Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

C. W. No. 3276 of 1969.

Attorney(S)

T. S. Mangat, Advocate,
R. K. Aggarwal, Advocate, No. 1.
I. S. Tiwana, Deputy Advocate-General, Punjab, No. 5.

Judges

Bal Raj Tuli
S.S Sandhawalia
D.S Tewatia, JJ.

Acts

provisions of section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Acquisition Act), by section 59 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act (hereinafter referred to as the Improvement Act),
Land Acquisition Act and clause (2) and clauses (a), (d) and (f) added to sub-section (3) of section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act by clause (3) of para 10 of the Schedule to the Town Improvement Act,
section 59 of the Improvement Act ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution.
SECTION 32 PUNJAB TOWN IMPROVEMENT ACT 1922
provisions of that section ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution
SECTION 3 PUNJAB TOWN IMPROVEMENT ACT 1922
sub-section 3(a), (d) and (f) added to section 23 of the Acquisition Act
Acquisition Act and section 59 of the Improvement. Act
SECTION 36 PUNJAB TOWN IMPROVEMENT ACT 1922
provisions of section 23 of the Acquisition Act
(2) of clause 6 of the Schedule to Act 37 of 1950
Madras City Improvement Trust Act 37 of 1950
SECTION 58 PUNJAB MUNICIPAL ACT 1911
section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act
sub-section (3) of section 32 of this Act
Section 23(2) the Land Acquisition Act
PUNJAB TOWN IMPROVEMENT ACT 1922
Madras City Improvement Trust Act.
section 23 of the Acquisition Act,
section 59 of the Improvement Act
LAND ACQUISITION ACT

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Smart Summary

Full Bench Opinion — Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This Full Bench (constituted to decide questions arising from several writ petitions) considered whether the mode of determining compensation prescribed by amendments to section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (as effected by paragraph 10 of the Schedule to the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 via section 59 of that Act) results in discrimination when land is acquired under the Improvement Act, and whether the absence of a right of appeal against awards of the Tribunal under the Improvement Act amounts to a discriminatory denial of equal protection because the Acquisition Act provides a right of appeal from the District Judge to the High Court.

A reference to the Full Bench was made by an earlier Division Bench order dated 7 January 1971. Nine writ petitions (numerous file numbers are recorded in the opinion) were placed before the Full Bench after prior procedural steps in which some petitions were directed to be heard along with other matters before the Division Bench. The Full Bench heard the matters and recorded its conclusions.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the mode of determining compensation for land acquired for town improvement—by the amendment to section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act effected by paragraph 10 of the Schedule to the Punjab Town Improvement Act—results in discrimination contrary to Article 14 of the Constitution.
Whether the non-provision of a right of appeal against the award of the Tribunal under section 59 of the Improvement Act amounts to discrimination because the Acquisition Act provides a right of appeal from the District Judge to the High Court.

Arguments of the Parties

Arguments advanced on behalf of landowners / petitioners

Paragraph 10 of the Schedule to the Improvement Act (as amending section 23 of the Acquisition Act) reduces the market value used for compensation and removes the statutory solatium (15%). As a result, compensation under the Improvement Act will be less than compensation payable under the Acquisition Act, producing differential treatment of similarly situated owners and amounting to discrimination contrary to Article 14.
Relying on precedents (including Balammal and Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao), petitioners argued that deprivation of statutory additions and reduced valuation principles were invalid as discriminatory.

