V.K Jhanji, J.:— This shall dispose of Regular Second Appeals No. 1356, 1357 and 1358 of 1997. All these three appeals have been preferred by equal number of defendants qua the suits filed against each of them by the plaintiff, Jora Singh (respondent herein) for possession. The suits have been decreed by both the Courts below.

2. In brief, the facts are that plaintiff, Jora Singh filed three suits for possession in respect of land measuring 23 kanals 14 marks (in each suit) as per Jamabandi for the year 1984-1985, being 1/5th share of land measuring 118 kanals 8 marlas, pleading therein that he being a tenant for the last 30-35 years over the land is entitled to pre-empt the sale made by Amir Singh son of Gulab Singh vide registered sale-deed dated 26.10.1988 for a consideration of Rs. 41,250/-. In the suit, he also challenged order dated 12.10.1990 passed by the Assistant Collector II grade whereby entries in favour of plaintiff in the khasra girdawanes were changed ex-parte. Suits were contested by the defendants by taking the plea that the plaintiff was not in possession of the suit land at the time of sale and the suits have been filed on the basis of false and wrong entries in the revenue record. Further, it was pleaded that the sale consideration is Rs. 58,815/- and not Rs. 41,250/-. Order dated 12.10.1990 of the Assistant Collector II Grade was stated to be legal and in accordance with law and binding on the rights of the plaintiff. The learned trial Court on the basis of evidence brought on record, decreed the suits of the plaintiff for possession by way of pre-emption subject to payment of Rs. 55,3027/- in each suit on or before 26.10.1994 failing which suits of the plaintiff were ordered to be dismissed. Defendants filed appeals in each suit and the same too have been dismissed by the first appellate Court. Hence, the present second appeals.

3. It has been contended by Mr. H.S Gill, Sr. Advocate, counsel for defendants, that the defendants were given possession of the suit land before execution of the sale-deed and wrong entries in favour of plaintiff in the revenue record were corrected by order dated 12.10.1990 passed by the Assistant Collector II grade. In this regard, he submitted that in the Jamabandis, the name in the column of possession is shown of Jora Singh (plaintiff) and his two brothers, Nidhan Singh and Santa Singh, whereas it is the admitted case of the plaintiff that his brothers, Nidhan Singh and Santa Singh died 20 years ago. He thus contended that despite the death, the entries are still continuing in their names and from this, an inference can be drawn that the entries in the Jamabandis are wrong. He further contended that in the jamabandi for the year 1984-1985, land measuring 76 kanals 14 marlas has been shown to be in possession of owners and plaintiff, Jora Singh and his brothers have been shown in possession of the remaining land. From this entry in the jamabandi for the year 1984-1985, counsel wanted to impress upon this Court that order dated 12.10.1990 whereby khasra girdawaries relating to the suit land were changed from the name of tenants in the names of owners from Rabi, 1985 onwards, is valid. Lastly, he contended that in the revenue record, plaintiff is shown as tenant along with his brothers, Nidhan Singh and Santa Singh, both of whom have died and so, the plaintiffs share in no case can be more than ⅓rd. Against this, Mr. M.L Sarin, Sr. Advocate, for the plaintiff has contended that both the Courts below on reading of the revenue record have returned a concurrent finding of fact that the plaintiff is a tenant on suit land since 1959-1960. He contended that the defendants cannot take advantage of the entry in the jamabandi for the year 1984–1985 showing the owners in possession of land measuring 76 kanals 14 marlas as alteration in the entries was made without any notice to the plaintiff. He contended that previously the land was being cultivated as tenant by the plaintiff along with his brothers, Nidhan Singh and Santa Singh and after the death of his brothers, plaintiff alone is in cultivating possession as tenant. He submitted that otherwise also if the tenant part of the land is involved in the sale, tenant has a right of pre-emption qua the entire land sold. In this regard, reference has been made to judgment of the Supreme Court in Ram Chand v. Randhir Singh, (1994-3) 108 PLR 605 (SC).

4. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties at some length and on going through the pleadings and revenue record, I am of the view that the appeals are without any merit and deserve to be dismissed. In answer to the case set up by the plaintiff that he is a tenant for the last 30-35 years, defendants in their written statement totally denied the tenancy and alleged that the plaintiff never cultivated the suit land as tenant. The stand of the defendant that the plaintiff had never been in possession as tenant, has been proved wrong. In the jamabandi for the years 1959–1960, 1964–1965, 1969–1970, 1974–1975 and 1979–1980, plaintiff, Jora Singh has been shown to be a tenant on land measuring 118 kanals 8 marlas on payment of ⅓rd Batai. It is only in the jamabandi for the year 1984–1985 that on land measuring 76 kanals 14 marlas, owners are shown in possession and on the remaining land the plaintiff and his brothers, Nidhan Singh and Santa Singh are shown in possession. However, in the khasra girdawaries, Exh.P-10, for the period Kharif 1985 to Rabi 1990, plaintiff-Jora Singh and his brothers are shown in possession as tenants. The very favt that in the khasra girdawaries, the plaintiff is shown to be in possession as tenant proves the contention of counsel for the plaintiff that the change in entry made in the jamabandi for the year 1984–1985 in regard to land measuring 76 kanals 14 marlas was made unauthorisedly. No material on record has been pointed but to justify the change in entry. In a case where earlier revenue entries are changed in the later revenue entries and the change is effected without any mutation and there is no order of the revenue Authorities for changing the entries, it is for the defendants to prove as to now the change in the entry came to be made. In absence of any justification, presumption in favour of later entries would stand rebutted by the fact that alteration in the later entries was made unauthorisedly. In this regard, reference be made to recent judgment of the Apex Court in Mansu v. Shadi Rain, 1996 P.L.J 215, wherein it has been held that there is a presumption in favour of continuity of possession. Once it is proved that a person was a tenant over the suit land, he would be presumed to have continued thereafter unless by some cogent evidence or overt act it is proved that he abandoned the tenancy or was otherwise evicted in accordance with law. In view of the consistent revenue record in favour of the plaintiff, i.e jamabandis from 1959–1960 to 1984–1985 and khasra girdawaries for the period kharif 1985 to Rabi 1990, I find no substance in the contention of the counsel for the defendants that the revenue record adduced in evidence in support of the plea of tenancy is not reliable. Plaintiff being a tenant has a right to maintain an action to exercise right of pre-emption. As regards the judgment in Jit Singh's case (supra), cited by the counsel for the defendants, the learned Single Judge of this Court on reading of jamabandi for the year 1972–1973 had observed that if the words ‘SAHAIK’ or Helper had not been incorporated in the jamabandi, the status of the appellant therein would be that of a tenant. Since the appellant therein was described as a helper, it contradicted the presumption of tenancy.

5. As regards the contention that the plaintiff was a tenant along with his brothers and so, on the death of his brothers the plaintiff cannot claim more than ⅓rd share, it is only to be stated that a reading of the revenue record clearly proves that there was a joint tenancy of three brothers and on the death of two brothers, the plaintiff being the third brother had been cultivating the entire land as tenant. In a sale of agricultural land where some part of it was tenanted, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the right vests in the tenant to seek pre-emption of the sale in entirety. The following observations of the Apex Court in para 11 of the judgment in Ram Chand's case (supra) may be noticed:

“11. A learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Balwant Singh v. Mehar Singh, 1966-1968 (Supp) PLR 484, interpreting the provision has viewed that the word “holds” in the provision is not to be construed in isolation but is to be read with its succeeding words “under tenancy”. This ratio of the High Court has apparently risen where the tenant claiming preemption of the suit land had, after the sale, been ousted from physical possession and his claim for pre-emption was being protected by the Court. It is in that context that the High Court ruled that the word “holds” must be read alongwith the words “under tenancy” and that the right of tenancy did not-merely mean the act of physical possession. Qualificatory rights in that regard were thus settled by precedent that the pre-empting tenant should merely have held the land on the date of sale and not necessarily at any time thereafter to satisfy the rule of maintaining the status on three occasions i.e on the date of sale, on the date of the suit, and on the date of the decree of the first Court. However, it has always remained unquestioned that the tenant can pre-empt the sale with regard to the portion of the land actually in his tenancy. To the un-tenanted portion which was part of the sale, a bar has always been read. All the same, it would have to be gathered from the provisions whether such right of pre-emption, in respect of agricultural land, has been made to vest in the tenant. It is apparent that the tenant in priority has the last right for pre-emption in Section 15(1) of the Act. The language conferring such right, as is evident, is not punctuated. All the words have been put together. Its language thus is capable of more than one meaning. Therefore, whatever goes to further the intendment of the measure should be the basis of interpretation. It is well to remember that this right to the tenant was conferred by amendment in the Act in, the year 1960 in the post-constitutional era as part of agrarian reform. Atam Parkash's case is a clear pointer. Unlike its other provisions, save in the case of a co-sharer, which have been struck down as archaic and unconstitutional in Atam Parkash's case, this part has been kept alive, attuned as it is with modern thinking. Thus, the provision would need a purposive interpretation furthering, if not expanding, the right rather than curtailing it. If the words “holds under tenancy” be not disjuncted as per dictum of Balwant Singh's case (supra), they have then as a sequator to be conjuncted with the words “or the vendor”. If so the right thus is vested in the tenant who holds under tenancy of the vendor not only the land sold but even a part thereof, i.e of the land sold. Thus, on interpretation, this view can be taken that when a tenanted part of land is involved in the sale, the tenant thereof has a right of preemption qua the entire sold land and the vendees cannot resist the same.”

6. In view of the settled law, the suits of the plaintiff for pre-empting the entire sold land have rightly been decreed by the Courts below and consequently, no interference is called for in second appeal.

7. Resultantly, all the three appeals, RSA Nos. 1356, 1357 and 1358 of 1997 shall stand dismissed in limine.

Appeals dismissed.