M.M Kumar, J. — This petition presents a piquant situation in as much as the tenant-petitioner who has insisted on appearing in person has not only mis-used the process of the Court but has refused to assist the Court. This has resulted into wastage of the precious time of the Court and the administration of justice has also suffered. The instant petition has been filed under Section 15(5) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 challenging concurrent findings of facts recorded by both the Courts below holding that the tenant-petitioner is in arrears of rent w.e.f 1.4.1994 to 31.12.1994 The assertion made by the tenant-petitioner that there was a compromise entered into between the parties in the month of February, 1995 and the rent was paid in the presence of the brother of the landlord-respondent has been disbelieved as no evidence of fact of payment of rent has been tendered except the bald statement of the tenant-petitioner. It has also been found that the rate of rent has been Rs. 2,250/- p.m and the premises were given on rent w.e.f 1.11.1992 In March, 1993 also an ejectment petition was filed against the tenant-petitioner where he tendered the rent upto 31.8.1993 alongwith interest in the Court of the Rent Controller, Chandigarh on 23.11.1993 That ejectment petition was thereafter withdrawn. Another petition seeking ejectment of the tenant-petitioner on the ground of arrears of rent w.e.f 1.9.1993 to 31.12.1993 was also filed. The ex parte eviction order was passed against the tenant-petitioner.

2. The Courts below have also found that there is relationship of landlord and tenant as it has been admitted by the tenant-petitioner that the landlord-respondent is the co-landlord alongwith his brother D.N Rampal when he appeared as RW1. He also admitted that he had been paying rent to the landlord-respondent who had infact created tenancy with the tenant-petitioner. On that basis it has been found that the tenant-petitioner is not entitled to raise any dispute of title in respect of his landlord. The document Ex.PX has been admitted by the tenant-petitioner which shows that the tenant-petitioner has tendered security amount of Rs. 2,250/- to the landlord-respondent and the tenancy was to start from 1.11.1992 with the rate of rent of Rs. 2,200/- p.m The petitioner also filed an application for review of the order dated 24.12.1997 passed by the Rent Controller ordering his ejectment. The application was rejected by the Rent Controller on 21.1.1998 Another application for adducing of additional evidence was also rejected on 14.2.1998

3. In the appeal filed before the Appellate Authority it has been noticed that the tenant-petitioner has refused to address arguments despite the undertaking given by him to argue the case on an earlier occasion. The Appellate Authority proceeded to hear the arguments of the landlord-respondent and accordingly recorded the following findings :—

“Now it has to be seen whether the appellant was in arrears of rent w.e.f 1.4.1994 till the date of filing of the petition i.e 14.12.1994 From the pleadings of respondent in para 1 of the petition, it is clear that the appellant was required to pay the rent in advance by 7th of each month. Thus, when the present petition was filed on 14.12.1994 and the rent was not paid by the appellant, it means the rent of the month December, 1994 had also become due on the date of institution of the petition because of the plea regarding liability to pay rent in advance has not been disputed. Thus, the appellant was in arrears of rent w.e.f 1.4.1994 to 31.12.1994 as per the case of the respondent. On the other hand the appellant in his written statement has pleaded that there was a dispute between the parties regarding the handing over the possession of one room and the compromise was arrived at between them in the month of February, 1995 at the instance of the brother of the respondent and at that time the rent upto the month of February, 1995 was paid by him to the respondent in the presence of his elder brother and other person, but as RW1 he has given a totally different version regarding the payment of arrears of rent upto February, 1995 because he has stated that the rent was paid by him to the brother of the respondent in the presence of witnesses. Again in his cross-examination he has stated that the rent was paid by his wife of D.N Rampal the brother of respondent in February, 1995 when the compromise was arrived at. Thus, the appellant has given three different versions regarding the payment of rent to the respondent. So, it cannot be said to have (been?) proved that he had paid the rent for 1.4.1994 to 31.12.1994 It is well settled that the onus to prove the payment of money is always on the person who asserts so. However, in this case the appellant has totally failed to prove the payment of rent for the period 1.4.1994 to 31.12.1994 not to speak of the payment of rent upto February, 1995 as pleaded and stated by him because his bald statement in this regard cannot be accepted.”