Arguments advanced on behalf of the Improvement Trust / State

Counsel for the Improvement Trust relied upon the Supreme Court judgment in Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab to submit that paragraph 10 of the Schedule and section 59 were intra vires and that the supplemental principles in paragraph 10 legitimately regulated how market value should be ascertained (i.e., by reference to actual use on the relevant date).
The Trust also relied on Sarwan Singh to contend that the absence of a right of appeal under the Improvement Act does not render section 59 ultra vires Article 14.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Balammal v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1425	Depriving owners of the statutory solatium (15% addition under section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act) by modifying the Land Acquisition Act is violative of equality guaranteed by Article 14; owners are entitled to the statutory solatium for compulsory acquisition.	The opinion cites Balammal for the proposition that denial of the statutory solatium under a modified acquisition regime is discriminatory; this supports the view that persons whose lands are acquired under the Improvement Act must receive benefits at least equal to those under the Land Acquisition Act.
Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao, 1973 1 SCC 500	Para 10-type modifications (similar to those in the Improvement Act schedule) alter valuation methods so that market value is determined by the use of the land on the relevant date and deny the statutory solatium; classification based on purpose or acquiring authority ordinarily cannot justify differential compensation under Article 14.	The Court treated this larger-bench decision as directly on point and followed its reasoning (including the analysis in paras 17 and 22–28) to conclude that certain amendments which reduce compensation are unconstitutional under Article 14.
Mattulal v. Radhe Lal, 1974 2 SCC 365	When faced with conflicting Supreme Court decisions, the decision of the larger Bench is to be followed even if a smaller Bench decision is prior in time.	The Full Bench invoked this principle to justify following the larger Bench decision in Nagpur Improvement Trust over the conflicting Sarwan Singh decision on the point concerning paragraph 10 and its effect on compensation.
Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab, 1975 1 SCC 284	Noticed paragraph 10 as amending section 23 and observed that paragraph 10 provides supplemental principles for determining market value according to actual use on the material date; also held that denial of the right of appeal did not render section 59 ultra vires Article 14.	The Improvement Trust relied on Sarwan Singh to support intra vires character of paragraph 10 and section 59. The Full Bench declined to follow Sarwan Singh on the paragraph 10 point (because of Nagpur being a larger Bench) but accepted Sarwan Singh's conclusion concerning the non-provision of a right of appeal not making section 59 ultra vires.
Harbans Kaur etc. v. Ludhiana Improvement Trust (Full Bench of the Court)	The denial of benefits of the Acquisition Act to persons whose lands are acquired under the Improvement Act amounts to violation of Article 14; such persons are entitled to benefits under the Acquisition Act.	The Full Bench relied on this court's Full Bench decision as supporting the proposition that benefits under the Acquisition Act must be allowed to those whose lands are acquired under the Improvement Act, reinforcing the conclusion to strike down provisions that reduce compensation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Full Bench proceeded in a structured manner:

The Court first examined the text of paragraph 10 of the Schedule to the Punjab Town Improvement Act, which amends section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act by (a) substituting references to notices under the Improvement Act for certain publications under the Acquisition Act, and (b) introducing a new subsection (3) that prescribes how market value is to be calculated (i.e., by reference to the use to which land was put on the relevant date), allows limited additional compensation where the owner in good faith took active steps to secure a more profitable use, and provides for various disregards to increases in value (e.g., unauthorized improvements, improvements made within two years unless shown to be in good faith, unlawful uses, and rent-return limitations).
The Court observed that these modifications have the effect of reducing the market value and removing the statutory solatium that would otherwise be payable under section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act. From this it followed that compensation under the Improvement Act, as amended, would be less than compensation under the unamended Acquisition Act.
The opinion relied on authoritative Supreme Court reasoning in Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao (a larger Bench decision) which held that classification based upon the public purpose for which land is acquired, the authority acquiring the land, or merely the choice of one acquisition statute over another, does not ordinarily supply an intelligible differentia or rational nexus required to justify unequal treatment in compensation under Article 14. The opinion quoted and applied paras 22–28 of Nagpur concerning the two-fold test for reasonable classification: (i) intelligible differentia, and (ii) rational relation to the object of legislation.
Applying Nagpur and Balammal, the Full Bench concluded that paragraph 10 (specifically clause (2) of the Schedule and sub‑section (3)(a), (d) and (f) added to section 23) operates to reduce compensation below what would be payable under section 23 of the Acquisition Act and therefore results in discrimination contrary to Article 14. On that basis these provisions were held ultra vires Article 14 and struck down.
The Court addressed the competing Supreme Court authority in Sarwan Singh. It treated Sarwan Singh as conflicting with Nagpur on the paragraph 10 point but, applying the principle in Mattulal v. Radhe Lal, held itself bound to follow the larger Bench (Nagpur) over the earlier decision in Sarwan Singh. However, Sarwan Singh's separate conclusion — that the absence of a right of appeal under the Improvement Act does not render section 59 ultra vires Article 14 — was accepted by the Full Bench, and thus the challenge to section 59 on the ground of denial of an appeal was dismissed.
The Court therefore bifurcated the result: striking down the specific amendments that reduce compensation but upholding section 59 insofar as the absence of an appellate remedy was concerned.
Finally, the Full Bench remitted the cases back to a Division Bench for adjudication on remaining points and for determination of compensation in accordance with the legal conclusions reached.

