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  • SECTION 6 LAND ACQUISITION ACT 1894
  • Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, (hereinafter referred to as the Rehabilitation Act)
  • sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Rehabilitation Act
  • Section 12 of the Rehabilitation Act.
  • sub-section (1) of Section 4
  • Section 4(1),
  • Section 6(1)
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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  • SECTION 6 LAND ACQUISITION ACT 1894
  • Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, (hereinafter referred to as the Rehabilitation Act)
  • sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Rehabilitation Act
  • Section 12 of the Rehabilitation Act.
  • sub-section (1) of Section 4
  • Section 4(1),
  • Section 6(1)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution challenged two notifications and a Collector's Award:

  • Notification dated 11-6-1953 issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the Act), coupled with a direction under Section 17 that action would be taken on an urgency basis and Section 5-A would not apply.
  • Notification dated 3-4-1957 under Section 6 of the Act (declaring acquisition of 4.07 acres in village Parowal for a brick-kiln and directing the Collector under Section 7 to take order of acquisition).
  • Collector's Award dated 29-5-1965.

The petitioners claimed title to land measuring 32 Kanals and 11 Marlas in village Parowal. The chronology in the opinion includes:

  • Petitioners' predecessor (Sansara son of Arjan) was allotted the land by the Central Government by Government order No. 266/3-B dated 27-7-1964, and a Sanad of allotment was issued on 27-7-1964 (Annexure 'F').
  • Sansara died; mutations were sanctioned in favour of his daughter Dhan Devi in April–June 1965, and Dhan Devi sold the land to the petitioners by registered deed dated 2-7-1965 for Rs. 26,000.
  • When petitioners sought attestation of mutation in their favour, revenue authorities attested mutation No. 1383 dated 25-6-1966 in favour of the State Government on the basis of the Collector's Award dated 29-5-1965. Petitioners alleged they first learned of State interest on 25-6-1966.

The Respondent-State's written statement admitted the land was evacuee property acquired by the Central Government under Section 12 of the Rehabilitation Act, 1954, acknowledged allotment in favour of Sansara but denied that any mutation in his favour had been sanctioned and stated that possession had been taken by Government (through Respondent No. 2) in 1953. Respondent No.4 filed a separate return contesting the validity of the Sanad due to Sansara's earlier death and asserting alternative transactions.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (dated 11-6-1953) was validly issued — specifically, whether it sufficiently described the land/locality so as to enable affected persons to know that their land was being acquired.
  2. Whether the subsequent declaration under Section 6 of the Act (dated 3-4-1957) and the Collector's Award (dated 29-5-1965) could stand where the earlier Section 4(1) notification was allegedly defective.
  3. Whether land that had been acquired by the Central Government under Section 12(1) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 (thereby extinguishing evacuee rights and vesting absolute title in the Central Government) could thereafter be validly acquired by the State under the Land Acquisition Act.
  4. Whether the petitioners had locus standi to maintain the writ petition, given the timing of allotment and subsequent steps in the acquisition process.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The notification under Section 4(1) was void and ineffective because it failed to give sufficient particulars of the land and locality, preventing owners from knowing if their land was to be acquired; this defect was fatal to subsequent proceedings.
  • They relied on Supreme Court decisions (Gunwant Kaur v. Municipal Committee, Bhatinda and Narendrajit Singh v. State of U.P.) to support the contention that a Section 4(1) notification must specify locality sufficiently and cannot be vague.
  • They further contended that the land had been acquired by the Central Government under Section 12(1) of the Rehabilitation Act before the Section 6 declaration under the Land Acquisition Act, and Sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Rehabilitation Act extinguished evacuee rights and vested title in the Central Government; therefore, the State Government could not validly acquire that property under the Land Acquisition Act.

