointed out that Section 26 of the Act clearly provides that no decree for eviction of a tenant from any premises in an area to which this Act extends for the time being, passed before the date of commencement of this Act shall in so far as it relates to the eviction of such tenant be executed against him, except on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 13 and under the circumstances specified in the Act. It is, therefore, contended by the learned counsel that since at the time when the decree for eviction of the petitioner was passed the Act was not in force in Chhipa-Badod, none of the grounds mentioned in Section 13 were considered and, therefore, the decree is in executable and invalid. Reliance has been placed on decision of this Court in Kanhaiya Lal v. Nemi Chand, 1986 WLN (UC) 156. It is also urged by the learned counsel that the above decision of this Court is in consonance with the law laid down by other High Courts and is referred to the decision of the Madras High Court in Chand Basha v. Pyari Bi (1978) 2 Ren CJ 359 and of Patna High Court in Mohammad Ismail v. Suraj Narain Pd., AIR 1951 Patna 635. It is also contended that "satisfaction of the Court", does not mean satisfaction of the Executing Court but of a Court where the inquiry in details regarding any of the grounds mentioned in Section 13 of the Act is made. It is also submitted that if the interpretation is given that it is the satisfaction of Executing Court required then the petitioner shall have no right of appeal against the same. It is further submitted that Section 14 of the Act regarding comparative hardship shall have also to be considered and evidence has to be recorded on this aspect of the matter also as no such material is evidently in existence on the case file since the proceedings were filed while the Act was not in the force in Chhipa-Badod, The learned counsel has also referred to decisions in AIR 1987 SC 248, AIR 1975 Raj 167, 1972 WLN (UC) 873 and AIR 1954 Raj 43. It is further urged by the learned counsel that Act has been enacted for the benefit of tenants and should be interpreted in such a way that the benefit is extended to the tenants.

4. Shri B. P. Agarwal, learned counsel for the non-petitioners contends that provisions of Sections 13 and 26 of the Act could not be made applicable to the execution of decrees. It is submitted that the decree of eviction came into existence before provisions of section 13 became applicable in the area where the shop in suit is situated. It is further submitted by the learned counsel that Section 27 shall not be applicable since the decree of eviction had already been passed before the Act was extended. It is also pointed out that in Section 26 the word "commencement" used does not mean "extension". The learned counsel points out that in Section 2 of the Act words "commencement" and "extension" have been used to have different meanings. According to the learned counsel what is required is satisfaction of the Executing Court on the basis of the material on record and the landlord is not required to file fresh proceedings as contended by the petitioner. Reliance has been placed in 1988 (4) SCC 248 (sic), (1987) 4 SCC 382 : (AIR 1987 SC 2284), AIR 1966 SC 1003, ILR (1958) 8 Raj 994, ILR(1952) 2 Raj 290: (AIR 1954 Rajasthan 43).

5. We have heard both the learned counsel and have also gone through the order of the trial Court.

6. Before we proceed to consider the arguments of both the parties, it will be necessary to see some of the provisions of the Act. Section 2 provides that the Act shall extend to whole of the State of Rajasthan. Sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act further provides that sections 1 to 4 and sections 27 to 31 shall come into force at once and the remaining provisions thereof shall extend to such areas in the State of Rajasthan and shall come into force therein with effect from such date as may be from time to time notified by the State Government in official gazette. The Act was enacted as a beneficial legislation to protect the rights of tenants keeping in view acute shortage of accommodation in Rajasthan. Section 13(1), therefore, provides that "notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract, no court shall pass any decree, or make any order, in favour of a landlord, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, evicting the tenant so long as he is ready and willing to pay rent therefor, to the full extent allowable by this Act, unless it is satisfied........" This section provides certain conditions to be fulfilled/proved before an order/decree, for eviction of a tenant can be passed under the provisions of this Act which includes defaults, subletting, personal bona fide necessity etc. Section 26 is regarding execution of decree for eviction. It provides "No decree for the eviction of a tenant from any premises in areas to which this Act extends for the time being, passed before the date of commencement of this Act shall in so far as it relates to the eviction of such tenant be executed against him, as long as this Act remains in force therein, except on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 13 and under the circumstances specified in this Act. "This section puts restrictions on execution of decree for eviction and lays down that unless conditions specified in this Section are satisfied the executing court shall not evict any tenant by way of execution of a decree for eviction passed against any tenant. Section 27 refers to the provisions made for pending matters in the Courts. Sub-section (1) lays down that "In all suit for eviction of tenants from any premises in areas to which this Act has been extended under Section 2, pending on the date specified in the notification under that section, no decree for eviction be passed except on one or more of the grounds mentioned in Section 13 and under the circumstances specified in this Act..." Sub-section (2) lays down that "Except as is otherwise provided by or under this Act, all cases which are, at the commencement thereof in any area to which it has been extended under Section 2, pending before a Controller or any other authority appointed by or under any law in force therein immediately before such commencement, shall notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act, be determined and disposed of by the Magistrate in accordance with such law..."

