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  • Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (hereinafter called the Act),
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  • Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (hereinafter called the Act),
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion by J.V. Gupta, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The tenant-petitioner filed a revision petition before this Court challenging the Appellate Authority, Patiala's order dated 18 March 1980, which had maintained the Rent Controller's order dated 15 February 1979 directing the tenant's ejectment. The landlord sought ejectment inter alia under Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (the Act), alleging that the tenant had changed the user of the rented shop by residing there with his family in addition to carrying on a bakery business, without the landlord's written consent.

Relevant documentary and pleading background included a rent-note (Exhibit A-1) dated 6 March 1956 for eleven months at Rs. 30 per month. The tenant's written statement denied a change of user, asserted that residence in part of the premises was integral/necessary to his bakery business, claimed long possession (about 19 years) with the landlord's knowledge and acquiescence, and pleaded infirmity and family help as reasons for residence on the premises. The landlord's replication denied these contentions.

On these pleadings the Rent Controller framed three issues: (1) whether the respondent (tenant) changed the user of the demised premises and if so to what effect; (2) whether the respondent is liable for ejectment; and (3) relief. The Rent Controller found that the tenant had changed the user and ordered ejectment; the Appellate Authority affirmed that order. The tenant appealed in revision to this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the tenant changed the user of the demised premises (i.e., used it for a purpose other than that for which it was leased) under Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act, and, if so, with what consequence?
  2. Whether, on the facts and law, the tenant is liable to be ejected?
  3. What relief should follow from the resolution of the above questions?

Arguments of the Parties

Tenant-Petitioner (Appellant) — main contentions

  • The rent-note (Exhibit A-1) did not specify any particular purpose or business; it merely rented a shop at Rs. 30 per month.
  • The tenant resided in the premises from the inception of the tenancy and residential occupation was necessary for running his bakery business (given the premises' L-shape: front for shop, rear for residence).
  • Only a small portion of the premises was used for residence while the major portion continued to be used for the bakery; hence there was no change of user of the entire building as contemplated by Section 13(2)(ii)(b).
  • The tenant relied on multiple authorities in support of the "dominant purpose" test (cases cited in the opinion). He also relied on a prior judgment of the same bench in Amin Chand v. Gian Chand.

