Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

Regular First Appeal No. 20 of 1957.

Attorney(S)

A. Hussain, D.C Gupta and J.N Kaushal,
F.C Mittal and D.D Khanna,

Judges

K.L Gosain
A.N Grover, JJ.

Acts

SECTION 16 PROVINCIAL SMALL CAUSE COURTS ACT
Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure
provisions of Section 11 of the Code
SECTION 15 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
Section 11 of the Code
Cause Courts Act

See more information ...

Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff alleged that he had been appointed in 1923 as agricultural adviser of the Balrampur Estate (belonging to the defendant) while the estate was under the Court of Wards. After the Estate was released from the Court of Wards in 1937, the defendant agreed to retain the plaintiff. The plaintiff was offered either continuation of contributory provident fund benefits or a pension fixed at retirement if he refunded the Estate's provident-fund contributions. The plaintiff opted for the pension, refunded approximately Rs. 17,000, and retired in 1944.

The defendant fixed a pension of Rs. 500 per mensem and paid the pension until January 1951, when payments stopped. The plaintiff earlier sued in the Small Cause Court, Simla, for Rs. 500 for February 1951; that suit resulted in a decree dated 30-4-1954. The plaintiff relied on that judgment as res judicata and later, claiming arrears, sued again seeking Rs. 18,000 (for the period 1-8-1953 to 31-7-1956), having abandoned the remainder of a larger claimed sum.

The defendant resisted, denying the existence of a contractual entitlement to pension, asserting that payments made at retirement (allegedly Rs. 25,000) were ex gratia, asserting lack of personal liability, claiming want of consideration, limitation bar, and denying that the Small Cause Court judgment operated as res judicata.

On the pleadings the trial Court framed three preliminary issues (territorial jurisdiction, whether the earlier judgment operated as res judicata, and correct plaint valuation). The trial Court held all issues for the plaintiff, finding the Small Cause Court judgment operated as res judicata and decreed the suit. The defendant appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the previous judgment dated 30-4-1954 of the Judge, Small Cause Court, Simla operates as res judicata in the subsequent suit.
Whether the trial Court had territorial jurisdiction to hear the suit.
Whether the plaint was correctly valued for the purposes of court-fee (i.e., correct valuation of the suit).

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

The plaintiff alleged a contract for pension existed pursuant to the post-1937 arrangement; he had refunded the Estate's provident-fund contributions and accepted pension in lieu of provident benefits.
The plaintiff relied on the earlier Small Cause Court judgment (30-4-1954) and contended that that judgment operated as res judicata in the present suit on points previously decided.
The plaintiff limited his present claim to Rs. 18,000 for a specific period and abandoned the balance of the larger alleged arrears.