7. In H. Shiva Rao v. Cecillia Pereira, AIR 1987 SC 248, it was observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that rent control legislations are beneficial to the tenant and restrictive of the rights of the landlord. Whether this is the best way to meet the problem of finding habitats for growing number of people is another issue, and whether or not the problem could not be met by another way is also another question. It was further stated that in finding the literal meaning of the expression in the task of construction if the expressions are ambiguous then the construction that fulfils the object of the legislation must provide the key to the meaning.

8. Sub-section (1) of Section 2 provides that the Act extends to whole of the State of Rajasthan. Sub-section (2) provides that Sections 1 to 4 and 27 to 31 of the Act shall come into force at once. It further provides that the remaining provisions thereof shall come into force to such areas in the State, w.e.f. such date as may be notified by the State Government in official gazette from time to time. The contention of Shri B. P. Agarwal, learned counsel for the non-petitioners is that since Sections 1 to 4 and 27 to 31 extended to whole of the State of Rajasthan, therefore, Section 27 was already applicable to Chhipa-Badod the area where the disputed shop is situated. Further contention of the learned counsel that on this ground provisions of Section 26 of the Act are not applicable to the case under consideration has no force because it is clearly provided under Section 26 that no decree for eviction of a tenant passed before the date of commencement of this Act in so far as it relates to the eviction of such tenant be executed against him except on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 13 of the Act. Admittedly the provisions of the Act were extended to Chhipa-Badod during the pendency of the second appeal before this Court and when the execution proceedings were pending in the trial Court. We do not find that the respondent landlord can derive any advantage in making any distinction between the words "commencement" and "extension" has used in particular provisions under the Act so far as the present case is concerned. We are, therefore, of the opinion that provisions of Section 26 and Section 13 shall be applicable to the matter under consideration. This similar matter came under consideration before Division Bench of this Court in case of Ramji Lal v. Ramkrishan, AIR 1975 Raj 167, this was a matter relating to Sub-clause (e) of Section 2 of the Act as it existed at the relevant time which contained a proviso that nothing in the Act shall be applied "to any premises the construction of which was completed on or after the 1st June, 1951 for a period of seven years from the date of such completion. "The Act was applicable to the town of Hindaun but because of Clause (e) of the proviso the provisions of the Act did not apply to the shop in suit for a period of 7 years from the date of its completion. After the expiry of 7 years, the provisions of the Act came into force. It was held by this Court that as soon as the provisions of the Act became applicable Section 13 came into play. It was further held that Section 27 was enacted as a tenant caution (sic) to apply to pending matters. Postponement of the applicability of Section 13(1) could not be urged, when once the Act had come into force. It was, therefore, held that the tenant was protected and could not be dispossessed except under the circumstances enumerated in Section 13. Similar view was taken in case of Narayan Chand v. Krishna Kumar, 1967 Raj LW 312 and Umed Ram v. Rameshwar Prasad, 1972 WLN (UC) 873. In the authority of Nand Kishore Marwah v. Samundri Devi, (1987) 4 SCC 382 : (AIR 1987 SC 2284). The matter under consideration of the Apex Court was restriction on the institution of suit under Sub-section (2) of Section 2 and Section 20(1) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (for short 'the U. P. Act'). The main question agitated before the apex Court whether during the pendency of litigation even if 10 years expired the restriction under Section 20 will be attracted as the suit had been instituted within 10 years, therefore, this authority is of no help to the respondents even if the decree for eviction was passed prior to the applicability of the provisions of section 13 of the Act to a particular area. It is abundantly clear from bare reading of Section 26 of the Act that as soon as the provisions of the Act which also include Section 13 are made applicable extended to a particular area no decree for eviction so far as it relates to eviction of such tenant can be executed against him except on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 13 of the Act. Even when a decree for eviction passed prior to the applicability of the provisions of the Act to a particular area can be executed by the Executing Court provided any of the grounds enumerated in Section 13 of the Act is in existence.

