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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Article 65 of the 1963 Limitation Act Article 144
  • Article 113 of the 1963 Limitation Act,
  • Order 2 Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure,
  • Article 110 of the 1963 Limitation Act,
  • Article 144 of the old Limitation Act,
  • Article 120 of the old Limitation Act
  • Article 110 of the New Limitation Act,
  • Article 127 of the old Limitation Act,
  • Article 113 of the 1963 Act,
  • Order 2, Rule 2
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Article 65 of the 1963 Limitation Act Article 144
  • Article 113 of the 1963 Limitation Act,
  • Order 2 Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure,
  • Article 110 of the 1963 Limitation Act,
  • Article 144 of the old Limitation Act,
  • Article 120 of the old Limitation Act
  • Article 110 of the New Limitation Act,
  • Article 127 of the old Limitation Act,
  • Article 113 of the 1963 Act,
  • Order 2, Rule 2
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (G.C. Mital, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a letters patent appeal against the judgment of a learned Single Judge dated August 25, 1976, in R.F.A. No. 6 of 1964, by which the plaintiffs' appeal was allowed and the case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

The dispute arises from a suit filed by Abnashi Singh, Tarlok Singh and their mother Shmt. Rajwant Kaur for partition of joint properties and for rendition of accounts against Shmt. Lajwant Kaur (widow of Bhupinder Singh) and Iqbal Singh (son of Bhupinder Singh). The underlying factual narrative in the opinion includes:

  • Originally Lakha Singh and his sons formed a joint Hindu family with Lakha Singh as karta. After his death, his eldest son Bhupinder Singh ran a printing business called Wazir Hind Press. Bhupinder Singh died on September 28, 1952. His widow Shmt. Rajwant Kaur allegedly took over the business and ran it.
  • The joint family also owned a house (No. 384/7, Kucha Kahan Singh, Amritsar).
  • There was an earlier suit (Civil Suit No. 104 of 1953) by the plaintiffs seeking declaration and injunction that the press, its assets and liabilities and the family house were joint Hindu family property; that suit was decreed by the trial court on March 31, 1954, but on appeal a Division Bench of the High Court on April 11, 1960, allowed the appeal and dismissed the injunction suit holding that the joint Hindu family had disrupted in 1944 when Abnashi Singh served a notice of separation.
  • Following that decision, the plaintiffs filed the present suit for partition and rendition of accounts on August 9, 1961.
  • The defendants pleaded, inter alia, that the present suit was barred by Order 2 Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure (failure to include partition claim in earlier suit) and by limitation.
  • The trial court (Subordinate Judge 1st Class, Amritsar) by judgment dated August 13, 1963 held the suit within limitation but barred under Order 2 Rule 2 and dismissed the suit. The plaintiffs appealed (R.F.A. No.6 of 1964). A learned Single Judge allowed that appeal on August 2, 1976, holding the present suit was not barred by Order 2 Rule 2 and that the suit was within limitation under Article 110 (New Limitation Act) as applied by that judge. The present letters patent appeal challenges that Single Judge judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the suit is within time? (Issue No. 2 reproduced in the record.)
  2. Whether the suit is barred by the principles of res judicata and Order 2, Rule 2, C.P.C.? (Issue No. 3 reproduced in the record.)

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Defendants') Arguments — as presented in the opinion

  • Mr. K.S. Thapar argued that the present suit is barred by Order 2 Rule 2, C.P.C. because the cause of action in the present suit and the previous suit was the same: plaintiffs were being deprived of the business and partition could have been claimed in the previous suit.
  • He relied upon decisions that embody the rule in Order 2 Rule 2, though he did not cite any decision on identical facts.
  • On limitation, he argued that movable properties (such as press assets and business assets) are governed by the shorter limitation period (Article 120 of the old Limitation Act, equivalent to Article 113 of the 1963 Act — three years), and relied on Raghunath Das v. Gokal Chand (AIR 1958 SC 827) and Siraj-ul-Haq Khan v. The Sunni Central Board of Wakf, U.P. (AIR 1957 SC 287) in support of that proposition.