Landlord-Respondent — main contentions

  • According to the landlord's case (and the tenant's own admission at trial), the tenant began residing first and then started the bakery business; the family of six occupied the premises, so the dominant purpose was residential rather than commercial.
  • The tenant never obtained permission (oral or written) for a change of user; therefore, he is liable to be ejected under Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act.
  • Even if the rent-note lacks a specific purpose, the rented entity was a "shop" which, the landlord argued, implies letting for business and not residence; the landlord relied on authorities purportedly supporting eviction where residential use replaces commercial use.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For (as described in the opinion) Application by the Court
Sagar Mal alias S.M. Aggarwal v. Shree Seeta Ram, 1980 1 Rent. L.R. 33 Principle that if the dominant purpose remains the same, a partial residential use does not amount to a change of user. The Court relied on this case to support the conclusion that the dominant purpose remained commercial (bakery) and therefore there was no change of user.
Firm Himalayan Traders v. Narain Dass, 1966 68 PLR 367 The opinion lists this case among those relied upon by the tenant; no specific rule is elaborated in the text. The case was cited by the tenant; the opinion does not state a detailed application beyond that it formed part of the tenant's supporting authorities.
Rameshwar Dass v. Rishi Parkash, 1964 Cur. L.J. 513 Cited by the tenant in support; the opinion does not set out a specific principle from it. Not specifically analyzed in the opinion; listed among tenant's authorities.
Sant Ram v. Rajinder Lal, 1979 2 SCC 274 Holding that landlord's long acquiescence reinforces the tenant's case that the purpose was two-fold (commercial + residential). The Court relied on this principle to support the tenant's argument where the landlord accepted rent and did not object for a long period.
Ram Niwas v. Union of India, 1973 C.R. 425 Cited by the tenant; the opinion does not elaborate the specific principle taken from it. Listed among authorities relied upon by the tenant; no discrete application explained in the text.
M.K. Palaniappa Chettiar v. A. Pennuswami Pillai, 1970 2 SCC 290 When the landlord fails to show that any substantial part of the building was used for a different purpose than that for which it was let, the landlord's claim must fail. The Court applied this principle: because the landlord did not prove substantial residential use, the eviction claim could not succeed.
Amin Chand v. Gian Chand (Civil Revision Petition No. 631 of 1976; decided 25.8.1981) Observed that use of a part of premises for another purpose, while the premises continue to be used for the original purpose, does not by itself give the landlord a right to evict under Section 13(2)(ii)(b). The Court referred to this prior decision (by the same bench) in support of the "dominant purpose" approach and to show consistency with prior reasoning.
Chhaju Ram v. Tulsi Dass, 1972 2 Rent L.R. 156 Cited by the landlord; the opinion does not state a specific rule taken from it. Listed by the landlord as supporting authority; the Court did not adopt a detailed exposition of the case's rule in the reasons recorded.
Balak Ram v. B.N. Gupta, 1977 2 Rent L.R. 83 (Himachal Pradesh High Court decision) This decision was relied upon by the courts below; it takes the view that the character of premises can be determined by actual user at the date of the eviction petition. The Court discussed this as a contrary view and explained why that ratio was not applicable to the present case, distinguishing the facts and stressing the statutory language of Section 13(2)(ii)(b).
Prem Chand v. Beni Madhaya, I.L.R. 1973 Him. Pra. 670 Cited within the discussion of Balak Ram; the Himachal decision affirmed the view in Prem Chand that character may be determined by actual user at the eviction date. The Court noted these authorities in explaining the differing approach taken by the Himachal Pradesh High Court but rejected that approach for the facts before it.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a fact-based and statutory analysis. The key steps in the Court's reasoning were:

  1. Evaluation of the factual record: The Court observed that the landlord's own ejectment application admitted that the tenant was residing in the shop along with conducting a bakery business. The common case of the parties was that the premises were L-shaped with the front used as a shop and the rear for residence.
  2. Examination of evidence on area usage: The tenant produced an (ex-)Assistant Engineer as R.W.4 who filed a plan (Exhibit R.W-4.A) showing the total area as 918 sq. ft., of which 714 sq. ft. was used for bakery purposes and 204 sq. ft. for residence. The landlord did not rebut this evidence or produce independent proof of the partition of usage or that the tenant had begun residing only later.
  3. Assessment of landlord's evidentiary gaps: The landlord had not produced cogent evidence to prove that the tenant began residing elsewhere earlier or to contradict the plan's area division. The landlord's contention that a family of six could not live in the 204 sq. ft. was not substantiated by evidence.
  4. Application of precedents and the "dominant purpose" test: The Court relied on authorities (M.K. Palaniappa Chettiar; Sagar Mal; Amin Chand; Sant Ram) to support the legal principle that partial residential use of a shop does not amount to a change of user requiring ejectment where the dominant purpose remains commercial. The Court found these authorities analogous and controlling on the facts.
  5. Statutory construction of Section 13(2)(ii)(b) vis-à-vis Section 13(2)(ii)(a): The Court noted that subsection (a) expressly uses the words "any portion thereof" (allowing ejectment for sub-letting of any portion), whereas subsection (b) (the change-of-user provision) does not include those words. From this linguistic difference the Court inferred that liability under (b) contemplates use of the entire building or at least a major portion thereof for a purpose other than the one for which it was leased.
  6. Consideration of the contrary authority (Balak Ram): The Court analyzed Balak Ram (Himachal Pradesh HC) which emphasized determining character by actual use at the date of the petition. The Court distinguished that decision on the facts and, in light of the statutory language and evidence here, found it not applicable.
  7. Rejection of the "conversion" argument: The landlord's argument that the tenant had converted a non-residential building to a residential one (relying on the Act's definition of "non-residential") was rejected because eviction can only be sought on grounds enumerated in Section 13. The Court also observed that Section 11 (which regulates conversion of residential to non-residential buildings) restricts conversion in one direction and does not address conversion from non-residential to residential in the context the landlord asserted.
  8. Conclusion from the above: On the facts, only a small portion was used for residence, the dominant purpose remained bakery business, and the landlord failed to prove usage of a substantial or major portion for a different purpose. Accordingly, the statutory condition for ejectment under Section 13(2)(ii)(b) was not satisfied.