When this petition came up for hearing before this Court on 25.5.2004, the tenant-petitioner appearing in person had insisted that he would argue only Civil Misc. Applications. However, one last opportunity was granted to him to address arguments on 2.7.2004 and the following order was passed :

“Shri D.S Puri, petitioner in person has insisted that he will argue only the C.Ms Despite the fact that his written request has been opposed by the learned counsel for the respondent, he is not prepared to address arguments in the main petition.

One last opportunity is granted to him to address arguments on 2.7.2004 It is made clear, that if the petitioner refused to argue on that day, no further opportunity shall be granted and the Court shall proceed with the hearing of the main case.”

4. The case was taken up today for arguments and Mr. D.S Puri appearing in person adopted the same stance and stated that he wishes to approach the Hon'ble Supreme Court and Hon'ble the Chief Justice. He further stated that he wants to file S.L.P in the Supreme Court and would address arguments only thereafter. He has been apprised that he may approach the Supreme Court by filing S.L.P or he may meet the Chief Justice but he has to address arguments in this petition. However, he has again requested for adjournment for which I do not find any justification and, therefore, his request has been declined.

5. Shri A.K Chopra, learned Senior Counsel for the landlord-respondent has argued that the tenant-petitioner has been successful in delaying the proceedings which have been pending before this Court since 2000. According to the learned counsel the petitioner has been mis-using the process of the Court by filing various review applications and frivolous misc. applications. The learned counsel has stressed that this is being done in order to delay the proceedings.

6. On merits, the learned counsel has submitted that the petitioner is in arrears of rent w.e.f 1.4.1994 to 31.12.1994 and the arrears of rent runs into lacs of rupees if the amount is calculated from 1.4.1994 at the rate of admitted rent of Rs. 2,250/- p.m Learned counsel has submitted that the relationship of landlord and tenant has been established on account of the admitted fact that the receipt Ex.PX was issued by the landlord-respondent and the same has been accepted by the tenant-petitioner. Learned counsel has also submitted that both the Courts below have concurrently found that the petitioner has failed to prove payment of any rent for the year 1995 or any compromise which he had asserted in his bald statement made before the Rent Controller. The learned counsel has maintained that once there is concurrent findings of facts with regard to arrears of rent and non-payment of rent then no interference by this Court would be warranted in the face of the afore-mentioned findings.

7. After hearing the learned counsel and perusing the grounds of revision taken by the petitioner in his petition, I am of the considered view that this petition is liable to be dismissed. There are findings of facts recorded by both the Courts below with regard to non-payment of rent w.e.f 1.4.1994 to 31.12.1994 The tenant-petitioner is in arrears of rent even thereafter which runs into lacs of rupees. The plea raised by him with regard to the fact that the landlord-respondent is not the owner has also been rejected by both the Courts below because he had admitted the issuance of Ex.PX which is a receipt showing payment of Rs. 2,250/- as security from the tenant-petitioner before the commencement of the tenancy. The tenancy was to commence from 1.11.1992 Therefore, it is established beyond doubt that the tenant-petitioner is in arrears of rent payable to the landlord-respondent.

8. It is trite to state that in all rent laws non-payment of rent has been provided as a ground for ejectment of the tenant. Section 13(2)(i) of the Act which is applicable to the case of the parties provides for ejectment of a tenant who has not paid or tendered the rent in respect of the rented premises. Section 13(2) of the Act reads as under :—

“13. Eviction of tenants.—(1) xx xx xxx

2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the applicant is satisfied -

(i) that the tenant has not paid or tendered the rent due by him in respect of the building or rented land within fifteen days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy with his landlord or in the absence of any such agreement, by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable :

Provided that if the tenant on the first hearing of the application for ejectment after due service pays or tenders the arrears of rent and interest at six per cent per annum on such arrears together with the cost of application assessed by the Controller, the tenant shall be deemed to have duly paid or tendered the rent within the time aforesaid.”