Respondents' (Plaintiffs') Arguments — as presented in the opinion

  • Mr. Bhagirath Dass contended that the cause of action for partition is independent and separate from a suit for declaration and injunction; he cited Duni Chand v. Jegdev (AIR 1949 East Pb 243) as bearing on the facts.
  • He maintained that a suit for partition arises when one or more co-sharers or family members do not wish to continue jointness, and that multiple suits between joint-family members or co-sharers can arise on different causes of action.
  • Regarding limitation for the press and business assets, he argued that the press, its assets and liabilities and other business assets were immovable properties, causing Article 144 (old) / Article 65 (1963) to apply instead of the three-year rule for movables.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court (as recorded in the opinion)
Duni Chand v. Jegdev, AIR 1949 East Pb 243 Cited by plaintiffs' counsel as having some bearing on the facts; supports the view that partition is a separate cause of action and multiple suits between family members may be permissible. The court noted the citation and used the broader principle that a suit for partition is an independent cause of action to conclude that Order 2 Rule 2 was not attracted; this supported the Single Judge's conclusion on that point.
Raghunath Das v. Gokal Chand, AIR 1958 SC 827 Relied on by defendants' counsel to support the proposition that for movable properties the shorter limitation period applies (as a basis for arguing the suit in respect of movable business assets was time-barred). The court recorded that defendants relied on this decision and accepted the law laid down therein as authoritative on limitation for movables; the court nevertheless held that classification of specific disputed items (movable vs immovable) must be decided by the trial court on remand and concluded that the suit insofar as movable properties is barred by limitation.
Siraj-ul-Haq Khan v. The Sunni Central Board of Wakf, U.P., AIR 1957 SC 287 Relied on by defendants' counsel as another authority for the limitation rule applicable to movable properties (supporting the shorter limitation period argument). The court acknowledged reliance on this decision and treated the law as binding for the purpose argued by defendants; it nonetheless left factual classification of assets to the trial court and concluded that movable-property claims were time-barred in this case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in several discrete steps, addressing first Order 2 Rule 2 (res judicata/issue estoppel type objection) and then the question of limitation, distinguishing between immovable and movable properties. The reasoning as expressed in the opinion is summarized below without any additions:

  1. Order 2 Rule 2 objection:
    • The court considered the defendants' contention that the present suit should have been included in the earlier suit and is therefore barred by Order 2 Rule 2, C.P.C. It observed that the claim for declaration and injunction in the earlier suit arose from the fact that in 1953 Shmt. Lajwant Kaur took a licence to run the press in her own name and sought to deprive the plaintiffs of benefit.
    • The court accepted the principle that a suit for partition is a separate cause of action — the right to file a partition suit is independently available to any member of a joint family or co-sharer — and that it is not necessary in every instance that a partition claim be included in an earlier suit concerning related matters.
    • Accordingly, the court agreed with the Single Judge that the principles of Order 2 Rule 2 were not attracted and the present suit was not barred on that ground.
  2. Limitation — application of Limitation Act provisions:
    • The Single Judge had applied Article 110 of the New Limitation Act (equated by the opinion with Article 127 of the old Act) treating the properties as joint Hindu family property and applying a twelve-year period from the date when exclusion became known.
    • The letters patent bench disagreed with that application because, on the facts recorded, Abnashi Singh had given notice in 1944 of his intention to separate, which, the court held, ended the status of a joint Hindu family between the brothers. Therefore Article 110/127 (applicable only to joint family property) was inapt.
    • Once joint-family status was held to have ceased, the property became co-shared and the appropriate limitation provision for immovable property or interest therein was Article 144 of the old Act (equivalent to Article 65 of the 1963 Act): a twelve-year period running from the date when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff.
    • Applying that provision, the court found that the plaintiffs' interest in the immovable properties was denied in 1953 when Shmt. Lajwant Kaur acquired exclusive licence to run the press, thereby casting doubt on plaintiffs' title; therefore the suit filed on August 9, 1961 was within twelve years as to immovable properties.
    • With regard to movable properties (press assets, business assets and liabilities), the defendants argued (relying on the cited Supreme Court decisions) that a shorter limitation period (as in Article 120 old / Article 113 new) applies. Plaintiffs countered that the press and its business assets should be treated as immovable.
    • The court observed that the classification of specific disputed items as movable or immovable had not been examined by the courts below and that the trial court, on remand, should decide which disputed properties are immovable and thus subject to partition. The court, however, concluded in this opinion that the suit insofar as it concerns movable properties is clearly barred by limitation (the opinion states this as barred under Article 420 — as recorded in the judgment text).
  3. Relief and procedural directions:
    • On the basis of the foregoing, the court ordered a preliminary decree for partition and rendition of accounts limited to the immovable properties and directed that movable property claims stand dismissed.
    • The court specified that the plaintiffs are entitled to accounts from defendant No.1 in respect of the immovable properties from December 30, 1944, as found by the trial court.
    • The court left to the trial court in post-preliminary-decree proceedings the task of determining the precise classification of contested items (immovable vs movable) and to carry out the final partition excluding movable items from consideration for partition.

