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Smart Summary

Summary of the Opinion — Gokal Chand Mital, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This set of seven writ petitions (C.W.P. Nos. 158, 486 to 490 and 565 of 1980) concerns tenants who had been in possession of agricultural land long before the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 (the "Act") came into force. The original land-owners, Raja Narinder Singh and others, gifted the disputed property to the Jhajjar Education Society by three registered gift deeds during 1958–1961. By a registered gift deed dated 2nd August, 1963, the Jhajjar Education Society gifted the property to the State of Haryana. Consequently the petitioners became tenants of the State of Haryana with effect from 2nd August, 1963.

After the State became the land-owner it initiated ejectment proceedings under the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Recovery) Act, 1959 and obtained ejectment orders, which were challenged by the petitioners in writ petitions; the State gave an undertaking not to implement those orders and the writ petitions thus became infructuous. The State thereafter filed applications under Sections 42(b), 43 and 45 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 before the Assistant Collector for ejectment of the petitioners. The petitioners contended that they enjoyed protection under the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 and hence the Tenancy Act could not be used to eject them. The Assistant Collector accepted the petitioners' contention (order dated 26th November, 1976) following a decision of the Financial Commissioner in Bachan Singh's case. The State appealed and preferred revision, both without success. The Financial Commissioner, Haryana, later took a contrary view, allowed the State's revision (order dated 23rd November, 1979) and remanded the matter to the Assistant Collector to decide on merits. The petitioners filed the present writ petitions to impugn the Financial Commissioner's order. Given the importance and the conflicting views, the matter was placed before a larger bench for final disposal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a tenant of the State Government in respect of agricultural land acquired by the State Government after 1st February, 1955, is governed by the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 and can claim protection by virtue of section 16 read with section 9 of the Act.
  2. Whether such a tenant can avoid ejectment under the provisions of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 (i.e., whether the overriding effect of section 9(1) of the Act prevents ejectment notwithstanding other laws).
  3. How section 21(1) of the Act (saving in respect of land "held" by a tenant or lessee under Government or local bodies) should be interpreted in relation to lands acquired by the State after commencement of the Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The petitioners, who had been tenants before the Act came into force, contended that they were protected by the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 and that the provisions of that Act (notably section 16 read with section 9) prevented the land-owner — even if the State Government — from ejecting them except on the statutory grounds specified in section 9(1).
  • They argued that because section 16 saved tenants' rights in respect of transfers after 1st February, 1955 (subject to the limited exception of acquisitions by the State under any law for the time being in force or inheritance), their tenancy rights were not affected by the gift of the land to the State in 1963.

State Government's Arguments

  • The State Government's position was that, by virtue of section 21 of the Act, the Act was not applicable to land in respect of which the State was the owner — and therefore the petitioners could not rely on any provision of the Act to resist ejectment.
  • Implicit in the State's approach (also reflected in the Financial Commissioner’s contrary view) was the contention that acquisitions or ownership by the State (even when arising after the commencement of the Act) excluded the Act's protections for tenants.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bachan Singh v. Sarda???i Rupinder Kumari, 1961 P.L.J. 18 Administrative decision relied on by the Assistant Collector in dismissing ejectment applications; treated in the opinion as supporting tenants' protection under the Act. The Assistant Collector followed this decision when vacating notices of ejectment; the opinion approves the decision in Bachan Singh's case.
Mota Singh v. The Financial Commissioner, Punjab, 1963 P.L.J. 140 (A.N. Grover, J.) Interprets section 10-A(b) of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act as saving only lands acquired by the State under any law for the time being in force (e.g., Land Acquisition Act), excluding lands sold to the State by private treaty. The court approved this decision and relied on it to support the distinction between acquisitions by the State under law and voluntary/private transfers such as sales or gifts to the State.
N.T. Veluswami Thevar v. G. Raja Nainar, AIR 1959 SC 422 Principle of statutory interpretation: courts should adopt a construction which avoids rendering any provision redundant where reasonably possible. Relied upon to justify a harmonious construction of sections 6, 10-A(b), 16 and 21(1) of the Act so that no provision is rendered obsolete.
Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. The State of Vindhya Pradesh, AIR 1953 SC 394 Rule of interpretation: avoid a construction that would render part of a statute devoid of meaning or application where a reasonable alternative construction is available. Quoted to support the approach of adopting a construction of section 21(1) that gives full effect to all provisions of the Act.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds from a detailed reading of the relevant provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 — specifically sections 6, 9(1), 10-A(b), 16, 19 and 21(1) — and from the need to harmonize these provisions so that no part of the statute is rendered redundant.

