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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Tenant-petitioners filed this revision against concurrent findings of the lower Courts, which had allowed the respondents' ejectment petition under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 and passed an order for ejectment of the petitioners.

The landlord (now deceased; represented by his legal representatives) had initiated an ejectment petition alleging that the land bearing Khasra No. 657 (O-12) within municipal limits of Kharar, together with a room, was leased out by rent note dated November 10, 1966. The rent note, it was alleged, had been executed in favour of the Society (Kharar Saw Mill Industry and Furniture Production Industrial Cooperative Society Limited) and signed by Bachan Singh. The tenancy was originally for eleven months at Rs. 200 per annum and later adjusted to Rs. 375 per annum on a six-monthly basis. The landlord alleged that rent had not been paid from December 31, 1982, till the filing of the rent application on August 31, 1984, that the Society had since been dissolved, and that the Society (through Bachan Singh) had sublet the premises to Bhajan Singh, Hazara (Razara) Singh and Mohinder Singh, who now occupied and altered the premises and ran separate sawmills therefrom.

In reply the respondents (tenants in the rent petition) claimed that the premises were taken in the name of Bachan Singh as Karta of a joint Hindu family and that the brothers jointly ran a family business; they denied that the Society ever existed (alleging it was a paper transaction) and denied subletting and material impairment. A compromise/agreement dated June 7, 1969 was relied on by the tenants as altering tenancy terms.

The Rent Controller found that the tenancy was in the name of the Society, held that tender of rent by Bhajan Singh was invalid because it was made by a third party, found subletting and material impairment proved and allowed the ejectment petition. The appellate court affirmed that order on September 26, 1994. The tenants then filed this revision in the High Court under Section 15(5) of the Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the tenancy was in the name of the Cooperative Society or in the name of a joint Hindu family with Bachan Singh as Karta (i.e., the proper identity of the tenant).
  2. Whether the tender of rent made by Bhajan Singh was valid when Bhajan was not shown to be the tenant of record.
  3. Whether subletting of the demised premises to Bhajan Singh, Hazara Singh and Mohinder Singh was proved.
  4. Whether the construction of five rooms on the rented land amounted to acts likely to impair materially the value or utility of the demised land.
  5. What is the scope of the High Court's revisional jurisdiction under Section 15(5) of the Act (in particular, whether the High Court can act as a third appellate court reappraising evidence).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The tenancy belonged to a joint Hindu family with Bachan Singh as Karta; Bachan Singh and his brothers (including petitioners) ran a joint family business on the demised premises.
  • The Cooperative Society was only a paper device to obtain a loan and never truly held tenancy; hence the Society was not the real tenant.
  • A fresh contract of tenancy/compromise dated June 7, 1969 altered the original terms and made the tenancy six-monthly in favour of the family through Bachan Singh; therefore tenders of rent by Bhajan Singh were valid.
  • Subletting was not proved because the premises were taken in the joint names via the Karta and there was no evidence that the original tenant parted with possession for consideration or otherwise.
  • The construction of additional rooms was necessary to run a sawmill; demolition would restore the land to its original condition, and the landlord had not specifically pleaded impairment of value or utility—hence the absence of a framed issue on that point should preclude finding impairment (though petitioners conceded that if parties were aware of the matter and led evidence, non-framing alone would not defeat the plea).
  • The petitioners relied on a number of authorities (described as a "plethora" of case law) to support these contentions.

Respondents' / Landlord's Arguments

  • The demised premises were let to the Cooperative Society and Bachan Singh signed the rent note as an office-bearer of the Society; tenancy was therefore in the name of the Society, not a joint Hindu family.
  • Rent was regularly paid by the Society (as shown in the Society's account books) until December 31, 1992 (as recorded in the opinion), establishing the Society's role as tenant; consequently, a tender by Bhajan Singh (not being tenant of record) was invalid.
  • The Society had gone into liquidation and an Official Liquidator was appointed; the Society was no longer in possession and the occupying parties were independent operators running separate sawmills—facts indicative of subletting and independent occupation.
  • The construction of five rooms where only one room had existed at lease commencement was likely to materially impair the value or utility of the demised land and supported ejectment on that ground.
  • Relying on Shiv Lal v. Sat Parkash and Anr., 1993 H.R.R. 267, the respondent contended that under Section 15(5) of the Act the High Court, in revisional jurisdiction, cannot function as a regular third appellate court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shiv Lal v. Sat Parkash and Anr., 1993 H.R.R. 267 That under Section 15(5) of the Act the High Court, in revisional jurisdiction, cannot act as a regular third appellate court. The Court applied the principle to hold that while the High Court cannot reappraise evidence as a third appellate forum, it may examine the legality or propriety of the orders of the subordinate courts; the Court therefore reviewed the legality/propriety of the findings but did not substitute its own reappraisal of evidence.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the documentary and evidentiary record and proceeded issue by issue. The key elements of its reasoning are:

  1. Tenancy identity: The rent note and related documents showed that the premises had been leased to the Cooperative Society and that Bachan Singh executed documents in his capacity as an office-bearer of the Society. The Court found it proved that the tenancy was in the name of the Society and not in the name of a joint Hindu family with Bachan Singh as Karta.
  2. Validity of tender: Because Bhajan Singh was not the tenant of record (the Society was), the tender of rent made by Bhajan Singh on the first date of hearing was not a valid tender by a tenant and therefore did not defeat the landlord's ground of non-payment of rent.
  3. Effect of the 1969 compromise/agreement: The compromise dated June 7, 1969 was interpreted by the Court as a document by which Bachan Singh bound himself to pay rent regularly on behalf of the Society and on his own behalf; however, that did not convert the tenancy into one held by Bachan Singh as Karta of a joint Hindu family for himself and his brothers. Thus, the compromise did not establish the petitioners' claimed joint-family tenancy.
  4. Subletting: The Court noted evidence that the Society had gone into liquidation and an Official Liquidator had been appointed; that Bachan Singh had shifted to Chandigarh and set up a separate mill; and that the demised premises were being used by two independent sawmill operators (one run by Bhajan and Hazara, the other by Mohinder) separated by a wall. These facts supported the conclusion that the original tenant (the Society) was no longer in exclusive possession and that the occupying parties were independent users—circumstances constituting subletting. The Court stressed that the landlord need only prove that in place of the original tenant somebody else was occupying the premises independently.
  5. Construction and material impairment: The Court accepted the factual finding that when leased there had been only one room and that subsequently five large rooms were constructed. Although the landlord had not expressly pleaded that the constructions were likely to impair materially the value or utility of the rented land, the Court held that the physical change from one room to five large rooms could safely be concluded to be likely to impair materially the value or utility of the demised land. The Court therefore treated the construction as an independent ground justifying ejectment.
  6. Revisional scope under Section 15(5): The Court reiterated the principle (as in Shiv Lal) that the High Court in revision cannot act as a regular third appellate court reappraising evidence; nevertheless, the High Court is empowered to examine the legality or propriety of the orders passed below. The Court applied that standard, found no illegality or impropriety in the subordinate Courts' findings, and declined to interfere.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revision is dismissed. The High Court held that the lower Courts correctly found in favour of the landlord on all grounds of ejectment (non-payment of rent, subletting, and construction likely to impair value or utility), and therefore refused to interfere with the ejectment order.

Consequences and immediate effects:

  • The ejectment order passed by the Rent Controller and confirmed by the appellate court is upheld.
  • The petitioners are granted three months' time from the date of the High Court's order to vacate the demised premises.
  • The revision was dismissed with costs.

Broader implications: The opinion does not announce any new legal doctrine. It applies established principles regarding (a) identification of the tenant by reference to rent notes and conduct, (b) the evidential standard for proving subletting and independent occupation, (c) the treatment of structural changes on demised land as potentially materially impairing its utility or value, and (d) the limited scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 15(5) (cannot reappraise evidence but may examine legality/propriety). The Court explicitly stated that no interference was called for and did not purport to lay down a novel precedent beyond applying these principles to the facts of the case.

    Kharar Saw Mill Industry And Furniture Production Indl. Coop. Society Ltd. And Anr. v. Smt. Prem Kaur And Ors

    1. Tenant-petitioners have filed this revision against concurrent findings of the lower Courts, whereby respondents' petition under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (in short, the Act) is allowed and ejectment order is passed against the petitioner.

    2. Petitioner's contention is that Bachan Singh, Razara Singh and Mohinder. Singh respondents are real brothers of petitioner Bhajan Singh. Bachan Singh being the eldest brother is the Karta of their joint Hindu family. They were all running their joint Hindu family business in the demised premises. Kharar Saw Mill Industry and Furniture Production Industrial Cooperative Society Limited, Kharar (hereafter in short, the Society) was shown as a tenant only with a view to obtain loan from the concerned authorities.

