Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (A.P. Chowdhari, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This matter arises from a complaint by Narinder Singh under Sections 326, 324 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The accused — Sukhbir Singh, Ranjit Singh, Kabal Singh and Sewa Singh — were tried by the Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, Dasuya. By judgment and order dated 27 August 1985 the trial court convicted Kabal Singh and Sewa Singh substantively under Section 324 of the Penal Code and found Sukhbir Singh and Ranjit Singh guilty of the same offence with the aid of Section 34. Instead of imposing a substantive sentence, the trial court released the accused on probation for one year on furnishing bonds and sureties of Rs. 2,000 each, directed each accused to pay Rs. 100 as costs and ordered that out of this amount Rs. 200 be paid as compensation to the complainant.

The complainant (Narinder Singh) appealed seeking to set aside the acquittal under Section 326 of the Penal Code and for awarding substantive imprisonment. The factual background presented at trial (as narrated by the prosecution) was that on 1-8-1983, during heavy rain, the complainant was draining water from his lower-level house into the street. The accused objected, called Kabal Singh and his son; Kabal arrived with a gandasi and Sewa Singh with a kirpan. Sewa Singh allegedly struck the complainant's right thumb with the kirpan; Kabal Singh hit the complainant's little and ring finger with the gandasi; Sukhbir and Ranjit allegedly struck with fists and slaps. The complainant raised alarm, was rescued by his mother and another person, taken to a Primary Health Centre, and an FIR dated 5-8-1983 was lodged; a complaint was filed before the Magistrate on 16-8-1983.

At trial the prosecution examined four witnesses (the examining doctor Dr. Dewan Chand as PW-1, the complainant PW-2, the complainant's mother PW-3, and Constable Sukhwant Singh PW-4 who proved the FIR). The accused pleaded denial and sought to show the complainant had been involved in an earlier fight with another person and had compromised, thereby falsely implicating them. The trial court rejected several defence contentions but held that in absence of an X-ray the extent of the cut to bone could not be determined and therefore treated the injury as not grievous, leading to convictions under Section 324 read with Section 34 as noted above.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the material on record, Injury No. 1 (incised wound to the right thumb described by the doctor) amounted to a "grievous" injury (i.e., a fracture of bone) within the meaning of Clause (seventhly) of Section 320/Section 30 as applied by the court.
  2. Whether the evidence of exhortation (that Sukhbir Singh and Ranjit Singh exhorted Kabal Singh and Sewa Singh to assault the complainant) was sufficiently clear, cogent and reliable to sustain convictions against them.
  3. What orders, if any, should be passed on conviction and sentence in view of the factual matrix, medical evidence and applicable law.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Complainant's) Arguments (Mr. J.S. Mann)

  • A partial cut of the bone (a cut not necessarily through-and-through) amounts to a grievous injury; therefore Injury No.1 should be treated as grievous.
  • Presence of "crepitations" found on probing implied a fracture (cut bone), supporting a finding of grievous injury.
  • The doctor did not advise an X-ray for Injury No.1 (but did advise it for Injury No.3), indicating the doctor was satisfied that Injury No.1 was grievous.
  • The medico-legal report (Exhibit PW1.A) recorded Injury No.1 as grievous; reliance placed on State of Punjab v. Naib Singh and Hori Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Jagir Singh v. State of Punjab.

Respondents' (Accused's) Arguments (Mr. P.S. Hundal)