Holding and Implications

PARTLY ALLOWED

The court's operative holdings and their direct consequences (as stated in the opinion) are:

  • A preliminary decree for partition and for rendition of accounts is passed.
  • The suit is held to be not barred by Order 2 Rule 2, C.P.C.; the cause of action for partition is distinct from the earlier suit for declaration and injunction.
  • With regard to limitation:
    • The Single Judge's application of Article 110 (Article 127 old) was held to be incorrect because the joint Hindu family status had ceased in 1944.
    • The proper limitation provision for immovable properties is Article 144 (old) / Article 65 (1963): a twelve-year period from adverse possession; the suit filed on August 9, 1961 was within that period for immovable properties.
    • The suit insofar as it concerns movable properties (press assets, business assets and liabilities) is declared barred by limitation in this opinion.
  • Share allocation as directed in the opinion: "The share of each of the plaintiffs, would be ¼th and the share of the defendants would be half and and half in the remaining ¼th share." (This is the allocation language used in the judgment text.)
  • Rendition of accounts: plaintiffs entitled to accounts from defendant No.1 in respect of immovable properties from December 30, 1944, as found by the trial court.
  • Because of partial success, there was no order as to costs.
  • The parties (through counsel) were directed to appear before the trial court on April 16, 1979, and the records were to be sent to the trial court forthwith for further proceedings (post-preliminary decree matters and final decree).

No broader precedent was announced beyond application of existing principles; primary practical consequences are limited to the parties in this litigation and the remand for classification and final decree.

    Shrimati Lajwant Kaur And Another v. Abnashi Singh And Others

    G.C Mital, J.:— This is a letters patent appeal against the judgment of a learned Single Judge dated August 25, 1976, in R.F.A No. 6 of 1964, by which the plaintiffs' appeal was allowed and the case was remanded to the trial Court for further proceedings in accordance with law.

    2. Abnashi Singh, Tarlok Singh and their mother Shmt. Rajwant Kaur filed a suit for partition of joint properties and for rendition of accounts against Shmt. Lajwant Kaur widow of Bhupinder Singh, and Iqbal Singh son of Bhupinder Singh Bhupinder Singh was brother of Abanashi Singh and Tarlok Singh plaintiffs and their father was Lakha Singh Bhupinder Singh had died before the institution of the suit.

    3. In the aforesaid suit, out of which this appeal arises, the plaintiffs stated that Lakha Singh with his sons formed a joint Hindu family of which he was the karta and after his death, his eldest son Bhupinder Singh took over the family business of printing press under the name and style of Wazir Hind Press, Hall Bazar, Amritsar, and after the death of Bhupinder Singh on September 28, 1952, his widow Shmt. Rajwant Kaur took over the business and started running the same, Besides this, the joint Hindu family owned house bearing No. 384/7, situate in Kucha Kahan Singh, Amritsar. The plaintiffs claimed partition of the aforesaid properties as a dispute arose between them about the management and control of the family business. It is pleaded that the plaintiffs earlier brought Civil Suit No. 104 of 1953, for a declaration that the property Wazir Hind Press, its assets and liabilities and family house were the properties of the joint Hindu family and for the grant of a permanent injunction restraining Shmt. Lajwant Kaur from interfering in the enjoyment by the plaintiffs of the joint Hindu family property including Wazir Hind Press and also restraining her from ???efns???ng to allow the plaintiffs from acting at Karta and Manager of the joint family assets. That earlier suit for injunction was decreed by the trial Court on March 31, 1954, but on appeal, a Division Bench of this Court on April 11, 1960, allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit for injunction on the finding that the joint Hindu family had disrupted in 1944 when Abnashi Singh plaintiff had served notice to separate from the Hindu undivided family and, therefore, the declaration sought for that the properties belong to Hindu undivided family could not be granted. The Division Bench specifically observed as follows:—

    “They can if they are so advised, file a suit for actual partition of the property or seek any other appropriate relief.”