Holding and Implications

The Court recorded the following dispositive rulings:

Core holding: The provisions of the Schedule to the Punjab Town Improvement Act that have the effect of reducing compensation below the amount payable under section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act are ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution and are struck down. Concretely, clause (2) of the Schedule and sub‑section (3)(a), (d) and (f) added to section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act by clause (3) of paragraph 10 of the Schedule are declared ultra vires Article 14. The opinion states that compensation awarded to landowners whose land is acquired for a Town Improvement Trust must not be less than the compensation determined under the Land Acquisition Act.
Appeal point: The absence of a right of appeal against the award made by the Tribunal under section 59 of the Improvement Act does not make the provisions of that section ultra vires Article 14. The challenge to section 59 on the ground of denial of an appellate remedy was rejected in light of Sarwan Singh.

Implications and immediate effects:

The struck-down provisions may not be applied to reduce compensation below what section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act mandates; compensation for lands acquired under the Improvement Act must be at least equivalent to compensation under the Acquisition Act (including statutory additions applicable under the Acquisition Act as held relevant by precedent).
The question of the precise amount of compensation in the individual cases is to be determined by a Division Bench in conformity with this Full Bench decision; the cases were remitted for that purpose.
The Full Bench followed a larger Bench Supreme Court decision (Nagpur) over a conflicting smaller-Bench decision (Sarwan Singh) on the point of paragraph 10's effect, applying the principle from Mattulal v. Radhe Lal; but on the separate procedural issue of appeal the court accepted Sarwan Singh's conclusion. The opinion therefore adopts existing precedent rather than announcing a novel legal principle beyond applying settled Supreme Court primacy rules.

Disposition: Reference answered; the parties were directed back to a Division Bench for determination of remaining points and assessment of compensation consistent with this ruling. All members of the Bench concurred.

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Devinder Kaur v. Ludhiana Improvement Trust, Ludhiana And Others

B.R Tuli, J.:— This Bench has been constituted to decide whether the mode of determining compensation prescribed by the amendment in the provisions of section 23 of the Land acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Acquisition Act), by section 59 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act (hereinafter referred to as the Improvement Act), results in discrimination where the land of a citizen is acquired for the purposes of the Improvement Act. Another point for consideration is whether the non-provision of a right of appeal against the award of the Tribunal under the Improvement Act amounts to discrimination because under the Acquisition Act right of appeal has been provided against the award of the District Judge to the High Court. Reference to the Full Bench has been made by order dated January 7, 1971, passed by a Division Bench consisting of D.K Mahajan and Gopal Singh, JJ. Previously, eight of these writ petitions came up for hearing before Suri, J. and he was informed that C.W ??? of 1970, in which the questions involved were the same as in the writ petitions before him, had been admitted direct to a Division Bench and was on the daily list of the III Division Bench. The learned Judge directed that the eight writ petitions before him should also be placed before that Bench. Thus nine writ petitions (Nos. 3276 of 1969, ???, 2474, 2523, 2609, 2611, 2612, 2629 and 3013 of 1970) came up for hearing before the Bench consisting of D.K Mahajan and Gopal Singh, JJ. ??? Nos. 771 of 1970 and 30 and 33 of 1971 were also directed to be heard with this reference by the Division Bench hearing those appeals.

2. The land for a Town Improvement Trust is acquired under the Acquisition Act and section 59 of the Improvement. Act has made certain modifications in the provisions of the Acquisition Act. These modifications are contained in the Schedule to the Improvement Act, para 10 of which mentions the amendments made to section 23 of the Acquisition Act and reads as under:—

“10(1). In clause first and clause sixthly of sub-section (1) of section 23 of the said Act, for the words ‘publication of the declaration relating thereto under section 6’ and the words ‘publication of the declaration under section 6’ shall be deemed to be substituted—

(a) if the land is being acquired under sub-section (3) of section 32 of this Act the words issue of the notice under sub-section (3) of section 32 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922,’ and

(b) in any other case, the words ‘first publication of the notification under section 36 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922,’

(2) The fullstop at the end of sub-section (2) of section 23 of the said Act shall be deemed to be changed to a colon and the following proviso shall be deemed to be added:

‘Provided that this sub-section shall not apply to any land acqired under the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922:

(3) At the end of section 23 of the said Act, the following shall be deemed to be added, namely:—

“(3) For the purposes of clause first of sub-section (1) of this section.