Holding and Implications

Holding: THE REVISION PETITION IS ALLOWED. The order of the Appellate Authority is set aside and the landlord-respondent's application for ejectment is dismissed with costs.

Implications and immediate consequences:

  • The tenant-petitioner is not liable to be ejected on the ground alleged under Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act on the facts before the Court.
  • The direct effect on the parties: the Appellate Authority's maintenance of the Rent Controller's ejectment order is quashed; the tenant may continue occupation subject to any other rights not before the Court; the landlord's ejectment application is dismissed and the tenant awarded costs.
  • Interpretive implication on Section 13(2)(ii)(b): the Court interpreted the provision, in contrast to Section 13(2)(ii)(a), as requiring that the building as let (or at least a major/substantial portion of it) be used for a purpose other than that for which it was leased before ejectment will lie under (b). This is the statutory reading the Court applied to the facts.
  • The Court expressly considered contrary authority (Balak Ram) but distinguished it on the facts and on statutory language; it did not adopt that contrary ratio for this case.
  • The opinion does not proclaim a novel rule of law beyond its statutory interpretation and application to the facts; it rests its conclusion on the established "dominant purpose" approach and the evidentiary record in this case.

Petition allowed (order reproduced in the concluding lines of the opinion).

    Dharam Chand v. Mathura Dass .

    J.V Gupta, J.:— The tenant-petitioner has filed this revision petition against the order of the Appellate Authority, Patiala, dated March 18, 1980, whereby the order of the Rent Controller, dated February 15, 1979, directing his ejectment was maintained.

    2. The landlord-respondent sought the ejectment of the petitioner from the demised premises inter alia on the ground of change of user as contemplated under Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (hereinafter called the Act), which provides that if the tenant has used the building or the rented land for a purpose other than for which it was leased, he is liable to be ejected. It was averred in paragraph 4 of the ejectment application that the tenant had changed the user of the shop, in dispute, without the written consent of the landlord and as such, he was liable to be evicted therefrom and that he had started residing there alongwith his family in addition to his bakery business. The rent-note, dated March 6, 1956, executed for eleven months, stipulating a monthly rent of Rs. 30/- is, Exhibit A-1. In the written statement it was stated that the tenant had not changed the user of the demised premises, he had taken the premises for use and occupation as his shop of bakery and also for his use and residence in part thereof, a part of it is used by him as residence ever since he took the rented premises on rent, the right of residence was not prohibited by the terms of the lease, his living in the part of the rented premises was essential part of his business, he was an old man of 70 years infirm and of weak eye sight, his wife helped him in the business of the bakery, he cannot carry on his trade and business without living in, the demised premises and that he guards the premises, in dispute, by living there. It was also pleaded that he had been living in the demised premises for more than 19 years and during this period, this landlord had the knowledge of the same as he accepted the rent, never protested against such user had always acquiesced in the user of the demised premises, and as such, he was estopped from taking this plea. In the replication filed on behalf of the landlord, it was stated that it was wrong that the shop, in question, was taken on rent by the tenant for residential purposes alongwith the bussiness of Bakery. The living of the tenant in a part of the rented premises was not an essential part of his business. It was wrong that his residence in the demised premises was required for guarding the building. It was also wrong that he had been living in the premises for the last 19 years and that it was also wrong that the landlord had acquiseced in the use of the premises, in dispute, for the residence of the petitioner. On the pleadings of the parties the learned Rent Controller framed the following issues:—

