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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Smt. Parsan Kaur (petitioner) applied under Section 488 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) and the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Ambala, on 1 October 1966 granted maintenance of Rs. 200 per mensem to her and her minor son. The maintenance order was made effective from the date of the application, 23 March 1966. The petitioner later sought realization of arrears totaling Rs. 1,800. On service of notice, the respondent/husband, Bakhshish Singh, on 22 July 1967 applied to the Magistrate to set aside the ex parte maintenance order under the proviso to sub-section (6) of Section 488 CrPC, contending inter alia that he had not been duly served and had only recently learnt of the order. The petitioner contended that the respondent's application was time-barred under the proviso prescribing application within three months from the date of the order.

The Magistrate (order dated 21 September 1967) directed a preliminary enquiry into the date when the respondent became aware of the ex parte decree. Aggrieved, the petitioner invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the Sessions Court at Ambala. The Sessions Judge (order dated 3 April 1968) held that the three-month period in sub-section (6) of Section 488 CrPC must be reckoned from the date of the order and recommended quashing the Magistrate's order directing the preliminary enquiry. The respondent opposed that recommendation; the present opinion considers the competing contentions and applicable law, and disposes of the revisional recommendation and remits the matter to the Magistrate for further action consistent with the reasoning below.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the three-month period prescribed by the proviso to sub-section (6) of Section 488 CrPC for making an application to set aside an ex parte order of maintenance is to be computed from the date of the order itself or from the date on which the person against whom the order was made comes to know of the order.
  2. Whether the Magistrate was justified in directing a preliminary enquiry into the date of the respondent's knowledge of the ex parte order (i.e., whether such an enquiry was necessary before dealing with the limitation point).
  3. Whether Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act is available to a person who seeks extension/condonation of time in making an application under the proviso to sub-section (6) of Section 488 CrPC.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Smt. Parsan Kaur)

  • The respondent's application to set aside the ex parte maintenance order was filed after the three-month period prescribed by the proviso to sub-section (6) of Section 488 CrPC and was therefore barred by limitation and liable to be dismissed without consideration of its merits.
  • The statutory language prescribes three months from the date of the order and deliberately omits any reference to the date of knowledge; therefore the period must be computed from the date of the ex parte order.
  • Contended that the Supreme Court decision relied on by respondent (dealing with the Land Acquisition Act) was distinguishable and did not justify the view that limitation should run from date of knowledge.

Respondent's Arguments (Bakhshish Singh; represented by Mr. R.L. Sharma)

