AMICUS AI
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citation codes
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  • Section 42 of the East Punjab Holding (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act. 1948 (for short, hereinafter referred to as the Act)
  • PUNJAB VILLAGE COMMON LANDS REGULATION ACT 1961
  • Rule 16(ii) of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Rules, 1949
  • Rule 18 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Rules, 1949,
  • SECTION 11 PUNJAB VILLAGE COMMON LANDS REGULATION ACT
  • Section 2(g) of the Village Common Lands Act
  • Section 11 of the Village Common Lands Act,
  • provisions of Rule 16(ii) of the Rules,
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Cites
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
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Acts
  • Section 42 of the East Punjab Holding (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act. 1948 (for short, hereinafter referred to as the Act)
  • PUNJAB VILLAGE COMMON LANDS REGULATION ACT 1961
  • Rule 16(ii) of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Rules, 1949
  • Rule 18 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Rules, 1949,
  • SECTION 11 PUNJAB VILLAGE COMMON LANDS REGULATION ACT
  • Section 2(g) of the Village Common Lands Act
  • Section 11 of the Village Common Lands Act,
  • provisions of Rule 16(ii) of the Rules,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The writ petitioners challenged an order of the Director of Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, passed under Section 42 of the East Punjab Holding (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. The petitioners were in possession of various parcels of land that the revenue record described as Shamlat deh and which had been mutated in the name of the Gram Panchayat in 1956-57 under the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (the Village Common Lands Act). In August 1985, certain right-holders of the village (respondents 3–6 and others) filed a petition under Section 42 of the Act contending that the land was Banjar Qadim and should be apportioned among the proprietors and khewatdars pro rata. They argued that the Director had no jurisdiction to hold the land vested in the Gram Panchayat, that the petition was time-barred, and that the correct remedy lay under Section 11 of the Village Common Lands Act before the Collector.

The proprietors (respondents 3–26) filed a joint written statement asserting that, prior to consolidation, the land was recorded as banjar/banjar qadim in individual possession (Maqbooza Malkan) and assessed as bila lagan bawajah qabza sab ka hissedari, and that it could not vest in the Gram Panchayat. The Gram Panchayat denied allegations of collusion and had earlier challenged the consolidation order in CWP No. 147/1986, which was dismissed by a Bench of the High Court and that dismissal was upheld by the Supreme Court. The proprietors sought vacation of an interim stay previously granted to the writ petitioners; the writ petitioners replied alleging collusion by the Sarpanch with the proprietors.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the land in dispute was properly held to be Shamlat deh (village common land) and vested in the Gram Panchayat under the Village Common Lands Act, or whether it was banjar/banjar qadim in individual possession and therefore subject to partition among proprietors.
  2. Whether the Director of Consolidation of Holdings had jurisdiction under Section 42 of the Consolidation Act to entertain and decide the petition filed by the right-holders (including questions of limitation and competence).
  3. Whether a writ petition challenging the Director's order was maintainable in view of alternative statutory remedy under Section 11 of the Village Common Lands Act (i.e., the Collector's jurisdiction to adjudicate claims regarding lands vested in the Panchayat).
  4. Whether the writ petitioners (lessees/occupants) were entitled to be impleaded as parties to the proceedings under Section 42 and whether their non-impleadment vitiated the impugned order for want of natural justice/opportunity of hearing.
  5. Whether the bar of limitation under Rule 18 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Rules, 1949 (six months) applied to the challenge to the consolidation scheme and re-partition.

Arguments of the Parties

Writ Petitioners' (Appellants') Arguments

  • The land vested in the Gram Panchayat under the Village Common Lands Act and, once vested, could not be divested.
  • The Director of Consolidation had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition under Section 42 because the petition was time-barred.
  • The petitioners were not made parties to the proceedings under Section 42; thus the order was passed behind their back and is vitiated for want of opportunity of hearing.
  • Counsel referred to Section 2(g) of the Village Common Lands Act to support the claim that the land qualified as shamilat deh.

