Gurmit Singh v. Tara Singh ., Punjab & Haryana High Court, Judgment, Law, casemine.com

Factual and Procedural Background

Bhagwan Singh was the last male holder of the disputed land. On his death he was succeeded by the widow of his pre-deceased son, Puran Kaur. On 1 July 1943 Puran Kaur executed a gift of the land in favour of her daughter's son, Gurmit Singh (the appellant). Tara Singh (the respondent), nephew of Bhagwan Singh, challenged the alienation and obtained a declaratory decree dated 24 March 1947 holding that the gift would be ineffective as against his reversionary rights. Puran Kaur died on 9 December 1956. After her death Tara Singh instituted the present suit for possession relying on the earlier declaratory decree. The lower courts decreed the suit in favour of Tara Singh, and this appeal is preferred by the defendant (identified in the opinion as the appellant).

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the relevant succession to the disputed land should be determined by the law in force at the death of the last male holder (Bhagwan Singh) or by the law in force at the death of the widow and limited holder (Puran Kaur).

Whether the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, No. 30 of 1956, apply to the succession in this case, given that Puran Kaur died after that Act came into force.

Whether a decree obtained by a reversioner in a representative suit during the life of a widow is enforceable to give possession to that reversioner in preference to a nearer heir who becomes ascertained at the death of the widow.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's Arguments

The respondent (Tara Singh), through his counsel Mr. Mamnohan/Manmohan Singh as referred to in the opinion, argued that because Puran Kaur held only a life-estate (a limited estate), succession had effectively opened on the death of Bhagwan Singh (the last male holder); therefore, succession should be determined according to the law applicable on Bhagwan Singh's death rather than on the date of Puran Kaur's death.

Reliance was placed on decisions (noted in the opinion) that were said to support the proposition that succession once opened at the death of the last male holder does not reopen or get re-determined on the death of the limited holder.

It was also argued (as described in the opinion) that the rule that “succession opens on the death of the limited owner” is peculiar to Hindu law and should not be applied where parties are governed by custom; the respondent maintained analogy between Hindu law and Punjab customary law but contended the succession opened earlier in time.

The opinion does not contain a detailed, separate enumeration of the appellant's pleaded arguments in the same manner; it records the central factual-legal positions and the respondent's specific contentions that the court addressed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Mt. Rajpali Kunwer v. Surju Rai, I.L.R. 58 All. 1041 (Full Bench of Allahabad High Court)	Established that during the lifetime of the widow reversioners have no vested interest but only a mere spes successionis; succession opens only on the death of the widow.	The court treated this decision as authoritative on the point and relied upon it to hold that succession opens on the death of the widow (Puran Kaur) and not on the death of the last male holder (Bhagwan Singh).
Lala Duni Chand v. Mt. Anar Kali, A.I.R. 1946 P.C. 173 (Privy Council)	Approved the view in Rajpali Kunwer that the reversioners' right is contingent during the widow's life and succession is to be determined at the widow's death.	The Privy Council's approval was treated as confirming the rule that the relevant date for determining succession is the termination of the widow's estate; the court applied this reasoning to the facts before it.
Shakuntala Devi v. Kaushalya Devi, I.L.R. 17 Lah. 356 (Lahore High Court, Division Bench)	Interpreted words like “dying intestate” as describing the status of the deceased and not as referring to the time of death; supports applying the law in force when succession actually opens.	The court relied on this interpretation to reinforce the position that the operative time is when succession opens (death of the widow), not the earlier death of the husband/last male holder.
Syed Roshan Ali v. Mt. Rehmat Bibi, A.I.R. 1943 Lah. 219	Dealt with application of the Muslim Shariat Act, 1937, to a widow's limited rights and concluded the Act did not have retrospective effect on the widow's pre-existing limited estate under customary law; used by respondent-counsel in support of earlier opening of succession.	The court distinguished this decision on its facts (different legal and factual context) and observed that some of its observations were contrary to the well-settled Hindu-law view adopted in Rajpali Kunwer and approved by the Privy Council.
R.S.A. No. 552 of 1953 (decision of Mehar Singh, J., 3 Dec 1958)	Decision based upon the view taken in Syed Roshan Ali's case.	The court observed that this decision merely followed Syed Roshan Ali and did not persuade it to depart from the principles established by the Full Bench/Privy Council line of authority.
Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act, No. 2 of 1929	Historical analogue concerning application of inheritance law upon changes in law and the date when succession is deemed to open.	The court reviewed earlier cases arising on the coming into force of this Act and used that jurisprudence as background and support for the rule that succession opens on the death of the widow.
Hindu Succession Act, No. 30 of 1956	Central statutory provision whose applicability depends on when succession is deemed to have opened (the key legal instrument the court had to decide whether applied).	The court held that because Puran Kaur died after the Act came into force and succession opened on her death, the Hindu Succession Act applied to determine the heirs; this conclusion determined that Gurmit Singh would be the nearer heir under the Act.
Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937	Appeared in the discussion of Syed Roshan Ali (which concerned application of this Act) and the temporal effect of a change in personal law.	The court described how Syed Roshan Ali applied that Act in its factual matrix and distinguished that case from the instant matter.