    3. The landlord, since deceased through LR respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 2 filed an ejectment petition against respondents No. 3, 4 and 5 and the petitioners alleging that land carrying Khasra No. 657 (O-12) within municipal limits of Kharar along with a room constructed thereon was leased out to petitioner No. 1 through respondent No. 3 Bachan Singh for 11 months at a rental of Rs. 200/- per annum for running Saw Mill. Rent note was executed on November 10, 1966. Later on petitioner No. 1 and respondent No. 3 agreed to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 375/-per annum and then the tenancy became six monthly. It was also agreed that in case of default in payment of arrears of rent, the landlord shall be entitled to evict the tenants. The landlord contended that the tenant has not paid rent from December 31, 1982, till date of filing of the rent application on August 31, 1984. It was also alleged that the landlord came to know that the Society is dissolved only a couple of weeks back. Rent was being regularly paid by the Society through Bachan Singh till December 31, 1982. After the dissolution of the Society, tenancy with the Society came to an end. Thereafter Bhajan Singh, Hazara Singh and Mohinder Singh have no right to continue in possession of the disputed premises. The Society through Bachan Singh sublet the premises to Bhajan Singh, Hazara Singh and Mohinder Singh. Bachan Singh has shifted to Chandigarh about two years back, were he has set up his own separate Mill. The disputed premises are in exclusive possession of Bhajan Singh, Hazara Singh and Mohinder Singh. In 1966 there was only one room on the disputed land. Thereafter these sub-tenants have constructed five big rooms on the disputed land. Bhajan Singh and Hazara Singh are running one Saw Mill and Mohinder Singh is running a separate Saw Mill on the disputed land. They have also stored fuel wood for sale in the disputed premises and thereby have changed its user. Thus, on the grounds of non-payment of rent, subletting and construction of rooms, which are likely to impair materially the value or utility of the land, eviction was sought.

    4. In the reply the respondents (in the rent petition) stated that the demised premises were taken on rent by respondents 2 to 5 from Santa Singh, the deceased-landlord, in the year 1954 in the name of respondent Bachan Singh as Karta of the joint Hindu family and respondents 3 to 5 are his younger brothers and all the said respondents constituted a joint Hindu family and thus have been running the joint Hindu family business. The Society never came into existence. It was only a paper transaction with a motive to secure loan from the Cooperative Department. On June 1, 1979, respondent No. 2 agreed to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 375/- per annum in two instalments. A compromise was effected between the landlord and the tenant in the Court on June 7, 1969. The tenancy never expired and thus these respondents petitioner have a right to remain in possession of the demised premises as tenants. The grounds of subletting and material impairment were also denied. It is alleged that the said construction was made with the consent and knowledge of Santa Singh deceased. They incurred Rs. 25,000/- on the construction, which Santa Singh agreed to pay.

    5. Issues were framed. On the first date of hearing Bhajan Singh tendered Rs. 750/- as rent from December 31, 1982, to December 31, 1984; Rs. 50/- as interest and Rs. 20/- as costs, which were accepted by the landlord's counsel under protest. Thereafter the parties adduced their evidence. The Rent Controller came to the conclusion that the demised premises were leased out to the Society through Bachan Singh for eleven months initially at the rate of Rs. 200/- per annum for running a Saw Mill and at that time a rent note was executed by them. It was also held that after the expiry of that tenancy, the respondents are liable to be ejected. The tender of rent was not held valid as it was not made by any tenant but was made by a third party. The grounds of subletting and material impairment were also held proved and thus the ejectment petition was allowed. The Society and Bhajan Singh preferred an appeal against that order of the Rent Controller, which was also dismissed on September 26, 1994, confirming all the findings of the Rent Controller.

    6. Petitioners' learned counsel contended that during the pendency of the rent petition a fresh contract of tenancy was entered into by the parties on June 7, 1969, by executing an agreement, which is on record. Thus, the terms of original tenancy were altered. The tenancy became six monthly and the premises were taken on rent by Bachan Singh for running a joint Hindu family business along with his brothers Bhajan Singh, Hazara Singh and Mohinder Singh. The Society was never the tenant. Rent was always being paid by Bachan Singh. Hence, on the first date of hearing tender of rent made by Bhajan Singh was a valid tender. The Courts below have fallen into an error in holding that it was not a valid tender and since the tenant was in arrears of rent, the tenant was liable to be ejected.

    7. His second contention is that subletting is not proved because the demised premises were taken on rent by all these brothers through their Karta Bachan Singh. It is further contended that there is no evidence on record to prove that this subletting was for some consideration and further that the original tenant parted with the possession of the demised premises in favour of the sub-tenants. Hence, petitioner's learned counsel contended that even this ground of subletting is not proved. To substantiate his argument he has relied on a plethora of case law.

