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  • S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the Act)
  • provisions of Art. 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act
  • Code of Civil Procedure. Article 137 of the Limitation Act
  • provisions of Art. 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963,
  • stale.3. Article 137 of the Limitation Act
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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  • S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the Act)
  • provisions of Art. 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act
  • Code of Civil Procedure. Article 137 of the Limitation Act
  • provisions of Art. 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963,
  • stale.3. Article 137 of the Limitation Act
Smart Summary

Comprehensive Summary of the Opinion (Sodhi, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This matter was admitted for hearing by a Motion Bench and ultimately heard by a Division Bench because the questions raised were of public importance and there were said to be no precedents directly on point. The petition challenged the State Government's refusal to make references under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act) in respect of disputes raised by three petitioners concerning termination or removal from service.

Procedurally: conciliation proceedings were held and proved abortive. The State Government declined to refer the disputes solely on the ground of delay. The petitioners sought judicial review of the State's refusal (by way of writ), and the court was called upon to decide whether the residuary provisions of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 apply to references under Section 10 of the Act and whether delay (laches) is a valid ground for the State to decline a reference under Section 10.

Relevant individual facts (as stated in the opinion): petitioner 1's services were terminated on 15 May 1986 and the demand notice was served on 30 November 1989 (about 3½ years later); petitioner 2's services terminated in August 1984 and demand notice served in March 1990 (about 6 years later); petitioner 3 was removed in August 1987 and served a demand notice in June 1990 (about 3 years later). The State declined to refer these disputes because of delay, and the petitioners could not provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay at any stage, including before the Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether termination of services can be challenged after expiry of 3 years by raising an industrial dispute and seeking reference to Labour Court for its decision?
  2. Whether Article 137 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 would be applicable in case of dismissal of an employee who challenged it by raising an industrial dispute and whether dismissal can be challenged after expiry of three years?
  3. Whether Article 137 would be applicable to Labour Court or to Industrial dispute or Tribunals?
  4. Whether the State can refuse to make reference to Labour Court on the stale claim?
  5. Whether State can refuse to make reference on the ground of laches?
  6. Whether question of laches can be decided by a Labour Court alone?

(The opinion additionally frames the two core questions in essence: whether the residuary Article 137 applies to a reference under Section 10 of the Act, and if it does not apply, whether delay is a valid ground to decline a reference under Section 10.)

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The State Government could not decline to make a reference on the ground of delay; instead, that question (regarding the effect of delay) was for the adjudicating authority to consider when granting relief, if any.

State Government's Position

  • The State Government declined to make references under Section 10(1) solely on the ground that the claims were belated (i.e., there was inordinate delay/laches in raising the disputes).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kerala State Electricity Board v. T.P. Kumhaliumma [(1976) 4 SCC 634 : A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 282] Article 137 "will apply to any petition or application filed under any Act to a civil Court." The court relied on this authority to explain that Article 137 applies to petitions/applications to civil courts, and therefore it does not apply to references under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act because such references are not applications to a civil court and Labour Courts/Tribunals are not civil courts under the Code of Civil Procedure.
Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay [A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1617] Appropriate Government, when deciding whether to make a reference under S.10(1) read with S.12(5), may consider prima facie merits; it may refuse reference if the claim is patently frivolous or clearly belated. The court cited this passage to support the proposition that the appropriate Government can examine, at least prima facie, the merits/timeliness of a claim and may refuse to refer an obviously belated or frivolous dispute.
Inder Singh and Sons, Ltd. v. Their Workmen [1961 — II L.L.J.89] Industrial tribunals should not generally encourage or allow overstale claims unless there is satisfactory explanation; when relief should be given depends on circumstances and particular attention should be paid to the date when the demand was first made. The court used this authority to reaffirm that laws of limitation applicable to civil courts are not mechanically applied by industrial tribunals, but nevertheless stale claims are generally not allowed without satisfactory explanation; the timing of demand is critical when deciding relief.
Jhagrakhand Collieries, Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal [1960 — II L.L.J.71] Support for the proposition that it is not fair to allow workmen benefit of an award for periods prior to the date of demand; tribunals should give attention to date of demand when deciding retrospective relief. Quoted as authority demonstrating that tribunals should refrain from granting relief for periods prior to when the dispute/demand was first raised; used to justify molding relief where a stale claim is adjudicated.
United Collieries, Ltd. v. Its Workmen [1961 — II L.L.J.75] Consistent with the above: tribunals should be cautious about retrospective relief prior to the date of demand; circumstances determine whether relief should be backdated. Cited alongside Jhagrakhand Collieries to support the principle that tribunals should consider the date of demand when determining the period for which relief may be granted.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning proceeds in discrete legal steps based solely on the statutory text and cited authorities:

  1. Statutory text of Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act: the appropriate Government "may at any time by order in writing" refer a dispute to the specified adjudicating authorities. The court read "at any time" as not admitting any statutory time-bar for making a reference under Section 10(1).
  2. Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act is a residuary provision in the Third Division that prescribes three years for "any other application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Division." The Supreme Court decision in Kerala State Electricity Board v. T.P. Kumhaliumma establishes that Article 137 applies to petitions/applications filed under any Act to a civil court.
  3. The court observed that a reference under Section 10(1) is not an application or petition to a civil court, and Labour Courts/Industrial Tribunals are not civil courts as understood in the Code of Civil Procedure. Consequently Article 137 does not apply to references under Section 10(1).
  4. Even though no period of limitation is prescribed in the Act, the court held that the legislative scheme emphasizes early settlement and industrial peace; therefore, the appropriate Government has discretion to refuse to make a reference when a claim is belated or stale. The court relied on prior authorities (including Bombay Union of Journalists and Inder Singh and Sons) to justify that the Government may consider prima facie merits and timeliness and refuse a reference that is patently frivolous or clearly belated.
  5. The court explained the practical legal consequences: (a) when a dispute becomes stale enough to justify the Government declining to refer depends on facts and circumstances of each case and is for the Government to decide in the first instance (subject to judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution); (b) it cannot be laid down as an absolute rule that the Government must refer every belated claim; (c) if the Government nonetheless refers a belated claim, the adjudicating authority can and should "mould" relief so as not to grant relief for periods prior to the date on which the dispute was raised (i.e., tribunals can limit retrospective relief).
  6. Application to the present facts: the petitioners had long delays in serving demand notices (specific dates provided). Conciliation failed. The State declined to refer solely on the ground of delay. No satisfactory explanation for the delay was offered by petitioners at conciliation or before the court. The court found no illegality in the State's refusal to refer the disputes given the established legal position.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court held that Article 137 of the Limitation Act does not apply to references under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act because such references are not applications to a civil court and Labour Courts/Tribunals are not civil courts. It further held that the appropriate Government may, in the exercise of its discretion, decline to make a reference if a claim is belated or stale. In the present case the writ petition was dismissed.

Direct implications for the parties:

  • The impugned orders of the State Government declining to refer the petitioners' disputes on the ground of delay were upheld as not illegal.
  • The writ petition challenging those refusals stands dismissed with no order as to costs.

Broader implications and precedent: The opinion reiterates and applies established authorities rather than creating a novel rule: Article 137 is confined to applications to civil courts, and the appropriate Government retains a discretion (subject to judicial review) to refuse belated references under Section 10(1). If a belated reference is made, the adjudicating authority may limit retroactive relief to reflect the date when the dispute was raised.

    Prem Singh And Others v. Labour Commissioner Punjab, Chandigarh, And Others

    Sodhi, J.:— Whether the residuary provisions of Art. 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, providing a period of three years of limitation apply to a reference under S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the Act) and if they do not apply, whether delay is a valid ground to decline a reference under S. 10 of the Act are in essence the two questions of law which we are called upon to decide. The Motion Bench while admitting this petition has, of course, formulated the following six questions but when examined in their true perspective answers to these two questions will cover all of them:

    (1) Whether termination of services can be challenged after expiry of 3 years by raising an industrial dispute and seeking reference to Labour Court for its decision?

    (2) Whether Art. 137 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963, would be applicable in case of dismissal of an employee who challenged it by raising an industrial dispute and dismissal can be challenged after expiry of three years ?