Precedent

Rule or Principle Cited For

Application by the Court

Mt. Rajpali Kunwer v. Surju Rai, I.L.R. 58 All. 1041 (Full Bench of Allahabad High Court)

Established that during the lifetime of the widow reversioners have no vested interest but only a mere spes successionis; succession opens only on the death of the widow.

The court treated this decision as authoritative on the point and relied upon it to hold that succession opens on the death of the widow (Puran Kaur) and not on the death of the last male holder (Bhagwan Singh).

Lala Duni Chand v. Mt. Anar Kali, A.I.R. 1946 P.C. 173 (Privy Council)

Approved the view in Rajpali Kunwer that the reversioners' right is contingent during the widow's life and succession is to be determined at the widow's death.

The Privy Council's approval was treated as confirming the rule that the relevant date for determining succession is the termination of the widow's estate; the court applied this reasoning to the facts before it.

Shakuntala Devi v. Kaushalya Devi, I.L.R. 17 Lah. 356 (Lahore High Court, Division Bench)

Interpreted words like “dying intestate” as describing the status of the deceased and not as referring to the time of death; supports applying the law in force when succession actually opens.

The court relied on this interpretation to reinforce the position that the operative time is when succession opens (death of the widow), not the earlier death of the husband/last male holder.

Syed Roshan Ali v. Mt. Rehmat Bibi, A.I.R. 1943 Lah. 219

Dealt with application of the Muslim Shariat Act, 1937, to a widow's limited rights and concluded the Act did not have retrospective effect on the widow's pre-existing limited estate under customary law; used by respondent-counsel in support of earlier opening of succession.

The court distinguished this decision on its facts (different legal and factual context) and observed that some of its observations were contrary to the well-settled Hindu-law view adopted in Rajpali Kunwer and approved by the Privy Council.

R.S.A. No. 552 of 1953 (decision of Mehar Singh, J., 3 Dec 1958)

Decision based upon the view taken in Syed Roshan Ali's case.

The court observed that this decision merely followed Syed Roshan Ali and did not persuade it to depart from the principles established by the Full Bench/Privy Council line of authority.

Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act, No. 2 of 1929

Historical analogue concerning application of inheritance law upon changes in law and the date when succession is deemed to open.

The court reviewed earlier cases arising on the coming into force of this Act and used that jurisprudence as background and support for the rule that succession opens on the death of the widow.

Hindu Succession Act, No. 30 of 1956

Central statutory provision whose applicability depends on when succession is deemed to have opened (the key legal instrument the court had to decide whether applied).

The court held that because Puran Kaur died after the Act came into force and succession opened on her death, the Hindu Succession Act applied to determine the heirs; this conclusion determined that Gurmit Singh would be the nearer heir under the Act.

Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937

Appeared in the discussion of Syed Roshan Ali (which concerned application of this Act) and the temporal effect of a change in personal law.

The court described how Syed Roshan Ali applied that Act in its factual matrix and distinguished that case from the instant matter.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by stating and applying settled principles concerning representative suits by reversioners and the nature of reversionary rights during the life of a widow or other limited holder:

The court explained that a suit by reversioners challenging an alienation by a female holder is representative in character and addresses a common apprehended injury to all reversioners (both presumptive and contingent). A decree in such a suit enures for the benefit of the person who is entitled to succeed after the death of the female.