Defendant's Arguments

The defendant denied any contractually enforceable obligation to pay pension; asserted that the retirement payment (allegedly Rs. 25,000 including the refunded provident contribution) was ex gratia and that the Rs. 500 annuity was awarded as a mere favour terminable at will.
The defendant challenged personal liability for making periodic pension payments, contended there was no consideration for the alleged agreement, and pleaded limitation.
The defendant denied that the judgment of the Small Cause Court operated as res judicata in the present suit, and further contended the earlier Small Cause Court decree could not bind the present forum because the present claim (for Rs. 18,000) exceeded the Small Cause Court's pecuniary jurisdiction.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Ishwar Datt v. General Assurance Society, Ltd., AIR 1937 Lah 346	Authority relied upon by the trial Court that the general principle of res judicata applies where the matter in issue is the same and has been previously decided by a competent Court, including decisions of Small Cause Courts where exclusive jurisdiction is asserted.	The opinion notes the trial Court proceeded on this authority but ultimately rejects the trial Court's reliance on it because that decision assumes a Small Cause Court to be one of exclusive jurisdiction; the present Court holds that premise to be incorrect for the present purposes.
G. H. Hook v. Administrator-General of Bengal, ILR 48 Cal 499 (AIR 1921 PC 11)	Privy Council authority for the proposition that the principle of res judicata has a wider application and governs cases where the matter in issue is the same and previously decided by a competent Court.	Quoted as part of the general principle that res judicata can apply beyond the strict confines of Section 11; used in doctrinal discussion but not decisive for the present facts because of the Court's conclusion about Small Cause Courts.
Ram Chandra Rao v. Ramchandra Rao, ILR 45 Mad 320 (AIR 1922 PC 80)	Authority illustrating the wider application of res judicata where matters were previously decided by a competent Court.	Referred to in support of the general principle but not treated as controlling in the present case once the Court concluded the earlier Small Cause judgment could not operate as res judicata here.
Velji Dayalji v. Nand Lal, AIR 1926 Sind 236	Decision holding Section 11 of the Code was not exhaustive and that the plea of res judicata extended to judgments of Courts of exclusive jurisdiction, including Small Cause Courts (as treated by that bench).	Described as one of the key authorities on which Bhide J. relied; the present Court discusses it at length and distinguishes or rejects the premise that a Small Cause Court is thereby a Court of exclusive jurisdiction for the purposes of barring subsequent suits.
Hemraj Harnam Das v. Hargolal, AIR 1934 Sind 112	Followed Velji Dayalji and treated Small Cause Court decisions as having res judicata effect in certain circumstances.	Cited as part of the line of cases supporting the view that Small Cause Court judgments might operate as res judicata; the present Court reviews this line but ultimately finds it inapposite to sustain res judicata in the instant facts.
Champat v. Toti Bam, AIR 1934 Lah 324	Referenced among authorities considering res judicata and competence of earlier Courts.	Noted in the survey of authorities relied upon by earlier benches; the present Court includes it in historical discussion but does not treat it as decisive for affirming res judicata here.
Daulat Ram v. Munshi Ram, AIR 1932 Lah 623	Authority dealing with applicability of previous court decisions (including revenue or special jurisdiction courts) as res judicata in subsequent proceedings.	Referred to for the proposition that decisions of Courts with exclusive jurisdiction can bind later proceedings; considered in the Court's review but not applied to sustain res judicata in this case.
Mauj v. Sardara, AIR 1929 Lah 586	Discussed in the context of earlier decisions that supported res judicata principles when a court of exclusive jurisdiction had decided a matter.	Included in the historical survey; the present Court examined these authorities but found them insufficient to support the trial Court's reliance on res judicata because the Small Cause Court was not regarded here as a court of exclusive jurisdiction.
Hayat Mohammad v. Bar Gaushala Ltd., Lyallpur, AIR 1938 Lah 811	Decision where a judge agreed with the view that when a Small Cause Court decides a matter on which it has exclusive jurisdiction the decision will be binding on subsequent Courts; but in that case the Small Cause Court's decision on title in a rent suit was not accepted as res judicata in a later suit for rent and ejectment.	Used to show the complexity and divergent results in earlier authorities; the present Court notes the mixed treatment of Small Cause Court decisions in subsequent suits.
Smt. Raj Lakshmi Dasi v. Banamali Sen, AIR 1953 SC 33	Supreme Court authority that the competency condition in Section 11 CPC is a limitation on the general rule of res judicata and that on general principles res judicata can be invoked in respect of judgments of Courts of exclusive jurisdiction.	The Court accepts the correctness of the view in this Supreme Court decision that Section 11's competency limitation must be considered, but it applies that proposition by holding that a Small Cause Court is not a Court of exclusive jurisdiction for the present purposes.
Dulare Lal v. Hazari Lal, AIR 1914 All 229	Held that a Small Cause suit transferred to a Munsif retained its character as a small cause suit and a Munsif's decision in such a suit could not operate as res judicata for purposes of other suits not cognizable by the Court of Small Causes.	Referred to as part of the line of authorities that treat Small Cause Courts as having only preferential jurisdiction and limiting the res judicata effect of their decisions.
Shakira Bibi v. Nandan Rai, AIR 1922 All 241	Considered that a judgment did not operate as res judicata where a Munsif hearing a small-cause nature suit was not competent to try the later suit.	Included to illustrate precedents favoring the view that Small Cause Court decisions do not automatically operate as res judicata in later suits of a different character.
Ghulappa v. Raghavendra, ILR 28 Bom 338	Expressed the view that a Court of Small Causes was a Court of preferential jurisdiction.	Quoted and relied on by the present Court to support the conclusion that Small Cause Courts are preferential, not exclusive, and therefore the prior Small Cause judgment could not be treated as having conclusive res judicata effect here.
Mohini Mohan Roy v. Ramadas Paramhansa, AIR 1924 Cal 487	Held that if a later suit was not of a Small Cause nature, a decree for money in a previous Small Cause Court suit did not operate as res judicata.	Used in the survey of authorities to support the view that a Small Cause Court decree does not invariably bind subsequent suits that are not of the same small-cause character.
Madhorao v. Amrit Hao, AIR 1918 Nag 163	Held that the decision of a Subordinate Judge in a previous suit is res judicata in a subsequent small cause suit where the inability of the Subordinate Judge to entertain a small cause claim arises from the existence of another court with preferential jurisdiction.	Noted among authorities reflecting the variety of approaches; the present Court reviews and contrasts these lines of authority in reaching its conclusion.
Raja Simhadri Appa Row v. Ramachandrudu, ILR 27 Mad 63	Addressed whether decision on rate of rent by a Court of Appeal in an original suit on the file of the District Munsif was res judicata in a subsequent suit.	Referred to in the doctrinal discussion leading to consideration of the Full Bench decision in ILR 29 Mad 195.
Avanasi Gounden v. Nachammal, ILR 29 Mad 195	Full Bench decision addressing whether an earlier small-cause character decision binds subsequent suits; the Full Bench held in certain contexts that the decision in a former small-cause suit did not operate as res judicata in a later suit and provided reasoning on appealability and the grades of courts.	The present Court expressly commends the Full Bench's reasoning and follows the approach that the appealability/grade of Court considerations must be kept in view; the Court relies on this to hold that the Small Cause Court decision does not operate as res judicata here.
Afzal Husain v. Mahmood Husain, AIR 1943 Oudh 449	Observed that Section 16 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act prevents other courts from trying suits cognizable by a Small Cause Court but does not take away the jurisdiction of the regular court.	Referred to in support of the proposition that Small Cause Courts have preferential jurisdiction and that other courts' jurisdiction is not absolutely ousted, informing the Court's conclusion on the nature of Small Cause Courts.
U. K. Seal v. Aramugam Chettyar, AIR 1938 Rang 25	Held that the character of a suit is not altered by the mode in which it is tried; the effect of section establishing Small Cause Courts is not to deprive regular courts altogether of jurisdiction but to prevent exercise of that jurisdiction while a Small Cause Court exists locally.	Used to support the conclusion that Small Cause Courts are preferential and that the mere fact of a suit being tried there does not create an exclusive jurisdictional bar to other courts considering the matter in appropriate circumstances.
Mt. Edun v. Mt. Bechun, 8 Suth WR 175 (as referred)	Referenced in the ILR 29 Mad 195 discussion: the decision was relied upon by later authorities emphasising differences in grades of courts and why inferior court decisions should not be too readily treated as absolutely binding on superior courts.	Referred to as part of the jurisprudential background favouring caution in applying estoppel by judgment across different grades of Courts; the present Court cites that background in support of its reasoning.
Misser Raghubardial v. Sheo Baksh Singh, ILR 9 Cal. 439 (as referred)	Referred to in the discussion of judicial committee views stressing differences in grades of courts and judges when considering estoppel by judgment.	Included in the opinion's review of authorities; the present Court uses the general principle to underline the importance of considering appealability and court-grade differences in res judicata analysis.
AIR 1937 Lah 846	Referenced (in the opinion's text) as the decision by Bhide J. whose reasons the Court considered (the text cites this reference in para 49).	The opinion states that the trial Court erred in treating the earlier decision as res judicata relying on the reasons given by Bhide J. in this authority; the present Court rejects that basis because it treats Small Cause Courts as not being courts of exclusive jurisdiction in the relevant sense.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The central analytical task for the Court was to determine whether the judgment of the Small Cause Court (Simla) could operate as res judicata in the present suit. The Court conducted a doctrinal survey of authorities and statutes (notably Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 16 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act) and reasoned as follows:

The Court acknowledged the general principle (as reflected in Privy Council and other authorities) that res judicata extends where the same matter has been decided by a competent court. It accepted that outside the strict wording of Section 11 CPC, res judicata on general principles may apply to judgments of courts of exclusive jurisdiction.
The Court examined the character of Small Cause Courts: whether they are courts of exclusive jurisdiction (whose decisions would have finality under the broader doctrine) or merely courts of preferential jurisdiction (whose decrees should not automatically bind subsequent courts).
The Court reviewed numerous precedents showing divergent views. Some earlier benches treated Small Cause Courts as having exclusive effect in certain circumstances. Other authorities (including Full Bench decisions and various high-court precedents) treated Small Cause Courts as having only preferential jurisdiction and limited the res judicata effect of their decisions—particularly where the later suit was not of a small-cause character or where appealability and court-grade differences suggested caution.
The Court emphasized the statutory scheme: the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act provides for speedy disposition of small-value suits (generally under Rs. 1,000) with limited appellate avenues, reflecting the legislature's intent to restrict the ambit of such courts to less important matters. Because the statute was intended for speedy resolution and limited subject matter, the Small Cause Court was not to be equated with courts that have exclusive jurisdiction over particular subject-matter (like Probate or Revenue courts).
Practical consequences were considered: treating Small Cause Court decrees as having absolute res judicata effect on larger claims would enable forum-shopping and allow litigants to secure final decisions on substantial points before a Court that, by its nature and statutory scheme, is not designed to decide major controversies with full appellate safeguards.
On this basis the Court concluded that a Court of Small Causes is a court of preferential jurisdiction, not a court of exclusive jurisdiction in the sense required to extend res judicata beyond the limits of Section 11. Therefore the trial Court erred in holding that the earlier Small Cause Court judgment operated as res judicata in this case. The Court further observed that the competency/appealability considerations in Section 11 must be kept in view when assessing estoppel by judgment.
Having reached that conclusion, the Court set aside the trial Court's finding on the jurisdiction issue that had been based upon the res judicata finding, and remanded the suit for decision according to law on the merits (or as appropriate), giving directions for the parties to appear before the trial Court on a specified date.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed; the decree of the trial Court is set aside and the suit is remanded for decision in accordance with law.