  • The burden to prove bone was cut and the extent of the cut lay on the prosecution; since no X-ray was done this burden was not discharged.
  • At most the material suggested a partial cut which did not amount to grievous injury within Clause (seventhly) of Section 320 (Section 30 (seventhly) as referred in the opinion).
  • Relied on Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab (1979) 81 Punjab Law Reports 37 for the proposition that absence of indication as to extent of cut bone means the offence does not fall within clause (seventhly) of Section 320.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hori Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1970) 1 SCC 8 : AIR 1970 SC 1969 The principle that a bone need not be cut through and through to amount to a fracture under Clause (seventhly) of Section 320; a break by cutting, splintering, rupture or fissure in the bone suffices to constitute a fracture. The court held Hori Lal squarely applicable and applied its test to conclude that Injury No.1 involved a fracture of bone and hence was grievous.
State of Punjab v. Naib Singh (ILR (1978/1979) 2 Punjab and Haryana 32) (Division Bench) Followed Hori Lal's principle regarding partial cut/splintering constituting fracture. The court noted this Division Bench decision followed Hori Lal and treated it as supporting the proposition that a partial cut could amount to fracture; the decision was relied upon by the court as consistent precedent.
Naib Singh v. State Of Punjab (1986) 4 SCC 401 : AIR 1986 SC 2192 The Supreme Court affirmed the Division Bench in State of Punjab v. Naib Singh and reiterated the law in Hori Lal. The opinion records that the Division Bench decision in Naib Singh was affirmed by the Supreme Court, and that this affirmation reiterated the Hori Lal principle; the court relied on this to uphold the application of Hori Lal.
Jagir Singh v. State of Punjab (1983) 2 Recent Criminal Reports 1 (Punjab and Haryana) Followed the law in Hori Lal that a partial cut/splintering/fissure in bone can amount to fracture. Referenced as one of the decisions that followed Hori Lal and supportive of treating Injury No.1 as a fracture.
Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab (1979) 81 Punjab Law Reports 37 Held (by a single Judge) that where extent of cut to bone is not indicated, the offence would not fall within clause (seventhly) of Section 320. The court rejected reliance on Balwant Singh, stating that it was based on earlier Rangoon/Patna decisions which had been overruled and therefore was not a correct statement of law; Balwant Singh was held to be of no assistance to the accused.
Maung Po Yi v. Ma E. Tin, AIR 1937 Rangoon 253 and Mukutdhari Singh v. Emperor, AIR 1942 Patna 376 : 1942 (43) Cri LJ 511 Earlier contrary view (to Hori Lal) about requirement for cut-through or displacement to constitute fracture. The court noted these earlier decisions do not hold the field because they were expressly overruled in Hori Lal; therefore they cannot be relied upon and were distinguished.
UJS Chopra v. State of Bombay, 955 SCJ 603 (and Nirbhay Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1970) 2 SCJ 1) Principle that an accused whose appeal was summarily dismissed is nonetheless entitled to show cause against enhancement of sentence; summary dismissal does not preclude him from contesting enhancement or related proceedings. The court cited these authorities to hold that even though Sukhbir Singh and Ranjit Singh did not file an appeal against their conviction, it was open to them to assail the conviction or contest enhancement in the appeal filed by the State; the principle was invoked to permit the accused to argue against their convictions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in two main strands: (A) determination of whether Injury No.1 amounted to a grievous injury (a fracture of bone) and (B) evaluation of the sufficiency of evidence of exhortation against Sukhbir Singh and Ranjit Singh.

(A) Injury No.1 — grievous or simple?

  • The court first reproduced the doctor's description of the injuries (three incised wounds with measurements, noting for Injury No.1 that probing revealed the bone in the region was cut and there were crepitations; wound filled with fresh blood).
  • It then considered submissions: complainant's counsel relied on the medico-legal report and precedent (Hori Lal and related cases) to argue that a partial cut of bone qualifies as a fracture; defence counsel emphasised absence of X-ray and urged that without proof of extent of cut, the injury should not be held grievous.
  • The court held that the point was squarely covered by the law in Hori Lal's case, which establishes that it is not necessary that a bone be cut through and through or that the crack extend from outer to inner surface; a break by cutting, splintering, rupture or fissure amounts to a fracture within the meaning of Clause (seventhly) of Section 320. The court quoted the passage from Hori Lal setting out that test.
  • The court observed that Hori Lal had been followed by the Division Bench in State of Punjab v. Naib Singh and by a single Judge in Jagir Singh, and that Naib Singh (Division Bench) was later affirmed by the Supreme Court (Naib Singh v. State Of Punjab), which reiterated Hori Lal's law.
  • The court rejected the contrary approach taken in earlier Rangoon and Patna decisions (Maung Po Yi and Mukutdhari Singh) as having been overruled by the Supreme Court in Hori Lal, and it concluded that the single-judge decision in Balwant Singh was based on those overruled authorities and therefore was not a correct statement of law.
  • Applying the settled test from Hori Lal to the doctor’s findings (bone cut on probing, crepitations), the court concluded that Injury No.1 involved a fracture of the bone and was therefore grievous.