    8. Both the Courts below have held and rightly so that the tenancy was in the name of the Society. Bachan Singh signed the rent note on behalf of the Society as its office-bearer. The premises were never demised to any joint Hindu family to run its business and Bachan Singh never entered into the contract of tenancy as Karta of the joint Hindu family. It is also proved on record that till December 31, 1992, rent was being regularly paid by the Society which is recorded in the account books of the Society. Therefore, Bhajan Singh was not a tenant and hence both the Courts below have rightly held that the tender of rent made by him was not valid and thus on this ground of non-payment of rent the ejectment order was rightly passed.

    9. So far as the ground of subletting is concerned, I have already held above that both the Courts below have rightly held that the premises were leased out to the Society and the rent note was executed by Bachan Singh as its office-bearer. The compromise dated June 7, 1969, is nothing but a document whereby Bachan Singh has bound himself to pay the rent regularly on behalf of the Society and on his own behalf. Therefore, even on the basis of this compromise, it cannot be said that he got these premises on rent as Karta of the joint Hindu family for himself as well as for his younger brothers. It is proved that Bachan Singh has now shifted to Chandigarh and is running his business there. It is also proved on record that in the demised premises one Saw Mill is being run by Bhajan Singh and Hazara Singh and another by Mohinder Singh. In between these two Saw Mills there is a wall. It is also an admitted fact that the Society has gone into liquidation. The Official Liquidator is also appointed, who was made a party at the stage when the case was remanded by this Court to the Rent Controller. Thus, it is apparent that the original tenant i.e. Society is no more in possession of the demised premises. The other two Saw Mills which are being run i.e. one by Mohinder Singh and the other by Bhajan Singh and Hazara Singh, are independent units. Hence, under these circumstances, subletting is duly proved by the landlord. This fact is always in the knowledge of the sub-tenants as tot in what capacity they are in possession of the demised premises. The burden lies on f them. The landlord can only prove that in place of the original tenant somebody else | is occupying the premises independently. Respondents petitioners plea that the premises were leased out to a joint Hindu family with Bachan Singh as a Karta and these brothers as members of the joint Hindu family for running their business on the said premises, was rightly negatived by both the Courts below. Hence, the inference is inevitable that the premises are sublet to Bhajan Singh, Hazara Singh and Mohinder Singh. In my considered view, the Courts below have not fallen into any error in deciding this issue in favour of the landlord.

    10. Relying on various authorities, petitioners' learned counsel lastly contended that in the rent petition it was not pleaded that by constructing five rooms on the rented land the tenants have committed such acts as are likely to impair materially the value or utility of the rented land. Hence, no issue was framed on this point. He admits that in the absence of issue, if the parties are alive to the plea raised and have adduced evidence thereon, knowing fully well the facts, then simply non-framing of the issue cannot be made a ground to get the order set aside. He further contends that admittedly the demised premises were leased out for running a Saw Mill. Without making construction thereon, running of Saw Mill was not feasible. Only open land was rented out. If constructed room are demolished, the land will come back in its original position. Hence, there is no ground to hold that by constructing these rooms, they have not done any act which is not likely to impair materially the value or utility of the rented land.

    11. No doubt, these words are not pleaded by the landlord that by constructing these rooms these persons have done acts which are likely to impair materially the value or utility of the demised land, but nevertheless the fact remains that when the premises were leased out, there was only one room constructed thereon. Now they have constructed five big rooms thereon. Even in the absence of pleading to that effect that this construction is likely to impair materially the value or utility of the rented land, it can safely be concluded that this construction is likely to impair materially the value or utility of the rented land. Hence, on this ground also the Courts below have rightly held so.

    12. Respondents' learned counsel, relying on Shiv Lal v. Sat Parkash and Anr., 1993 H.R.R. 267 contended that under Section 15(5) of the Act, the High Court, while exercising revisional jurisdiction, cannot act as a regular third appellate Court. Petitioners' learned counsel contended that under Section 15(5) the High Court is empowered to call and examine the record relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such order or proceedings and may pass such order in relation thereto, as it may deem fit.

    13. No doubt, it is true that the High Court cannot act as a third appellate authority, but nevertheless under section 15(5) the High Court is empowered to consider the legality or propriety of the orders passed by the Courts below. The High Court cannot reappraise the evidence to arrive at a different conclusion, but all the same the legality or propriety of the findings can be looked into by the High Court.

    14. In my considered view, both the Courts below have rightly held all the grounds of ejectment proved in landlord's favour. Hence, no interference is called for. Revision, being meritless, is hereby dismissed with costs. Accepting the alternative prayer, three months' time from today is granted to the petitioners to vacate the demised premises.

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