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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • Harsh Aggarwal
  • Sandeep Vermani
Judges
  • Dr. Sarojeni Seksena, J.
Acts
  • Section 13(i) (i-a) (i-b) (iii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)
  • Laws Amendment Act, 1976),
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • Harsh Aggarwal
  • Sandeep Vermani
Judges
  • Dr. Sarojeni Seksena, J.
Acts
  • Section 13(i) (i-a) (i-b) (iii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)
  • Laws Amendment Act, 1976),
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Case Summary — Opinion by Dr. Mrs. Sarojeni Seksena, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal was filed by the appellant-wife against the judgment and decree of the trial Court in HMA Petition No. 30 of 2.6.1987, decided on 28.10.1987.

Uncontroverted facts recorded in the opinion: the parties were married on 12.10.1983 at Bhim Nagar, Gurgaon, in accordance with Hindu rites. The marriage was consummated and the appellant gave birth to a female child on 26.12.1984; the child died after about one and a half months (approximately 45 days).

The respondent husband filed a petition for divorce under Section 13(1) (i) (i-a) (i-b) (iii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, pleading unsoundness of mind, cruelty and desertion. He alleged that the appellant displayed abnormal behaviour from the start of matrimonial life, describing acts he said evidenced mental disorder and cruelty, and averred that the appellant left the matrimonial home in February 1984 and has been living with her parents since 29.12.1984.

The appellant contested the petition, raised preliminary objections (estoppel, no cause of action and limitation), denied unsoundness of mind and cruelty, alleged that the respondent treated her cruelly and that dowry demand and maltreatment were the real causes of her misery, and denied that she had intentionally withdrawn from the respondent's society for two years.

At trial, both parties led evidence. The trial Court accepted the respondent's evidence and granted a decree of dissolution of marriage on grounds of cruelty and desertion. The appellant challenged that decree in this appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the respondent proved that the appellant was of unsound mind such as to ground a divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act.
  2. Whether the respondent proved cruelty by the appellant of such a nature as to constitute legal cruelty and justify dissolution of the marriage.
  3. Whether the facts established amounted to desertion by the appellant, including the requisite intention to forsake cohabitation.
  4. Whether the appellant was entitled to permanent alimony and, if so, the quantum to be awarded.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Raised preliminary objections of estoppel, no cause of action and limitation.
  • Denied suffering from any mental disorder and denied behaving in a cruel or abnormal manner in the matrimonial home.
  • Asserted that the child died because of the respondent's negligence, maltreatment and misconduct, and that she was treated cruelly by her husband (including dowry demand allegations).
  • Alleged she was turned out of the matrimonial home on 29.12.1984 after being beaten by the respondent and did not leave voluntarily; therefore the respondent cannot rely on the separation to claim desertion (i.e., respondent cannot take advantage of his own wrong).
  • Relied on Smt. Sulekha Bairaqi v. Prof Kamla Kania Bairaqi and Amarjit Kaur v. Babu Singh for the legal propositions that (a) cruelty must be of a nature to give rise to a reasonable apprehension that it will be harmful or injurious to continue to live with the spouse, and (b) desertion requires proof of intention not to cohabit when the parties separated.
  • Claimed entitlement to permanent alimony (sought Rs. 1,50,000 for rehabilitation).