(B) Exhortation and convictions of Sukhbir Singh and Ranjit Singh

  • The court accepted the respondents' submission that evidence of exhortation is inherently a weak species of evidence and must be clear, cogent and reliable before a conviction can be sustained on that basis.
  • The court noted that the slaps and fist blows allegedly by Sukhbir and Ranjit were not corroborated by medical evidence.
  • On this basis the court found merit in the contention that conviction for exhortation against Sukhbir Singh and Ranjit Singh could not be sustained.
  • The court further relied on authorities (UJS Chopra and Nirbhay Singh) to hold that even though Sukhbir and Ranjit had not filed an appeal against their conviction, it was open to them to challenge their conviction in the appeal filed by the State in respect of acquittal under Section 326 read with Section 34 and on sentence adequacy grounds; the court therefore entertained the argument on their behalf.

Overall disposition in reasoning: The court combined the application of settled precedent on fracture (Hori Lal and subsequent affirmations) with an evidential assessment on exhortation and medical corroboration to reach its conclusions on guilt and sentence.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

  • The court held that Injury No.1 involved a fracture of bone and was therefore a grievous injury.
  • Consequently, the court set aside the earlier acquittal (as proceeded from the trial court's treatment) in part and adjusted convictions as follows (as stated in the opinion): the court set aside the conviction of Sukhbir Singh and Ranjit Singh and acquitted them of the charge; it set aside the acquittal of Sewa Singh and Kabal Singh under the provision mentioned in the opinion and convicted Sewa Singh under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code and convicted Kabal Singh under the provisions referred to in the opinion (Section 3-6 read with Section 34 and Section 324 of the Penal Code as recorded in the text).
  • Sentence imposed: Sewa Singh and Kabal Singh were sentenced to imprisonment "till rising of Court" and to pay fines of Rs. 200 and Rs. 1,000 respectively; in default of payment each will undergo three months rigorous imprisonment. The accused were allowed one month to pay the fines. (The opinion concludes "Order according.")

Implications:

  • The immediate consequence is a reallocation of criminal liability among the accused: Sewa Singh and Kabal Singh are held guilty of more serious offences (including Section 326 for Sewa Singh according to the opinion) while Sukhbir Singh and Ranjit Singh are acquitted.
  • The court applied and reiterated established precedent (notably Hori Lal and subsequent affirmations) on what constitutes fracture for purposes of Clause (seventhly) of Section 320; the opinion treats that principle as settled law and applies it to the medical findings in this case.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down a new legal principle; it applies existing authorities to the facts and adjusts convictions and sentences accordingly.

Note: All statements above are based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion. Textual references, section numbers and citations are presented as they appear in the opinion.

    Narinder Singh v. Sukhbir Singh And Ors.

    A.P Chowdhari, J.:— Sukhbir Singh (18), Ranjit Singh (35), Kabal Singh (70) and Sewa Singh (45) were tried by the Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, Dasuya on a complaint filed by Narinder Singh under Sections 326/324/34 of the Penal Code. By judgment and order dated August 27, 1985. Kabal Singh and Sewa Singh were substantively convicted under Section 324 of the Penal Code and the co-accused Sukhbir Singh and Ranjit Singh were convicted for the said offence with the aid of Section 34 of the Penal Code. Inste'ad of any sentence the accused were directed to be released on probation for a period of one year on their furnishing bond and surety to the extent of Rs. 2,000/- each. Each of the accused was further directed to pay Rs. 100/- as costs of the proceeding and out of this amount Rs. 200/- were directed to be paid as compensation to the complainant. Aggrieved by the judgment, the complainant Narinder Singh has preferred this appeal for setting aside the acquittal under Section 326 of the Penal Code and for awarding substantive sentence of imprisonment against the accused.

    2. According to the prosecution, the parties belong to village Alharpind and are neighbours. On 1-8-1983 it was raining heavily. At about 4 p.m the rain water entered the house of the complainant which is at a lower level compared to the street on which it abuts. The complainant started draining out the water into the street with the help of a Kassi. The accused Sukhbir Singh and Ranjit Singh were returning from their fields. They took objection to the discharge of the water in the street. They called the co-accused Kabal Singh and his son. Kabal Singh appeared on the scene with a Gandasi and Sewa Singh with a Kirpan. Sukhbir Singh and Ranjit Singh exhorted the co-accused, upon which Sewa Singh gave a Kirpan blow hitting the right thumb of the complainant. Kabal Singh gave a blow with Gandasi which hit the little finger and the ring finger of the right hand of the complainant. Sukhbir Singh and Kanjit Singh belaboured the complainant with fists and slaps. The complainant raised alarm which attracted his mother Smt. Raghbir Kaur (PW-3) and Pargat Singh who bad come to house of the complainant. They rescued the complainant from further assault. The injured was taken to Primary Health Centre, Tanda. He was examined. Later on the matter was also reported to the police vide FIR Exhibit PW 4 A dated August 5, 1983, but the police failed to take any action and accordingly a complaint was filed before the Magistrate on August 16, 1983.