Key interpretive points the court makes (drawing only on the language and reasoning in the opinion):

  1. Sections 6 and 16: Section 6 saves certain transfers made after 15 August 1947 and before 2 February 1955 (bona fide sale, mortgage with possession, or inheritance) from affecting tenants' rights. Section 16 provides that, save in the case of land "acquired by the State Government under any law for the time being in force" or inherited, no transfer effected after 1 February 1955 shall affect tenants' rights. Thus section 16 gives a broad protection to tenants from transfers after 1 February 1955 except in the narrow class of State acquisitions under law or inheritance.
  2. Section 9(1): This provision gives sectionally enumerated grounds for ejectment and is stated to have an overriding effect ("Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no land-owner shall be competent to eject a tenant except when such tenant..." on specified grounds). The court treats this as giving the Act primacy over other ejectment statutes, including the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887.
  3. Section 10-A(b) and amendment history: Section 10-A(b) (as amended in 1959) contains a saving clause excepting land "acquired by the State Government under any law for the time being in force or by an heir by inheritance." The court notes that before the 1959 amendment those saving words were absent and that the amendment narrowed the protection to exclude lands acquired by State under law and inheritance from the general non-effect of transfers.
  4. Section 19: By its terms, sections 17 and 18 (rights of pre-emption and purchase by tenants) do not apply to evacuee property or land acquired by the Central Government for resettlement of displaced persons; but the court notes that this does not negate the applicability of other provisions to such lands.
  5. Section 21(1) interpretation: A literal reading of section 21(1) might suggest the Act does not affect any land "held" by a tenant under Government. The court resolves the potential conflict between a literal reading of section 21(1) and the other provisions by focusing on the tense of the word "held" and by applying principles of harmonious construction and established rules of interpretation cited from precedent. The court concludes that "held" is used in the past tense and that section 21(1) applies only to lands that were held by tenants or lessees under Government (or local bodies) immediately before the commencement of the Act.
  6. Distinction between acquisition "under any law" and private transfers/gifts: The court emphasizes that the phrase "acquired by the State Government under any law for the time being in force" must be read to mean acquisitions made under statutory schemes (e.g., Land Acquisition Act) and not voluntary private transfers (sales, treaties, gifts). It therefore holds that private contracts and gifts to the State are not "acquisitions under any law" for the purposes of sections 10-A(b) and 16.
  7. Harmonizing the provisions: By construing section 21(1) as limited to pre-commencement holdings of tenants under Government and by construing "acquired under any law" narrowly, the court gives meaning to sections 6, 10-A(b), 16 and 19 without rendering any redundant.
  8. Application to the facts: Because the State acquired the disputed land by gift (a voluntary transfer) on 22nd August, 1963 — i.e., after 1st February, 1955 — the court holds that section 16 applies to protect the petitioners' tenancy rights (the gift is not an "acquisition by the State under any law for the time being in force"). Consequently, under section 9(1) the State, as land-owner, is not competent to eject the tenants except on the statutory grounds enumerated in section 9(1) (or under sections 14-A(i) and (ii) as the court notes).
  9. Rejection of the Financial Commissioner's contrary view: The Financial Commissioner had taken a contrary position that section 21 rendered the Act wholly inapplicable to lands owned by the State even if acquired after 1st February, 1955. The court found that to be an incorrect construction and set that order aside.
  10. Reliance on precedent and interpretive maxims: The court cites Supreme Court authority (N.T. Veluswami Thevar and Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh) to justify avoiding constructions that render statutory provisions meaningless. The court also approves the earlier decision in Mota Singh (A.N. Grover, J.) regarding the meaning of section 10-A(b).

