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Judgment Summary — Civil Misc. 3005.C of 1968 & Supreme Court Application No. 329 of 1968

Factual and Procedural Background

This order disposes Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 3005.C of 1968 and Supreme Court Application (S.C.A.) No. 329 of 1968. The S.C.A. was filed under Article 133(1)(a) and (c) of the Constitution in respect of a judgment dated 18 March 1968, by which Civil Writ 1925 of 1964 had been dismissed.

The petitioner sought a certified copy of the High Court's judgment. The application for a certified copy was submitted on 18 April 1968. The court office prepared the copy by 23 May 1968. The petitioner did not collect the copy on 23 May because he lacked funds to pay for it. He obtained funds and paid for, and collected, the certified copy on 27 August 1968.

The petitioner filed an Article 133 petition on 20 September 1968; it was returned for want of the certified copy. He re-filed on 9 October 1968 but the petition was found to be beyond time and returned the same day. The petition was ultimately re-submitted on 15 October 1968 together with a miscellaneous application under section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, under section 12(2) of the Limitation Act and the Limitation Schedule (article 132), the petitioner is entitled to add to the normal period of limitation the entire time actually elapsed between making the application for a certified copy (18 April 1968) and the date of actual receipt of that copy (27 August 1968), including the period after the certified copy was ready for delivery (23 May 1968).
  2. Whether the petitioner's inability to pay for the certified copy (resulting in delay between 23 May and 27 August 1968) constitutes "sufficient cause" under section 5 of the Limitation Act to extend the time for filing the Supreme Court Application.
  3. Whether, on the facts and the applicable law, the Supreme Court Application No. 329 of 1968 is time-barred.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Mr. Puran Chand)

  • The petitioner contended that under section 12(2) of the Limitation Act he was entitled to add to the ordinary sixty-day limitation period the entire period actually spent by him in obtaining the certified copy — i.e., the whole interval from 18 April 1968 to 27 August 1968.
  • The petitioner relied on the decision State of U.P. v. Maharaja Narain (AIR 1968 SC 960) as authority that a litigant is entitled to the entire time actually spent in obtaining a copy and not merely the time required by the Court to prepare it.
  • In the miscellaneous application under section 5, the petitioner specifically pleaded that the certified copy cost more than Rs. 200 and he could not immediately arrange such a sum; therefore he only received the copy on 27 August 1968 and should be allowed the period from application to delivery.

Respondent's / State's Arguments (Mr. B.S. Dhillon, Advocate-General for Punjab)

  • The State contended that the petitioner is only entitled to add the period actually required for preparing the copy — here 36 days (from 18 April to 23 May 1968) — to the ordinary sixty days under article 132, so that the last date for filing would have been 22 June 1968.
  • The State argued that even if the court's vacation were relevant, the petitioner could have availed himself of statutory provisions and filed on the re-opening day; in any event, the claimed extension up to 27 August 1968 should not be allowed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of U.P. v. Maharaja Narain, AIR 1968 SC 960 The Supreme Court reversed an Allahabad High Court decision that had followed the Lahore view; it considered questions regarding the period to be allowed under section 12(2) and endorsed principles rejecting deduction for laches. The court held Maharaja Narain does not endorse the petitioner's proposition that the entire time actually spent by him (including time after the copy was ready) is to be added. Maharaja Narain did not decide the specific question whether time between readiness of copy and actual collection (owing to applicant's delay) counts as "time requisite". Thus Maharaja Narain was held to be of no avail to the petitioner on that point.
Mathela v. Sher Mohammad, A.I.R. 1935 Lah. 682 Lahore High Court's view that "time requisite" means the shortest time during which a copy could have been obtained assuming reasonable promptitude — i.e., excludes time lost by the appellant's own delay. The Supreme Court had overruled this Lahore view in Maharaja Narain; the High Court in the present case treated the Lahore view as rejected by the Supreme Court.
Pramatha Nath Roy v. William Arthur Lee, 9 I.A. 307 Judicial Committee held that time lost due to the applicant's own laches is not "requisite" within the meaning of section 12(2); the period which would not have elapsed if the appellant had taken reasonable steps cannot be regarded as requisite time. The Supreme Court approved this principle and the present court relied on it to rule that delay caused by the petitioner's own inaction (e.g., not collecting a copy ready for delivery) cannot be added to the limitation period.
Panjam V. Tirumala Reddi v. C.K. Anavemareddi, 1934 I.L.R. Mad 560 Full Bench of Madras: "time requisite for obtaining a copy" means the time beyond the party's control actually occupied in obtaining the copy filed — not an ideal lesser period. The Supreme Court approved this view; the present court adopted it to hold that only the time beyond the petitioner's control (i.e., until the copy was ready) can be reckoned, not the subsequent time the petitioner voluntarily took to collect the copy.
Punjab State… v. Gopal Singh Nagahia Singh…, AIR 1964 Punj 154 Held that lack of funds discovered on the last day of limitation, without satisfactory explanation for why the situation arose, is not a sufficient cause under section 5 to condone delay (even where the appellant is the State). The court applied this authority to reject the petitioner's plea that inability to pay for the certified copy justified extension under section 5; the present case was held to be worse (no explanation why funds were not arranged) and therefore not a ground for extension.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two linked stages: first, by construing section 12(2) of the Limitation Act and the relevant authorities to determine what period may be added to the normal sixty-day limitation under article 132; second, by examining the section 5 miscellaneous application for condonation of delay.