    4. That is how the plaintiffs filed the present suit for partition of the joint properties and for rendition of accounts on August 9, 19???1.

    5. The defence of the defendants. Shmt Lajwant Kaur and Iqbal Singh, was that the present suit was barred by the principles of Order 2 Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure, inasmuch as the plaintiffs should have included the prayer for partition in the previously instituted suit that the suit was barred by limitation and raised some other points which are no longer in controversy between the parties. The two relevant issues, which survive for decision, are issues No. 2 and 3, which are reproduced below:—

    2. Whether the suit is within time? (Onus objected).

    3. Whether the suit is barred by the principles of res judicata and Order 2, Rule 2, C.P.C?

    6. The learned Subordinate Judge 1st Class, Amritsar, by his judgment and decree dated August 13, 1963, held under issue No. 2 that the suit is within limitation Under issue No. 3, it held that the suit was barred under Order 2, Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure Consequently the trial Court dismissed the suit. The plaintiffs filed R.F.A No. 6 of 1964 in this Court which was allowed by a learned Single Judge on August 2, 1976, holding that the suit is not barred by the principles of Order 2, Rule 2 as the cause of action in the previous suit was different, as in that suit only declaration and injunction were claimed. He also found that in the previous suit all the properties were not included and if the prayer for partition had been made in that suit then that suit would have failed on the ground of partial partition and a fresh suit for the partition of all the properties would have sot been barred. On the point of limitation, the suit was held to be within limitation, not on the reasoning adopted by the trial Court but by applying Article 110 of the New Limitation Act, considering the property to be Hindu undivided family property for which limitation is twelve years from the date when the exclusion becomes known to the plaintiff. It was held on facts that it was in 1953 that Shmt. Lajwant Kaur sought to run the business in her own name when she purported to exclude the plaintiffs from part of the family property and the suit could be brought upto 1965 and as such the suit filed on August 9, 1961, was within limitation.

    7. In the letters patent appeal, Mr. K.S Thapar has argued in the first instance that the present suit is barred under the principles of Order 2 Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure, as the cause of action in the present suit and the previous suit was one, namely, that the plaintiffs were being deprived of the business by the defendants and that the relief of partition could also be included in the previous suit. In support of his argument he has relied on some decisions, the underlying rule therein is the same as contained in Order 2, Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure. But, he has not been able to cite any decision either on identical facts before us or something near it. Therefore, we need not refer to those decisions as the rule laid down therein is well known and there is no quarrel with the same. The claim for declaration and injunction which was laid in the previous suit was on the basis that in 1953 Shmt Lajwant Kaur took the licence for running the press in her own name and thereby she wanted to deprive the plaintiffs from getting the benefit of the same. The cause of action for partition is an independent one. The right to file a suit for partition is always available to any member of the joint family and when it is a case of merely co-sharers, to any one of the co-sharers, but it is not necessary that whenever somebody's share is denied in a joint property a suit for partition must be filed.

    8. On the other hand, Mr. Bhagirath Dass, the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondents has cited Duni Chand v. Jegdev . AIR 1949 East Pb 243., which has some bearing on the facts of this case. To our mind, any number of suits may go on between members of the joint Hindu family with regard to the joint family property and between co sharers with regard to joint property, but a suit for partition is always based on a separate cause of action and that is when one of more of the co-sharers or members of the joint Hindu family do not want to continue joint any longer. On this principle, we are of the opinion that the learned Single Judge was right in holding that the principles of Order 2 Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure, are not attracted to this case and the present suit is not barred.

    9. As regards the point of limitation, Article 127 of the old Limitation Act, which is equal to Article 110 of the 1963 Limitation Act, is as follows:—

    “Description of suit.Period of limitation.Time from which period begins to run.127. By a person excluded from joint family property to enforce a right to share therein.Twelve yearsWhen the exclusion becomes known to the plaintiff.”