However, the court emphasised that while a decree benefits the person who ultimately succeeds, the decree does not itself establish the right to inherit if a nearer heir exists at the time the succession actually opens; the representative who obtains the decree can enforce it only if he is, at the time the widow's estate terminates, the nearest heir entitled to succeed.

The decisive legal question was therefore temporal: when does the succession "open" for the purpose of determining who is the nearest heir — at the death of the last male holder (Bhagwan Singh) or at the death of the widow/limited holder (Puran Kaur)?

The court reviewed and relied upon a line of authorities (notably the Full Bench decision in Mt. Rajpali Kunwer v. Surju Rai and the Privy Council in Lala Duni Chand v. Mt. Anar Kali) holding that reversioners during the life of the widow have only a contingent possibility of succession (spes successionis) and that the succession does not open until the widow's death. Those authorities were held to determine that the correct date for applying a change in succession law is the date when the widow's estate terminates.

The court accepted related interpretive authority (Shakuntala Devi) that statutory phrases like “dying intestate” describe the status of the deceased and do not fix an earlier time for opening succession; the material time is the date when the succession actually opens.

The court considered and rejected the respondent's reliance on Syed Roshan Ali and the subsequent decision in R.S.A. No. 552, finding Syed Roshan Ali factually distinguishable and observing that some of its observations appeared contrary to the well-settled line of authority it had adopted. The court explicitly rejected the proposition that a succession can be "split" or that the succession, once opened on the husband's death, would remain in that state for all purposes despite the intervening life-estate of a widow.

Applying these principles to the facts, the court concluded that succession to the reversioners opened on the death of Puran Kaur (the widow), who died after the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, came into force. Because that Act applies at the time the succession opened, Gurmit Singh (the appellant) would, under the Act, be a nearer heir than Tara Singh (the respondent) and would therefore succeed to the suit land if the gift were ignored or ineffective.

Given that the declaratory decree previously obtained entitled the respondent to possession only if and when succession opened in his favour, and because succession opened after the Act and in a manner favourable to the appellant, the court found that the lower courts' decrees in favour of the respondent could not stand.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Appeal accepted. The court set aside the judgment and decree of the District Judge and dismissed the suit. The parties were left to their own costs throughout.

Implications:

Direct effect on the parties: The appellant's challenge to the lower courts' decrees succeeded; the declaratory decree obtained earlier did not entitle the respondent to possession given that succession opened on the widow's death after the Hindu Succession Act came into force. The suit for possession was dismissed and parties bear their own costs.

Broader legal consequence: The decision applies established authority (Full Bench decisions and Privy Council approval) to reaffirm that the operative date for determining the applicable succession law is the date on which the succession actually opens (termination of the widow's life-estate). The opinion does not purport to lay down a new precedent beyond applying and endorsing prior decisions.

Appeal accepted.

Gurmit Singh v. Tara Singh .

Chopra, J.:— The last male holder of the land in dispute was Bhagwan Singh who, on his death, was succeeded by his pre-deceased son's widow Puran Kaur. On 1st July, 1943, Puran Kaur gifted the land in favour of her daughter's son Gurmit Singh appellant. Tara Singh respondent, nephew of Bhagwan Singh, brought a suit impugning the alienation and obtained a declaratory decree that the gift would be ineffective as against his reversionary rights. This decree is dated 24th March, 1947. Puran Kaur died on 9th December, 1956, and thereafter Tara Singh brought the present suit for possession on the basis of the decree in his favour. The suit has been decreed by the Courts below and this is an appeal preferred by the defendant.