    1. Whether the respondent has changed the user of the demised premises? If so, to what effect?

    2. Whether the respondent is liable for ejectment?

    3. Relief.

    3. On issue No. 1, it was found that the petitioner had changed the user of the demised premises. According to the Rent Controller, they were rented out for funning a shop whereas on the admission of the tenant himself, he was also residing therein with his family. As a result, the order of ejectment was passed against the tenant. In appeal, this finding of the Rent Controller was maintained by the Appellate Authority. Feeling aggrieved against the same, the tenant has come up in revision to this Court.

    4. The learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that no specific purpose was provided in the rent-note, Exhibit A-1, nor was there any mention of any particular business to be carried on by the petitioner. The only recital therein is that the shop, in dispute, had been rented out to the petitioner at the rate of Rs. 30/- per month. According to the learned counsel, from the evidence on the record, it has been amply proved that the tenant was residing therein from the very beginning as it was necessary for him to reside therein for doing his bakery business. The premises, in dispute, are L-shaped and therefore, the hind portion of the shop is being used for residence whereas the front portion is being used for running the bakery business. It was further contended that in any case, the major portion of the building was still being used for business purposes and it was only a small portion in which the tenant was residing and, therefore, there was no change of user of the building as such, i.e, the entire building, as contemplated under section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act. The argument proceeds that the dominant purpose of the demised premises is still the carrying on of the business and, therefore, he is not liable to be ejected therefrom. In support of his contention, the learned counsel placed reliance on Sagar Mal alias S.M Aggarwal v. Shree Seeta Ram 1980 1 Rent. L.R 33., Firm Himalayan Traders… v. Narain Dass…. 1966 68 PLR 367., Rameshwar Dass v. Rishi Parkash 1964 Cur. L.J 513., Sant Ram v. Rajinder Lal 1979 2 SCC 274, Ram Niwas v. Union of India 1973 C.R 425. and M.K Palaniappa Chettiar v. A. Pennuswami Pillai 1970 2 SCC 290.. He also referred to a judgment rendered by me in Civil Revision Petition No. 631 of 1976 (Amin Chand v. Gian Chand C.R 631 of 1976.) decided on August 25, 1981. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the landlord-respondent, submitted that according to the evidence of the Tenant himself, he started residing first in the demised premises and then he started his bakery business therein. His family consists of six persons, i e., two sons two daughters, his wife and he himself. Even the marriage of one of his daughters was celebrated in the demised premises Under the circumstances, it cannot be said that the dominant purpose is the carrying on of the bakery business, rather, according to the learned counsel, almost the whole of the demised premises are being used for residential purposes though a very small portion thereof is being used as a shop. As the tenant never obtained any permission, either oral or in writing, for the change of the user of the demised premises, he is liable to be ejected therefrom under section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act. According to the learned counsel, though there is no specific purpose for which the demised premises were rented out, but at the same time, what was rented out was a shop and, therefore, it would mean that it was for the purpose of carrying on of the business and not for residence. In support of this contention, the learned counsel placed reliance on Chhaju Ram v. Tulsi Dass 1972 2 Rent L.R 156. and Balak Ram v. B.N Gupta 1977 2 Rent L.R 83.

    5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at a great length and have also gone through the record.

    6. According to the Appellate Authority, there is no evidence on the record that the petitioner took the demised premises for running a bakery and since it was a shop and was being used by the petitioner for residence which was never the intention of the parties when the rent note, Exhibit A-1, was executed, the petitioner is liable to ejectment. Main reliance in this behalf was placed by both the Courts below on the judgment of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Balak Ram's case (supra) In my considered opinion, both these findings arrived at by the learned Appellate Authority are wrong and against the record.