Proprietors / Right-holders' (Respondents') Arguments

  • The disputed land was recorded prior to consolidation as banjar / banjar qadim in the individual cultivating possession of the khewatdars (entered in cultivation column as Maqbooza Malkan and in assessment as bila lagan bawajah qabza sab ka hissedari).
  • The Director of Consolidation was justified in partitioning the land among proprietors as per entries in the Wajib-ul-Arz and the re-partition scheme; there was no limitation bar to a petition under Section 42 when the validity of the re-partition and the scheme itself was attacked.
  • They placed on record the dismissal of CWP No. 147/1986 (Gram Panchayat v. Director) and its subsequent affirmance by the Supreme Court to support their position regarding the consolidation authorities' actions and issues of stay.

Gram Panchayat's Position

  • The Gram Panchayat denied allegations of collusion with the proprietors and stated it had pursued its remedy by filing CWP No. 147/1986 (which was dismissed).
  • Impliedly, the Panchayat maintained its claim of title based on mutation into its name under the Village Common Lands Act; however, the Gram Panchayat was unable to rebut the factual entries in the revenue records as noted by the consolidation authorities.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477 Limits of writ jurisdiction: when a writ of certiorari can correct findings of fact (e.g., admission/refusal of admissible evidence, findings based on no evidence) and distinction between errors of fact and errors of law. The Court relied on this authority to explain that it cannot substitute its view for the Tribunal's/inferior authority's factual findings unless they fall within the narrow categories permitting interference; used to reject a broad factual re-appraisal of the Director's findings.
Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, (1955) 1 SCR 1104 : AIR 1955 SC 233 Supportive authority cited in Syed Yakoob for limitations on certiorari in relation to factual findings. Cited (through Syed Yakoob) as one of the authorities delineating the High Court's writ jurisdiction over factual findings recorded by tribunals.
Nagendra Nath v. Commissioner of Hills Division, 1958 SCR 1240 : AIR 1958 SC 398 Another authority referenced (via Syed Yakoob) on limits of writ interference with factual findings. Referred to in support of the principle limiting interference with findings of fact by writ jurisdiction.
Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1168 Also referenced as authority on the scope of writ relief vis-à-vis factual findings. Referred to as part of the legal framework explaining when factual findings can be challenged by writ.
Jagtar Singh v. Addl. Director of Consolidation of Holdings, 1984 Pun LJ 222 : AIR 1984 Punj & Har 216 (Full Bench) Interpretation of limitation (Rule 18 of the Consolidation Rules) — when the six-month bar does or does not apply to challenges. The Court relied on this Full Bench decision to conclude that Rule 18's six-month bar was not attracted because the right-holders attacked the validity of the scheme and re-partition rather than simply challenging a particular consolidation order.
Nek Singh v. State of Punjab through Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings & others, CWP No. 2820/1986 (decided Aug. 12, 1986) Authority on whether lessees/annual occupiers have a right to be impleaded in Section 42 proceedings between proprietors and Gram Panchayat. The Court treated this decision as directly on point and adopted its reasoning that annual lessees/occupants do not have a right to be impleaded as respondents in a dispute between proprietors and the Gram Panchayat.
Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1909 Permissibility of review by High Court under Article 226 and the application of natural justice where persons affected were not made parties; analogous application to tribunals' power to correct mistakes for justice. The Court invoked this decision to support the proposition that tribunals/courts can, on principles analogous to review, correct mistakes and afford parties an opportunity to be heard where required by justice.
1977 Pun LJ 276 (Full Bench) Cited by petitioners' counsel to argue that land not in use for common purposes could not be transferred to Gram Panchayat. Referenced in the Director's findings as a cited authority; the Gram Panchayat could not effectively rebut the plea. The court accepted the Director's appraisal of the record rather than making a fresh legal ruling based on this citation.
Narinder Nath Sachdeva v. Bhajan Lal, 1982 Pun LJ 243 Cited by petitioners' counsel in support of the argument that they were entitled to be heard. The Court observed that this authority had no bearing on the facts of the instant case and did not apply to give lessees the right to be impleaded in Section 42 proceedings between proprietors and Panchayat.
Gram Panchayat of Village Serohi Behali v. Har Lal, (1971) 73 Pun LR 1009 Cited by petitioners' counsel regarding entitlement to be heard. The Court held this authority inapplicable to the present factual matrix and did not rely on it to support petitioners' locus to be impleaded.
Ajit Singh v. Smt. Subaghan, AIR 1970 Punj & Har 93 (Full Bench) Cited by petitioners' counsel for the proposition regarding hearing/party rights. The Court considered it in argument but concluded it did not bear upon the circumstances of the present case and therefore did not apply it to grant petitioners party status.
Gram Panchayat, Akar v. Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, CWP No. 147/1986 Record of earlier constitutional challenge by the Gram Panchayat to consolidation action; the High Court dismissed that writ and the Supreme Court refused special leave or otherwise upheld the dismissal. Respondents relied on the dismissal of that writ (and the Supreme Court's action) to argue against the writ petitioners' claim for continuation of interim relief; the Court noted this fact in the procedural background and as supporting the respondents' stance on earlier challenges.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by examining statutory definitions, consolidation rules, the consolidation authority's factual findings based on the revenue record, and the proper scope of writ interference.