  • Since the maintenance order was obtained in the respondent's absence and he was not duly served in the original proceedings, the three-month period under the proviso to sub-section (6) of Section 488 CrPC should be reckoned from the date on which the respondent became aware of the order (i.e., the date of knowledge), not from the date on which the order was passed.
  • Relied on the Supreme Court decision in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1961 SC 1500 (interpreting the phrase "date of the award" in the Land Acquisition Act to mean the date when the award is communicated or comes to party's knowledge) and on Zohra Begum v. Mohamed Ghouse Qadri Qadeeri, AIR 1966 Andh Pra 50 (which applied that notion to Section 488 CrPC matters).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1961 SC 1500 Held that the expression "date of the award" (Land Acquisition Act, s.18(2) proviso) means the date when the award is communicated or comes to the knowledge of the party (actual or constructive), because the Collector's award is in substance an offer/tender requiring communication. The court distinguished this authority on the ground that the Supreme Court's construction was based on the peculiar legal character of the Collector's award and therefore cannot be treated as a general rule applicable to every statutory provision where limitation is said to run from "the date of the order".
Zohra Begum alias Aysha Begum v. Mohamed Ghouse Qadri Qadeeri, AIR 1966 Andh Pra 50 Applied the reasoning of the Supreme Court (AIR 1961 SC 1500) to hold that under the proviso to sub-section (6) of Section 488 CrPC limitation begins from the date of knowledge of the ex parte maintenance order. The court rejected this view, holding that Zohra Begum improperly imported the Collector-award reasoning into Section 488(6) CrPC and that the peculiar nature of the Collector's award had been ignored in reaching that conclusion.
Hari Singh v. Mst. Dhanno, (1962) 64 Pun LR 59 : 1962 (2) Cri LJ 581 Held that the three-month period under the proviso to sub-section (6) of Section 488 CrPC is to be reckoned from the date of the ex parte order sought to be set aside, not from the date when the respondent obtains knowledge. The court expressed respectful agreement with this earlier view and relied upon it in concluding that limitation runs from the date of the order itself.
A.S. Govindan v. Jayammal, AIR 1950 Mad 153 Madras High Court decision supporting the view that limitation for setting aside ex parte orders is reckoned from the date of the order (not from date of knowledge). The opinion noted the Madras High Court's approach as supportive authority for reckoning limitation from the date of the order and cited it in support of the court's conclusion.
State v. Bhimrao, AIR 1963 Mys 239 Held (by T.K. Tukol, J.) that where a person is not validly served, the ex parte maintenance order is not valid and the period of three months may not begin to run from the date of such an order. The court explicitly rejected this reasoning, holding that non-service may be a ground to set aside an order on merits but does not affect the statutory period of limitation prescribed by the proviso to sub-section (6) of Section 488 CrPC.
Mohan Lal v. Jai Lal, (1949) 1 Pepsu LR 212 Used as authority for the proposition that limitation periods specified (e.g., Article 122) begin to run from the date of the order/dismissal and not from the date of knowledge. The court referred to this authority when demonstrating that in several statutory provisions the legislature has expressly specified when knowledge matters; absence of such specification in Section 488(6) shows an intention to fix the date of the order as the terminus a quo.
Kanai Lall Shaw v. Bhattu Shaw, AIR 1961 Cal 474 Authority supporting commencement of limitation from the date of dismissal (Article 122 context) rather than from the date of knowledge. The court cited this case to reinforce the textual approach that where the legislature wanted the date of knowledge to govern commencement it did so expressly; otherwise the date of the order controls.
Hardyal Singh v. Swaran Kaur, Criminal Revision No. 634 of 1966, Dated 15-5-1967 (Punjab) Decision noted for application of Section 5 Limitation Act: the court there remanded to consider whether the petitioner had knowledge only shortly before filing and whether Section 5 could be applied to condone delay. The present court observed that this decision does not support the proposition that the three-month period runs from the date of knowledge; rather it shows that Section 5 can be invoked to seek condonation and thus offers relief against strict limitation in appropriate cases.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court conducted a textual and contextual analysis of the proviso to sub-section (6) of Section 488 CrPC, which provides that any ex parte orders "may be set aside for good cause shown, on application made within three months from the date thereof." The court emphasized these points in its step-by-step analysis:

  1. Textual interpretation: The phrase "from the date thereof" (i.e., from the date of the order) is clear and unambiguous. Where statutory language is plain, courts must give effect to it irrespective of resulting hardship.
  2. Legislative intent by omission: The legislature deliberately omitted any reference to "the date of the knowledge" in the proviso. The court contrasted provisions in other statutes (and in the Indian Limitation Act schedule) where, when the legislature intended the date of knowledge to be the commencement point, it expressly stated so (for example, Article 123 of the Indian Limitation Act explicitly provides for commencement from the date of knowledge where notice was not duly served).
  3. Distinguishing authority: The court considered the Supreme Court's decision in the Land Acquisition Act context (Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh) and concluded that the reasoning there rested on the special legal character of a Collector's award (being essentially an offer/tender to the owner). Consequently, that construction cannot be exported as a general principle to provisions like the proviso to Section 488(6) CrPC.
  4. Treatment of non-service: Although non-service or defective service may constitute "good cause" to set aside an ex parte order on merits, such factual defects do not alter the clear statutory period of limitation. In other words, the validity or merits of the ex parte order are separate from the statutory commencement of the limitation period.
  5. Availability of relief under Limitation law: The court observed that Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act (as amended and present in the 1963 Act) permits the court to admit applications after the prescribed period if the applicant shows sufficient cause for delay. Therefore, while the three-month period runs from the date of the ex parte order, a respondent who is late may seek condonation of delay under Section 5 by satisfying the court that sufficient cause exists.
  6. Procedural consequence: Given the availability of Section 5 relief, the Magistrate's order directing a preliminary enquiry into the date of knowledge was unnecessary and could not be sustained as a basis for treating the limitation point as starting from the date of knowledge. The Sessions Judge's recommendation to quash the Magistrate's order was accepted for that reason.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: The court accepted the Sessions Judge's recommendation: the three-month period prescribed by the proviso to sub-section (6) of Section 488 CrPC for applying to set aside an ex parte order of maintenance is to be reckoned from the date of the ex parte order itself (the date "thereof"), not from the date on which the person affected becomes aware of the order.