    10. A reading of this Article would show that it would be applicable only in the case of joint family property whenever it is sought to be petitioned and the limitation of twelve years will run from the date when the exclusion becomes known to the plaintiff. This Article would be applicable only if the property in dispute belongs to joint family. Abnashi Singh plaintiff himself gave a notice in the year 1944 of his intention to separate from the joint Hindu family and the moment he gave the notice, the status of joint Hindu family between brothers came to an end and that is why in the previous suit, which came to the High Court, this Court held that the properties ceased to be joint family property and on that ground the suit was dismissed and it was left open for the plaintiffs to file a suit for partition or to adopt any other appropariate remedy Mr. Bhagirath Dass, learned counsel for the plaintiff respondents, could not controvert this point and, therefore, we hold that the learned Single Judge was not right in applying Article 110 to the facts of the present case.

    11. If the parties to this litigation are not members of the joint Hindu family, the property which was once owned by their joint Hindu family could also be not joint family property. The moment the status is taken away, they became co-sharers in the property and as such the only Article applicable would be Article 144 of the old Limitation Act, which is equal to Article 65 of the 1963 Limitation Act Article 144 reads as follows:—

    “144,—For possession of immovable property or any interest therein not hare by otherwise specially provided for.Twelve years.When the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff.”

    12. The plaintiffs clearly have an interest in the property in dispute which is denied by the defendants and, therefore, they are entitled to maintain the suit within a period of twelve years from the date the possession of the defendants becomes adverse to the plaintiffs, Admittedly, it was in 1953 when Shmt Lajwant Kaur got the exclusive licence in her favour for the press, that is, she threw a cloud on he title of the plaintiffs and, therefore, the present suit brought on August 9, 1961, is clearly within twelve years. The title of the plaintiffs in other immovable property, that is, the house was never denied and, in any case, the suit with regard to that is within limitation.

    13. The above conclusion of ours is true only with regard to immovable properties which are the subject matter in dispute Mr. Thapar wanted to apply Article 120 of the old Limitation Act which is equal to Article 113 of the 1963 Limitation Act, to argue that the suit is beyond three years and, therefore, is barred by limitation. When faced with Article 144, he could not controvert the same but went on to argue that article 144 will apply only to immovable properties and not to movable properties like press its as sets and liabilities and other business assets, and for such movable properties the limitation would be six years under Article 120 of the old Act which is equal to Article 113 of the 1963 Act, under which the limitation is three years. For his argument that for movable properties Article 120 is applicable, he has relied on Raghunath Das v. Gokal Chand . AIR 1958 SC 827, and Siraj-ul-Haq Khan v. The Sunni Central Board of Wakf, U.P . AIR 1957 SC 287. and contends that in any event for the movable properties the suit is clearly barred by time. Mr. Bhagirath Dass, counsel for the plaintiff-respondents had no answer to the law laid down in the foresaid two decisions but argued that the press, its assets and liabilities and other business assets, are immovable properties and as such this Article would not be applicable and the only Article applicable would be 144. This matter has not been ???one into by any of the Courts below as it was never adverted to in the manner it has been argued before us. All that we hold is that the suit with regared to the immovable properties is within limitation under Article 144 and suit with regard to the movable properties is clearly barred by limitation under Article 420. Now, it will be open for the trial Court in post preliminary decree proceedings to decide which of the properties in dispute are immovable property and to partition the same and to exclude from consideration for purposes of partition the movable properties. This could be done by the trial Court after the case goes back to it for the passing of the final decree.

    14. or the reasons recorded above, the appeal is partly allowed to the extent indicated above and a preliminary decree for partition and for rendition of accounts is passed. The share of each of the plaintiffs, would be ¼th and the share of the defendants would be half and and half in the remaining ¼th share. With regard to rendition of accounts, the plaintiffs are entitled to accounts from defendant No. 1 in respect of the immovable properties from December 30, 1944, as found by the trial Court in para ???2 of its judgment. The suit with regard to movable properties shall stand dismissed. In view of partial success, there will be no order as to costs. The parties, through their counsel, are directed to appear before the trial Court on April 16, 1979. The records may be sent to the trial Court forthwith.

    S.S Sandhawalia, C.J:— I agree.

    R.M.S
    Order accordingly.

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    Shrimati Lajwant Kaur And Another v. Abnashi Singh And Others
    (Mar 20, 1979)