(a) the market-value of the land shall be the market value according to the use to which the land was put at the date with reference to which the market-value is to be determined under that clauses;

(b) if it be shown that before such date, the owner of the land had in good faith taken active steps and incurred expenditure to secure a more profitable use of the same, further compensation based on his actual loss may be paid to him;

(c) if any person without the permission of the trust required by sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922, has erected re-elected, added to or altered any building or wail so as to make the same project beyond a street alignment or building line duly prescribed by the trust, then any increase in the market-value resulting from such erection, re-erection, addition or alteration shall be disregarded;

(d) if the market value has been increased by means of any improvement made by the owner or his predecessor in-interest within two years before the aforesaid date, such increase shall be disregarded unless it be proved that the improvement so made was made in good faith and not in contemplation of proceedings for the acquisition of the land being taken under the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922;

(e) if the market-value is specially high in consequence of the land being put to a use which is unlawful or contrary to public policy, that use shall be disregarded, and the market value shall be deemed to be the market value of the land if put to ordinary use; and

(f) when the owner of the land or building has after the passing of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922, and within two years preceding the date with reference to which the market value is to be determined, made a return under any enactment in force of the rent of the land or building, the rent of the land or building shall not in any case be deemed to be greater than the rent shown in the latest return so made, save as the Court may otherwise direct, and the market-value may be determined on the basis of such rent:

Provided that where any addition to, or improvement of the land or building has been made after the date of such latest return and previous to the date with reference to which the market-value is to be determined the Court may take into consideration any increase in the letting-value of the land due to such addition or improvement.”

3. From the provisions of this para in the Schedule, it is apparent that the marker value to be determined under the emended provisions of section 23 will be less than the market value as determined under the provisions of section 23 of the Acquisition Act without the modifications prescribed in the Schedule. In there circumstances, a question arises whether different modes for determining compensation in respect of lands acquired for a public purpose under the Acquisition Act and for the purposes of town improvement under the Improvement Act can be validly prescribed and, if prescribed, will be hit by the vie of discrimination which is prohibited by article 14 of the Constitution. It was held by the Supreme Court in Balammal v. State of Madras . A.I.R 1968 S.C 1425., that clause 6(2) of the Schedule to the Madras City Improvement Trust Act (37 of ???) read with section 73 of that Act, which deprived the owners of the statutory right to solatium at the rate of 15 per cent on the market value of the lands is invalid and the owners of the lands are entitled to the statutory solatium under Section 23(2) the Land acquisition Act in consideration of compulsory acquisition of their lands. It was further observed that

“sub-clause (2) of clause 6 of the Schedule to Act 37 of 1950 insofar as it deprived the owners of the lands of the statutory addition to the market value of the lands under section 23(2) of the Land acquisition Act is violative of the equality clause of the Constitution, and is on that account void. If the State had acquired the lands for improvement of the town under the Land acquisition Act, the acquiring authority was bound to award in addition to the market value 15 per cent solatium under section 23(2) of the Land acquisition Act. But by acquiring the lands under the Land acquisition Act as modified by he Schedule to the Madras City Improvement Trust Act 37 of 1950 for the Improvement Trust which also is a public purpose, the owners are, it is, claimed, derived of tbs right to the statutory addition. An owner of land is ordinarily entitled to receive the solatium in addition to the market value, for compulsory acquisition of his land, if it is acquired under the Land acquisition Act, but not if it is acquired under the Madras City Improvement Trust Act. A clear case of discrimination which infringes the guarantee of equal protection of the law arises and the provision which in more prejudicial to the owners of the lands which are compulsorily acquired must on the decisions of this Court, be deemed invalid.”