Respondent-State's Arguments and Pleadings

  • Preliminary objection: The petitioners had no locus standi because Sansara (through whom petitioners claimed) came into the picture only after publication of the declaration under Section 6.
  • The State admitted the land was evacuee property acquired by the Central Government under Section 12 of the Rehabilitation Act, and admitted the allotment in favour of Sansara, but averred that no mutation had been sanctioned in his favour; it stated mutation in favour of the State was attested after the Collector's Award and denied that Sansara was ever in physical possession (asserting possession was taken by Government in 1953).
  • The State pleaded that notice under Section 9 was duly issued.

Respondent No. 4's Arguments

  • Respondent No.4 contended Sansara died on 5-10-1963, arguing a Sanad could not be issued in favour of a dead man.
  • He also contended that the land was sold by the petitioner on 1-5-1967 to Randhir Kaur and asserted that he (Respondent No.4) had paid the price for the land to the Respondent-State.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gunwant Kaur v. Municipal Committee, Bhatinda ((1969) 3 SCC 769 : AIR 1970 SC 802) Notification under Section 4 which merely states that "some parts" of a khasra (field) are required, without evidence that the entire area is intended, fails to give due notice to the owners; such infirmities are serious. The court relied on this authority to support the proposition that a Section 4(1) notification must give sufficient particulars of the land/locality so owners can know their lands are intended to be acquired. The opinion found comparable vagueness in the impugned notification.
Narendrajit Singh v. State of U.P. ((1970) 1 SCC 125 : AIR 1971 SC 306) Section 4 requires specification of the locality where the land is needed; a notification that only gives district or very general particulars and refers to a plan in the Collector's office is defective because it does not reasonably notify affected owners. Also, defect in Section 4 notification cannot be cured by subsequent Section 6 notification. The court applied this principle to hold that the impugned Section 4(1) notification was defective and that the subsequent Section 6 notification and proceedings could not cure that defect. The opinion also notes that the Supreme Court later reviewed this judgment but a copy of the reviewed judgment was not before the court.
Bahori Lal v. Land Acquisition Officer (AIR 1970 All 414 (FB)) A Full Bench held that sufficient particulars of the locality relative to the land intended to be acquired should be set out in the Section 4(1) notification to enable concerned persons to know their land is being acquired. The court cited this Full Bench decision to reinforce the requirement that Section 4(1) notifications must contain sufficient particulars of the locality; it used this authority to support invalidation of the impugned notification.
Somawanti v. State of Punjab (AIR 1963 SC 151) The issue of a valid notification under Section 4(1) is a condition precedent to further exercise of powers under the Act; such notification must be strictly construed and a notification failing essential requirements is bad. The court relied on this precedent to state the settled principle that Section 4(1) notifications are to be strictly construed and non-compliance with essential requirements renders the notification and subsequent proceedings invalid.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning proceeds in identifiable steps, following the structure of the parties' pleadings and established principles:

  1. Locus standi: The court addressed the preliminary objection that the petitioners lacked locus standi because their predecessor Sansara came into the picture after the Section 6 declaration. The court held that the petitioners "stand in the shoes of Sansara" whose allotment (Sanad) was dated 27-7-1964 — i.e., before the Collector's Award of 29-5-1965 — and accordingly found petitioners had a personal interest or right in the disputed land. The preliminary objection was overruled.
  2. Validity of Section 4(1) notification: The petitioners' primary contention was that the Section 4(1) notification (11-6-1953) was void because it did not sufficiently indicate the land/locality, thereby preventing affected persons from preferring objections. The court examined the content of that notification and found it provided only that the land likely to be acquired for a brick-kiln was in village Parowal, Tehsil Garhshankar, district Hoshiarpur, with the "Area" column reading "whole area" and a note stating "Details of the land at site be given in such a manner that it be possible to ascertain it that in which village the land is situated."
    • The court characterized this language as vague and "nebulous in the extreme," noting the note itself showed uncertainty as to whether the land was in the revenue estate of Parowal or another village, and that no demarcation or plan had been drawn.
    • The court applied settled principles (citing Somawanti and other authorities) that a Section 4(1) notification is a condition precedent, must be strictly construed, and serious lapses cannot be tolerated. It also relied on Gunwant Kaur, Narendrajit Singh and Bahori Lal to emphasize the requirement of sufficient particulars of locality in Section 4(1) notifications.
    • The court concluded the inherent and substantial defect in the Section 4(1) notification rendered the entire acquisition proceedings founded on it bad in law.
  3. Effect of Rehabilitation Act acquisition: The court considered the petitioners' second contention that the land had been acquired by the Central Government under Section 12(1) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 before the State's Section 6 declaration, and that Section 12(2) extinguished evacuee rights and vested the property absolutely in the Central Government. The court observed that immediately before publication of the Section 6 declaration (dated 3-4-1957) the totality of rights in the land belonged to the Central Government and no other person had title or interest. On that basis the court held that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act could not validly be invoked by the State Government to acquire property belonging solely to the Central Government, and therefore the Section 6 declaration was invalid and ineffective for that reason as well.
  4. Conclusion and relief: Because of the fatal defect in the Section 4(1) notification (and the additional point regarding prior Central Government vesting under the Rehabilitation Act), the court held the acquisition proceedings were invalid. The court stated it was unnecessary to consider remaining points raised by petitioners. It therefore allowed the writ petition, quashed the impugned notifications and the Collector's Award, and ordered costs and counsel fee.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The court allowed the writ petition and held the acquisition proceedings to be invalid. Specifically, the court quashed:

  • The notification dated 11-6-1953 issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894;
  • The notification dated 3-4-1957 issued under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894;
  • The Collector's Award dated 29-5-1965.

Consequences ordered by the court:

  • The Respondents were ordered to pay the costs of the petitioners.
  • Counsel's fee awarded: Rs. 100/-. (As recorded in the opinion.)

The opinion does not assert that a new legal principle was established beyond applying and following existing authorities. It confined its ruling to declaring the particular notifications and award invalid and specifying the direct consequences for the parties named in this case.

    Hari Chand Bishna Ram And Another v. State Of Punjab And Others

    1. This is a writ petition, under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, for impugning notifications dated June 11, 1953, issued under Section 4(1) and notification, dated April 3, 1957, under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’), and the Award, dated May 29, 1965. Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was also coupled with a direction under Section 17 that action would be taken on urgency basis and the provisions of Section 5-A of the Act would not apply.

    2. The petitioners alleged that the land in dispute, measuring 32 Kanals and 11 Marlas, situated in the revenue estate of village Parowal, Tehsil Garhshankar, was evacuee property and subsequently after the coming into force of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Rehabilitation Act’) it was acquired by the Central Government under Section 12 of that Act. On June 11, 1953, a notification under Section 4 was published that the whole area of village Parowal was likely to be acquired by the Government at its expense for brick-kiln. On April 3, 1957, another notification under Section 6 was published that 4.07 acres of land in the village, shown in the map which could be inspected at the spot, had been acquired for brick-kiln. It was also stated in this notification that the Collector was being directed under Section 7 to take order of the acquisition of the said land. The land in dispute was by order No. 266/3-B, dated 27-7-1964, allotted by the Government to one Sansara son of Arjan, and that the mutation was attested in the name of the allottee immediately thereafter.