    7. The landlord respondent in his ejectment application has himself stated that the tenant had started residing in the shop, in dispute, alongwith his family members, in addition to his doing the bakery business. Thus, it cannot be said that the tenant was not using the premises, in dispute, for his bakery business. It is the common case of the parties that in addition to the bakery business, the tenant had also started residing therein, which according to the landlord, was for the last four or five years whereas according to the tenant, he was residing therein from the very inception of the tenancy as the demised premises were taken on rent for both the purposes. It is also the common case of the parties that the premises, in question, were L-shaped and the tenant was using the front portion as his shop and the rear portion for his residence. The landlord has not led any evidence to prove the total area of the demised premises and out of that how much is being used by the tenant for his residential purposes. The tenant produced Hira Lal, R.W 4, who was an Assistant Engineer (retired). He filed the plan of the property, Exhibit R. W-4.A. The total area of the demised premises given therein is 918 square feet. According to this witness area measuring 714 square feet was being used for bakery purposes whereas the area measuring 204 square feet was being used for residence. There is no rebuttal to this evidence on behalf of the landlord. Thus, it has been amply proved on the record that only a small portion of the demised premises was being used for residential purposes. The argument raised on behalf of the landlord-respondent, however, is that the family of the tenant consisted of six persons and, therefore, it was not possible for them to reside in such a small accommodation. This contention cannot be accepted for the simple reason that in the first instance there is no evidence to this effect and secondly, it will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether a family of six persons can live in such an accommodation or not. There is nothing uncommon in the present circumstances for the people to reside in such small accomodation particularly when the tenant-petitioner is doing only bakery business at a very small scale. Apart from that, the landlord-respondent has not proved his case that the tenant started residing in the demised premises four or five years back, as alleged by him, in his ejectment application. In case, he was residing earlier somewhere else, then it was not difficult for the landlord to prove, by cogent evidence, the premises he was occupying earlier. On the other hand, it has been, proved on the record from the evidence of the tenant-petitioner that he was residing in the demised premises from the very inception of the tenancy. It may be that in the rent-note, no particular purpose for which the premises were rented out to him is given, but from the evidence on record, it is evident that the tenant-petitioner was residing therein from the very beginning of the tenancy and the ‘landlord-respondent never objected to the same. Thus, both the said findings arrived at by the Appellate Authority are against the record and even against the case of the landlord-respondent as set up by him in his ejectment application. Under these circumstances, it can safely be held that the tenant-petitioner is occupying a very small portion of the demised premises for his residence. The dominant purpose is still the bakery business fox which the premises were rented out to him. In M.K Palaniappa Chettiar's case (supra), it has been held that when the landlord failed to show that any substantial part of the building was being used for a purpose different from the purpose for which the building had been let out, the claim of the landlord had to fail irrespective of the plea taken by the tenant to resist the application. In that case also, one of the grounds of ejectment was that the tenant had used the building for a purpose other than that for which it was leased out. On this finding, the judgment of the Madras High Court was set aside, by their Lordships of the Supreme Court and the application for ejectment was dismissed.

    8. Similarly, in Sagar Mal alias S.M Aggarwals case (supra) R.N Mittal, J. held that if the dominant purpose remains the same, it will not amount to the change of user of the building. In the said case, the building consisted of three rooms which were let out for business purposes and one of the rooms was used for residential purposes.

    9. In Civil Revision Petition No. 621 of 1976, Amin Chand's case (supra), I had also the occasion to consider the provisions of Section 13(2)(ii)(b), of the Act. The view that I have taken therein is that if the premises were being used for the same purpose for which they were originally let out and in addition thereto a part of the building or the rented land was used for same other purpose, that per se would not give the landlord the right to claim the eviction of the tenant from the demised premises.

    10. In Sant Ram's case (supra) also it has been held that the landlord's acquiesence over a long stretch of time reinforces the case of the tenant that the purpose was two-fold. The common experience of life lends evidence to this case and none, but those who live in avery towers can refuse to look at the raw realities of life while administering justice. In view of these decisions, the landlord respondent has failed to prove that the tenant-petitioner has used the entire building for a purpose other than that for which it was leased to him.