Respondent's Arguments

  • Detailed his testimony about the appellant's abnormal behaviour from the beginning of marriage (refusal to permit conjugal relations on the first night, eccentric bathing and dressing habits, not washing hands after answering nature's call, urination in the street or in clothes, quarrelsomeness and occasional violence, not performing household work, wandering without permission, repeated visits to her parental home).
  • Asserted that these acts were not disclosed before marriage, that he complained to her parents who promised but did not get treatment, and that the appellant left the matrimonial home and later refused to return even at delivery (the mother took her to the hospital without informing him).
  • Stated that witnesses (Bhim Sain PW2, Lachman Dass PW3, Heera Nand PW4) corroborated his account; pointed out that the appellant did not testify to rebut his evidence and did not call her mother to deny key allegations.
  • Respondent's counsel relied on several precedents in support of the contention that the respondent had proved cruelty and desertion (cases cited in the text include Ashim Ranjan Poddar v. Smt. Anusree Poddar; Sunderi Devi v. Ram Lal; Asha Rani v. Raj Kumar; Smt. Lalita v. Om Parkash; Smt. Arminder Kaur v. Major Narinder Singh Brar).
  • On alimony, the respondent contended he earned Rs. 700 per month and was already paying Rs. 200 per month as maintenance, and that he could not pay the large sum claimed; he offered a reasonable amount of about Rs. 18–20,000.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Smt. Sulekha Bairaqi v. Prof Kamla Kania Bairaqi As cited by appellant: the legal requirement that cruelty must be of such nature as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension that it will be harmful or injurious to live with the other spouse (post the Marriage Laws Amendment Act, 1976). The court adopted and articulated the settled principle quoted in the opinion — that cruelty consists of conduct giving rise to a reasonable apprehension — and applied that test to the appellant's conduct, finding it amounted to legal cruelty.
Amarjit Kaur v. Babu Singh As cited by appellant: authority for proposition that, to prove desertion, the respondent must show that the wife intended not to live with him when she parted company. The court applied the factual test (continued non-return since 29.12.1984 and conduct evidencing refusal to cohabit) and concluded that the appellant's conduct established the requisite intention to forsake cohabitation, thereby supporting a finding of desertion.
Ashim Ranjan Poddar v. Smt. Anusree Poddar Not specified in the opinion; cited by respondent in support of his case. The opinion notes this precedent as relied upon by the respondent; the court's decision relied principally on the evidence and corroboration rather than an explicit textual application of this particular authority.
Sunderi Devi v. Ram Lal Not specified in the opinion; cited by respondent. Referenced by respondent's counsel; the court primarily evaluated witness testimony and the parties' conduct in reaching its conclusions.
Asha Rani v. Raj Kumar Not specified in the opinion; cited by respondent. Cited by respondent's counsel; the court's reasoning relied on the factual record and the general legal principle of cruelty as causing reasonable apprehension.
Smt. Lalita v. Om Parkash Not specified in the opinion; cited by respondent. Listed among authorities relied on by respondent; the court did not expressly analyse the specific rule from this case in the body of the opinion.
Smt. Arminder Kaur v. Major Narinder Singh Brar Not specified in the opinion; cited by respondent. Not expressly analysed in the opinion; cited as supportive authority by the respondent's counsel while the court based its finding on witness testimony and the legal definition of cruelty.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded from the trial record and the credibility of witnesses. Key elements of the court's reasoning were:

  1. The court noted that the appellant did not enter the witness box to rebut, on oath, the respondent's testimony concerning the appellant's behaviour; even the appellant's mother did not give evidence to contradict specific allegations (for example, regarding who took the appellant to the hospital for delivery).
  2. The respondent's witnesses were found to have corroborated aspects of his testimony about the appellant's behaviour and habits while she resided in the matrimonial home.
  3. Although the trial court had correctly found that the respondent had failed to prove that the appellant was of unsound mind, the appellate court explained that a finding of unsoundness was not necessary to a finding of legal cruelty.
  4. The court set out the settled legal principle (quoting or adopting the standard relied upon from prior authority) that cruelty is not defined in the Act but includes conduct of such a nature as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the other spouse that it would be harmful or injurious to live with the first spouse.
  5. Applying that standard to the facts — the enumerated "small twigs" of abnormal conduct (refusal to cohabit on the first night, inappropriate dressing, hygiene and urination habits, quarrelsome and violent conduct, neglect of household responsibilities, repeated departures to parental home, and incidents at delivery and care of the child) — the court concluded that the cumulative effect amounted to legal cruelty (mental torture heavier than physical torture) and disturbed the respondent's mental peace.
  6. On desertion, the court observed that the appellant had been residing with her parents since 29.12.1984 and had not returned to the matrimonial home. The court accepted that this continuing absence demonstrated that she had forsaken the respondent's company and declined to cohabit, thereby satisfying the factual component for desertion and the appellant's intention not to cohabit.
  7. Consequently, the appellate court found no error in the trial court's grant of decree of dissolution on grounds of cruelty and desertion and affirmed that result.
  8. On the alternate contention of permanent alimony, the court balanced the parties' positions: the appellant sought Rs. 1,50,000; the respondent said he earned Rs. 700 per month and paid Rs. 200 maintenance, offering about Rs. 18–20,000. Taking the facts and circumstances into account, the court ordered permanent alimony of Rs. 35,000 to be paid by the respondent within four months, and stipulated that failure to pay would result in the decree of divorce automatically standing vacated.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court affirmed the trial court's decree dissolving the marriage on the grounds of cruelty and desertion and dismissed the appellant's challenge to that decree. The court also directed payment of permanent alimony in the sum of Rs. 35,000 by the respondent within four months; failure to make that payment would result in the divorce decree being vacated.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The trial court's decree of dissolution on the grounds of cruelty and desertion was upheld.
  • The respondent was directed to pay Rs. 35,000 as permanent alimony within four months; if payment is not made within the stipulated period, the decree of divorce shall stand vacated.
  • The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs (as stated in the opinion). The printed opinion also contains the blockquoted lines "R.M.S" and "Appeal allowed." The body of the reasoning, however, records that the decree was affirmed and the appeal dismissed — and separately addresses modification in relation to the alimony award.