    3. A Sanad of allotment (Annexure ‘F’) was also issued on July 27, 1964, in favour of the aforesaid allottee. Sansara allottee died and the mutations No. 1354, dated June 2, 1965, Nos. 1340, 1341 & 1354 all the three dated April 21, 1965, were sanctioned in favour of the deceased's daughter, Shrimati Dhan Devi. By a registered deed, dated July 2, 1965, this Dhan Devi sold the land in dispute to the petitioners for a sum of Rupees 26,000/-. The vendees petitioners then applied to the Revenue Officer for attestation of the mutation in their favour on the basis of the sale. The revenue authorities not only refused to do so, but instead, attested mutation No. 1383, dated June 25, 1966, in favour of the State Government on the basis of an Award made by the Collector on May 29, 1965. The petitioners alleged that it was on June 25, 1966 that they for the first time, came to know that Punjab State had some interest in the land in dispute when the mutation was attested in favour of the State Government. In their written-statement, the Respondent-State admitted that the land in dispute was evacuee property and had been acquired by the Central Government under Section 12 of the Rehabilitation Act. It was not denied that the land had been allotted in favour of Sansara. It was, however, averred that no mutation was sanctioned in favour of Sansara. It was further clarified that mutation No. 1383 was attested in favour of the Respondent-State after the announcement of the Collector's award, dated May 29, 1965. It was denied that the land was ever in the physical possession of Sansara. It was also stated that possession of the land was taken by the Government through Respondent No. 2, in 1953. It was denied that the department intended to transfer the land in dispute in favour of Respondent No. 4 (Shri Hardit Singh Contractor). It was pleaded that notice under Section 9 was duly issued.

    4. Respondent No. 4 in his separate Return averred that Sansara had died on October 5, 1963 and the Sanad allotment (Annexure ‘F’) could not be issued in favour of a dead man. It was pleaded that the land in dispute has been further sold on May 1, 1967, by the petitioner in favour of Randhir Kaur. Respondent (No. 4) also pleaded that he had paid the price for this land to the Respondent-State.

    5. A preliminary objection has been raised by the learned counsel for the Respondents that the petitioners had no locus standi to maintain this petition inasmuch as Sansara, under whom they claim, came into the picture only after the publication of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act.

    6. It is true that, except in cases of quo warranto and habeas corpus, the existence of a legal right inhering in the petitioner is the foundation of the writ jurisdiction of the Court. The petitioners, however, stand in the shoes of Sansara son of Arjan in whose favour the land in dispute had been allotted (vide Annexure ‘F’ copy of Sanad of allotment) by the Central Government on July 27, 1964, that is, long before the Collector's award which was made on May 29, 1965. It cannot, therefore, be said that the petitioners had no personal interest or right in the disputed land. The preliminary objection is, therefore overruled.

    7. The first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act was void and ineffective inasmuch as the land and the locality were not sufficiently indicated therein to enable the person, whose land was going to be acquired, to prefer objections. Failure to set out these necessary particulars — argues the counsel — was fatal to all the subsequent proceedings. In support of his contention, counsel has relied upon two decisions of the Supreme Court reported as: Gunwant Kaur v. Municipal Committee, Bhatinda, (1969) 3 SCC 769 : AIR 1970 SC 802 and Narendrajit Singh v. State of U.P, (1970) 1 SCC 125 : AIR 1971 SC 306.

    8. It appears to me that there is force in this contention. In Gunwant Kaur's case, (1969) 3 SCC 769 : AIR 1970 SC 802 ibid in the notification under Section 4, the only information given was that some parts of Khasra No. 2030 belonging to the owners were required. There was no evidence on the record that the entire area of Khasra No. 2030 was intended to be acquired. Their Lordships, therefore, held that notification did not give due notice to the owners that their lands were intended to be notified for acquisition. Their. Lordships also observed that the pleas raised by the petitioners about these infirmities in the notifications and the proceedings for compulsory acquisition were serious.

    9. In Narendrajit Singh's case, (1970) 1 SCC 125 : AIR 1971 SC 306 ibid the only description of the locality of the land given, in the notification under Section 4, was that the land measured 105 acres and it was situated in Mauza Gokal Nagri, Pargana Bilaspur of District Rampur. There was a foot-note showing that “the plan of the land may be inspected in the office of the Collector Rampur.” Their Lordships observed:

    “Section 4 does not require that the identity of the lands which may ultimately be acquired should be specified but it enjoins upon the Government the duty to specify the locality in which the land is needed. In the instant cases the notifications suffer from a very serious defect in that the locality where the lands were needed was not specified. The notification merely showed that lands mentioned in the schedule were needed. The schedule in its turn though it contained the heading District, Pargana Mauza and approximate area, gave no particulars of the same and all that was mentioned by way of a note was that the plan of the land might be inspected in the office of the Collector of Rampur. As no details were given, the only indication about the locality of the lands was possibly the District of Rampur inasmuch as the plan of the land was to be found in the office of the Collector of the same district. Certainly the Act did not intend that all the persons owning land in a district should rush to the Collector's office to find out whether his lands were covered by the notification.”