    11. The only contrary view can be said to have been taken by the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Balak Ram's case (supra). In that case, the main question to be decided was whether the disputed premises were non residential premises because the character of those premises could be determined not by reference to the actual use to which they were put by the tenant, but by reference to the original purpose for which they were initially let out. In paragraph 5 of the judgment, it has been observed by the learned Judges that this was the most important question of law involved in that case. However, reply to this question has been given by the Hon'ble Judges in paragraph 18 of the judgment wherein it has been concluded that the character of the suit premises should be determined with reference to the actual user found on the date of eviction petition and that, therefore, the view taken by the Court in Prem Chand v. Beni Madhaya I.L.R 1973 Him. Pra. 670., was affirmed. Thus, the main consideration in that case was whether the use of the building at the time of the institution of the ejectment proceedings will determine the character of the building or the original purpose for which the same was rented out. Since the ejectment in that case was claimed on other grounds as well including that the landlord bona fide required the premises for his own use and occupation, it was held in that case that, the landlord had according to the findings recorded by the Courts below, proved his bona fide personal requirement of the disputed permises and that being a pure finding of fact, it was not open to that Court to interfere with the same in the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction. In this view of the matter, I am of the considered opinion that the ratio of the said decision is not applicable to the facts of the present case. The language used in section 1 (2)(ii) (b) of the Act is suggestive that while in view of section 13()(ii)(a). the tenant is liable to be ejected if he has sub-let the entire building or the rented land or an portion thereof, but under section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act, he is liable to be ejected if he has used the building or the rented land for a purpose other than that for which it was leased to him. The words, “any portion thereof” in section 13(2)(ii)(a) of the Act, do not find any place in section 13(2)(ii). (b) of the Act and, therefore, the legislature seems to be of the view that in case a tenant is liable to be ejected under section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act, then the entire building, as rented out, or at least a major portion thereof should have been used for a purpose other than that for which it was leased. In the present case, as held earlier, the dominant purpose of the demised premises, is still the bakery business and only a small portion thereof is being used by the petitioner for his residence. It is also in evidence that the portion which is being used for residence by the petitioner opens in a blind lane. There are no shops on that side Under the circumstances, the dominant purpose of the demised premises is still the business which is being carried on by the tenant-petitioner. Moreover, there is evidence on the record, that the tenant is 70 years old and is of weak eye-sight. For running the bakery business, the help of his other family members is necessary and, thus, his residence in the premises, in dispute is also required to run his bakery business satisfactorily.

    12. The argument of the learned counsel for the landlord-respondent that the tenant petitioner by using the demised premises for his residence along with his business has converted the building from non-residential to residential, because the definition of non-residential building, as given in section 2(d) of the Act, is a building being used solely for the purpose of business or trade, and has, thus, rendered himself liable to ejectment, has no force, because the ejectment of a tenant can only be sought on the grounds, as given in section 13 of the Act. The ejectment of the petitioner in the present case is being sought on the ground that he has used the building for a purpose other than that for which it was leased Section 11 of the Act deals with the conversion of residential building into a non-residential building and provides that no person shall convert a residential building into a non-residential one except with the permission, in writing, of the Controller. In this section also, the prohibition, if any, is from converting a residential building, but not vice versa.

    13. From the above discussion, it is clear that the landlord-respondent has failed to prove that the tenant-petitioner has used the demised premises for the purpose other than that for which they were leased out to him. Consequently, this revision petition succeeds and is allowed. The order of the Appellate Authority is set aside and the application of the landlord-respondent for the ejectment of the tenant-petitioner is dismissed with costs.

    H.L.S
    Petition allowed.

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    Comments

    Dharam Chand v. Mathura Dass .
    (Oct 5, 1981)