    3. At the trial, the complainant examined four witnesses. PW-1 is Dr. Dewan Chand who examined the injured at 7.15 p.m on the day of occurrence. PW-2 is Narinder Singh complainant himself. PW-3 is mother of the injured Smt Raghbir Kaur and PW-4 is Constable Sukhwant Singh who proved first information report Exhibit PW 4.A.

    4. The plea of the accused was one of denial. The accused further tried to show that in fact the complainant bad a fight with one Amrik Singh son of Sucha Singh of village Johal. In that occurrence Amrik Singh had suffered several injuries. The complainant and said Amrik Singh entered into a compromise and thereafter the complainant had falsely implicated the present accused. The accused examined a number of witnesses in defence.

    5. The trial Court repelled the various contentions raised on behalf of the accused. It was, however, held that in the absence of the X-ray which had admittedly not been done, the extent of the cut of the bone could not be determined and the same could not therefore, be considered to be grievous in nature. In this view of the matter, the trial Court convicted Kabal Singh and Sewa Singh under Section 324 and the remaining accused with the aid of Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.

    6. The main question which arises for consideration in this appeal is — whether on the basis of the material on record, injury No. 1 on the person of Narinder Singh can be considered grievous or simple. In order to determine this question, it is necessary to reproduce the injuries found on the person of Narinder Singh as described by Dr. Dewan Chand PW-1:—

    1. Incised wound 1.8 cm × 0.3 cm × bone deep right thumb inside 2.5 cm below root of thumb. On probing, bone in the reigion was cut and there were crepitations. Wound was filled with fresh blood.

    2. Incised wound on palmer aspect of right ring finger. The wound was 1 cm below base of finger.

    3. incised wound 2 cm × 0.4 cm × bone deep, palmer side of right little finger with fresh blood. Wound was 0.5 cm below root of finger. Injury kept under observation till X-ray.

    7. Mr J.S Mann, learned counsel for the complainant, contended that a partial cut of the bone, as distinguished from a cut through and through of the bone, amounts to a grievous injury. He further submitted that the presence of crepitations which implied the typical sound of a broken bone on the affected part being moved clinched the issue that the doctor found a bane cut. He highlighted the fact that while Dr. Dewan Chand advised X ray for injury No. 3, he did not advise X ray for injury No. 1, for the obvious reason that he was satisfied that injury No. 1 was grievous in nature on account of fracture of the bone. Learned counsel also emphasised the fact that as the doctor did not entertain any doubt about the nature of the injury being grievous, he had declared injury No. 1 to be grievous in the medico-legal report Exhibit PW1.A. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance on State of Punjab v. Naib Singh. ILR (1979) 2 Punjab and Haryana 32 in which Hori Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1970) 1 SCC 8 : AIR 1970 SC 1969, was followed. He also referred to Jagir Singh v. State of Punjab, (1983) 2 Recent Criminal Reports 1 (Punjab and Haryana).

    8. The contention of Mr. P.S Hundal, learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, is that the burden of proving that the bone was cut and further to prove the extent of the cut was on the prosecution. Admittedly, no X ray was done and the material on record at the most suggested that there was a partial cut of the bone which did not amount to a grievous injury as defiled in Section 30 (seventhly) of the Penal Code. He placed reliance on Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, (1979) 81 Punjab Law Reports 37, in which a learned single Judge of this Court held that where there was no indication regarding extent of the cut bone, the offence would not fall within the mischief of clause (seventhly) of Section 320 of the Indian Penal Code.

    9. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the respective submissions of the learned counsel 10, The point in question does not require any lengthy discussion as it is squarely covered by the law laid down by the Apex Court in Hori Lal's case (1970 Cri LJ 1665) (supra). Therein, it was laid down as under (at p. 1667 of Cri LJ:—

    “It is not necessary that a bone should be cut through and through or that the crack must extend from the outer to the inner surface or that there should be displacement of any fragment of the bone If there is a break by cutting or splintering of the bone or there is a rupture or fissure in it, it would amount to a fracture within the meaning of Clause 7 of Section 320. What the Court has to see is whether the cuts in the bones noticed in the injury report are only superficial or do they effect a break in them”

    10. The law laid down in Hori Lal's case (SC) was followed by a Division Bench of this Court in State of Punjab v. Naib Singh, ILR (1978) 2 Punjab and Haryana 32, and a learned single Judge in Jagir Singh v. State of Punjab, (1983) 2 Recent Cri Reports 1. The decision of Division Bench in Naib Singh's case (supra) was affirmed by the Apex Court in Naib Singh v. State Of Punjab., (1986) 4 SCC 401 : AIR 1986 SC 2192. The law in Hori Lal's case was reiterated.