Implications:

The Court held that a Court of Small Causes is a Court of preferential jurisdiction and not a Court of exclusive jurisdiction in the relevant sense; therefore a judgment of such a Court does not automatically operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit that exceeds or is of a different character from the small-cause matters it was competent to decide.
Section 11 CPC's competency limitation and the considerations of appealability and grades of Courts must be kept in view before giving res judicata effect to earlier judgments; the broader common-law principle of res judicata (as recognized in certain authorities) does not suffice to override these statutory and structural considerations where the earlier judgment was rendered by a Small Cause Court that lacked exclusive jurisdiction over the subject-matter.
Practical consequence for the parties in this case: the decree in favour of the plaintiff for Rs. 18,000 is set aside; the suit is remanded to the trial Court for fresh decision in accordance with law. Parties were directed to appear before the trial Court on 4-5-1959. Costs were ordered to abide the final event.

Note: This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion. No information beyond the text has been added.

Show full summary ...

Maharaja Pateshwari Parshad Singh, v. A.S Gilani, .

1. This appeal is directed against a decree for Rs. 18,000/- granted in favour of the plaintiff-respondent against the defendant-appellant.

2. According to the allegations of the plaintiff he was appointed in the year 1923 as agricultural adviser of the Balrampur Estate belonging to the defendant with benefit of provident fund contribution by the U. P. Court of Wards and by the plaintiff. The Estate was released from the superintendence of the Court of Wards in the year 1937 and thereafter the defendant agreed to retain the plaintiff as agricultural adviser and he continued in service of the Estate.

The plaintiff was given an option either to continue to enjoy the benefit of the contributory provident fund as before or to agree to accept on retirement such pension as might be fixed by the defendant at the time of retirement

"or in default of such fixation, as may be permissible under the rules of the Raj on the condition of the plaintiff refunding the amount contributed by the Estate towards the provident fund"

(vide paragraph 4 of the plaint). The plaintiff opted for the second alternative and refunded Rs. 17,000/- odd which had been contributed by the Estate towards the provident fund and agreed to pension being given to him after his retirement.

In the year 1944 the plaintiff retired from the defendants service with his permission, and the defendant in pursuance of the agreement mentioned above, and also because the amount contributed by the Estate towards the provident fund had been refunded, fixed Rs. 500/- per mensem as the plaintiff's pension which was agreed to be paid wherever the plaintiff might be. The defendant had been paying the plaintiff's pension up to January 1951 when it was stopped.

