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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion by S.S. Saron, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision petition challenges the Appellate Authority's order dated 27.4.2005 under the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act, 1949, which dismissed the tenant-petitioner’s appeal against an ejectment order originally passed by the learned Rent Controller on 2.5.2003.

The landlord-respondent had filed a petition under Section 13 of the Act seeking ejectment of the tenant from a shop on two grounds: (1) alleged arrears of rent from 1.3.1993, and (2) the landlord's personal requirement of the shop for his own use and occupation (including the intention to start or continue his own business after retirement). The Rent Controller found the tenant was not in arrears but held that the landlord required the premises for personal use and granted ejectment. The Appellate Authority affirmed that finding and order. The tenant filed this revision petition attacking that affirmation.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the landlord has demonstrated a bona fide and genuine need (and not a mere desire) for the non-residential accommodation sufficient to justify eviction under the Act.
  2. Whether the factual findings made by the authorities (Controller and Appellate Authority) regarding the landlord's need and the supporting documentary evidence were legally sustainable and free from material irregularity or mis-reading of evidence.
  3. Whether the landlord's failure to specify the precise nature of the business he intends to start defeats his claim of bona fide requirement.

Arguments of the Parties

Tenant-Petitioner's Arguments (as represented by Mr. Sanjay Majithia)

  • The authorities committed material irregularities and misread evidence in allowing the landlord's petition.
  • The evidence only shows a desire on the part of the landlord to occupy the shop, whereas the law requires proof of a bona fide need.
  • Reliance was placed on Brij Lal v. Arjan Singh and the Supreme Court decisions discussed therein (Phiroze Bamanji Desai and Mattulal v. Radhe Lal) to argue that mere assertion by the landlord that he needs the accommodation to start/continue business is insufficient without objective substantiation of genuine need.

Landlord-Respondent's Arguments (as represented by Mr. Parveen Kumar)

  • The authorities correctly found as a fact that the landlord genuinely requires the demised premises for his personal use and occupation.
  • The landlord is a retired person (ex-Indian Army, later Central Police Organisation) who intends to shift to his native town, Dasuya, to settle and carry out his own business; this intention reflects a bona fide need.
  • Documentary evidence was produced to show concrete steps taken to settle at Dasuya — for example, transfer of a gas connection from Bombay to Dasuya — which supports the genuineness of the requirement.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Brij Lal v. Arjan Singh, 1979 (2) RCR (Rent) 275 (P&H) : 1979 (2) Rent Law Reporter 273 Used by petitioner to emphasize the requirement that a landlord must show bona fide need (relies on Supreme Court authorities discussed in the judgment). The court noted the reliance but focused on the underlying Supreme Court authorities cited in that case (Phiroze and Mattulal) when applying legal tests to the facts.
Phiroze Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, ALR 1974 SC 1059 Interpreted the word "requires" (in Section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rents Act) to mean there must be an element of need, not a mere desire; bona fides required. The court accepted the proposition as correct law and applied the requirement that the landlord show an objective, bona fide need rather than mere desire.
Mattulal v. Radhe Lal, 1974 RCR (Rent) 441 (SC) : (1974) 2 SCC 365 Held that mere assertion by a landlord that he requires accommodation to start/continue business is not decisive; the court must test truth and bona fides by an objective standard and the burden lies on the landlord. The court applied the objective test indicated and examined evidence produced by the landlord, concluding that the landlord's requirement was genuine and bona fide on the facts.
Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, 1999 (2) RCR (Rent) 141 (SC) : 1999 Haryana Rent Reporter 396 (SC) Discussed the meaning of 'bona fide need' and observed that words like 'need' and 'require' denote a degree of want; bona fide refers to state of mind and the fact-finder should assess whether the need is natural, real and sincere. The court applied this guidance directly: it placed itself in the landlord's position (as suggested by the precedent) and concluded the landlord's need was natural and sincere on the material before the authorities.
Raj Kumar Khaitan & others v. Bibi Zubaida Khatun, 1995 (1) RCR (Rent) 495 (SC) : AIR 1995 SC 576 Held that landlords need not indicate the precise nature of the business they intend to start in the premises to establish bona fide requirement. The court relied on this authority to hold that the landlord's failure to specify the precise business he intended to start was not fatal to his claim of bona fide need.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a fact-specific and legal analysis, as follows:

  1. Review of findings below: The Rent Controller examined material and evidence (including documentary exhibits relating to transfer of a gas connection and witness evidence from the gas agency) and found that the landlord intended to settle at Dasuya and to open a new business; consequently the Controller held that the landlord required the premises for personal use and granted ejectment. The Appellate Authority affirmed that finding.
  2. Evaluation of evidentiary material: The landlord produced a copy of the gas connection transfer and related documents (marked exhibits, and a witness PW-3 from the gas agency) which the authorities treated as corroborative material showing steps taken to settle at Dasuya.
  3. Legal standard applied: The court accepted and recapitulated the settled legal principle from the cited Supreme Court authorities that the word "requires" in eviction statutes involves an element of need and that mere desire is insufficient; the test is objective and the landlord bears the onus of proving genuine need.
  4. Application of law to facts: Applying the objective test and the guidance that a fact-finder should mentally place himself in the landlord's position, the court concluded that the landlord — a retired person intending to settle in his native town and who had taken concrete steps such as transferring a gas connection — had established a bona fide requirement of the shop. The landlord's inability to specify the precise nature of the business was held to be inconsequential in light of Raj Kumar Khaitan, which precludes a requirement that the landlord present a detailed project report.
  5. Consideration of protective statutory provision: The court noted Section 13(3)(a) and the protective provision in Section 13(4) of the Act (that if a landlord who obtains possession does not occupy it for a continuous period of 12 months, the evicted tenant can apply for restoration). The court observed that this statutory protection reduces the tenant's apprehension of improper deprivation.
  6. Revisional review standard: Given concurrent findings of fact by the Controller and Appellate Authority that the landlord's need was genuine, and the supporting evidence, the court found no ground to interfere under its revisional jurisdiction conferred by Section 15(5) of the Act.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revision petition is dismissed. The Appellate Authority's order of 27.4.2005, affirming the Rent Controller's ejectment order dated 2.5.2003, stands.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The tenant's challenge to the ejectment has been rejected and the landlord's entitlement to obtain possession (on the factual finding of a bona fide need) is upheld.
  • Protective consequence for the tenant: The opinion expressly notes the statutory protection under Section 13(4) — if the landlord fails to occupy the premises for a continuous period of 12 months after obtaining possession under the order, the evicted tenant may apply for restoration of possession and the Controller shall make an order accordingly.
  • Precedential effect: The court applied existing Supreme Court authority on the standard for bona fide need; the decision affirms application of those principles to the facts but does not purport to lay down new law. The judgment is an affirmation of the established test that the requirement must be genuine and proven, and that inability to specify a detailed business plan does not by itself defeat a bona fide claim.

Note: This summary strictly reflects only the facts, arguments, authorities, reasoning and decision contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer information beyond that text.

Show full summary ...

    Tarsem Lal Petitioner v. Pritam Dass Khullar

    S.S Saron, J. — This revision petition has been filed against the order dated 27.4.2005, passed by the Appellate Authority under the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (Act, for short), whereby the appeal of the tenant-petitioner against the order of his ejectment, passed by the learned Controller on 2.5.2003 has been dismissed.

    2. The landlord-respondent filed a petition under Section 13 of the Act for ejectment of the tenant-petitioner from the shop as detailed in the head note of the petition. The ejectment was sought on the ground that the tenant-petitioner had neither paid nor tendered rent of the shop in dispute to the landlord-respondent w.e.f 1.3.1993 and thus, was in arrears of rent. Besides, the petitioner is a retired person and requires the shop in dispute for his own personal use and occupation. Insofar as the issue of arrears of rent is concerned, it was found that the tenant-petitioner was not in arrears. However, it was found that the landlord-respondent required the shop in dispute for his personal use and occupation. The said finding of the learned Rent Controller has been affirmed by the Appellate Authority, which is assailed in this revision petition.