1. Statutory definition and primary factual assessment: The Court examined Section 2(g) of the Village Common Lands Act (definition of "shamilat deh") and concluded, on the record before it, that the land in dispute did not fall within that definition. The petitioners had not produced material to show the land was recorded as shamilat deh or that it was described as banjar qadim and used for common purposes prior to consolidation. The Court noted that the consolidation scheme already provided adequate shamilat deh land for village/common purposes; any excess land taken from proprietors by a pro rata cut deserved redistribution to proprietors according to their rights.

2. Application of Consolidation Rules: Rule 16(ii) of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Rules, 1949 was quoted to show the treatment of land reserved for village panchayat and common purposes and that proprietary rights in respect of land so reserved vest in the proprietary body; if land had been deducted illegally contrary to Rule 16(ii), it had to be restored to proprietors.

3. Appraisal of Director's findings: The Director of Consolidation had examined the revenue records and observed that the relevant area was mostly banjar and banjar qadim in individual possession (entries: Maqbooza Malkan in cultivation column; assessment recorded as bila lagan bawajah qabza sab ka hissedari). Mutations transferring land to the Gram Panchayat (specifically mutation No. 386 dated 12-6-56) were found by the Director to be illegal, non est, and not sanctioned by authority. The Director concluded that an area (2263K-16M, excluding parts used for common purposes during consolidation) should be distributed among shareholders per the jamabandi of 1951-52, which the Director regarded as the authentic inherited record.

4. Reviewability of factual findings: The Court emphasized the limited scope of writ interference with findings of fact: errors of law apparent on the record can be corrected by writ, but not mere errors of fact. The Court relied on Syed Yakoob (and the authorities cited therein) to explain that findings of fact can only be upset on certiorari in narrow circumstances (e.g., no evidence, admission/refusal of admissible evidence, or influence of inadmissible evidence), and that the adequacy of evidence and inferences drawn remain within the tribunal's domain. Applying that principle, the Court found no material to conclude that the Director's factual appraisal was vitiated.

5. Availability of alternate statutory remedy: The Court observed that Section 11 of the Village Common Lands Act provides a statutory mechanism for any person claiming right, title or interest in land vested (or deemed vested) in the Panchayat to submit a claim to the Collector within prescribed time; the Collector's order is appealable to the Commissioner. The Court held that petitioners could have availed themselves of this remedy and therefore could not fault the Director's order in these writ proceedings except within the confined limits established by the Apex Court in Syed Yakoob.

6. Limitation: The Full Bench decision in Jagtar Singh was applied to hold that the six-month bar under Rule 18 of the Consolidation Rules did not apply where right-holders attacked the validity of the scheme and the re-partition rather than simply challenging a consolidation order; accordingly the limitation objection failed on the facts.

7. Party status and opportunity to be heard: The Court rejected the submission that the impugned order was vitiated because the petitioners were not made parties. It viewed the dispute as primarily between proprietors and the Gram Panchayat; the petitioners (who had obtained the property by annual auction/lease from the Gram Panchayat) had no right to be impleaded as respondents in Section 42 proceedings. The Court relied on the reasoning in Nek Singh (CWP No. 2820/1986) and related authorities to conclude that annual lessees/occupants do not have locus standi to be made parties in such proceedings. The Court also observed that the petitioners could have sought a fresh order from the Director after being afforded an opportunity to be heard.