The plaintiff instituted a suit for recovery of pension for the month of February 1951 amounting to Rs. 500/- in the Court of Judge, Small Causes, Simla, on 9-3-1953 in which issues were framed and decided and the suit was decreed. The plaintiff claimed that the aforesaid judgment operated as res judicata in the present case so far as all the points which had been decided previously were concerned. The plaintiff further alleged that a sum of Rs. 32,500/- was due from March 1951 to the end of July 1956 on account of the arrears of pension, but the plaintiff sued only for the recovery of Rs. 18,000/- as pension due from 1-8-1953 to 31-7-1956 and the balance of the claim was given up.

The suit was resisted by the defendant and a large number of pleas were raised which need not be stated in their entirety. It was denied that any contract had been made with the plaintiff for payment of the pension. According to the defendant, the sum of Rs. 17,000/- contributed out of the income of Balrampur Raj towards the provident fund was also paid to the plaintiff in 1944 at the time of his retirement with an additional amount of Rs. 8,000/-, the total being Rs. 25,000/, and this payment was ex gratia and an annuity of Rs. 500/- per mensem was further awarded purely "as a favour for such time as the defendant so wished."

The defendant also denied any personal liability to pay the pension to the employees of the Raj after the Raj had ceased to exist. It was, however, not admitted that the defendant was liable personally to make payment periodically of the sum of Rs. 500/- per mensem. According to the defendant, the alleged agreement was without consideration and unenforceable at law and the plaintiff's claim was barred by limitation. The defendant denied that the judgment given by the Court of Small Causes on 9-3-1953 operated as res judicata.

3. On the pleadings of the parties the trial Court framed the following preliminary issues:

1. Has this Court territorial jurisdiction to hear the suit?

2. Does the judgment dated 30-4-1954 in suit No. 23 of 1953 operate as res judicata? If so on what points?

3. Is the plaint not correctly valued for the purposes of court-fee? If so, what is the correct valuation?

All the issues were found in favour of the plain-tiff with the result that the suit was decreed. It would be best to state the conclusion of the trial Court in its own words--

In my opinion, the judgment dated 30-4-1954 operates as res judicata on all the points decided therein. No other point arises for decision in the present suit. The issue is accordingly decided in favour of the plaintiff.

4. It has been contended on behalf of the appellant that the previous judgment given by the Judge, Small Cause Court, Simla, could not operate as res judicata in the present case. The suit was for recovery of Rs. 500/- alleged to be due to the plaintiff on account of pension for the month of February 1951 and the allegations were practically the same as they are in the present suit.

It is submitted, however, that the present suit being for recovery of Rs. 18,000/- was beyond the jurisdiction of the Judge, Small Cause Court, and therefore, Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure could not apply. This matter was conceded even by the trial Court, but it proceeded to decide in favour of the plaintiff on the authority of Ishwar Datt v. General Assurance Society, Ltd., AIR 1937 Lah 346.

In that case Bhide J., had occasion to consider the applicability of the general principle of res judicata in cases where Section 11 of the Code did not apply. A suit had been instituted for about Rs. 109/- in the Small Cause Court claimed by way of commission. That suit had been dismissed on the finding that the plaintiff had violated the terms of the agreement.

Subsequently another suit was filed by the some person in the Court of Subordinate Judge, IVth Class for an account. It was not denied that the plaintiff's claim was based on the same agreement in both the suits. Bhide. J., observed as follows--

''But the principle of res judicata is of wider application, as pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in G. H. Hook v. Administrator-General of Bengal, ILR 48 Cal 499: (AIR 1921 PC 11); and Ram Chandra Rao v. Ramchandra Rao, ILR 45 Mad 320: (AIR 1922 PC 80). It has been: held to govern cases where the matter in issue is the same and has been previously decided by a competent Court. For instance, when a Court has exclusive jurisdiction to try any matter its decision on that point will operate as res judicata."

The learned Judge affirmed the decisions of the Courts below that the subsequent suit was barred in view of the principle referred to above. Bhide J., relied mainly on Velji Dayalji v. Nand Lal, AIR 1026 Sind 236, which was followed in Hemraj Har-nam Das v. Hargolal, AIR 1934 Sind 112, and reference was made by him to Champat v. Toti Bam, AIR 1934 Lah 324; Daulat Ram v. Munshi Ram, AIR 1932 Lah 623; and Mauj v. Sardara, AIR 1929 Lah 586.