    3. Mr. Sanjay Majithia, learned counsel for the tenant-petitioner has vehemently contended that the Authorities under the Act have committed material irregularities in allowing the petition and there has been mis-reading of evidence on record. It is contended that the material and evidence on record merely show that the landlord-respondent has a desire for the shop whereas under the law, he has a need for the same. Therefore, it is contended that for the failure of the landlord-respondent to show his bona fide need, the Authorities under the Act have erred in passing the impugned orders. In support of his contention, Mr. Majithia has placed strong reliance on a judgment of this Court in the case of Brij Lal v. Arjan Singh, 1979 (2) RCR (Rent) 275 (P&H) : 1979 (2) Rent Law Reporter 273 and has laid emphasis on the two judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to in the said case i.e Phiroze Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel and others, ALR 1974 SC 1059 and Mattulal v. Radhe Lal, 1974 RCR (Rent) 441 (SC) : (1974) 2 SCC 365, to contend that mere assertion of the landlord that he requires the non-residential accommodation in occupation of the tenant for starting or continuing his own business is not enough. It is contended that the landlord has not shown any bona fide need of the demised premises but has only shown a desire, which is not a ground for seeking ejectment of the tenant-petitioner.

    4. Mr. Parveen Kumar, Advocate, has put in a caveat petition and has opposed the revision petition. He has contended that the Authorities under the Act have reached a clear finding of fact that the landlord-respondent requires the demised premises for his own use and occupation. It is contended that the landlord-respondent has retired from Indian Army and then joined the Central Police Organisation from where he has also retired. Now, he has to shift to Dasuya where he is to carry out his own business. He has laid emphasis on the fact that the landlord-respondent has got his gas connection shifted from Bombay to Dasuya and his need is bona fide.

    5. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties.

    6. It may be noticed that the learned Rent Controller, after consideration of the material and evidence on the record, as also the case law cited on behalf of the parties, has noticed that the shop in dispute was required by the landlord-respondent for opening new business and to settle in his brotherhood. He (landlord-respondent) had asked the tenant-petitioner to vacate the premises in dispute but in vain. Then he filed a petition for eviction of the tenant-petitioner. The landlord-respondent has brought on record a copy of the Gas Connection as Mark ‘A’ to show that because he was to settle at Dasuya from Bombay he had got the Gas Connection transferred from Bombay to Dasuya. Jagdish Singh (PW-3), owner of the Gas Agency was examined by the landlord-respondent, who deposed that the Gas Connection was issued after verification of the Ration Card. The said witness brought on record copy of the Transfer Voucher, Mark ‘C’, copy of declaration, Ex P-3/1, copy of certificate showing the issuance of connection, Ex. P-3/2, copy of Ration Card, Mark Ex P-3.B, copy of affidavit of Pritam Dass, Mark Ex. P3.C, copy of confirmation letter, Ex. P3/3 and photocopy of voucher for issuance of Gas, Ex P3.B.

    7. From the above, it was found that the petitioner had indeed decided to settle at Dasuya. Accordingly, it was held that the landlord-respondent needed the building for his own use. It was observed that the landlord-respondent was at the fag end of his life being retired from the department of Police and had proved his necessity for the shop in dispute, for the personal use and occupation. Consequently, the order of ejectment was passed. The said order has been affirmed by the Appellate Authority. On a consideration of the evidence and material on the record, it was found that the shop in dispute was required by the landlord-respondent and that his requirement was genuine and bona fide. Consequently, the appeal of the tenant-petitioner was dismissed.

    8. The contention of Mr. Majithia that in fact it is the only desire on the part of the landlord-respondent to occupy the premises and he has not shown any specific need, may be noticed. It is contended that in fact during the deposition in the Court, the landlord-respondent has not stated as to what business he intended to start. In this respect, it is appropriate to note that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Phiroze Bamanji Desai (supra), referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner, observed while interpreting the word “requires” in Section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Houses Rates Control Act, 1947, that there must be an element of need and not mere desire before a landlord can be said to require the premises for his own use and occupation. Similarly, in Mattulal's case (supra), it was again retirated by the Hon'ble Apex Court that mere assertion on the part of the landlord that he requires the non-residential accommodation in the occupation of the tenant for starting or continuing his own business, was not decisive. However, it was observed that it is for the Court to determine the truth of the assertion and also whether it is bona fide. The test which has to be applied, is an objective test and not a subjective one and merely because a landlord asserts that he wants the non-residential accommodation for the purpose of starting or continuing his own business, that would not be enough to established it he requires it for that purpose and that his requirement is bona fide. The word “required”, it was held, signifies that mere desire on the part of the landlord is not enough but there should be an element of need, and the landlord must show the burden being upon him that he genuinely requires the non-residential accommodation for the purpose of starting or continuing his own business.