4. It was thus recognised in this judgment that the compensation to be paid under the Improvement Act will not be less than the compensation payable under the Acquisition Act. The matter was made clear by the Supreme Court in Nagpur Improvement Trim v. Vithal Rao . 1973 1 SCC 500, which considered the effect of para 10 of the Schedule amending section 23 of the Acquisition Act, which was similar in terms to para 10 of the schedule to the Improvement Act, which has been set out above. That case, therefore, directly covers the point that is for decision there us. In paragraph 17 of the report, it has been observed:

“It would be seen that the effect of the modifications in two respects is tremendous. First, the owner whose land is acquired under the Improvement Act is paid compensation not according to the market value of the land but the market value according to the use to which the land was put at the date with reference to which the market value is to be determined in that clause. In other words, if the land is being used for agricultural purposes, even though it has a potential value as a building site, the potential value is to be ignored. The second respect in which the owner suffers if the land is acquired under the Improvement Act is that he does not get a solatium of 15% which he would have got a the land had been acquired under the Land acquisition Act. It is true that he has some minor advantages which have been pointed out by the learned counsel but they have no comparison in value to the loss suffered by virtue of the market value being determined according to the use to which the land was being put or the loss of 15% of the market value of the land.”

5. It was then pointed out that the acquiring authority of the land for the Improvement Trust is the State Government and it is, therefore, quite clear that the Government can acquire for a housing accommodation scheme either under the Acquisition Act or under the Improvement Act. If this be so, it enables the State Government to discriminate between one owner equally situated from another owner. The matter is than dealt with in paras 22 to 28 of the report which bear repetition and are as under:—

“22. The question then arises whether the High Court is right in holding that the impugned provisions were hit by article 14 of the Constitution.

23. It is now well settled that the State can make a reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation. It is equally well settled that the classification in order to be reasonable must satisfy two tests (i) the classification must be founded on intelligible differentia and (ii) the differentia must have a rational relation with the object sought to be achieved by the legislation in question. In this connection it must be borne in mind that the object itself should be lawful. The object itself cannot be discriminatory, for otherwise, for instance, if the object is to discriminate against one section of the minority, the discrimination cannot be justified on the ground that there is a reasonable classification because it has rational relation to the object sought to be achieved.

24. What can be reasonable classification for the purpose of determining compensation if the object of the legislation is to compulsorily acquire land for public purposes?

25. It would not be disputed that different principles of compensation cannot be formulated for lands acquired on the basis that the owner is old or young, healthy or ill, tall or short, or whether the owner has inherited the property or built it with his own efforts, or whether the owner is a politician or an advocate. Why is this sort of classification not sustainable? Because the object being to compulsorily acquire for a public purpose, the object is equally achieved whether the land belongs to one type of owner or another type.

26. Can classification be made on the basis of the public purpose for the purpose of compensation for which land is acquired? In other words can the legislature lay down different principles of compensation for lands acquired say for a hospital or a school or a Government budding? Can the legislature say that for a hospital land will be acquired at 50% of the market value, for a school at 60% of the value and for a Government building at 70% of the market value? All three objects are public purposes and as far as the owner is concerned, it does not matter to him whether it is one public purpose or the other. Article 14 confers an individual right and in order to justify a classification there should be something which justifies a different treatment to this individual right. It seems to us that ordinarily a classification based on the public purpose is not permissible under Article 14 for the purpose of determine compensation. The position is different when the owner of the land himself is the recipient or benefits from an improvement scheme, and the benefit to him is taken into consideration in fixing compensation. Can classification be made on the basis of the authority acquiring the land? In other words can different principles of compensation be laid if the land is acquired for or by an Improvement Trust or Municipal Corporation or the Government? It seems to us that the answer is the negative because as far as the owner is concerned, it does not matter to him whether the land is acquired by one authority or the other.

27. It is equally immaterial whether it is one Acquisition ‘Act or another Acquisition Act under which the land is acquired. If the existence of two Acts would enable the State to give one owner different treatment from another equally situated, the owner, who is discriminated against, can claim the protection of Article 14.

28. It was said that if this is the true position, the State would find it impossible to clear slums, to do various other laudable things. If this argument were to be accepted, it would be totally destructive of the protection given by Article 14 It would enable the State to have one law for acquiring lands for hospital, one law for acquiring lands for schools, one law (for) acquiring lands for clearing slums, another for acquiring lands or Government buildings, one for acquiring lands in New Delhi and another for acquiring lands in Old Delhi. It was said that in many cases, the value of the kind has increased not because of any effort by the owner but because of the general development of the city in which the land is situated. There is no doubt that this is so, but Article 14 prohibits the expropriation of the unearned increment of one owner while leaving his neighbour untouched. This neighbour could sell his land and reap the unearned increment. If the object of the legslation is to tax unearned increment, it should be done throughout the State. The State cannot achieve this object piecemeal by compulsory acquisition of land of some owners leaving others alone. If the object is to clear slums, it cannot be done at the expense of the owners whose lands are acquired, unless, as we have said, the owners are directly benefited by the Scheme, the object is to build hospitals, it cannot be done at the expense of the owners of the land which is acquired. The hospitals, schools etc. must be built at the expense of the whole community.”