5. In AIR 1926 Sind 236, Kennedy and Rup-chand Bilaram A. J. Cs., laid down that Section 11 of the Code was not exhaustive and the plea of res judicata was not limited to a judgment of a Court of concurrent jurisdiction being pleaded as a bar to the subsequent suit but it extended also to a judgment of a Court of exclusive jurisdiction. In that case also the previous judgment was of a Court of Small Causes.

The basis of the decision was that the Court of Small Causes was a Court of exclusive jurisdiction and, therefore, by the application of the wider provisions of res judicata it would have the force of finality, and any points decided by such Court would be conclusive in any subsequent litigation. In AIR 1934 Sind 112, Aston A. J. C., referred to several cases'but appears to have been influenced naturally by the strong opinion expressed in the earlier Bench decision of that Court, In AIR 1934 Lah 324, Hilton J., referred to the decision of the Sind Court in. AIR 1926 Sind 236, and observed that the Judgment of a Court of exclusive jurisdiction could operate as res judicata only on a matter which that Court could exclusively decide. In the case decided by him it was held by the learned Judge that the Small Cause Court had not exclusive jurisdiction to decide the question of title, nor to decide the character of the plaintiff or defendant's possession.

In AIR 1932 Lah 623, the question was whe-ther the decision of a revenue Court would operate as res judicata in a civil Court. It was held by Dalip Singh J., that a revenue. Court's decision was binding on the civil Court so far as the issue raised then was raised again. In AIR 1929 Lah 586, Shadi Lal C. J. and Broadway J., expressed the view that the decision of a revenue Court in matters in which it had exclusive jurisdiction would be res judicata in a subsequent suit in a civil Court.

In Hayat Mohammad v. Bar Gaushala Ltd., Lyallpur, AIR 1938 Lah 811, Skemp J., agreed with the view of Bhide J., that if a Small Cause Court decided a matter on which it had exclusive Jurisdiction, then that decision would be binding on subsequent Courts. In that case, however, the decision of the Small Cause Court on title in a suit for rent was not accepted to have the force of res judicata by the learned Judge in a subsequent suit for rent and ejectment on the ground that the prayer for ejectment took the suit away from the jurisdiction of the Court of Small Causes.

6. The learned counsel for the appellant does not and indeed cannot challenge the correctness of the view expressed in several English cases and in Smt. Raj Lakshmi Dasi v. Banamali Sen, AIR 1953 SC 33, that the condition regarding the competency, of the former Court to try the subsequent suit is one of the limitations engrafted on the general rule of res judicata by Section 11 of the Code and has application to suits alone and a plea of res judicata on general principles, can be successfully taken in respect of judgments of Courts of exclusive jurisdiction.

It is urged that a Small Cause Court is not a Court of exclusive jurisdiction but it is a Court of preferential jurisdiction and cannot be put in the same category as a Revenue Court, Land Acquisition Court, Administration Court, Insolvency Court, Guardian Court, Probate Court and the like. It is pointed out that Courts of exclusive jurisdiction are those which have been conferred exclusive powers to decide certain matters and a Court of Small Causes cannot be regarded to be such a Court as has exclusive jurisdiction to decide a particular matter.

It certainly has preferential jurisdiction with regard to certain suits where, such a Court exists; otherwise a suit which is of a Small Cause nature is triable by any civil Court of competent jurisdic-tion. By way of illustration it is pointed out that Courts of Small Causes in the Punjab State exist only in some places like Amritsar and Simla and have not been established anywhere else.

If the suit which was instituted by the present plaintiff at Simla on the previous occasion had been instituted anywhere else, it would have been cognizable by any Court of competent jurisdiction there. Even in Simla if the Court of Small Causes had not been established, the suit would have been triable by the Court having jurisdiction to try civil suits there. :

It is merely because a Court of Small Causes has been established there that the suit became cognizable and triable by it in accordance with the provisions contained in Section 16 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The suit filed by the plaintiff at Simla was cognizable by a Court of Small Causes there not because of "any matter" falling exclusively within the jurisdiction of a particular Court, but it became triable by the Court of Small Causes as the same existed there and it had to be given preference.

Reference in this connection has been made to certain decisions in which the view has' been taken that Small Cause Court has preferential juris diction only and its decisions cannot operate as res judicata for the purposes of other suits which if was not competent to try. In Dulare Lal v. Hazari Lal, AIR 1914 All 229, Sunder Lal J., held that a Small Cause suit which was transferred to a Mun-

sif retained its character as such and no appeal lay against the decision of the Munsif in such a suit, nor could his decision operate as res judicata for purposes of other suits not cognizable by the Court of Small Causes.