Holding and Implications

Holding: All seven writ petitions are allowed. The Financial Commissioner's order dated 23rd November, 1979 (Annexure P.4) is set aside and the decision of the Commissioner, Ambala Division dated 15th December, 1977, is restored. Counsel's fees of Rs. 100/- are awarded in each case and the petitions are allowed with costs.

Practical implications as stated in the opinion:

  • Because the State acquired the land by a gift on 22nd August, 1963 (a voluntary transfer after 1st February, 1955), the tenants' rights under the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 are not affected by that transfer by virtue of section 16.
  • Consequently, by virtue of section 9(1) of the Act the State Government (as land-owner) is not competent to eject the petitioners except on the grounds specified in section 9(1) — notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force (which includes the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887).
  • The State's remedies to eject the petitioners are therefore limited to those available under the Act (section 9(1) or sections 14-A(i) and (ii) as mentioned in the judgment), and not by invoking the Punjab Tenancy Act in a way that would conflict with the Act's overriding provisions.
  • The court approved the decision in Bachan Singh's case and the decision in Mota Singh (A.N. Grover, J.) as consistent with its statutory interpretation; the contrary decision of the Financial Commissioner was set aside in these matters.

Note: This summary is confined to the matters and language found in the provided opinion and does not add or infer information beyond that text.

    Rama Nand v. State Of Haryana And Others

    Gokal Chand Mital, J.:— A common question of law which arises in this set of seven writ petitions (C.W.P Nos. 158, 486 to 490 and 565 of 1980), is whether the tenant of the State Government in respect of agricultural land acquired by the State Government after 1st February, 1955, shall be governed by the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, (hereinafter called the ‘Act’) and can claim protection by virtue of section 16 read with section 9 of the Act and can avoid ejectment under the provisions of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887.

    2. Raja Narinder Singh and others were the land-owners and the petitioners in the seven cases before us were their tenants since long before the coming into force of the Act. Raja Narinder Singh and others gifted the property in dispute to the Jhajjar Education Society, Jhajjar, by three separate registered gift deeds during the period 1958 to 1961. By another registered gift deed dated 2nd August, 1963, the Jhajjar Education Society, Jhajjar, gifted the property in dispute to the State of Haryana. The net result was that the petitioners became the tenants of the State of Haryana with effect from 2nd August, 1963.

    3. After the State Government became the land-owner of the property in dispute, they started proceedings for ejectment of the petitioner under the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Recovery) Act, 1959, and finally obtained orders of their ejectment. The petitioners filed writ petitions in this Court challenging the orders of ejectment on the ground that since they were tenants, no proceedings under that Act could be taken against them under the 1959 Act. At the hearing of those writ petitions, the State Government gave an undertaking that they would not implement the orders of ejectment, with the result that the writ petitions became infructuous. Thereafter, the State Government filed applications under Section 42(b), 43 and 45 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887, against the petitioners before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Jhajiar, for their ejectment. The petitioners took up the defence that the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887, was not applicable to them as they had the protection of the Act which had the over riding effect and therefore, they could not be ordered to be ejected under that Act. On the contrary, the stand of the State Government was that in view of section 21 of the Act, the Act was not applicable to the land in dispute which came to be owned by the State Government and, therefore, the petitioners could not rely on any provision of the Act. The Assistant Collector upheld the contention of the petitioners and dismissed the applications and vacated the notices of ejectment issued against the petitioners by order dated 26th November, 1976, copy Annexure P. 1. In doing so, he followed a decision of the Financial Commissioner in Bachan Singh v. Sarda???i Rupinder Kumari . 1961 P.L.J 18.. The State Government took the matter in appeal and revision before the Collector and Commissioner in which they failed vide orders Annexures P. 2 and P. 3 respectively. Then a further revision was filed before the Financial Commissioner, Haryana. The Financial Commissioner took a view contrary to Bachan Singh's case (supra) and held that even if transfer of the property to the State Government is made after Ist February, 1955, the provisions of the Act would not come to the rescue of the petitioners and they would not be entitled to the benefit of section 16 of the Act as the Act would be wholly inapplicable, by virtue of section 21 of the Act; with the result that the revisions filed by the State Government were allowed by order dated 23rd November, 1979, (copy Annexure P. 4) and the matter was remanded to the Assistant Collector to decide the same on merits. The petitioners filed the present writ petitions to impugn the order of the Financial Commissioner initially, the writ petitions came up for consideration before me sitting singly and in view of the importance of the matter and conflicting views of the Financial Commissioner, the matter was ordered to be heard by a larger bench and that is how these writ petitions have been placed before us for final disposal.

