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  • Article 227 of the Constitution of India and section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Constitution or this Act or the Government of Part C States Act, 1951 (49 of 1951); or(b) ****(c)
  • Article 227 of the Constitution.7. Rule 2 of Order 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 116 of the Code of Civil Procedure or Article 227 of the Constitution
  • provisions of section 123(7) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
  • SECTION 36 REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE ACT 1951
  • provisions of rule 2 of Order 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • provisions of Order 14 rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • section 123(7) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951
  • SECTION 100 REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE ACT 1951
  • provisions of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 100
  • rule 2 of Order 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • provisions of the Constitution or of this Act
  • section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • ARTICLE 227 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • SECTION 115 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE ACT 1951
  • provisions of section 100(1)(d)(iv)
  • provisions of Order 14 rule 2
  • provisions of sub-section (2),
  • provisions of rule 2
  • rule 2 of Order 14
  • section 100(1)(c)
  • Order 14 rule 2
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Article 227 of the Constitution of India and section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Constitution or this Act or the Government of Part C States Act, 1951 (49 of 1951); or(b) ****(c)
  • Article 227 of the Constitution.7. Rule 2 of Order 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 116 of the Code of Civil Procedure or Article 227 of the Constitution
  • provisions of section 123(7) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
  • SECTION 36 REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE ACT 1951
  • provisions of rule 2 of Order 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • provisions of Order 14 rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • section 123(7) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951
  • SECTION 100 REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE ACT 1951
  • provisions of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 100
  • rule 2 of Order 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • provisions of the Constitution or of this Act
  • section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • ARTICLE 227 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • SECTION 115 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE ACT 1951
  • provisions of section 100(1)(d)(iv)
  • provisions of Order 14 rule 2
  • provisions of sub-section (2),
  • provisions of rule 2
  • rule 2 of Order 14
  • section 100(1)(c)
  • Order 14 rule 2
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenges an order of an Election Tribunal refusing to decide certain preliminary questions of law under rule 2 of Order 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The factual matrix as set out in the opinion:

  • S. Partap Singh Kairon (Chief Minister of Punjab) was elected member of the Punjab Legislative Assembly from the Sarhali Constituency, defeating S. Gurmej Singh by a large majority.
  • On 11 April 1957 S. Gurmej Singh presented an election petition challenging the election on multiple grounds, including (1) that the Returning Officer improperly rejected the nomination paper filed by Santa Singh, and (2) that S. Partap Singh obtained assistance from lambardars in furtherance of his election prospects.
  • S. Partap Singh controverted these allegations and argued, inter alia, that Santa Singh's nomination had not been improperly rejected and that the office of lambardar was not covered by section 123(7) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
  • The Election Tribunal framed several issues, including Issue No. 3 (competence to raise objection about Santa Singh's rejected nomination / whether it was improperly rejected) and Issue No. 8 (whether a lambardar is a person in the service of Government under section 123(7)).
  • S. Partap Singh asked that Issues Nos. 3 and 8 be decided as preliminary issues under rule 2 of Order 14, which the Tribunal declined to do.
  • S. Partap Singh petitioned the High Court under Article 227 and section 151 CPC asking that the election petition be dismissed without trial and that the Tribunal's order declining to decide the preliminary questions be quashed. The Court heard argument from Mr. C.K. Daphtary for the petitioner and Mr. Anand Sarup for the respondent.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Are the provisions of rule 2 of Order 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure mandatory?
  2. Can the whole case or any part thereof be disposed of on Issues Nos. 3 and 8 (i.e., are those issues pure questions of law that will dispose of the case or part of it)?
  3. If the answers to the first two questions are affirmative, have grounds been shown that justify interference by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant / Petitioner (S. Partap Singh) — as presented by Mr. C.K. Daphtary

  • Requested that the two points (Issue Nos. 3 and 8) be disposed of as preliminary points under rule 2 of Order 14 because their decision would substantially dispose of the whole action or at least a substantial part of it.
  • Argued (as reflected in the opinion) that, on the pleadings, Santa Singh's nomination was not improperly rejected and that the office of lambardar was not within the scope of "person in the service of Government" under section 123(7), so these legal points should be determined first.