Broader implications: The opinion applies and reiterates the settled principle that cruelty for matrimonial relief is measured by whether conduct gives rise to a reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or injurious to continue living with the spouse. The court emphasized that cumulative acts of abnormal behaviour, even if each taken singly might appear minor, can constitute legal cruelty when viewed together. The opinion did not purport to lay down a new legal rule beyond applying established principles to the facts of this case.

R.M.S
Appeal allowed.

Note: the summary above is drawn exclusively from the text of the provided opinion and does not add any information beyond what the opinion itself contains.

Show full summary ...

    Smt. Uma Wanti v. Arjan Dev .

    Dr. Mrs. Sarojeni Seksena, J.:— Appellant-wife had assailed the judgment and decree of the trial Court passed in HMA petition No. 30 of 2.6.1987 decided on 28.10.1987

    2. Uncontroverted facts are that the appellant was married with the respondent Arjan Dev on 12.10.1983 at Bhim Nagar, Gurgaon, in accordance with Hindu rites and rituals. The marriage was consummated and appellant gave birth to a female child on 26.12.1984 The child expired after about 1-½ months.

    3. The respondent filed a petition for divorce under Section 13(i) (i-a) (i-b) (iii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) seeking for dissolution of marriage on the ground of unsoundness of mind, cruelty and desertion. Respondent averred that before marriage, it was not disclosed to him that appellant is of unsound mind. Only after marriage, he came to know of her mental disorder which is incurable. From the very first day of matrimonial life, the appellant behaved in a peculiar way, she was not obedient and declined to cohabit. She does not understand the responsibilities of a house wife. She has no sense of living like a wife in a matrimonial home. She does not wash her hands after answering the call of nature. After taking bath sometime, she does not put on clothes properly. She urinates even outside the house. When she was advised not to behave in this manner, she would start crying and tearing of clothes. Her habit of taking her meals was also eccentric. Sometime, she urinated in her clothes. She is quarrelsome by nature. Some times she became violent. Her behaviour is intolerable to the respondent. After the marriage, when a complaint was lodged with the parents of the appellant, her mother promised to get her treated but nothing was done. At the time of delivery, she was taken to hospital by her mother without informing the respondent. When the child became ill, she had left the child at the respondent's house and went to her parental home. The child expired due to her negligence and carelessness. She left the matrimonial home in Feb, 1984. Since then, she is residing with her parents and has refused to come back to the respondent. Thus, on these counts he prays for dissolution of marriage.

    4. The appellant contested the petition, raised preliminary objections about the estoppel, no cause of action and limitation. She denied that she is suffering from any mental disorder or her behaviour was cruel in matrimonial home. She averred that her child died because of the negligence, maltreatment and misconduct of the respondent. She was treated cruelly by her husband. He and his father wanted huge amount in dowry that is the real cause of her misery. In the matrimonial home, she behaved like a dutiful wife. She also denied that her behaviour was abnormal or anti-social. She did not leave the matrimonial home on her own. Rather, the respondent turned her out from his residence on 29.12.1984 after beating her and, thereafter he never came to bring her back. The respondent took her to the hospital for delivery and after delivery also he went to her matrimonial home and therefrom, she was turned out on 29.12.1984 It is also denied that she has withdrawn from the society of the respondent for a continuous period of two years.

    5. Parties adduced evidence in support of their contentions, Relying on the respondent's evidence, the trial Court held that the respondent has proved the grounds of cruelty and desertion and, the decree of dissolution of marriage was passed.

    6. Appellant's learned counsel contended that the trial Court has correctly held that the respondent has failed to prove that the appellant is suffering from any mental disorder but despite this finding the trial court came to the conclusion that the respondent has proved the grounds of cruelty and desertion. Even if it is to be believed that the appellant behaved in the way in which the respondent has alleged, that behaviour of the appellant does not amount to cruelty vis-a-vis the respondent. After the delivery of a female child, she was turned out from the matrimonial home by the respondent himself and since then she is living in her parental home. Respondent cannot take advantage of his own wrong and seek a decree of dissolution of marriage on the ground of desertion. Relying on Smt. Sulekha Bairaqi v. Prof Kamla Kania Bairaqi,1 he contended that even after amendment (Marriage Laws Amendment Act, 1976), the legal requirement is that the respondent has to prove that the cruelty is of such a nature as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension in his mind that it will be harmful or injurious for him to live with the appellant. Normal lapses in day to day life will not constitute legal cruelty. He further pointed out that simply on the ground that from 29.12.1984 the parties are living separately, it will not prove the ground of desertion. The respondent is required to prove further that the appellant had not intention to live with him when she parted his company. For this preposition, he has placed reliance on Amarjit Kaur… v. Babu Singh…. Singh,2.