    4. In order to appreciate the point involved in these cases, it will be useful to notice certain provisions of the Act, which are sections 6, 9(1), 10-A(b), 16, 19 and 21(1), and are reproduced hereunder:—

    “6. Certain previous transfers of land not to affect rights of tenants. No transfer of land, except a bona fide sale or mortgage with possession or a transfer resulting from inheritance, made after the 15 August, 1947, and before the 2nd February, 1955, shall affect the rights of the tenant on such land under this Act.

    9. Liability of tenant to be ejected

    (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no land-owner shall be competent to eject a tenant except when such tenant.—

    (various grounds of ejectment (i) to (vii) are stated).

    10-A (b) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force and save in the case of land acquired by the State Government under any law for the time being in force or by an heir by inheritance, no transfer or other disposition of land which is comprised in surplus area at the commencement of this Act, shall affect the utilization thereof in clause (a).

    16. Saving of tenancies from effect of mala fide transfer.

    Save in the case of land acquired by the State Government under any law for the time being in force, or by an heir by inheritance, no transfer or other disposition of land effected after the Ist February, 1955, shall affect the rights of the tenant thereon under this Act.

    19. Sections 17 and 18 not to apply to certain property and tenants:—

    Nothing contained in section 17 or section 18 shall affect any land which is evacuee property, as defined in the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, (XXX of 1???50) or any other land which may at any time be acquired by the Central Government for resettlement of displaced persons.

    21. Saving of tenants and lessees under Government.

    (1) Nothing contained in this Act shall affect any land held by a tenant or lessee under Government, or local bodies in the State, or any unallotted evacuee land.

    ………………”

    5. A reading of sections 6 and 16 of the Act together shows that while bona fide sale, mortgage with possession or transfer resulting from inheritance made after 15th August, 1947, but before 2nd February, 1955, alone have been saved and all other transfers are not to affect the rights of the tenants under the Act during that period, according to section 6, under section 16 only the land acquired by the State under any law for the time being in force, or by an heir by inheritance, have been saved and no transfer or other disposition of land effected after 1st February, 1955 shall affect the rights of the tenant thereon under the Act. While under section 6, certain bona fide transfers are permissible besides inheritance, under section 16, no transfer is permissible which may have the result of affecting the rights of a tenant under the Act. The two exceptions are inheritance by an heir and the acquisition by the State Government under any law for the time being in force. According to Section 9(1) of the Act, no land-owner is competent to eject a tenant except on grounds (i) to (vii) contained therein notwithstanding any other law. This provision has the overriding effect on the other legislation concerning the ejectment of the tenant: namely, the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887, as the Urban Rent Control legislation has over the Transfer of Property Act.