    11. There can, therefore, be no manner of doubt that the settled law is that in order to constitute fracture of bone within the meaning of Clause (seventhly) of Section 3 0, it is not necessary that a bone should be cut through and through or that the crack must extend from the outer to the inner surface of that there should be displacement of any fragment of the bone. The view to the contrary which was held in Maung Po Yi v. Ma E. Tin, AIR 1937 Rangoon 253 and followed in Mukutdhari Singh v. Emperor AIR 1942 Patna 376 : 1942 (43) Cri LJ 511, does not held the tield. It appears that the fact that the above decisions of Rangoon and Patna High Courts had been expressly overruled in Hiri Lal's case (1970 Cri LJ 1965) by the Supreme Court, was not brought to the notice of the learned single Judge who decided Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, 1979) 81 Punjab LR 37 For the foregoing reasons, the statement of law in Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab is not a correct statement as it is based on decisions which had earlier been expressly overruled by the Supreme Court. It follows that Balwant Singh's case which has been relied on by Shri Hundal, can be of no assistance to the accused.

    12. This brings us to a consideration of the next important question arising in this appeal. Shri Hundal vehemently contended that the main allegation against Sukhbir Singh and Ranjit Singh, accused was that they exhorted co-accused Kabal Singh and Sewa Singh to assault Narinder Singh complainant. The evidence of exbortion is, in the very nature of things a weak piece of evidence. There is quite often a tendency to implicate some person, in addition to the actual assailant by attributing to that person an exhortation to the assailant to assault the victim. Unless the evidence in this respect is clear, cogent and reliable, no conviction for abstment can be recorded against the person alleged to have exhorted the actual assailant. This is especially so in the facts of this case as the slaps and fist blows alleged to have been given by Sukhbir Singh and Raujit Singh are not borne out by the medical evidence. We find merit in the contention. Even though Sukhbir Singh and Ranjit Singh have not filed an appeal against their conviction under Section 324 of the Penal Code, it is open to them to assail their conviction in the appeal filed by the State in so far as their acquittal under Section 326 read with Sec. 34 and on the ground of inadequacy of the sentence imposed on them by the trial Court is concerned. In UJS Chopra v. State of Bombay. 955 SCJ 603, the aooellant Chopra was convicted by the Trial Magistrate of an offence under the Bombay Prohibition Act. His appeal to the High Court of Bombay was summarily dismissed. Thereafter the State of Bombay applied to the High Court of Bombay for an order for enhancement of sentence and notice was issued to Chopra to show cause against enhancement of the sentence. Chopra pleaded that he was entitled to show cause against the order of conviction. The Supreme Court held that the summary dismisaal of the appeal preferred by Chopra did not preclude him from showing cause against his conviction even though his appeal was summarily dismissed (See also Nirbhay Singh v. State of Madbya Pradesh, (1970) 2 SCJ 1).

    13. In our view, therefore, it is open to Sb. Hundal to argue against the conviction of Sukhir Singh and Ranjit Singh even though they have not challenged the order of conviction by filing an appeal.

    14. Though we have held that injury No. 1 involved fracture of bone and was, therefore, grievous in nature, it was at the root of thumb while two other injuries attributed to Kabal Singh were on the little finger and ring finger of the complainant. All the three injures were thus on a non-vital part of the body They were inflicted as far back as August, 1983. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case and for the foregoing reasons we set aside the conviction of Sukhbir Singh and Ranjit Singh and acquit them of the charge. We set aside the acquittal of Sewa Singh and Kabal Singh under Section 26 and convict Sewa Singh under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code and Kabal Singh under Section 3-6 read with Section 34 and Section 324 of the Penal Code. In view of the peculiar facts herein before mentioned we sentence Sewa Singh and Kabal Singh to imprisonment till rising of Court and fine of Rs. 200/- and Rs. 1000/- respectively. In default of payment of fine, the defaulting accused shall uadergo three months R.I The accused are allowed one month to p??? the fine.

    Order according.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Narinder Singh v. Sukhbir Singh And Ors.
    (Sep 25, 1991)