6. Following this judgment, a Full Bench of this Court held in Harbans Kaur etc. v. Ludhiana Improvement Trust etc.,3 that the denial of the benefits of the Acquisition Act to the persons whose lands are acquired under the Improvement Act will amount to violation of article 14 of the Constitution and, therefore, all benefits under the Acquisition Act are to be allowed to the persons whose lands and properties are acquired under the Improvement Act. It may also be pointed out that under section 58 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, any land can be acquired for the purposes of that Act by the State Government at the request of the municipal committee and that acquisition has to be made under the provisions of the Acquisition Act and on payment by the committee of the compensation award able under that Act. It is thus obvious that if the State Government acquires land for a municipal committee within the town and for the improvement trust in the same town, different modes of determination of compensation will have to be followed and the compensation determined in one case will be less than the one determined in the other. Thus a clear case of discrimination arises. For this reason, clause (2) of the Schedule and sub-section 3(a), (d) and (f) added to section 23 of the Acquisition Act by clauses (3) of the Schedule, cannot be resorted to as the amount of compensation determined in accordance therewith will be less than the amount of compensation determined under section 23 of the Acquisition Act and, therefore, these provisions are ultra vires section 23 of that Act.

7. The learned counsel for the Improvement Trust has invited our attention to the judgment of Supreme Court in Sarwan Singh etc. v. The State of Punjab . 1975 1 SCC 284 wherein para 10 of the Schedule to the Improvement Act has been noticed as amending section 23 of the Acquisition Act and it has been observed that the said para provides some supple-mental principles for determining the market value of the land according to the use to which the land is put on a material date. On the basis of the observations made in paras 3 to 6 of this judgment, it is submitted that section 59 of the Improvement Act and para 10 of the Schedule were held to be intra vires and, therefore, compensation can be determined under the mode provided by section 23 of the Acquisition Act as amended by para 10 of the Schedule. Thus, this decision appears to be directly in conflict with the previous decision of the Supreme Court in Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao (supra). In this situation, we have to follow the decision of the larger Bench, even if prior in time, as was ruled by the Supreme Court in Mattulal v. Radhe Lal . 1974 2 SCC 365. With very great respect to the learned judges who decided Sarwan Singh's case (supra), we cannot follow that decision on this point in preference to the decision in Nagpur Improvement Trust case (supra), which is by a larger Bench, though prior in time, which was not considered in Sarwan Singh's case.

8. Sarwan Singh's case (supra), however, also decided that the denial of the right of appeal available in the case of acquisition under the Acqirsition Act does not make section 59 of the Improvement Act ultra vires article 14 of the Constitution. In view of that judgment, the attack on the vires of section 59 of the Improvement Act on that ground is no more available to the petitions. For the reasons given above, it is held—

(i) that the compensation to be awarded to the landowners those land is acquired for a Town Improvement Trust will not be less than the compensation determined for that land under the Land acquisition Act and clause (2) and clauses (a), (d) and (f) added to sub-section (3) of section 23 of the Land acquisition Act by clause (3) of para 10 of the Schedule to the Town Improvement Act, which have the effect of reducing the amount of compensation to an amount less than the amount payable under the Acquisition Act, are ultra vires article 14 of the Constitution and are struck down, and

(ii) the non-provision of the right of appeal against the award made by the Tribunal under section 59 of the Improvement Act does not make the provisions of that section ultra vires article 14 of the Constitution on the ground that a right of appeal has been provided in the Acquisition Act against the award of the District Judge to the High Court.

9. All these cases with now go back to a Division Bench for decision on the remaining points involved in these cases and for determination of the amount of compensation in accordance with the decision recorded above.

10. S.S Sandhawalia, J.:— I agree.

11. D.S Tewatia, J.:— I also agree.

12. Reference answered.

Devinder Kaur v. Ludhiana Improvement Trust, Ludhiana And Others

Full Bench Opinion — Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Arguments advanced on behalf of landowners / petitioners

Arguments advanced on behalf of the Improvement Trust / State

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Devinder Kaur v. Ludhiana Improvement Trust, Ludhiana And Others

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