    6. Section 10-A (a) of the Act authorises the utilization of surplus area and Section 10-A (b) thereof provides that the power to utilize is not affected by any transfer or other disposition of land comprising the surplus at the commencement of the Act, save in the case of land acquired by the State Government under any law for the time being in force or by an heir by inheritance. It deserves to be noticed here that Section 10-A (b), as it stood before the amendment made in this connection by the Punjab Security of Land Tenures (Amendment) Act, 1959, which was published on 19th January, 1959, was minus the words “and save in the case of land acquired by the State Government under any law for the time being in force or by an heir by inheritance”. Therefore, before the Amending Act, 1959, the utilization of the surplus area was not affected even by inheritance or by acquisition of land by the State Government under some law. But after the the amendment, the saving clause operated in favour of an heir by inheritance and the acquisition by the State under some law. Section 19 of the Act has a reference to sections 17 and 13 of the Act and before the scope of section 19 is discussed, it will be useful to notice as to what is contained in sections 1 and 18. Under Section 17 of the Act, certain tenants have been conferred the right to pre-empt the sale of land under their tenancy, while under section 18 certain tenants have been conferred the right to purchase land under their tenancy subject to the conditions laid in that section. Therefore, by virtue of section 19 sections 17 and 18 of the Act would not apply to evaccue property as defined in the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, or any other land which maybe acquired by the State Government for re-settlement of displaced persons, meaning thereby that there would be no bar to the applicability of sections 17 and 18 of the Act to any other land owned by the Central or Government. Even to land which is evacuee property or the one acquired by the Central Government for re-settlement of displaced persons, all other provisions would apply barring sections 17 and 18.

    7. This brings me to the consideration of section 21(1) of the Act, which is the last provision to be construed. According to this provision, nothing contained in the Act is to affect any land held by a tenant or lessee under the Government or local bodies in the State, or any unallotted evacuee land. A bare reading of section 21(1) does go to show that the provisions of the Act would not apply to land held by the State Government while in possession of a tenant or lessee. On the other hand, a reading of sections 6, 10-A (b), 16 and 19 goes to show that only limited protection has been granted to the property owned by the State Government or the Central Government. If section 21 is to be read to completely exclude the applicability of the Act to the land owned by the Government, when it is in possession of a tenant or a lessee, then the provisions of sections 6, 10-A and 16 of the Act would be rendered completely obsolete and redundant so far as the land owned by the Government in possession of tenant other then that which was acquired by it under any law for the time being in force is concerned. This could not have been the intention of the Legislature. Under the Principles of interpretation of the provisions of law, it has been held that the provisions must he construed in such harmonious way that no provision of law is left redundant. It is equally true that if on true construction a statute leads to anomalous results, the Courts have no option but to give effect to it and leave it to the Legislature to amend and alter the law, but when on a construction of a statute two views are possible, one which results in anomaly and the other not, it is the duty of Courts to adopt the latter and not the former, seeing consolation in the thought that law bristles with anomalies. (See N.T Veluswami Thevar v. G. Raja Nainar . AIR 1959 SC 422.)

    8. Following view was taken by the Supreme Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. The State of Vindhya Pradesh . AIR 1953 SC 394..

    “While, no doubt, it is not permissible to supply a clear and obvious lacuna in a statute and imply a right of appeal, it is incumbent on the Court to avoid a construction, if reasonably permissible on the language, which would render a part of the statute devoid of any meaning or application.”