Disposition and Immediate Consequences:

  • The Magistrate's order dated 21 September 1967 directing a preliminary enquiry into the date when the respondent came to know of the ex parte order was quashed.
  • The recommendation of the Sessions Judge dated 3 April 1968 was accepted.
  • The case was remitted to the Magistrate for disposal of the respondent's application in the light of the opinion's observations.
  • The respondent is permitted to file a proper application for extension of time (condonation) under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, supported by affidavit; the Magistrate shall consider such application and deal with the matter in accordance with law.
  • Counsel for the parties were directed to cause appearance of their clients before the Magistrate on 27 October 1969.

Broader Implications: The opinion grounds its holding primarily on textual interpretation and distinctions from authorities that rely on the special nature of a Collector's award. The opinion does not purport to create a novel general principle beyond the direct holding; it reaffirmed existing views (including Hari Singh v. Dhanno and supportive Madras High Court authority) that the statutory period runs from the date of the order where the statute so prescribes. The court also emphasized the procedural safeguard available through Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act to mitigate hardship in appropriate cases.

Administrative / Procedural Directions

  • The case is remitted to the Magistrate for disposal in conformity with the opinion.
  • The respondent may file an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act supported by affidavit; the Magistrate is to decide on that application and then proceed to hear the application to set aside the ex parte order on its merits as appropriate.
  • Appearance before the Magistrate was directed on 27 October 1969 for the parties.

Sources and Authorities Referenced in the Opinion

The court's reasoning and conclusions were derived from the text of the proviso to sub-section (6) of Section 488 CrPC, the Indian Limitation Act (including Section 5 and Articles 122, 123, 131), and the authorities enumerated in the precedents table above.

    Smt. Parson Kaur v. Bakshish Singh .

    1. On an application made by Smt. Parsan Kaur, petitioner, against her husband, Bakhshish Singh, under Section 488 of the Cr PC, she and her minor son were granted maintenance at the rate of Rs. 200/- per mensem by an order of the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Ambala, dated the 1st October, 1966. The maintenance was, however, granted with effect fom the date of the application, i.e, 23rd of March, 1966, Subsequently the petitioner applied to the Magistrate for realisation of the arrears of maintenance amounting to Rs. 1,800/-. On service of notice upon him the respondent Bakhshish Singh, approached the Magistrate on 22nd of July, 1967, for setting aside the ex parte order of maintenance in exercise of his powers under Section 488(6) of the Cr PC. This application was contested inter alia on the plea that he was not duly served in the original proceedings and it was about a month back that he had learnt that such an order had been passed against him. In contesting this prayer for setting aside the ex parte order, Smt. Parsan Kaur pleaded inter alia that the application under sub-section (6) of Section 488 of the Cr PC, having been made after more than 30 days (3 months?) from the date of the order prescribed under that provision, was barred by time and was thus liable to dismissal without going into its merits.

    2. The learned Magistrate by his order dated the 21st of September, 1967, however, directed that a preliminary enquiry about the date of the knowledge of the ex parte decree passed against Bakhshish Singh, be made. Aggrieved by this order, Smt Parsan Kaur invoked the re visional jurisdiction of the Court of Session at Ambala, reiterating her plea that her husband's application for setting aside the order of maintenance being beyond the period of limitation prescribed under sub-section (6) of Section 488 of the Cr PC, had to be dismissed. The learned Sessions Judge, on due consideration of the matter, held that the period of three months prescribed under sub-section (6) of Section 488 of the Cr PC, for setting aside an ex parte order of maintenance had to be reckoned from the date of that order and the question of respondent's knowledge of such an order was not relevant. He has referred the case by his order dated the 3rd of April, 1968, recommending that the Magistrate's order dated the 21st September, 1967, directing a preliminary enquiry to be made of the date when the respondent came to know of the ex parte order of maintenance, be quashed.