    (3) Whether Art. 137 would be applicable to Labour Court or to Industrial dispute or Tribunals?

    (4) Whether the State can refuse to make reference to Labour Court on the stale claim?

    (5) Whether State can refuse to make reference on the ground of laches?

    (6) Whether question of laches can be decided by a Labour Court alone?

    When this petition came up for motion hearing it was stated at the Bar that there was no precedent shedding any light on the question raised and since the questions were of some public importance likely to arise in a large number of cases, the present case was admitted to be heard by a Division Bench. This is how the matter has been placed before us for final disposal.

    2. As the questions raised are purely legal, it is not necessary to refer to the facts of the case at this stage. The relevant part of S. 10(1) of the Act under which a reference of an Industrial dispute can be made by an appropriate Government to any of the adjudicating authorities mentioned therein reads as under:

    “10. Reference of disputes to Boards, Courts or Tribunals: (1) Where the appropriate Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may at any time by order in writing—

    (a) refer the dispute to a Board for promoting a settlement thereof; or

    (b) refer any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to the dispute to a Court for inquiry;

    (c) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, if it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule, to a Labour Court for adjudication; or

    (d) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, whether it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule or the Third Schedule, to a Tribunal for adjudication:

    Provided***

    It would be relevant to note the provisions of Art. 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act as well which reads as under:

    Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run 137. Any other application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Division. Three years. When the right to apply accrues.

    Sub-section (1) of S. 10 quoted above empowers the appropriate Government to make a reference of an industrial dispute to the authorities enumerated therein by an order in writing. Reference can be made by the appropriate Government at any time if it is of the opinion that an industrial dispute is either existing or is apprehended. There is no period of limitation prescribed in the Act for making a reference under S. 10(1). It is for the appropriate Government which is the sole arbiter to consider as to whether it is expedient or not to make a reference. The words “at any time” used in the section do not admit of any limitation of time in making an order of reference. The scheme of industrial adjudication does not, indeed, permit the application of the laws of limitation as in the matter of deciding the question as to whether a stale claim should be entertained or not, it is always the industrial peace that has to be kept in view as the object of the Act is to maintain such peace. It is difficult to lay down a uniform rule as to when a belated claim should be entertained or not. It has to be borne in mind that the object of the Act is that for the maintenance of good relations between the management and its employees and also for the benefit of the concerned industry, the industrial disputes are settled at the earliest and it is for this purpose alone that a detailed machinery for the settlement of disputes has been provided in the Act. There may, however, be cases where settlement of disputes between an employer and his employees becomes necessary in the interest of industrial peace, no matter that the claim is belated but it will be in very rare cases. To achieve this objective of early settlement of disputes, it will be, thus, open to the appropriate Government in the exercise of its discretion not to make a reference when a claim has become stale.

    3. Article 137 of the Limitation Act which is the residuary clause in the Schedule provides for a period of limitation in a case for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the Third Division of the Schedule. This article, as held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Kerala State Electricity Board v. T.P Kumhaliumma [(1976) 4 SCC 634 : A.I.R 1977 S.C 282], “will apply to any petition or application filed under any Act to a civil Court.” A reference made to an adjudicating authority under S. 10(1) of the Act cannot by any process of reasoning be deemed to be an application or a petition under the Act and at any rate, it is not made to a civil Court. It is by now well settled that a Labour Court or an Industrial Tribunal is not a civil Court as understood under the Code of Civil Procedure. Article 137 of the Limitation Act is, therefore, clearly not attracted. The questions raised in this petition need not be examined any further as they stand answered by the Apex Court authoritatively in a number of reported decisions. In Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay [A.I.R 1964 S.C 1617], Justice Sri Gajendragadkar (as his Lordship then was) while dealing with the power of the Government to make or refuse a reference under S. 10(1) read with S. 12(5) of the Act observed as under:

    “But it would not be possible to accept the plea that the appropriate Government is precluded from considering even prima facie the merits of the dispute when it decides the question as to whether its power to make a reference should be exercised under S. 10(1) read with S. 12(5), or not. If the claim made is patently frivolous, or is clearly belated, the appropriate Government may refuse to make a reference.”