    9. Following the aforesaid rules of interpretations the only reasonable way of interpreting section 21 of the Act and of giving full effect to it while reading sections 6, 10-A (b), 16 and 19 of the Act on the statute book, would be that it applied to such land held by a tenant or lessee under Government, or local bodies in the State, or any unallotted evacuee land on the commencement of the Act. The word ‘held’ has been used in the past tense and, therefore, section 21(1) of the Act would be applicable only to such lands in possession of tenants or allottees immediately before the commencement of the Act. Therefore, on the harmonious construction as also on the plain reading of section 21(i) of the Act I am of the considered view that Section 21(i) would apply only to such land held by a tenant or lessee under Government, or local bodies in State, or any unallotted evacuee land, immediately before the commencement of the Act and not thereafter. If the Stats Government acquired land after the commencement of the Act by bona fide sale before 2nd February, 1955 such a transfer in favour of the Stats would be protected and the tenant will not be entitled to claim benefit of section 6 of the Act in respect thereof. Similarly, if the State Government acquires surplus area by a voluntary transfer, the same would be liable to be utilized in pursuance of Section 10-A (b) of the Act and the saving clause would apply only in respect of the land acquired by the State Government under any law for the time being in force. The voluntary transfers do not come within the ambit of acquisition by the State Government under any law for the time being in force, but would be a case of transfer by private contract. This view finds support from a decision of A.N Grover, J. in Mota Singh v. The Financial Commissioner, Punjab . 1963 P.L.J 140., wherein it was held as follows:—

    ‘Section 10 A(b) of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act saves only those lands which are acquired by the State Government under any law for the time being in force, which necessarily must refer to lands acquired under the Land Acquisition Act or any other similar statute. Thus any land sold to the State Government by private treaty would not be covered by the saving clause under section 10-A(b) of the Act.”

    The aforesaid decision is approved.

    10. Any acquisition by a private contract after 1st February, 1955, according to section 16 of the Act, is not to affect the rights of a tenant thereon under the Act and the only saving clause is acquisition by the State under any law for the time being in force. The words “land acquired by the State Government under any law for the time, being in force” cannot be equated with the words “acquired in any manner” and, therefore, these words have to be read differently. The acquisition under any law for the time being in force is under the Land Acquisition Act or allied statutes, but private sale transactions are not called acquisitions under any law for the time being in force. Therefore, the words used by the Legislature in section 16 of the Act have to be interpreted as they are and by giving full meaning to these words, the only conclusion is that the saving is in respect of land acquired by the State Government under any law for the time being in force and not to land acquired by a private contract or gift.

    11. Once again, sections 16 and 21 of the Act, if read together, clearly go to show that apart from the harmonious construction according to the word ‘held’ in section 21, the Legislature must have intended that section 21 would apply to any land held by a tenant or lessee under the Government on the date of commencement of the Act whereas according to section 16 of the Act, it envisaged the acquisition of land by the State Government not only after the commencement of the Act but after 1st February, 1955, and for acquisition after 1955, the saving clause is applied not to all acquisitions by the State, whether under law or by the private contracts, but only to such acquisitions which are under any law for the time being in force. This farther goes to show that section 21 has application to such land in possession of a tenant or a lessee belonging to the Government on the commencement of the Act, whereas Section 16 of the Act has application to acquisitions by the State after 18th February, 1955, other than under any law for the time being in force. section 10-A(b) of the Act has application to utilization of such land which was not acquired by the State Government under any law for the time being in force which would be only after the commencement of the Act.

    12. For the reasons recorded above, I am of the view that since the State Government acquired the land in dispute by gift on 22nd August, 1963, i.e after 1st February, 1955, the rights of the petitioners as tenants, thereon would not be affected by virtue of section 16 of the Act. The necessary corollary would be that by virtue of section 9(I), the State Government, who is their land owner, shall not be competent to eject them except on grounds (i) to (vii) contained therein notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force namely, the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887. The only remedy available to the State Government to eject the petitioners would be either under Section 9(1) or under Sections 14-A (i) and (ii) of the Act. Accordingly, the decision in Bachan Singh's case (supra) is approved.

    13. In the result, all the seven writ petitions are allowed with costs; the decision of the Financial Commissioner dated 23rd November 1979, Annexure P.4 is set aside and that the Commissioner, Ambala. Division, dated 15th December, 1977, is restored; counsel's fee being; Rs. 100/- in each case.

    S.S Sandhawalia, C.J:— I agree.

    R.M.S
    Petitions allowed.

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    Comments

    Rama Nand v. State Of Haryana And Others
    (Feb 9, 1981)