1. On the scope of "time requisite for obtaining a copy" under section 12(2):

  • The court acknowledged that the petitioner is entitled under section 12(2) to add "the time requisite for obtaining a copy" to the normal sixty days. The essential question was whether that phrase entitles the petitioner to add the whole period actually spent by him (from the date of application for a certified copy to the date of actual receipt), including periods when the copy was ready for delivery but he did not collect it.
  • The court analyzed the petitioner's reliance on Maharaja Narain (AIR 1968 SC 960) and concluded Maharaja Narain did not decide the precise issue now raised. Maharaja Narain had overruled the Lahore High Court view in Mathela v. Sher Mohammad but had not held that every period actually spent by an applicant (including periods attributable to his own delay after the copy was ready) must be treated as "time requisite".
  • The court accepted the principles in Pramatha Nath Roy and the Madras Full Bench decision in Panjam v. Tirumala Reddi: time which would not have elapsed had the applicant acted with reasonable promptitude (i.e., time lost by the applicant's laches) cannot be regarded as "requisite." Conversely, "time requisite" contemplates time beyond the party's control actually occupied in obtaining the copy filed.
  • Applying these principles, the court held the petitioner could add only the 36-day period between the application for the certified copy (18 April 1968) and the date when the copy was prepared (23 May 1968). Thus, adding 36 days to the statutory sixty days under article 132 produced a last filing date of 22 June 1968. The Supreme Court Application first submitted on 20 September 1968 was therefore beyond time.

2. On the section 5 application (condonation of delay):

  • The petitioner relied on inability to pay the cost of the certified copy (more than Rs. 200) as constituting sufficient cause for delay between 23 May and 27 August 1968. The court found this averment to be an unsupported plea and not a satisfactory explanation for delay; it characterized the averment as primarily a reiteration of the petitioner's substantive limitation argument rather than a justification for excusing delay.
  • The court referred to the Punjab State v. Gopal Singh Nagahia Singh precedent, where lack of funds on the last day of limitation without adequate explanation was held not to entitle the appellant to condonation under section 5. The present court considered the present facts worse because no explanation was given as to why funds were not arranged earlier.
  • Moreover, the court noted there was no explanation for the further delay between obtaining the copy on 27 August 1968 and the filing (or attempted filing) on 20 September 1968. There was no affidavit or satisfactory account explaining that interval.
  • For these reasons the court concluded there was no valid ground for extending time under section 5, and the miscellaneous application was liable to be dismissed.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The court dismissed Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 3005.C of 1968 and consequently dismissed Supreme Court Application No. 329 of 1968 as time-barred.

DISPOSITION: The Civil Miscellaneous petition for extension of time under section 5 of the Limitation Act was dismissed; the Supreme Court Application failed for being filed out of time. Costs of the respondents in both the S.C.A. and the Civil Miscellaneous application were ordered to be borne by the petitioner.

Implications: The decision confirms that (i) under section 12(2) only the time beyond the applicant's control actually occupied in obtaining the certified copy may be added to the ordinary limitation period, and (ii) inability to pay for a certified copy, without satisfactory explanation for why funds could not have been procured earlier, is not a sufficient cause under section 5 to condone delay. The opinion does not purport to lay down any new principle beyond application of existing authorities to the facts; its effect is the dismissal of the applicant's requests and an order for costs against the petitioner.