8. Natural justice / review principle: The Court noted the general principle (citing Shivdeo Singh) that courts and tribunals possess inherent powers to prevent miscarriage of justice and to correct grave and palpable errors — including affording a hearing where persons affected were not made parties — but considered its application limited by the facts: here the petitioners were temporary lessees and not proper parties to the contest between proprietors and the Panchayat.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition was dismissed. The core ruling is stated as follows:

Writ petition dismissed.

Implications and direct effects:

  • The Court upheld the Director of Consolidation of Holdings' factual finding that the land in dispute was not shamilat deh and did not vest in the Gram Panchayat, and accepted the Director's conclusion that certain mutations (notably mutation No. 386 dated 12-6-56) were illegal and non est.
  • The area identified by the Director (2263K-16M, excluding portions used for common purposes during consolidation) was to be distributed among the shareholders in accordance with the jamabandi of 1951-52, as per the Director's order; the Court found no infirmity in that order warranting interference in these proceedings.
  • The petitioners (annual lessees/occupants) were not entitled to be impleaded as parties to Section 42 proceedings between proprietors and the Gram Panchayat; their challenge on that ground failed.
  • The petitioners had an alternate remedy under Section 11 of the Village Common Lands Act (to bring claims before the Collector) which they could have pursued; the Court rejected the contention that the Director lacked jurisdiction for that reason.
  • No broader or new precedent was laid down by this opinion; the Court applied existing precedents and statutory provisions to the facts and confirmed the Director's order. The direct consequence is the dismissal of the writ petition and the continuation of the consolidation authority's redistribution as upheld by the Court.

Disposition and Ancillary Orders

The writ petition was dismissed with each party to bear its own costs. C.M. No. 2372 of 1987 was allowed. The other connected miscellaneous applications (C.M. Nos. 2116, 2371 and 2906 of 1987 and 5230 of 1988) were rendered infructuous by the decision in the main case.

Note: This summary has been prepared strictly from the contents of the provided opinion and does not add, infer, or supplement facts or holdings beyond those expressly contained in the opinion.

    Joginder Singh And Others v. Director, Consolidation Of Holdings, Punjab And Others

    1. The writ petitioners have challenged the order of the Director of Consolidation of Holdings Punjab passed under Section 42 of the East Punjab Holding (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act. 1948 (for short, hereinafter referred to as the Act) in this petition.

    2. The brief facts as unfolded in the writ petition are these. The petitioners are in possession of different parcels of land under the Gram Panchayat (respondent 2). The land was described as Shamlat deh in the revenue record and owned by the Gram Panchayat. It was mutated in the name of the Gram Panchayat in the year 1956-57 under the provisions of Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act. 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Village Common Lands Act).

    3. The right holders of the village, including respondents 3 to 6. preferred a petition under Section 42 of the Act before the Director of Consolidation of Holdings. Punjab, in Aug. 1985. contending that the land in dispute was Banjar Qadim and according to the entry in the Wajib-ul-Arz of the village it had to be apportioned among the proprietors and Khewatdars of the village pro rata of their holdings in the revenue estate, that the Director of Consolidation of Holdings had no jurisdiction to hold that the land in dispute vested in the Gram Panchayat and was liable to be partitioned among the proprietors; that the petition had been filed after a lapse of 25 years; no petition under Section 42 of the Act could be filed challenging the title of the Gram Panchayat over the land in dispute and the proper remedy lay under Section 11 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act. and that the Collector was the proper authority to decide whether the land vested in the Gram Panchayat or not.

    4. Respondents 3 to 26 who are the proprietors filed a joint written statement. They controverted the allegations made by the petitioners in the writ petition and averred that the disputed land was described in the Record of rights prior to consolidation as banjar and banjar quadim in the individual cultivating possession of the Khewatdars, and in the column of cultivation it was recorded as in possession of Malkan (owners) while in the column pertaining to assessment it was recorded as bila lagan bawajah kabza sab ka hissedari (without payment of rent being in possession of co-sharers); that it could not vest in the Gram Panchayat and the Director of Consolidation of Holdings was perfectly justified to partition the land as per rules on the basis of entries in the Wajib-ul-arz and there was no bar of limitation to a petition under Section 42 of the Act when the re-partition and the scheme has been challenged.