    7. Respondent's learned counsel stressed that the respondent has stated on oath how the appellant behaved in an abnormal way while she was living with him in the matrimonial home. He has categorically stated that on the first night she did not permit him to cohabit with her. She used to come out from the bath room some times undressed, and sometime not fully dressed. After answering the call of nature. She did not wash her hands. She used to sit for urination in the gali. Whenever he advised her she used to quarrel with him. She used to wander in the gali without taking permission from him she used to go to her parental home. She never did any household work. Before marriage, this mental condition was not disclosed to him. He made a complaint to her father who promised to get her treatment done. She stayed with him for three months. He went alongwith his wife to her parental home and left her there but thereafter she was not subjected to any medical treatment and she never came back to him for the delivery also. She was taken to the hospital by her mother without informing him. When the child became ill, she was left at his residence while the appellant went back to her parental home. The child died because of her negligence. He has further stated that during the course of the trial under the orders of the Court he was taking the appellant with him to his house in a rickshaw but on the way she got down from the rickshaw and went back to her parents house. In the cross-examination, he has categorically stated that he never met her before marriage and hence he had no occasion to know about her mental disorder. His witnesses Bhim Sain PW2; Lachman Dass PW3; and Heera Nand PW4 have corroborated his testimony on the point of mental disorder. The respondent's learned counsel stressed that the appellant did not enter the witness box to rebut the testimony of the respondent. She has not even examined her mother to refute the allegations made by the respondent. She has only examined Dhanoat RW1 and Nand Lal-PW2. Dhanoat has clearly stated that he did not know the cause of the quarrel between the two. Nand Lal is the father of the appellant. He has denied that the appellant is of unsound mind. According to him, she has; studied upto 10th class. He has testified that respondent wanted Rs. 50,000/- from him to purchase a house. Since he declined, he refused to bring her daughter, but this fact is not put to the respondent in cross-examination. In support of his contentions, he has relied on Ashim Ranjan Poddar v. Smt. Anusree Poddar,3; Sunderi Devi v. Ram lal,4; Asha Rani v. Raj Kumar,5; Smt. Lalita v. Om Parkash,6; and Smt. Arminder Kaur v. Major Narinder Singh Brar,7.

    8. In this case, it is pertinent to note that the appellant wife has not entered the witness box to rebut on oath the testimony of the respondent. The respondent has objected to the abnormal behaviour and way of living of the appellant. These facts are within the personal knowledge of the appellant. She was required to enter the witness box to deny the said assertions of the respondent but under the advise of her counsel, she declined to enter the witness box. Even her mother had not entered the witness box to deny the allegations that she took the appellant to the hospital for delivery or after the delivery, she was brought back to her house from the hospital. No doubt, the female child died after a short span of about 45 days, may be due to negligence or carelessness of either of the two. But so far as her behaviour in the matrimonial home is concerned, there is no reason to disbelieve the respondent's evidence which is not controverted by the appellant. These small twigs of abnormal behaviour when piled, one upon another became a heavy burden of “cruelty”. This mental torture was more heavier than any physical torture. Under the Act, cruelty is not defined, but it is settled law that if the cruel behaviour of one spouse is of such a nature as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension in the mind of other spouse, that it will be harmful or injurious on the other one to live with the first spouse, it constitutes a legal cruelty. The day to day behaviour of the appellant was such as to disturb the mental peace and harmony of the respondent which definitely amounted to legal cruelty. She may not be of the unsound mind, but her peculiar ways of behaviour proved by the respondent are sufficient to constitute that legal cruelty. The husband could not live with peace in the company of the appellant. Peace was always disturbed due to her peculiar ways of behaviour, and thus he cannot be disbelieved that her behaviour was cruel to him. Admittedly, since 29.12.1984, the appellant is residing with her parent. She has not come back to her matrimonial home. Thus, she has for-saken the company of the respondent and thereby she has definitely declined to cohabit with him. This fact itself proved her intention not to cohabit with the respondent. Hence, I find that the trial Court has not fallen into any error in granting decree of dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty and desertion. I hereby affirm that decree and dismiss this appeal with no order as to costs.

    9. Alternatively, the appellant's learned counsel further contended that permanent alimony to the tune of Rs. 1,50,000/- be awarded to the appellant. As she stands divorced, she needs money for the rehabilitation. The respondent's learned counsel contended that the respondent is only an operator in Cinema Hall. He earns Rs. 700/- per month only, out of which he is paying Rs. 200/- per month as maintenance to the appellant. Hence, he is not in a position to pay such a huge amount to the appellant by way of permanent alimony. No doubt, he is willing to pay a reasonable amount of about Rs. 18/20,000/-. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the respondent is hereby directed to pay Rs. 35000/- to the appellant as permanent alimony within a period of four months. If he fails to make this payment within the stipulated time, the decree of divorce shall automatically stand vacated.

    R.M.S
    Appeal allowed.

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    Comments

    Smt. Uma Wanti v. Arjan Dev .
    (Jan 12, 1995)