9. The contention of Shri K.K. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner is that since the existence of any of the grounds enumerated in Section 13 of the Act were not under consideration while the decree for eviction against the tenant was passed, it will, therefore, be only proper that the decree of eviction passed against the tenant be set aside and the landlord respondent if he desires can file fresh proceedings in the trial Court for eviction against the petitioner-tenant. Reliance has been placed on Kanhaiya Lal v. Nemi Chand (1986 WLN (UC) 156). This matter came for consideration before learned single Judge of this court in second appeal as the decree passed by learned Munsiff Jetaran was confirmed by Civil Judge, Pali. This is a brief judgment in which all facts have not been stated. The parties belonging to Jetaran where municipalities was established since 29-10-1975 and thereafter a notification was issued by State of Rajasthan on May 18,1979 by which the Act was extended to all municipal committees. The Act thus became applicable to Jetaran towns as well. The Court, therefore, in view of Section 26 of the Act held that decree for eviction of a tenant to which this Act has been extended cannot be executed against him except on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 13 of the Act. Since the suit was filed in the year 1969 when the Act was not in force in Jetaran, the judgment and decree of both the courts below were set aside giving liberty to the landlord-respondent to file fresh suit for eviction if he so desired on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 13 of the Act. It is evident that the above matter came up before the Court in second appeal while the present proceedings have arisen out of execution proceedings or a decree for eviction passed against the tenant which is pending in the executing Court. Therefore, the case of Kanhaiyalal v. Nemi Chand (supra) is not relevant so far the present matter is concerned. Reliance (Reference) was also made to Full Bench decision of Shyam Sunder Lal v. Shagun Chand, AIR 1967 All 214. A Full Bench decision of Allahabad High Court, in which also similar matter was under consideration. The matter came before consideration of the Court in appeal. This was also a case where the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (3 of 1947) was made applicable to a particular area by way of notification by the State Government. The question, therefore, arose whether the tenant could take advantage of the protection provided to the tenants under the provisions of the above stated Act. The answer was given in affirmative and the Court thought it proper to send the case to the court below with direction that both the parties be given opportunity to amend the pleadings if they so want and to produce such additional evidence as they consider appropriate and as is relevant to the controversy and determine the suit in accordance with law, This again is a matter which was considered at the stage of second appeal, therefore, the facts and circumstances of the case under our consideration are different in as much as the matter for consideration has arisen at the time of execution of the decree for eviction passed against the petitioner/ tenant. It is also contended by Shri Sharma that the Act has to be given beneficial interpretation for the tenants and, therefore, full opportunity must be given to the tenant to disprove the case for eviction put up by the respondent landlord under any of the provisions of section 13 of the Act. From this angle it is contended that it is desirable that the decree for eviction should be set aside and the respondent-landlord may be given liberty to file fresh proceedings for evicting the petitioner if he so desires. It is further pointed out that if the executing Court is allowed to decide this matter, the petitioner shall lose right of appeal also.

10. The main question that now arises for determination is the scope and extent of Section 26 of the Act. This section has been already extracted above and it clearly exercised a duty on the executing court to see whether any of the grounds mentioned in Section 13 of the Act existed before putting the decree for eviction in execution. In Jagjivan Singh v. Sitaram, AIR 1954 Rajasthan 43, it was observed by Wanchoo, C.J. as he was then that the executing court

"it can satisfy itself on this point in one of two ways. If the question, whether any of the conditions mentioned in S. 13 exists, was agitated in the trial Court and decided in favour of the landlord and executing Court will, on the principle of 'res judicata', accept that decision 'inter paries' and be satisfied that decree could be executed. If on the other hand, no such question under Section 13 was raised or if any such question was raised but never decided it would be for the executing Court to decide that question for itself."

The contention of learned Counsel for the petitioners that if the interpretation is so given that it is the executing Court which will have to satisfy itself regarding existence of any ground enumerated in Section 13, the petitioner-tenant shall lose right of appeal which he could have, if the question is decided by the trial Court itself. We do not find any merit in this contention. For the simple reasons that the law has to be interpreted in the manner it exists. We may observe that it is none of the concern of the Court to see what shall be the result on two interpretations of a particular provision of law. The law has to be construed as it stands. A Judge is bound to the law as he finds it to exist and will not interpret in the manner he desires it to exist. Similar view was taken in Chand Shankar v. Bohresukh Lal, AIR 1951 Allahabad 383, while interpreting almost similar words in S. 14 of the U. P. Act.

11. We, therefore, are of the considered opinion that it is the duty of the Executing Court to satisfy itself under Section 26 that one or the other of the conditions mentioned in Section 13 is satisfied before the decree for eviction is executed. The executing Court will, therefore, proceed to record the statements of each party and such other witnesses of both the parties which it thinks necessary, to reach any conclusion regarding the existence of any of the grounds mentioned under Section 13 of the Act. Since the matter has become quite old, it should be disposed of expeditiously. The Executing Court shall fix up at least two dates in every 15 days for hearing of the matter.

In the result, the petition is disposed of as above with no order as to costs.

Kishan Lal v. Shyam Lal

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Revision Petition (Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as presented by Shri K. K. Sharma)

Non-Petitioners' Arguments (as presented by Shri B. P. Agarwal)

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Disposition

Kishan Lal v. Shyam Lal

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