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  • section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (for short, the Act)
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  • section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (for short, the Act)
Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal under section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is by the assessee against the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal's order dated September 26, 2002, whereby the Tribunal allowed appeals filed by the Revenue against the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) and rejected the assessee's claim. The assessee sought admission of the appeal before this Court by raising three substantial questions of law concerning (i) the applicability of a Board's circular restricting Departmental appeals where tax effect is less than Rs. 1,00,000, (ii) classification of income from temporary leasing as "Property income" or "Business income", and (iii) the treatment of interest for computing deduction under section 80HHC.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Tribunal erred in law in not dismissing the Revenue's appeals in view of Board's Circular No. F. No. 279/126/98-ITJ dated March 27, 2000 (which directs authorities not to file appeals where tax effect is less than Rs. 1,00,000).
  2. Whether the Tribunal was justified in law in holding that income of the assessee from temporary leasing of an asset for commercial exploitation was taxable under the head "Property income" and not "Business income".
  3. Whether the Tribunal was legally correct in holding that the claim for deduction under section 80HHC in respect of income from FDRs was not sustainable (i.e., whether interest received should be aggregated as business income for computing deduction), despite contrary views expressed by certain Bombay High Court decisions.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant (assessee), through learned counsel, contended that the appeal should be admitted because three substantial questions of law arise — those listed above — including reliance on the Board's circular to challenge the maintainability of the Revenue's appeals, contesting the classification of leasing receipts as business income, and asserting that interest income from FDRs should qualify for deduction under section 80HHC (pointing to contrary Bombay High Court precedents).

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the Revenue's or other parties' specific legal arguments beyond the procedural and factual positions recorded by the Tribunal, Assessing Officer and the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
CIT v. Paramount Premises (P.) Ltd., [1991] 190 ITR 259 This Bombay High Court decision was cited as expressing a view contrary to the Tribunal's: supporting the proposition that deduction in respect of income from FDRs could be sustained for purposes of section 80HHC. The Court noted that such a contrary view had been expressed by the Bombay High Court, but did not accept that this created a substantial question of law in the present petition; instead, the Court upheld the Tribunal's interpretation of clause (baa) of the Explanation to section 80HHC and found the Tribunal right in disallowing the claim.
Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Nagpur Engineering Co. Ltd., [2000] 245 ITR 806 This Bombay High Court decision was cited as expressing a view consistent with the Paramount Premises decision, namely that deduction in respect of interest from FDRs could be allowable under section 80HHC. The Court acknowledged this contrary consistent view but proceeded on the basis of the plain reading of clause (baa) of the Explanation to section 80HHC, holding that the Tribunal's contrary conclusion was correct and dismissing the appeal.
Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Nagpur Engineering Co. Ltd., [2000] 244 ITR (St.) 54 Reported reference to the dismissal of the Special Leave Petition (SLP) in relation to the Nagpur Engineering case, as noted in the appellant's submissions. The Court recorded the existence of that reported dismissal of SLP but did not treat it as creating a substantial question of law sufficient to admit the present appeal; the Court decided the issue on the statutory language (clause (baa)) and upheld the Tribunal.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined each of the three questions and explained why none constituted a substantial question of law warranting admission of the appeal.

  1. On question (i) (Board's circular): The Court observed that the plea based on the Board's Circular No. F-279/126/98-ITJ dated March 27, 2000, was not raised before the Tribunal and therefore could not be allowed to be raised for the first time before the Court. Additionally, the Court noted the circular is an administrative instruction to income-tax authorities not to file appeals where the tax effect is less than Rs. 1,00,000; the Tribunal is not bound by that instruction, and once the Department filed appeals the Tribunal was obliged to decide them on merits. The Court treated this as not amounting to a question of law.
  2. On question (ii) (classification of leasing receipts): The Court set out the material facts — the assessee purchased land and building, invested further in construction, and let the property out to a sister concern (in which family members were partners). The assessing officer had taxed the receipts as rental income under "Property income"; the CIT(A) had reversed that, but the Tribunal affirmed the assessing officer. The Court agreed with the Tribunal's conclusion that where leasing out such properties is not the assessee's business, receipts by way of rent cannot be treated as "business income." The Court concluded this issue did not involve any substantial question of law.
  3. On question (iii) (deduction under section 80HHC and treatment of interest): The Court recited the figures: interest received Rs. 6,33,454; interest paid Rs. 4,12,982. The Assessing Officer treated 90% of the gross interest as deductible from profits for the purpose of section 80HHC (thereby reducing the deduction), while the CIT(A) allowed 90% only after deducting interest actually paid. The Tribunal sided with the Assessing Officer, holding that 90% is to be taken from gross interest received and that interest paid by the assessee could not be deducted from that gross interest for the purpose of section 80HHC. The Court referred to a "plain reading of clause (baa) of Explanation to section 80HHC" and agreed with the Tribunal's interpretation, concluding the Tribunal was right in disallowing the assessee's claim.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED.

Holding: The Court dismissed the assessee's appeal, holding that none of the three questions raised constituted a substantial question of law. The Tribunal's order allowing the Revenue's appeals and rejecting the assessee's claim was upheld.