    3. In opposing this recommendation, Mr. R.L Sharma, appearing for the respondent-husband, has urged that since the order of maintenance, that has been sought to be set aside, was passed in the respondent's absence and without proper service of the notice of the original application for maintenance on him, the period of three months prescribed under sub-section (6) of Section 488 of the Cr PC, must be reckoned not from the date of the order but from the date on which the respondent became aware of it. In support of this contention, he has cited Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1961 SC 1500 and Zohra Begum alias Aysha Begum v. Mohamed Ghouse Qadri Qadeeri, AIR 1966 Andh Pra 50. The Supreme Court decision on which reliance is placed, relates to the question of limitation for an application under Section 18(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for reference to the Court. Under one of the provisos to that section, the application for reference has to be made within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court, however, ruled that the expression “date of the award” used in proviso (b) to Section 18(2) of the Act must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or comes to his knowledge either actually or constructively, observing that it would be unreasonable to construe the words “from the date of the Collector's award”, used in this proviso in a literal or mechanical way. Relying upon this observation, Jaganmohan Reddy, J., while dealing with an application made under the proviso to sub-section (6) of Section 488 of the Cr PC, in AIR 1966 Andh Pra 50, has held that limitation for setting aside the ex parte order of maintenance made under Section 488 of the Cr PC, begins from the date of the knowledge of the order by the aggrieved party and not from the date on which that order was passed. The petitioner's counsel Mr. Sunder Lal, submits that the Supreme Court Case on which Jaganmohan Reddy, J. has relied, is clearly distinguishable and does not justify the view taken in Zohra Begum's case, AIR 1966 Andh Pra 50. This contention, in my opinion, has considerable force. In holding that under proviso (b) to sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, the period prescribed for making an application for reference to the Court has to be computed from the date of the knowledge of Collector's award, this is what Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was) delivering the judgment of the Court observed:—

    “In dealing with this question it is relevant to bear in mind the legal character of the award made by the Collector under Section 12. In a sense it is a decision of the Collector reached by him after holding an enquiry as prescribed by the Act. It is a decision, inter alia in respect of the amount of compensation which should be paid to the person interested in the property acquired; but legally the award cannot be treated as a decision; it is in law an offer or tender of the compensation determined by the Collector to the owner of the property under acquisition. If the owner accepts the offer no further proceeding is required to be taken; the amount is paid and compensation proceedings are concluded. If, however, the owner does not accept the offer, Sec. 18 gives him the statutory right of having the question determined by Court, and it is the amount of compensation which the Court may determine that would bind both the owner and the Collector * * * * * * *. It is because of this nature of the award that the award can be appropriately described as a tender or offer made by the Collector on behalf of the Government to the owner of the property for his acceptance * * * *.

    4. Therefore, if the award made by the Collector is in law no more than an offer made on behalf of the Government to the owner of the property then the making of the award as properly understood must involve the communication of the offer to the party concerned. That is the normal requirement under the contract law and its applicability to cases of award made under the Act cannot be reasonably excluded. Thus considered the date of the award cannot be determined solely by reference to the time when the award is signed by the Collector or delivered by him in his office: it must involve the consideration of the question as to when it was known to the party concerned either actually or constructively? If that be the true position then the literal and mechanical construction of the words “the date of the award” occurring in the relevant section would not be appropriate.”

    5. From these observations, it is abundantly clear that the construction placed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court on the expression “the date of the award” is based upon the peculiar nature of the award made by the Collector under the Land Acquisition Act and, in my opinion, these observations cannot be taken as a charter for laying down that in every case where a period of limitation according to the statute has to commence from the date of the order, it should be taken as implied that where the parties are not present when the order is passed or the order is not communicated to them by the Court or the authority passing it, the date of its knowledge would be the terminus a quo of that period of limitation.

    6. The relevant proviso to sub-section (6) of Section 488 of the Cr PC under which the respondent approached the Magistrate for setting aside the ex parte order of maintenance passed against him as far back as 1st of October, 1966, reads thus:—

    “Provided that if the Magistrate is satisfied that he is wilfully avoiding service, or wilfully neglects to attend the Court the Magistrate may proceed to hear and determine the case ex parte. Any orders so made may be set aside for good cause shown, on application made within three months from the date thereof.”

    7. The concluding words of this proviso are clear and admit of no ambiguity. It is a well-settled canon of interpretation that where the language of a statute is clear, the duty of the Court is to give effect to it irrespective of the hardship that it may entail to individuals. Since the application to which this proviso refers, is for setting aside an ex parte order, it is obvious that the order in question is not passed in the presence of the party concerned but in his absence. The legislature while enacting this proviso was aware of the fact that the person, against whom an ex parte order of maintenance is passed, would not be aware of it for sometime and even during three months, prescribed for an application to set it aside, he may not obtain the knowledge of that order. If in that situation the legislature merely provided that the application for setting aside an ex parte order, is to be made within three months from the date of the order and did not proceed further to add “or from the date of the knowledge of such an order” it is obvious that the legislature did so intentionally and deliberately.