2. A suit on behalf of reversioners to challenge an alienation by a female during her lifetime, is always in a representative capacity. It is to remove a common apperhended injury to the interest of all the reversioners, presumptive and contingent alike. A decree obtained in such a suit enures for the benefit of the person entitled to succeed after the death of the female. The decree does not lay down that the person taking the action would be entitled to inherit and get the property. He would not be entitled to get it so long as some other nearer heir is alive. In other words, he can sue for possession on the basis of the decree only if he is the nearest heir entitled to succeed on the death of the female. The principle is well-settled and is not disputed. It is also not disputed that if the Hindu Succession Act, No. 30 of 1956, applies Gurmit Singh appellant, whether he be regarded as the grand daughter's son of Bhagwan Singh or the daughter's son of Gurmukh Singh, would be a better and nearer heir as compared to Tara Singh respondent and that the latter would not be entitled to inherit in the presence of Gurmit Singh appellant. The dispute, therefore, boils down to the application of the Hindu Succession Act, and that depends upon the question, when the succession should be deemed to have opened. Admittely, Puran Kaur died after the coming into force of the said Act. The respondent's case, however, is that since Puran Kaur was holding a life-estate the succession had, in fact, opened on the death of Bhagwan Singh, the last male holder, and, therefore, succession to the estate would have to be determined according to the law that was applicable on the date of the death of Bhagwan Singh. An identical question arose and was dealt with in a large number of cases on the coming into force of Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act No. 2 of 1929. The series of Full Bench decisions on the point were reviewed by the learned Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court in Mt. Rajpali Kunwer v. Surju Rai . I.L.R 58 All. 1041.. The decision was approved by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Lala Duni Chand v. Mt. Anar Kali . A.I.R 1946 P.C 173.. In this case Dharam Das, the last male holder of the property in dispute, died in 1922, before the coming into force of Act II of 1929. His mother Mst. Chaman Devi succeeded him as heir, taking a Hindu widow's estate. Chaman Devi died in 1936, after the date of the Act. The rival claimants to the right of inheritance were the sisters of Dharam Das on the one side and his collaterals on the other. The collaterals claimed that they had succeeded to the property as the heirs of Dharam Das, who had died before the Act came into force, and the Act having no retrospective effect did not apply to the parties of the case. The contention was turned down. Agreeing with the decision in Mst. Rajpali Kunwer's case their Lordships observed:—

“******

It will be sufficient to observe that their Lordship are in complete agreement with the views of the learned Chief Justice in that case, that, during the lifetime of the widow, the reversioners in Hindu Law have no vested interest in the estate but have a mere spes successions or a chance of succession, which is a purely contingent right which may or may not accrue, that the succession would not open out until the widow died, and that the person who would be the next reversioner at that time would succeed to the estate and the alteration in the rule of the Hindu Law brought about by the Act would then be in full force.”

In the course of argument, reliance was placed upon the words “dying intesate” in the said Act (the same words appear in section 8 of Act 30 of 1956) as connoting the future tense. Their Lordships accepted the view taken by a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court in Shakuntala Devi v. Kaushalya Devi . I.L.R 17 Lah. 356, and observed as follows:—

“*****

The words are a description of the status of the deceased and have no reference and are not intended to have any reference to the time of the death of a Hindu male. The expression merely means in the case of intestacy of a Hindu male. To place this interpretation on the Act is not to give a retrospective effect to its provision, the material point of time being the date when the succession opens, namely, the death of the widow”.

Expressing their agreement with some other Indian decisions their Lordships, concluded by saying:—

“The succession does not open to the heirs of the husband until the termination of the widow's estate. Upon its termination, the property descends to those who would have been the heirs of the husband if he had lived up to and died at the moment of her death.

There is no vesting as at the date of the husband's death, and it follows that the questions of who is the nearest reversionary heir or what is the class of reversionary heirs, fall to be settled at the date of the expiry of the ownership for life or lives. The death of a Hindu female owner opens the inheritance to the reversioners, and the one most nearly related at the time to the last full owner becomes entitled to possession. In her lifetime, however, the reversionary right is a mere possibility, or spes successionis, but this possibility is common to them all for, it cannot be predicated who would be the nearest reversioner at the time of her death.”