Implications: The direct effect is that the Tribunal's decision stands — (a) the Revenue's appeals are allowed, (b) the assessee's claim (including classification of income and the section 80HHC deduction as determined by the Tribunal) is rejected. The opinion does not announce a new legal precedent beyond applying the statutory language (clause (baa) of the Explanation to section 80HHC) and disposing of the appeal on the grounds stated.

    Rani Paliwal v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax

    1. This appeal by the assessee filed under section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (for short, “the Act”) is directed against the order dated September 26, 2002, passed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as “the Tribunal”), whereby the appeals filed by the Revenue against the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) (for brevity, the “CIT (Appeals)”) were allowed and the claim of the assessee rejected.

    2. According to learned counsel for the appellant, the following three substantial questions of law are involved in the appeal and, therefore, the same deserves to be admitted:

    “(i) Whether the Tribunal, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, erred in law in not dismissing the appeals of the Department/Revenue in view of the Board's Circular No. F. No. 279/126/98-ITJ, dated March 27, 2000;?

    (ii) Whether, on an application of the correct principles of law and in view of the judicial pronouncements of the Supreme Court and High Court(s), was the Tribunal justified in law in holding that the income of the assessee-appellant on account of temporary leasing of asset for commercial exploitation was taxable under the head ‘Property income’ and not ‘Business income’?

    (iii) Whether on a correct and proper interpretation of the provisions of section 80HHC of the Act and application thereof to the facts and circumstances of the case, was the Tribunal legally correct in holding that the claim for deduction in respect of income from FDRs was not sustainable despite contrary and consistent view having been expressed by the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. Paramount Premises (P.) Ltd., [1991] 190 ITR 259 and Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Nagpur Engineering Co. Ltd., [2000] 245 ITR 806 against which the S.L.P of the Department/Revenue stood dismissed as reported in Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Nagpur Engineering Co. Ltd., [2000] 244 ITR (St.) 54?”

    3. Having heard learned counsel for the appellant, we are of the view that none of the questions raised is a question of law much less a substantial question of law and, therefore, the appeal deserves to be dismissed.

    4. As regards question No. (i), it is urged that in view of the Board's Circular No. F-279/126/98-ITJ, dated March 27, 2000, the appeals filed by the Department were not maintainable because the tax effect did not exceed Rs. 1,00,000 in each assessment year and, therefore, according to the circular, the Department could not prefer an appeal. From the perusal of the order of the Tribunal, it is clear that no such plea was raised before the Tribunal and, therefore, we are not allowing the assessee to raise this plea for the first time before us.

    5. In any case, the Board's circular is only an instruction issued to the income-tax authorities not to file appeals where the tax effect is less than Rs. 1,00,000. The Tribunal is not bound by any such instruction and once the Department files an appeal, the Tribunal was bound to decide the same on the merits. This question, in our opinion, is not a question of law.

    Re. (ii):

    6. The assessee had purchased land with building for Rs. 46,60,000 on April 11, 1992, and a total investment of Rs. 14,80,319 had been made during the relevant assessment year for further construction of the building. This property was let out to its sister concern, M/s. Swati H/L Industries, in which the assessee's husband and her sons were partners. Its income was shown under the head, “Business income”. The assessing authority treated this income as “rental income” since the property had been leased out and the same was taxed under the head, “Property income.” The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) reversed the finding and the Tribunal, in appeal, affirmed the finding of the Assessing Officer. Since the property had been leased out to the sister concern and the assessee was receiving rent therefrom, the assessing authority as well as the Tribunal were right in holding that the income received by way of rent, could not be treated as “business income” particularly when leasing out of such properties was not the business of the assessee. This issue also does not involve any substantial question of law.

    Re. (iii):

    7. This issue relates to the inclusion of interest as part of the assessee's “business income” for working out the deduction claimed under section 80HHC of the Act. The total interest received by the assessee during the relevant assessment year was Rs. 6,33,454 and the total interest paid by the assessee was Rs. 4,12,982. The Assessing Officer was of the view that 90 per cent of the gross amount of interest of Rs. 6,33,454 was liable to be deducted from the profits of the business for the purpose of deduction. He, therefore, reduced the quantum of deduction under section 80HHC of the Act accordingly. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), however, took a different view in appeal and allowed 90 per cent, of the amount of interest to be deducted after deducting a sum of Rs. 4,12,982 which had been paid by the assessee as interest during the assessment year. The Tribunal again affirmed the view of the Assessing Officer holding that 90 per cent, of the interest that was deductible for the claim under section 80HHC of the Act was from the gross interest received by the assessee and that the amount of interest paid by the assessee could not be deducted therefrom. A plain reading of clause (baa) of Explanation to section 80HHC of the Act makes this aspect quite clear and we are of the view that the Tribunal was right in disallowing the claim of the assessee in this regard.

    8. Since no substantial question of law arises, the present appeal is dismissed.

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    Comments

    Rani Paliwal v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax
    (Oct 7, 2003)