    9. There is no dispute to the proposition of law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court and it is to be seen whether the landlord-respondent genuinely requires the non-residential accommodation for his own need. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also referred to the case of Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, 1999 (2) RCR (Rent) 141 (SC) : 1999 Haryana Rent Reporter 396 (SC), to contend that as to what is bona fide need has been considered. It was observed therein as to what is a bona fide requirement is not defined in the Act. The words ‘need’ and ‘require’ both denote a certain degree of want with a thrust within demanding fulfillment. ‘Need’ or ‘requirement’ qualified by word ‘bona fide’ or ‘genuine’ preceding as an adjective is an expression often used in Rent Control Laws. ‘Bona fide or genuine need’ of the landlord or that the landlord ‘genuinely requires’ or ‘requires bona fide’ an accommodation for occupation by or use for himself is an accepted ground for eviction and such expression is often employed by Rent Control legislation draftsman. The two expressions are interchangeable in practice and carry the same meaning. Thus, the term bona fide or genuinely refers to a state of mind. Requirement is not a mere desire. The degree of intensity contemplated by ‘requires’ is much more higher than in mere desirr. The phrase required bona fide is suggestive of legislative intent that a mere desire which is outcome of whim or fancy is not taken note of by the Rent Control Legislation. It was held that the judge of facts should place himself in the arm chair of the landlord and then ask the question to himself-whether in the given facts substantiated by the landlord the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere, honest. If the answer be in the positive, the need is bona fide. It was held that the failure on the part of the landlord to substantiate the pleaded need or in a given case, positive material brought on the record by the tenant enabling the Court drawing an inference that the reality was to the contrary and the landlord was merely attempting at finding out a pretence or pretext for getting rid of the tenant, would be enough to persuade the Court certainly to deny its judicial assistance to the landlord.

    10. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is appropriate to note that the landlord-respondent has retired from service and there is a clear intention on his part to shift to his native town Dasuya. He has stated that he wants to reside with the brotherhood. During the course of arguments, it has also been pointed out that the wife of the landlord-respondent has also retired from the Education Department at Bombay. In the circumstances, in respect of a person who has retired from service, it can be said that there is no genuine desire on his part to shift to Dasuya and reside there. Merely because the landlord-respondent has been residing at Bombay and now intends to reside at Dasuya, it cannot be said that his need is not genuine. The fact that the landlord-respondent has not been able to indicate as to what business he intends to start, is also quite inconsequential. At present, he does not have any business and being retired person, it is only when he occupies the shop then he would consider the feasibility of starting some business. It is not that the landlord is required to give a project report to the tenant of the business that he intends to start. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case; Raj Kumar Khaitan and other v. Bibi Zubaida Khatun, 1995 (1) RCR (Rent) 495 (SC) : AIR 1995 SC 576, which was a case under the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, considered the question where the landlords asserted that there was no other means of livelihood with them and as such they wanted to set up their own business in the premises in dispute. It was held that the landlords need not indicate the precise nature of the business which they intended to start there.

    11. From the standpoint of the landlord-respondent, it may be noticed that he has retired from service and wants to start some business to settle down. He intends to settle with his brotherhood at Dasuya. As regard the nature of the business, it is for him to decide. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that it is a case where the landlord is only wanting to get rid of his tenant. Besides, it may be noticed that the eviction in the case in hand has been passed in terms of Section 13(3)(a) of the Act and sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act enjoins that where a landlord who has obtained possession of the building or rented land in pursuance of an order under sub-paragraph (i) or sub-paragraph (ii) of paragraph (a) of sub-section (3) does not himself occupy it for a continuous period of 12 months from the date of obtaining the possession, then the tenant who has been evicted may apply to the Controller for an order directing that he shall be restored to possession of such building and the Controller shall make an order accordingly. Therefore, in terms of the protection provided under Section 13(4) of the Act, the apprehension of the petitioner-tenant in the facts and circumstances of the case would not be there. The Authorities under the Act having concurrently found the need of the landlord-respondent to be genuine, no ground for interference is made out in the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 15(5) of the Act.

    12. For the foregoing reasons, there is no merit in this revision petition and the same is hereby dismissed.

    Revision dismissed.

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    Comments

    Tarsem Lal Petitioner v. Pritam Dass Khullar
    (Jul 7, 2005)