    8. In fact it appears to me that it was for valid reasons that the date of knowledge was not prescribed as terminus a quo for computing the period of three months within which an application to set aside such an ex parte order is required to be made. An order of main tenance under Section 488 of the Cr PC, is passed on applications of wives and minor children who are not being maintained and who are in indigent circumstances. Considering the nature of the proceedings and the relief sought in these summary proceedings, the legislature set its face against permitting the husband, or other person against whom the order is made, from deliberately avoiding to appear at the proceedings and thereafter evade the service of the ex parte order. I had an occasion to deal with the precise question, which is now agitated before me, earlier in Hari Singh v. Mst. Dhanno, (1962) 64 Pun LR 59 : 1962 (2) Cri LJ 581, where I expressed the opinion that the period of three months has to be reckoned from the date of the ex parte order sought to be set aside under the proviso to sub-section (6) of Section 488 of the Cr PC, and not from any other date, irrespective of the date on which the respondent obtains the knowledge of the order. In coming to this conclusion I then observed as follows:—

    “The word ‘thereof’, which has been underlined above, leaves no manner of doubt that the period of three months has to be reckoned from the date of the ex parte order which is sought to be set aside and not from any other date. This is irrespective of the date on which the petitioner obtains the knowledge of the order. If the legislature intended that the period of three months for making an application for setting aside an ex parte order should be reckoned from the date of knowledge, it could not have failed to state so. On a reference to the various provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, we find that wherever the legislature considered that the date of knowledge should be the terminus a quo it has specifically said so. If the argument of the learned counsel is accepted, it would amount to incorporating in the relevant provision the words ‘or from the date on which he comes to know of this order’. Where the language is clear and unambiguous, it has to be given effect to irrespective of the hardship it may entail on the parties concerned. This is the view which has also been taken by the Madras High Court in A.S Govindan v. Jayammal, AIR 1950 Mad 153, which has been cited by the respondent's counsel”.

    9. I still find myself in respectful agreement with the view taken by Somasundram, J. AIR 1950 Mad 153. The contrary view expressed in AIR 1966 Andh Pra 50 has already been discussed above, and speaking with respect, in taking that view the peculiar nature of the Collector's award with which their Lordships of the Supreme Court were dealing in AIR 1961 SC 1500, has been ignored. I find that a contrary view has been taken by T.K Tukol, J. in State v. Bhimrao, AIR 1963 Mys 239. In holding that where a person is not validly served in proceedings under Section 488 of the Cr PC, an application, for setting aside an ex parte order awarding maintenance, made after the expiry of three months of the date of the ex parte order, (was maintainable?) the learned Judge observed:—

    “If there is no valid service, then the ex parte order awarding maintenance to the respondent will not be valid * * * *. The period of three months is with reference to the date of ‘any order so made’. The words ‘order so made’ must necessarily imply an order passed in conformity with the first part of the proviso. If the order itself is not in conformity with the first part of the proviso, the second part of the proviso prescribing a period of three months from the date of the order so made will not come into operation.”

    10. I regret, I do not find it possible to subscribe to this view. The application for setting aside an ex parte order under the proviso to sub-sec. (6) of Section 488 of the Cr PC, will succeed if sufficient cause is shown. The non-service, or service not effected in accordance with law may furnish a ground for setting aside the ex parte order but these matters do not, in any way, affect the period of limitation prescribed under that proviso for an application to set aside an ex parte order. The commencement of limitation would not depend upon the merits of the ex parte order.

    11. As I had an occasion to point out in (1962) 64 Pun LR 59 : (1962 (2) Cri LJ 581) (supra), on reference to the various articles of the Indian Limitation Act and similar provisions contained in several statutes laying down the period of limitation for an application, appeal, etc., the legislature has, wherever it considered necessary, made the date of knowledge of the order sought to be challenged, set aside, revised or appealed against, as the date of commencement of the prescribed period of limitation and in other cases it has contented itself by merely making the date of the order the terminus a quo for computing the period of limitation. It will suffice here to refer to Articles 122, 123 and 131 of the schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1963, Article 122 provides:

    Article. Description of Application. Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run. 122 To restore a suit or appeal or application for review or revision dismissed for default of appearance or for want of prosecution or for failure to pay costs of service of process or to furnish security for costs. Thirty days. The date of dismissal.

    12. There is ample authority for proposition that the period of 30 days provided under this article has to commence from the date of the dismissal and not from the date of the knowledge of the party whose appeal, application or revision is dismissed. Reference in this connection may be made to Mohan Lal v. Jai Lal, (1949) 1 Pepsu LR 212 and Kanai Lall Shaw v. Bhattu Shaw, AIR 1961 Cal 474.