Similarly in Shakira Bibi v. Nandan Rai, AIR 1922 All 241, Stuart J., considered that a judgment did not operate as res judicata where the Munsif in his capacity of an officer hearing a suit of a small cause court nature was not competent to by the later suit. In Ghulappa v. Raghavendra, ILR 28 Bom 338, Jenkins C. J. and Betty J., considered that a Court of Small Causes was a Court of preferential jurisdiction. In Mohini Mohan Roy v. Ramadas Paramhansa, AIR 1924 Cal 487, Rankin and Ghosh JJ., held that if a later suit was not of a Small Cause nature, a decree for money made in a previous suit instituted in the Small Cause Court did not operate as res judicata.

In Madhorao v. Amrit Hao, AIR 1918 Nag 163, the view that has been expressed is that the decision of a Subordinate Judge in a previous suit is res judicata in a subsequent small cause suit between the same parties inasmuch the inability of the Subordinate Judge to entertain a claim of a Small Cause nature arises not from the incompetence but from the existence of another Court with a pre-ferential jurisdiction.

The Nagpur Court followed the view of Jen-kins C. J. in ILR 28 Rom 338. In Raja Simhadri Appa Row v. Ramachandrudu, ILR 27 Mad 63, the question was whether the decision of the Court of Appeal in an original suit on the file of the Dis-trict Munsif with regard to the rate of rent was res judicata in a subsequent suit. Boddan and Bhashyam Ayyangar JJ. made the following observations--

"Under the Small Cause Courts Act a suit cognizable by a Small Cause Court is not to be instituted and tried by an ordinary civil Court if, and so long as, within the local limits of its jurisdiction a Small Cause Court is established competent to take cognizance of such small cause suit."

A Full Bench of the same Court in Avanasi Goun-den v. Nachammal, ILR 29 Mad 195, overruled this authority, but that was on a different point. In Afzal Husain v. Mahmood Husain, AIR 1943 Oudh 449, it has been observed that Section 16 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act only provides that a suit cognizable by a Court' of Small Causes shall not be tried by any other Court having jurisdiction.

It does not take away the jurisdiction of that Court. It is similar to Section 15, Civil Procedure Code, which provides that every suit shall be instituted in the Court of the lowest grade competent to try it. Similarly, in U. K. Seal v. Aramugam Chettyar, AIR 1938 Rang 25, Dunkley J., was of the view that the character of the suit was not altered by the mode in which it was tried.

It was further laid down by him that the effect of the provisions of section 16 was not to deprive the regular Court altogether of jurisdiction in suits cognizable by a Court of Small Causes, but merely to prevent the exercise of that jurisdiction by the regular Court so long as there was a Court of Small Causes having jurisdiction within the same local limits.

In ILR 29 Mad 195, the question was whether the decision upon a matter which was directly and substantially in issue between the same parties in a suit, which, though tried by the District Munsif as an original suit was yet one of a small cause nature and, therefore, in which no second appeal lay, was binding in respect of the same matter in a subsequent suit in which a second appeal lay. After considering a large number of authorities taking divergent views the observations of a Full Bench consisting of five judges at page 199 were as follows:

"Those learned Judges who hold, that in cases like the present, the decision in the earlier suit operates as res judicata take the view that the language of the section is satisfied when the Court deciding the first suit was competent to try the subsequent suit, irrespective of the question whether the earlier decision was or was not subject to the same appeal as the decision in the subsequent suit would be, and that a different interpretation would be straining the language of the legislature.

Those learned Judges on the other hand who take the opposite view consider that the Words "of jurisdiction competent" in the section admit of the provisions of law relating to appealability being considered in giving effect to the principle of estop-pel which the section is intended to enforce and that, having regard to the difference in the grades of the Courts administering justice in this Country and the qualifications of Judges which differ greatly, it is better not to tie down, as far as posi-sible. Courts of higher jurisdiction by the deci-sions of inferior Courts.