    10. (The note appended to the A.I.R Issue of April, 1971, says that the Supreme Court has reviewed its judgment in Narendrajit Singh's case, (1970) 1 SCC 125 : AIR 1971 SC 306 but despite efforts, no copy of the reviewed judgment has been placed for my perusal).

    11. A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case reported as: Bahori Lal v. Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1970 All 414 (FB) has held that sufficient particulars of the locality in relation to the land intended to be acquired, should be set out in the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act to enable all the persons concerned to know that their land is being acquired.

    12. In the case before me, no specific description of the locality has been set out. The only description, given in the notification under Section 4(1), is that the land likely to be acquired for the brick-kiln is in village Parowal, Tehsil Garhshankar, district Hoshiarpur. No field Nos. or boundaries of the land or locality are given under the column captioned “Area” where it is written “whole area”. Then there is a note which reads: “Details of the land at site be given in such a manner that it be possible to ascertain it that in which village the land is situated.” This note shows that even the authority issuing this notification was not sure as to whether the land likely to be acquired was situated in the revenue estate of village Parowal or any other village. It further shows that no demarcation at site had been done or plan drawn up. The notification is vague and nebulous in the extreme.

    13. It is well settled that any notification under Section 4(1) of the Act which is the first step towards depriving a man of his property, must be strictly construed and courts ought not to tolerate any lapse on the part of the acquiring authority in the issue of such notification if it be of a serious nature, The issue of a valid notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4 is a condition precedent to the exercise of any further power under the Act and a notification which does not comply with the essential requirements of that provision of law must be held to be bad. (See Somawanti v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 151). The mere fact that in the impugned notification under Section 6(1) the particulars of the land are set out, cannot cure the defect in the basic notification under Section 4(1) of the Act.

    14. In Narendrajit Singh's case, (1970) 1 SCC 125 : AIR 1971 SC 306 it was further held that the defect in the original notification under Section 4(1) could not be cured or glossed over by reason of the fact that the petitioners went to Court after the issue of the notification under Section 6(1). It appears to me that because of this inherent and substantial defect in the notification under Section 4(1), the entire acquisition proceedings founded on it must be treated as bad in law.

    15. The second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is, that since the land in dispute, which was evacuee property in 1953, had been acquired by publication of a notification under sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Rehabilitation Act before the publication of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act, it could not be legally acquired by the State Government under the provisions of the Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Rehabilitation Act says that on the publication of a notification under sub-section (1), the right, title and interest of any evacuee in the evacuee property specified in the notification shall be extinguished and the evacuee property shall vest absolutely in the Central Government free from all encumbrances. Thus immediately before the date of publication of the declaration (dated 3-4-1957) under Section 6 of the Act the totality of the rights in the land in dispute were owned by the Central Government and no other person had any title or interest in it. In these circumstances, I think that the provisions of the Act could not be validly invoked by the State Government to acquire this property belonging solely to the Central Government or vice versa. For this reason also the declaration under Section 6 of the Act was invalid and ineffective.

    16. In view of the above findings, it is not necessary to go into the remaining points canvassed by the learned counsel for the petitioners.

    17. Once it is found that the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, suffering as it does from a fatal defect, is null and void, the entire acquisition proceedings founded on it would automatically be deemed to be invalid and non est I, therefore, allow this writ-petition and quash the impugned notifications dated 11-6-1953 and 3-4-1957 and the Collector's Award (dated 29-5-1965), The Respondents shall pay the costs of the petitioners. Counsel's fee Rs. 100/-.

    18. Petition allowed.

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    Comments

    Hari Chand Bishna Ram And Another v. State Of Punjab And Others
    (Apr 30, 1971)