    13. Article 123 of the Indian Limitation Act prescribes a period of thirty days for an application to set aside a decree passed ex parte etc. It is expressly stated in column 3 of that article that the point of time from which the period of 30 days begins to run will be “the date of the decree or where the summons or notice was not duly served, when the applicant had knowledge of the decree”. It is thus obvious that in this article the legislature, being conscious of the fact that an ex parte decree is passed in the absence of a party—and the absence of the party may be due to non-service—has expressly provided that the date of knowledge should be the date of the commencement of the period of 30 days for making an application to set aside the ex parte decree. This is in direct contrast with the proviso to sub-section (6) of Section 488 of the Cr PC wherein any reference to the date of knowledge of the order is omitted and such an omission cannot be considered as accidental but deliberate. Again reference may be made to Article 131 which prescribes a period of 90 days for invoking the revisional jurisdiction of the Court under the Codes of the Civil and Criminal Procedure. The date of commencement is prescribed as “the date of the decree or order or sentence sought to be revised”. Even in this provision there is deliberate omission of any reference to the date of knowledge of the order by the person against whom the impugned order is passed.

    14. It is thus quite obvious that if the proviso to sub-section (6) of Section 488 of the Cr PC, is construed as implying that the period of limitation for setting aside an ex parte order would commence from the date of the knowledge of the aggrieved party, that would be tantamount to adding in that proviso the words “or from the date on which the person against whom the ex parte order is passed, becomes aware of it.” Such a construction is not permissible so as to extend the scope of a clear and unambiguous provision.

    15. It has been urged on behalf of the respondent that this strict interpretation with regard to the commencement of the period of limitation under the proviso to sub-section (6) of Section 488 of the Cr PC, may result in a good deal of hardship to the person against whom the order is passed and thus defeat the ends of justice. As has been observed earlier, where the language of a statute is clear and admits of no ambiguity, the question of hardship is not relevant in interpreting it. In any case, I find that there is ample provision in law to mitigate hardship. Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, as it now stands in the Indian Limitation Act, 1963, provides:—

    “Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order 21 of the CPC 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.”

    16. From this it is obvious that even in an application made under the proviso to sub-section (6) of Section 488 of the Cr PC, a party can seek extension of time by making out a case for it. Prior to the amendment of the Limitation Act in 1963, the position with regard to the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act may have been different, but now that provision can be availed of even in proceedings under sub-section (6) of Section 488 of the Cr PC. Consequently, the respondent could seek extension of time by showing that thet was sufficient cause for his not coming to the Court within the prescribed period of 30 days (3 months?) from the date of the ex parte order. For that purpose, he is entitled to an opportunity to satisfy the Court that there is sufficient ground for condoning the delay in coming to the Court to have the ex parte order set aside.

    17. The decision of Jindra Lal, J., in Hardyal Singh v. Swaran Kaur, Criminal Revn. No. 634 of 1966, D/- 15-5-1967 (Punj) is no authority for the proposition that the period of three months prescribed under proviso to sub-sec. (6) of Section 488 of the Cr PC is to be reckoned from the date on which the person against whom the ex parte order of maintenance is passed learns about that order. The learned Judge had ruled in that case that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act could be availed of by the party against whom the ex parte order is passed when he remanded thm case observing as follows:—

    “I therefore, allow this petition and remit the case to the learned Sessions Judge (for decision?) whether the allegation of the petitioner that he came to know of the order four days before the filing of the application, as alleged by him is correct or not. If he comes to the conclusion that the allegations of the petitioner are correct then he will be clearly entitled to the benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, especially as it appears that he was never served with a notice of the application under Section 488 of the Cr PC”

    18. Since I have held that Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act applies to an application for setting aside an ex parte order made under the proviso to sub-section (6) of Section 488 of the Cr PC, the impugned order of the learned Sessions Judge directing a preliminary enquiry into the date of the knowledge cannot be sustained.

    19. The recommendation of the learned Sessions Judge is accordingly accepted and the impugned order of the learned Magistrate is quashed. The case is remitted to the Magistrate for disposal of the respondent's application in the light of the observations made above. As I have held that the period fixed for filing the application can be extended under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, it will be open to the respondent to make a proper application for the extension of time supported by an affidavit. The Magistrate shall then proceed to deal with the matter in accordance with law. The counsel for the parties are directed to cause appearance of their clients before the Magistrate on the 27th of October, 1969.

    20. Order accordingly.

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    Comments

    Smt. Parson Kaur v. Bakshish Singh .
    (Oct 7, 1969)