In this view of the matter no retrospective effect is given to the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, they are applied to a succession which opened after the Act had come into force. The above dictum made in approval of the unanimous view of the High Courts in India affords complete answer to the entire argument of Mr. Mamnohan Singh, learned counsel for the respondent, and also to the two decisions relied upon by him. The facts in Syed Roshan Ali v. Mt. Rehmat Bibi . A.I.R 1943 Lah. 219., were somewhat different. There, a mortgage effected by one Rahmat Bibi, widow of Hassan Ali Shah, on 17th February, 1932, in favour of her two daughters was challenged by the nephew of Hassan Ali Shah, the last male owner. The suit had been dismissed because of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937, having come into force on 7th October, 1937. It was recognised that according to the Customary Law then in force, by which the parties were governed, “she (Rehmat Bibi) would have remained in possession of the whole of that property during her lifetime and inheritance would have opened to the collaterals of her husband only after her death and, as she happened to have two daughters, after their death.” The question to be decided was whether Rehmat Bibi's rights in the property could be found to have undergone any change by reason of the Muslim Shariat Law having been brought into operation and could she be regarded, since then, a full owner of ⅛th share in the property as provided by the Mohammedan Law of Inheritance instead of the limited owner that she had been after Hassan Ali Shah's death. Since there was nothing in the Muslim Shariat Act which could show that it was to have retrospective action either expressly or by necessary implication the question was answered by the Letters Patent Bench in the negative and the Plaintiff's right to bring a suit for declaration that the alienation would not be binding on him was not held to have been taken away by the said Act. One of the reasons for coming to his conclusion was stated by Abdur Rehman, J. as follows:—

“The expression that succession opens to the reversioners on the death of the last of the limited holders is unexceptionable but that would not show that the succession to the last male-holder had not opened before and had not remained in a state of abeyance for as long as the estate remained temporarily in the possession of the limited owner with the object of its being taken back to the time when the life of the last full owner came to a close and of allowing it to devolve permanently on his nearest relation in existence at the time of the limited owner's death except to the extent that it was reduced by her for consideration and justifiable necessity.”

The observation is not based upon any reasoning and seems to be contrary to the well-settled view referred to above. I have not been able to convince myself to accept the proposition that there can be any splitting of a succession. If the succession has once opened to the reversioners on the death of the last male-holders, that would be an end of the matter; it would not open once again on the death of the last of the limited holders.

3. The second decision relied upon by the learned counsel is that of Mehar Singh, J. in R.S.A No. 552 of 1953, (decided on 3rd December, 1958). The decision is merely based upon the view taken in Syed Roshan Ali's case referred to above.

4. According to Mr. Manmohan Singh the rule that succession opens to the reversioners on the death of the limited owner and not on the death of the last male holder is peculiar to Hindu Law and can have no application to a case the parties to which are governed by custom. Both under Hindu Law and Punjab Customary Law the respective rights of a widow in possession of the husband's estate and of the reversioners are analogous. Under both the laws, a widow is recognised as heir to her husband's estate, she holds it for life with the same limitations on her powers of disposition, and the reversioners enjoy the same rights in relation to the estate held by her. It is a well-recognised rule under custom that where a widow has succeeded collaterally, after her death it is the heirs of her husband who are entitled to succeed and not the heirs of the last male holder. That would not be possible, if the succession be taken to have opened to the reversioners on the death of the last male holder.

5. The widow's life tenure, which originated in her right to maintenance, was in course of time recognised as a right to the enjoyment of the whole estate, whether it exceeded her needs or not. It is now too late in the day to say that she holds the estate merely in lieu of maintenance; the widow or mother of a sonless proprietor succeds to the life estate as an heir. Widow's right of succession is not ordinarily affected by the circumstance that the husband was joint in estate with others. Two or more widows succeed jointly and they are governed by the rule of survivorship. Limitation on her right of disposition is only an incident of tenure of the estate she gets, and not a limitation on her right to succeed.

6. In the view that I take, succession to thee reversioners opened on the death of Puran Kaur and not on the death of Bhagwan Singh and Puran Kaur having died after the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act Gurmit Singh appellant, and not Tara Singh respondent, would succeed to the suit-land, if there had been no gift or the one made has to be ignored or regarded as ineffective. That is what was said by the declaratory decree; according to the decree the respondent is to get possession of the land only if and when the succession opens out to him.

7. In the result the appeal is accepted, the judgment and decree of the District Judge are set aside and the suit dismissed. In view of the facts of the case the parties are left to their own costs throughout.

Appeal accepted.

Regular Second Appeal No. 1360 of 1957

Gurmit Singh v. Tara Singh .

Case Summary — Opinion by Chopra, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Gurmit Singh v. Tara Singh .

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