    5. The Gram Panchayat respondent, through its Sarpanch, filed an affidavit dt/-April 25, 1986, in which the allegation that the order of the Director of Consolidation of Holdings was passed in favour of the proprietors in collusion with the Sarpanch, Gram Panchyat, was denied, and it was urged that the Gram Panchayat had challenged the order of the Director of Consolidation through C.W.P. No. 147/1986 titled as Gram Panchayat, Akar v. Director, Consolidation of Holdings. Punjab, Chandigarh and 24 others.

    6. Respondents 3 to 26 through C.M. No. 2116/87 sought vacation of the stay order granted in favour of the writ petitioners and placed on record a copy of the order passed by a Bench of this Court In C.W.P. No. 147/1986 (supra) dismissing the writ petition filed by the Gram Panchayat. The order of the Bench of this Court was upheld by the Supreme Court of India in Special Leave Petition filed by the G ram Panchayat.

    6A. The writ petitioners filed reply to C.M. No. 2116/87 (supra). They did not dispute the facts mentioned by the right-holders in the civil miscellaneous but the gravamen of the charge was that the Sarpanch was in collusion with the right-holders and he was not protecting the interests of the Gram Panchayat.

    7. Mr. P.K. Palli, the learned senior advocate, made the following submissions : --

    (a) that the land vested in the Gram Panchayat under the Village Common Lands Act. The land which once vested in the Gram Panchayat could not be divested;

    (b) that the Director of Consolidation of Holdings had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition under Section 42 of the Act as it was time-barred;

    (c) that the petitioners were not made ' parties, i.e., respondents to the petition under Section 42 of the Act, so, the order passed at their back stands vitiated.

    The learned counsel drew our attention to Section 2(g) of. the Village Common Lands Act which reads as under : --

    -'2(g) 'shamilat deh' includes --

    (1) lands described in the revenue records as Shamilat Deh excluding abadi deh;

    (2) Shamilat tikkas;

    (3) lands described in the revenue records as shamilat tarafs, patties, pannas and tholas used according to revenue records for the benefit of the village community or a part thereof or for common purposes of the village;

    (4) lands used or reserved for the benefit of village community including streets, lanes, playgrounds, schools, drinking wells or ponds within abadi deh or gorah deh, and (5) lands in any village described as banjar qadim and used for common purposes of the village according to revenue records :

    but does not include land which -

    A reading of the definition of shamilat deh contained in Section 2(g) of the Village Common Lands Act clearly shows that the land in dispute does not come within the ambit of shamilat deh. 11 is not described in the revenue records as shamilat deh. The writ petitioners have not placed any material on record to enable us to draw an inference that the land was recorded as shamilat deh in the record of rights or was described as banjar quadim and used for common purposes of the village prior to consolidation. Even otherwise, in the scheme of consolidation there existed adequate shamilat deh land for common purposes, including the purpose of the Gram Panchayat. The excess land secured from the Proprietors by imposing a pro rata cut deserves to be redistributed among the proprietors in accordance with their rights.

    8. Rule 16(ii) of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Rules, 1949 may be noticed : --

    "In an estate or estates, where during consolidation proceedings there is no Shamilat Deh land or such land is considered inadequate, land shall be reserved for the Village Panchayat and for other common purposes, under Section 18(c) of the Act out of the common pool of the village at the scale given in the schedule to these rules. Proprietary rights in respect of land so reserved (except the area reserved from the extension of abadi of proprietors and non-proprietors) shall vest in the proprietary body of estate or estates concerned and it shall be entered in the column of ownership of record of rights as Jumla Malkan Wa Digar Hakdaran Arazi Hasab Rasad, The management of such land shall be done by the Panchayat of the estate or estates concerned on behalf of the village proprietary body and the Panchayat shall have the right to utilise the income derived from the land so reserved for the common needs and benefits of the estate or estates concerned."