Judges and Disposition

The order is delivered by Narula, J. Mehar Singh, C.J., and P.C. Pandit, J. concurred. Final line: "Petition dismissed."

    Mahant Gurmukh Singh Chela Mahant Aggar Singh v. The State Of Punjab And Others

    Narula, J.:— This order will dispose of Civil Miscellaneous 3005.C of 1968, and Supreme Court Application No. 329 of 1968. The Supreme Court Application has been filed under Article 133(1)(a) and (c) of the Constitution in respect of our judgment, dated 18th March, 1968, whereby we dismissed Civil Writ 1925 of 1964.

    2. Civil Miscellaneous 3005.C of 1968, has been filed under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay in submitting the Supreme Court Application. The first contention of Mr. Puran Chand, learned counsel for the petitioner, is that the application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court has been filed within time as he is entitled to add to the normal period of limitation the entire time which actually elapsed between the date on which he made the application for a certified copy of our judgment in the writ petition, and the date on which he actually obtained the certified copy. It is not disputed that under sub-section (2) of section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 the petitioner is entitled to add to the normal period of limitation (sixty days prescribed under article 132 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act) “the time requisite for obtaining a copy” of our order in the writ petition. The application for certified copy was submitted by the petitioner on April 18, 1968. It is the common case of both sides that the copy was prepared by the office of the Court by May 23, 1968, but when the petitioner wanted to collect the copy, he found that he did not have enough funds to pay for it.

    3. Time was taken by the petitioner from May 23, 1968, till August 27, 1968 for arranging for the money requisite for obtaining the copy. On the last mentioned date he paid for the copy and obtained it. The petition under Article 133 of the Constitution was filed by him on September 20, 1968, but was returned by the office to produce the certified copy of the order to enable the Registry to verify limitation. The petition was then re-filed on October 9, 1968. Having been found to have been filed beyond time, the petition was returned on that very day. It was ultimately resubmitted on October 15, 1968 along with the miscellaneous application. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that he is entitled to add to the normal period of sixty days, the whole of the period between April 18 and August 27, 1968. If the whole of this period could be added under section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, the petitioner's application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court would indeed be within time. Mr. B.S Dhillon, the learned Advocate-Geneal for the State of Punjab, has contended that the petitioner is entitled to add 36 days (the period between April 18, 1968, and May 23, 1968) to sixty days and he should have filed the application under Article 133 of the Constitution on or before June 22, 1968. Even if it could be argued that the Court was in vacation on the last date of limitation, the petitioner could have availed of the provisions of section of the Limitation Act, and should then have filed the application on July 8, 1968, i.e, on the re opening day of the Court. The claim of the petitioner to add time right up to August, 27, 1968, has been hotly contested on behalf of the respondents.

    4. Mr. Puran Chand has argued that the Supreme Court has held in State of U.P v. Maharaja Narain . AIR 1968 SC 960., that a litigant is entitled to the entire time actually sepent by him in obtaining the copy and not only the time which was required by the Court for preparing the Copy we have carefully gone through the judgment of the Supreme Court in Maharaja Narains' case, and are unable to agree with Mr. Puran Chand that any such proposition of law has been laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as is sought to be canvassed before us by the learned counsel. In the case of Maharaja Narain, the Supreme Court had set aside and reversed the order of the Allahabad High Court dismissing the State's appeal against acquittal on the ground that though it was within time after adding the period actually spent in the preparation of the certified copy of the lower Court's order filed with the appeal, it was still out of limitation as the State was entitled to a much lesser time which had been taken by the State in obtaining another copy of the same order of the trial Court. The view adopted by the Allahabad High Court was undoubtedly supported by a decision of the Lahore High Court in Mathela v. Sher Mohammad . A.I.R 1935 Lah. 682.. In that case also it had been held that the time requisite means simply time required by the appellant to obtain a copy of the decree, assuming that he acted with reasonable promptitude and diligence, and that the time requisite for obtaining a copy is the shortest time during which copy would have been obtained by the appellant, and has nothing to do with the amount of time spent by him in obtaining the particular copy which he chose to, file with the memorandum of appeal. While accepting the State's appeal against the decision of the Allahabad High Court, their lordships of the Supreme Court overruled the Lahore view. No such thing happened in the instant case. The question as to whether the time between the date on which the certified copy is in fact ready for delivery to the knowledge of the applicant, and the date on which he actually takes delivery of the copy, should of should not be treated as time requisite for preparing the copy never came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Maharaja Narain's case. On the other hand, it is apparent that their Lordships of the Supreme Court did not differ from the view taken by the judicial Committee in Pramatha Nath Roy v. William Arthur Lee . 9 I.A 307.. In that case, the Judicial Committee had held that the applicant was not entitled to deduct the time lost due to his own laches, and that the time which need not have elapsed, if the appellant had taken reasonable and proper steps to obtain a copy of the decree or order, could not be regarded as ‘requisite’ within the meaning of sub-section (2) of section 12. Their Lordships expressly approved of the view taken by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Panjam V. Tirumala Reddi v. C.K Anavemareddi . 1934 I.L.R Mad 560. to the effect that the words “time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order” in section 12(2) of the Limitation Act mean the tune, beyond the party's control occupied, in obtaining the copy which is filed with the memorandum of appeal, and not an ideal lesser period which might have been occupied if the application for copy had been filed at some other date. The judgment of the Supreme Court is, therefore, of no avail to the petitioner. If the view sought to be canvassed by Mr. Puran Chand were to be accepted, it would have to be held, as suggested by the learned counsel, that if after coming to know, that the certified copy is ready, the applicant sits at home for six months or a year, and actually choses to collect the copy After the expiry of that period, he would be entitled to add even those six months or year to the time to which he is entitled for filing the appeal under section 12(2) of the Limitation Act. This appears to us to be preposterous. We have, therefore, no hesitation in repelling this contention of Mr. Puran Chand, and in holding that the last date for filing the Supreme Court Application in this case was June 22, 1968, after availing of the normal period of sixty days provided under article 132 and an additional period of 36 days under section 12(2) of the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court Application was, therefore, filed far beyond time when it was submitted to this Court for the first time on September 20, 1988.