9. A plain reading of the afore-mentioned provision shows that if the tenant fails to pay or tender the rent then he is liable to be ejected. In the present case, the arrears of rent has been claimed w.e.f 1.4.1994 to 31.12.1994 which remains unpaid. Therefore, the tenant-petitioner is liable to be ejected and the orders passed by both the courts below deserves to be upheld.

10. It is also well-settled that in cases where the tenant raises dispute with regard to the status of his landlord and alleges that infact the respondent is not his landlord then he would obviously be not required to make any payment of rent. In such circumstances he cannot expect the Rent Controller to first draw a provisional order of assessment and then claim an opportunity to make payment of arrears of rent. In other words, the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Rakesh Wadhawan v. Jagdamba Industrial Corporation and others, 2002 (1) RCR (Rent) 514 (SC) : 2002 (5) SCC 440, interpreting Section 13(2)(i) of the Act would not be applicable. This Court has taken the afore-mentioned view in the case of Rama Nand Shastri v. Gian Singh, 2003 (1) RCR 734 (P&H). Therefore, the plea which could have been raised on the basis of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Rakesh Wadhawan's case (supra) would not be available to the tenant-petitioner in the instant case.

11. It is unfortunate that the tenant-petitioner has mis-used the concession of permitting him to appear in person. He had time and again sought adjournments on one pretext or the other and has successfully delayed the proceedings. It has been seen in number of cases that those who appear in person are not well equipped to assist the Court. In the present era when complicated questions of law are raised before the Courts it is hardly expected that an ordinary person would be able to handle his own case. The litigant is always obsessed with his case and could hardly emerge out of the facts. Sometimes the Court has to face irresponsible litigants who have no regard for the decorum of the Court nor they have any respect for the system. As a result precious time of the Court is wasted. It is high time that the issue of personal appearance by a litigant should be taken up and is regulated in such a way as to subserve the interest of litigants and avoid wastage of precious time of the Courts. In somewhat similar circumstances, the Supreme Court in the case Bhuwneshwar Singh v. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC 327, has addressed a similar question and had suggested a solution of adopting the procedure for scrutiny of such petitions and screen the parties where the party insist upon appearing in person. It has been suggested that a Committee may certify about the competence of such a person to address arguments before the Court. In the absence of certificate, the petitioner may be relegated to the Free Legal Aid available. The observations of the Supreme Court in this regard reads as under :

“……Taking note of the increase in the number of cases in which the parties appear in person in this Court, we feel that a stage has now reached when this Court, on the administrative side, is required to consider the desirability of providing some procedure to scrutinise their petitions and screen the parties, appearing in person, and only such of the parties who are certified by an authority/committee as competent to assist the Court in person, may, with the leave of the Court, be permitted to argue in person. Those of the litigants, who are not so certified, or those to whom leave is not granted by the Court, should be referred to the Legal Aid and Advice Board or the “Supreme Court Senior Advocates Fee Legal Aid Society”, which is a voluntary body and offers assistance, in appropriate cases, irrespective of the financial position of the concerned litigant. Apart from providing proper assistance to the Court, the assistance by the lawyers would ultimately tend to be in the interest of the litigants themselves. It would also take care of preventing objectionable and unparliamentary language in the pleadings, which some of the ‘parties in person’ permit themselves the liberty of indulging in, not being familiar with the court craft and the bounds of law within which the parties must formulate their pleadings in proper language. Such a course would advance public interest while safeguarding individual interest also. Our experience shows that every advocate - senior, not so senior and junior - whenever requested by the Court to offer assistance has responded positively and generously and, therefore, the interest of the party in person who would be represented by such a counsel would stand adequately protected. We say no more on this aspect at this stage.”

12. The above observations of the Supreme Court in Bhuwneshwar Singh's case (supra) are also applicable to the situations created by cases like the one in hand. It would be appropriate if necessary steps are taken by this Court on the administrative side on the lines and directions as suggested by the Supreme Court. Therefore, a copy of this order be sent to the Registrar (Judicial) of this Court for placing the same before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for appropriate action.

For the reasons recorded above, this petition fails and the same is dismissed. In view of the fact that the main petition has been dismissed on merits. I do not feel the necessity of passing any orders on the misc. applications which are also dismissed.

Petition dismissed.