    If land was deducted from the holdings of the proprietors, the same was illegal and contrary to the provisions of Rule 16(ii) of the Rules, and had to be restored to them. The Director of Consolidation after a perusal of the revenue record arrived at the following findings : --

    "I had heard the parties in detail in this case on 28-11-1985 at Patiala and the orders were reserved. The records were also examined, from the record it is clear that the B B area ..1396-7 was mostly Banjar and Banjar Qadim and was in the individual possession of the khewatdars as. according to the entries in the jama bandi in the cultivation column, it was Maqbooza Malkan and in the column pertaining to assessment to land revenue it is mentioned as Bile Lagaan Bawaja Qabza Sabqa Hissedari, From the recoil it has been observed that a number of rightholders including Sh. Mangal Singh. etc. had got the area transferred to their proprietorship on the score of their possession vide mutation Nos. 376, 514 and 490 etc. The plea of the petitioners that mutation No. 386. transferring the land belonging to the petitioners in the name of the Gram Panchayat did not satisfy the ingredients of Section 2(g) of the Village Common Lands Act and, as such, could not be transferred in the name of the Gram Panchayat. The learned counsel for the petitioners also pointed out that according to citation 1977 Pun LJ 276 (FB), this land could not be transferred to the name of the Gram Panchayat as this area was not in use for common purposes. The learned counsel for the respondent (Gram Panchayat) could not rebut the pleas taken up by the learned counsel for the petitioners. It is admitted by the respondent Gram Panchayat that the area which is liable to be distributed was originally entered as Shamlat deh Hassab Rasad Zer Khewat and, in the cultivation column, it is entered as Maqbooza Malkan. Evidently, it was not used for common purposes. That being so, the area which was not being used for common purposes, could not be transferred to the name of the Gram Panchayat under Section 2(g) of the Village Common Lands Act and the consolidation authorities had no right or power to change the title of the land. They should have kept this area in the name of Shamlat Deh Hassab Rasad Zar Khewat and, in the cultivation column, it should have been entered as Maqbooza Malkan. The consolidation authorities had further no jurisdiction to break the possessions of the individual Ghair-Morrowsis who were in possession of the Shamlat Deh Hassab Rassad Zar Khewat. Mutation No. 386 is certainly illegal as it was not sanctioned under any specific authority nor it was done in accordance with the law. From the record, it is clear that the total area reserved for the Gram Panchayat in the consolidation scheme is 38K-18M and the Panchayat was not entitled to anything more than this. The provisions of the scheme are sacrosanct. The rest of the area shall have to be restored to the Shamlat Deh Hassab Rasad Zer Khewat as per the original record inherited by the consolidation Department. Since the revenue record is inherited by the Consolidation Department indicating this area to be Shamlat Deh Hassab Rasad Zer Khewat, the plea of the petitioners that this should be distributed amongst the shareholders cannot be resisted on any valid ground. That being so, the area measuring 2263K-16M but excluding area used for common purposes during consolidation proceedings should be distributed amongst the share-holders as per provisions contained in the jamabandi of 1951-52, which is the only authentic document inherited by the Consolidation Department. Since mutation No. 386 dt. 12-6-56 is illegal and non est and it cannot form the basis of conferring any right or title, it has to be ignored and is ignored accordingly."

    No material has been placed before us to hold that the finding arrived at by the Director, Consolidation of Holdings, on an appraisal of the revenue record is vitiated. We do not find any infirmity or illegality in the order of the Director of Consolidation of Holdings holding that the land is not Shamlat den. Resultantly. it did not vest in the Panchayat. Moreover, the banjar and banjar qadim land will be deemed to be in possession of the owners till the contrary is proved. The land was in possession of the proprietors as per their shares in the Khewat. Apart from this, an error of law which is apparent on the face of record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however, grave it may appear to be. In this connection, the observations of the Supreme Court in Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477 (at pp. 479-80) are very relevant. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court, while dealing with this question, were pleased to observe as under : --

    "In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that i n recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which had influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, (1955) 1 SCR 1104 : AIR 1955 SC 233); Nagendra Nath v. Commr. of Hills Division, 1958 SCR 1240 : AIR 1958 SC 398 and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1168."

    9. There is yet another aspect of the matter to which a brief reference has to be made. Section 11 of the Village Common Lands Act, envisages that a person claiming a right, title or interest to any land vested or deemed to have vested in the Panchayat under the Act can submit to the Collector, within such time as may be prescribed, a statement of his claim in writing, signed and verified in the manner prescribed, and the Collector shall have jurisdiction to decide such claim. The order passed by the Collector is appealable before the Commissioner. A complete machinery is provided to adjudicate the rights of a person who asserts whether a particular land vests or does not vest in the Panchayat. The petitioners could have availed themselves of the remedy open under Section 11 of the Act, but no grouse can be made against the order passed by the Director, Consolidation of Holdings, in these proceedings unless they were able to bring the case within the four corners of the dictum of the Apex Court in Sayed Yakoob's case (AIR 1964 SC 477) (supra). The first submission of Mr. Palli is, thus, rejected.