    5. Counsel then submitted that we should extend the time for filing the application under Article 133 of the Constitution up to September 20, 1968, by holding that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing it any earlier. The only cause which is mentioned in the miscellaneous application is expressed in the following words:—

    “That as the charges of the certified copy were more than Rs. 200/-, the petitioner was not able to arrange such a big amount and could only get the copy on August 27, 1968, and the petitioner deserves to be allowed time from the date of application till the date of delivery and if this time is allowed, then the application is within time.”

    6. The aboveoqoted averment in the miscellaneous application does not really amount to an explanation for the delay, but is a plea in support of the first submission made by counsel. Even otherwise, we are unable to bold that if an applicant is not able to collect a certified copy for about three months, after it is ready to his knowledge because he had to arrange for money to pay the costs of the copy, it would amount to a sufficient cause for dealy in filing the petition within the meaning of section 5 of the Limitation Act. A Division Bench of this Court consisting of Dulat, J. and my lord P.C Pandit, J. held in Punjab State… v. Gopal Singh Nagahia Singh…. . AIR 1964 Punj 154. that whether the appellant happens to be the State Government and the reason given out for the delay in filing an appeal was that the delay had occurred because on the last day of the limitation, the appellant discovered that it did not have sufficient money to buy the necessary court fee but no explanation is forthcoming as to why such state of affairs was allowed to come into existence, the appellant is not entitled to the benefit of section 5. Though in that case the Government official concerned could not necessarily be expected to pay the money required for court-fee from his pocket, and no latitude was allowed to the Government as no explanation was given for not putting the official concerned in funds within time the position is worse in the present case. Mere non-availability of funds for obtaining the requisite certified copy is, in our opinion, no ground for the extension of time under section 5 of the Limitation Act. Once it is found that the Supreme Court Application was barred by time, the petitioner has also to explain as to what prevented him from filing the application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court even after obtaining the certified copy of the judgment on August 27, 1968, till he actually filed it on September 20, 1968. Even a purported explanation for this delay is not forthcoming in the application of the petitioner or the affidavit supporting it. We are, therefore, unable to allow the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act as there is no valid ground whatever for extending the time under that provision of law,

    7. Civil Miscellaneous 3005.C of 1968, is dismissed for the foregoing reasons. The application for extension of time having been dismissed, Supreme Court Application No. 329 of 1968, also fails and is dismissed as time barred. Costs of the respondents in the S.C.A and in the Civil Miscellaneous application shall be borne by the petitioner.

    Mehar Singh, C.J:— I agree.

    P.C Pandit, J.:— I agree.

    8. Petition dismissed.

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    Mahant Gurmukh Singh Chela Mahant Aggar Singh v. The State Of Punjab And Others
    (Nov 28, 1969)