A.D Koshal, C.J:— In this petition the relief sought by the petitioners who are claimants before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Hissar, is for setting aside an order dated the 21st of April, 1976, made by the Tribunal and holding that although the petitioners are paupers, they cannot be absolved of the responsibility of paying court-fee on the claim petition for the reason that order XXXIII of the Code of Civil Procedures not applicable to proceedings adjudicated upon by the Tribunal.
2. In coming to the conclusion that the proceedings before the Tribunal were not governed by Order XXXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Tribunal relied on rule 20 of the Punjab Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules, 1964 and a Single Bench decision of this Court reported as Groz Beckert Saboo Ltd. v. Jupittr General Insurance Co. . 1966 68 P.L.R 161., reads thus:
“The following provisions of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall go far as may be apply to proceedings before this Claims Tribunal, namely, Order V, Rules 9 to 13 and 15 to 30, Order IX, Order XIII, Rule 3 to 10, Order XVI, Rules 2 to 21, Order XVII and Order XXIII, Rules 1 to 3”.
3. The Tribunal was of the opinion that as this rule does not mention Order XXXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure among the provisions of later made applicable to proceedings before the Tribunal, by implication it excludes their applicability to such proceedings. Support for this interpretation of the rule was sought from Groz Beckert Saboo's case (supra) in which Dua, J. expressed the opinion that section 110-C of the Motor Vehicles Act by no means clothes the Tribunal with all the characteristics of a Civil Court so as to attract the provisions of Order XVI, Code of Civil Procedure, and even the New Punjab Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules exclude the applicability of rule of Order XVI, Civil Procedure Code, which authorises the parties to obtain summons to persons whose attendance is required”.
4. According to Dua, J., this exclusion of rule 1 of order XVI of the Code of Civil Procedure appeared to be deliberate. This interpretation of rule 20, however does not appear to be sound and must be deemed to have been over-ruled by the dictum of a full Bench of this Court in Smt. Shanti Devi v. General Manager Haryana Roadways, Ambala . 1971 73 P.L.R 543. read with that of a Division Bench in Major Triloki Nath Bharguva, etc. v. Smt. Jaswant Kaur . 1975 77 P.L.R 422., P.C Jain, J., who delivered the judgment of the Full Bench in Shanti Devi case, analysed the relevant provisions the Motor Vehicles Act and the said Rules at length and came to the conclusion:
“The proceedings before the Claims Tribunal closely resemble the proceedings in civil court and to use the language of their lordships of the supreme court in Jugal Kishor's case (A.I.R 1967 S.C 1494) the Claims Tribunal for all intents and purposes discharges the same functions and duties in the same manner as a Court of law is expected to do. In this view of the matter hold that the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal are not in the nature of arbitration proceedings and that the Claims Tribunal while disposing of the claims acts as a Court”.
5. This dictum was followed and reiterated by Tuli and S.C Mittal, JJ. in Smt. Chawli Devi v. Union of India . 1973 75 P.L.R 848. and again by Narula, C.J, and Bains, J. in Major Triloki Nath Bhargava's (supra). In the case last mentioned it was argued that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure not specifically mentioned in rule 120 must be held to have been excluded and in support of the argument reliance was placed on The Motor Owners Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shrimati Renuka Roy . A.I.R 1973 Gauhati 142.. The view expressed in the Gauhati case, however, did not find favour with Narula, C.J who came to the conclusion on the basis of the Full Bench dictum in K. Chandrashekara Naik v. Narayana . A.I.R 1955 Karnatka 18., and three cases decided respectively by the Delhi. Orissa and Madhya Pradesh High Courts that the same did not lay down the correct law. He held, repelling the argument advanced before him, that the provision of rule 22 of order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure were applicable to proceedings under section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act in spite of the fact that rule did not find a place in rule 20 above mentioned.
6. In so far as this High Court is concerned, therefore the law appears to be well settled that a Claims Tribunal performing functions under the Motor Vehicles Act has more or less the same statute as that of a Court and performs functions similar to it and also that rule 20 of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules does not, either expressly or by necessary implication, exclude the applicability to proceedings before the Claims Tribunal of those provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure which it does not specifically mention and that, on the other hand, such provisions would be applicable if they are in consonance with the principles of fair-play and propriety. Viewed in this light rule 20 would not stand, in my opinion, in the way of the petitioners being absolved of the responsibility to pay court fee if they are found paupers as they have actually been found by the Tribunal. To hold otherwise would be to create an invidious distinction between subject and subject and to close the gates of justice to persons who are unable by virtue of their poverty to pay court-fee while such gates are left wide open for the millionaires a distinction which cannot have the sanction of any law worth the name.
7. In the result the petition succeeds and is accepted and the impugned order is set aside. The petitioners are held entitled to the benefit of the provisions of Order XXXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Claims Tribunal shall hence forward proceed on that basis. The parties shall appear before it on 20th of March, 1978. No costs.
8. Petition allowed.