    (emphasis supplied)

    Again, in Inder Singh and Sons, Ltd. v. Their workmen [1961 — II L.L.J.89]. Justice Sri K.C Das Gupta while dealing with the question of delay in raising an industrial dispute observed as under:

    “It is true that laws of limitation which might bar any civil Court from giving remedy in respect of lawful rights are not and should not be applied by the Industrial Tribunals. On the other hand, it is a well accepted principle of industrial adjudication that overstale claims should not generally be encouraged or allowed, unless there is a satisfactory explanation for the delay. Apart from the obvious risk to industrial peace from the entertainment of claims after a long lapse of time, it is necessary also to take into account the unsettling effect this is likely to have on the employer's financial arrangements. Whether a claim has become too stale or not will depend on the circumstances of each case. In Jhagrakhand Collieries, Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal [1960 — II L.L.J.71], where a claim for extra wages under Cl.(2) of this very Kerea award came up for consideration this Court held that it would not be fair or just to allow the workmen the benefit of an increase directed by the award even prior to the date of the demand. A Similar view was taken in this Court's judgment in United Collieries, Ltd. v. Its workmen [1961 — II L.L.J.75], (ante). While these cases do not lay down an absolute proposition as suggested on behalf of the respondent that relief can in no case be granted for a period prior to the demand, they do strongly support the proposition that in deciding on the date from which the relief should be given the Industrial Tribunal ought to pay particular attention to the date when the demand was first made.”

    Thus, to sum up, it must be held that no period of limitation is prescribed for making of a reference under S. 10(1) of the Act and that provisions of Art. 137 of the Limitation Act do not apply but nevertheless the appropriate Government should refer the disputes at the earliest and it is open to the said Government to decline a reference if it is belated or sought to be raised after a long lapse of time. As to when a dispute becomes stale so as to justify the Government to decline to refer the same for adjudication will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case of which the appropriate Government would be the sole judge subject, of course, to judicial review by this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. In other words, it cannot be laid down as a proposition of law that the Government can in no case decline a belated reference and that it is for the adjudicating authority only to mould its relief in the light of the delay made in making the reference. If, however, the Government refers a dispute after a long lapse of time it would be equally open to the affected party to challenge the same in appropriate proceedings including a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. In the event of a belated reference being made and adjudicated, the adjudicating authority while granting the relief, if any, will so mould it so as not to grant any for the period prior to the date on which the dispute was raised.

    4. Having discussed the legal position, we may now refer to the facts of the present case, services of petitioner 1 were terminated on 15 May 1986 and he served a demand notice and sought to raise an industrial dispute on 30 November 1989, almost after a lapse of three and a half years. Similarly, services of petitioner 2 were terminated in August 1984, and he served the demand notice in March 1990, after nearly six years. Petitioner 3 was removed from service in August 1987 and he served the demand notice in June 1990 after about three years. Conciliation proceedings were held and they proved abortive. The State Government declined to refer the disputes sought to be raised by the petitioners solely on the ground of delay. In view of the legal position discussed above, it was open to the Government to reject the demands on the ground that they were belated. No illegality could be pointed out in the impugned orders passed by the State Government declining to refer the disputes. No explanation much less satisfactory explanation was given before the authorities during the course of conciliation proceedings. Even before us, learned counsel for the petitioners could not furnish any plausible explanation for the delay caused by the petitioners in raising the disputes regarding their non-employment.

    5. It was urged on behalf of the petitioners that the State Government could not decline to make a reference on the ground of delay and that it was a matter for the adjudicating authority to consider while granting the relief, if any. In view of the aforesaid discussion there is not merit in this contention. It is true, as already observed above that if stale claim is referred for adjudication, the adjudicating authority will not grant any relief prior to the date of demand but it does not follow that the State Government is bound to refer a belated claim.

    6. No other point was raised.

    7. In the result, there is no merit in the writ petition which stands dismissed with no order as to costs.

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    Prem Singh And Others v. Labour Commissioner Punjab, Chandigarh, And Others
    (Aug 25, 1993)