Sir Barnes Peacock in the decision in Mt. Edun v. Mt. Bechun, 8 Suth WR 175, which is referred to by the Judicial Committee in Misser Raghubar-dial v. Sheo Baksh Singh, ILR 9 Cal. 439, as the leading case, and the Judicial Committee Itself in that case lay much stress upon the said difference in the grades of Courts and the qualifications of Judges in connection with the question of estoppel by judgment, and the Committee further observe that although it may be desirable to put an end to liti-gation the inefficiency of many of the Indian Courts makes it advisable not to be too stringent in preventing a litigant from proving the truth of his case."

Thus, various previous decisions including, ILR 27 Mad 63, were overruled and it was held that the decision in the former suit did not operate as res judicata and the fact that the former suit was one of a small cause nature prevented the decision therein from operating as res judicata in the present suit. The view expressed by the Full Bench, based as it is on very good reasoning, commends itself a great deal to us.

There can be no doubt that while considering the applicability of the principle of res judicata the provisions relating to appealability, must also be kept in view.

7. On giving the matter our best consideration we are of the opinion that a Court of Small Causes cannot be regarded to be a Court of ex-elusive jurisdiction in the sense in which that expression is employed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in AIR 1953 SC 33. It is note worthy that in the illustrations given by their Lord-ships a reference has been made to the Revenue Courts, Land Acquisition Courts, Administration Courts, etc. These Courts have exclusive jurisdiction over a particular subject-matter. The Court of Small Causes can only be regarded to be a Court of pre-ferential jurisdiction in the sense in which Jenkins C. J. employed those words in ILR 28 Bom 338, In the present case the suit was tried by the Court of Small Causes because it existed there and because of its establishment it came to have the sole jurisdiction to entertain that suit.

It was not that the suit was entertainable only by such Court because "the matter" covered by the previous suit was triable by it alone in the same way as a probate or acquisition matter would be entertainable only by a Probate Court or Acquisi-tion Court. Here the matter was such that it was triable by any Court of competent jurisdiction and it was tried by the Court of Small Causes as it was competent to try and entertain it by virtue of the provisions contained in the statute.

If any other view is taken, it would also lead to strange and absurd results. It would be open then for a plaintiff to get suits of very large amounts which are triable by a Subordinate Judge on the regular side and against which an appeal lies to superior Court as of right decided by a Court of Small Causes by first instituting a suit which would lie to and can be entertained by that Court and against which only a revision would be competent and no appeal would lie.

For instance in the present case there we several points of importance which have to be adjudicated upon. By adopting the device of filing a suit for Rs. 500/- in the Court of Small Causes the plaintiff cannot be allowed to have those points adjudicated once and for all by a Court which from its very nature and the scheme of the provincial Small Cause Courts Act is not expected to decide such matters.

The object of the aforesaid statute is to have a speedy decision in suits which do not exceed Rs. 1,000/- in valuation. In order to give finality to that decision no appeal has been provided against the decrees made by the Court of Small Causes except in matters covered by Section 24 and only a revision is competent to this Court for the purposes of satisfying itself that the decree or order made by the aforesaid Court was according to law.

Schedule II read with Section 15 excepts a large number of suits from the cognizance of a Court of Small Causes. Surely the intention of the legislature was not to confer powers on such Courts for decision of important matters. There can thus be no escape from the conclusion that in the present case the Court below was in error in considering that the previous decision of the Court of Small Causes operated as res judicata on account of the reasons given by Bhide J., in AIR 1937 Lah 846.

The entire basis of that decision is that such a Court is one of exclusive jurisdiction. Once that basis disappears, this case will have to be considered with reference to the provisions of Section 11 of the Code only. It is not disputed that under Section 11 the previous decision of the Simla Court cannot operate as res judicata so far as the present suit is concerned.

8. The learned counsel for the appellant also challenged the finding of the Court below on issue No. 1 and contended that that issue has also been decided in favour of the plaintiff because of the previous judgment which was considered to have the force of res judicata. As we are reversing the judgment of the trial Court on that point the finding on issue No. 1 is also hereby set aside.

9. For the reasons given above, this appeal if allowed and the decree of the Court below is set aside. The suit is remanded for a decision in accordance with law.

10. The parties have been directed to appear Before the trial Court on 4-5-59. The costs will abide the final event.

Gosain, J.

11. I agree.

Maharaja Pateshwari Parshad Singh, v. A.S Gilani, .

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

Defendant's Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Maharaja Pateshwari Parshad Singh, v. A.S Gilani, .

Comments