    10. The next submission of Mr. Palli does not hold good in view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Full Bench of this Court reported as Jagtar Singh v. Addl. Director of Consolidation of Holdings 1984 Pun LJ 222 : (AIR 1984 Punj & Har 216). In the present case, the right-holders had not challenged any order of the consolidation authorities but had attacked the validity of the scheme and the re-partition, and the bar of limitation of six months under Rule 18 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Rules, 1949, is not attracted to the facts of the instant case.

    11. Mr. Palli next submitted that the impugned order is vitiated because the petitioners were not afforded any opportunity of hearing before the passing of the order. In support of this submission, he relied upon the following authorities : --

    (i) Narinder Nath Sachdeva v. Bhajan Lal, 1982 Pun LJ 243.

    (ii) Gram Panchayat of Village Serohi Behali v. Har Lal, (1971) 73 Pun LR 1009.

    (iii)Ajit Singh v. Smt. Subaghan, AIR 1970 Punj & Har 93 (FB).

    These authorities have no bearing to the facts of the instant case. The dispute before the Director of Consolidation (Holdings) was between the proprietors and the Panchayat. They had no right to be impleaded as party/respondent. They got the property on, an annual lease from the Panchayat. If the Panchayat rights were in jeopardy it could defend them. The person who had got the property on lease for a year has no right or locus standi to become a party to those proceedings. This matter is not res integra. It directly came up for consideration in CWP 2820/1986 (Nek Singh v. State of Punjab through Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings & others), decided on Aug. 12, 1986, whereas Division Bench of this Court in somewhat similar circumstances, held as under : --

    "As regards the petitioners not having been made parties to the petition under Section 42 of the Act, it may be observed that the petitioners had no right to be impleaded as respondents to the petition in question. The matter was between the proprietors and the Gram Panchayat."

    In CWPNo. 2820/1986 (supra) the facts were almost identical as in the present case. The writ-petitioners who claimed themselves to be lessees under the Gram Panchayat challenged the order of the Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings, whereby in exercise of the powers under Section 42 of the Act, he directed the Consolidation Officer to redistribute the land pro rata among the proprietors which was deducted for a common purpose. The view taken by the Bench appears to be correct. We fully agree with the reasoning adopted by the Bench.

    12. Apart from this, the petitioners could have approached the Director of Consolidation for passing a fresh order after affording them an opportunity of hearing. In Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1909 (at p. 1911), the Supreme Court held as under : --

    "Learned counsel contends that Article 226 of the Constitution does not confer any power on the High Court to review its own order and, therefore, the second order of Khosla, J., was without jurisdiction. It is sufficient to say that there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. Here the previous order of Khosla, J., affected the interest of persons who were not made parties to the proceedings before him. It was at their instance and for giving them a hearing that Khosla, J.. entertained the second petition. In doing so, he merely did what the principles of natural justice required him to do. It is said that the respondents before us had no right to apply for review because they were not parties to the previous proceedings. As we have already pointed out, it is precisely because they were not made parties to the previous proceedings, though their interests were sought to be affected by the decision of the High Court, that the second application was entertained by Khosla. J."

    These observations, though relate to the courts, may on general principles equally apply to judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals. The inherent powers of relieving the suitors from the mistake of courts/tribunals may legitimately be invoked for promoting the cause of justice.

    13. The petitioners got the property for cultivation in auction for a year. They had a right to remain in possession for the auctioned period. After the expiry of the period, they were unauthorised occupants and had to surrender possession to the Gram Panchayat.

    14. The writ petition is dismissed. However, we leave the parties to bear their own costs.

    15. C.M.No. 2372 of 1987 is allowed. The other C.M.Nos. 2116, 2371 and 2906 of 1987 and 5230 of 1988 are rendered infructuous in view of our decision in the main case.

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    Joginder Singh And Others v. Director, Consolidation Of Holdings, Punjab And Others
    (Aug 8, 1988)