Respondent (S. Gurmej Singh) — as presented by Mr. Anand Sarup

  • Admitted that where a point of law is decisive of litigation the Court is at liberty to use the facilities of rule 2 of Order 14, but contended that the rule places no obligation on the Court to do so; it leaves the presiding officer discretion to decide whether circumstances justify deciding the point as a preliminary issue.
  • Urged reconciliation between two principles: (a) appellate courts and lower courts should, where possible, decide all important issues to avoid fragmentary decisions; and (b) where pure issues of law can be decided without evidence and go to the root of the case, such issues should be tried first.
  • Contended further (in submissions cited in the opinion) that the election might be void under section 100(1)(d)(iv) if the result was materially affected by non-compliance with the Constitution or the Act, and advanced arguments concerning the scope of that provision (though the Court described the respondent as unable to point to any rule or provision that the Returning Officer had failed to comply with).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Union of India v. Govind Ram (A.I.R. 1956 Hyd. 62) Example cited for proposition that a court is at liberty to take advantage of rule 2 when a point of law is decisive; supports the view that discretion exists. The opinion records this authority as part of the respondent's argument that rule 2 does not impose an absolute obligation to decide preliminary legal issues first.
Lachmi Narain Singh v. Rap Narain (85 I.C. 29) Cited with other authority to support the respondent's proposition about discretionary refusal to decide preliminary issues. Placed by the opinion among authorities that, according to respondent's counsel, indicated discretion in refusing to decide preliminary points.
Gobind Ram v. Chuni Lal (119 I.C. 330) Privy Council authorities cited for the general principle that lower courts should pronounce on all important points and avoid fragmentary decisions. Used in the opinion to demonstrate the tension between avoiding piecemeal decisions and deciding controlling legal issues first.
Mahomed Solaiman v. Kumar Birendra Chandra (74 I.C. 906 P.C.) Another Privy Council authority cited to support the general principle against fragmentary decisions. Referenced in the same context as other Privy Council authorities to show the competing principle.
Baga Mal v. Shib Parshad (120 I.C. 686) Privy Council authority cited regarding pronouncement on important points by lower courts. Referred to illustrate the general principle favouring comprehensive adjudication over fragmentary decisions.
Mahomed Sulaiman v. Birendra Chandra Singh (I.L.R. 50 Cal. 243) Privy Council authority cited in support of the same general principle about deciding all important points. Referenced as part of authorities the respondent relied on to show reluctance to decide points piecemeal.
Jagannatk Rao Dani v. Rambkarosa (A.I.R. 1933 P.C. 33) Privy Council authority cited concerning the desirability of lower courts pronouncing on important points. Used to illustrate the competing principle against piecemeal decisions raised by the respondent.
Rayarappan Nayanar v. Volia Madhavi (A.I.R. 1950 F.C. 140) Authority cited in the same group concerning comprehensive decision-making by lower courts. Referenced by the opinion as one of the decisions illustrating the general principle advanced by respondent's counsel.
Jankidas v. Kalu Ram (162 I.C. 486) Shows that the Court may exercise judgment and discretion to harmonise general principle and rule 2; also cited for requirement that discretion be exercised according to proper principles and on reasonable material. Used by the Court to support the proposition that although rule 2 permits consideration, discretion must be exercised according to established principles; also cited for the requirement that opinions be expressed on reasonable material.
Shanta Nand Gir v. Basudeva (A.I.R. 1934 All. 986) Held that refusal to take up question of law first is not a distinct proceeding for revision under section 115. Referred to as one of the decisions the respondent relied upon; the Court noted it but treated it as not decisive on the present issue concerning rule 2.
Union Ram Ram Sarup v. Ghasi Ram-Sohan Lal (A.I.R. 1933 All. 753) Cited supporting the view that where conditions for rule 2 exist the court must decide legal issues first. Relied upon by the Court to demonstrate earlier authority for compelling trial courts to decide preliminary legal issues where those issues may dispose of the case.
Sher Singh Kahan Singh v. Ajmer Singh (A.I.R. 1954 Pepsu 9) Authority where trial court declined to decide pure questions of law as preliminary issues and higher court required decision as preliminary issues under Order 14 rule 2. Used by the Court as precedent supporting mandatory application of rule 2 when conditions are met.
T. Ganapathia Pillai v. ??? Pillai (A.I.R. 1950 Mad. 213) Cited as authority that the Court may determine whether the case can be disposed of on issues of law only. Placed by the opinion among authorities illustrating that trial courts have the function to decide whether disposal on legal issues only is possible.
P.C. Gangulee v. Sm. Kadhuri Devi (A.I.R. 1952 Patna 281) Cited for the principle that refusal to decide a pure question of law as preliminary is not justified and is subject to interference in revision. Relied on by the Court in support of the proposition that an order refusing to decide a preliminary legal issue can be interfered with.
Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh (1955 1 S.C.R. 267) Explained that where qualification does not appear on the face of nomination paper or electoral roll, the Returning Officer acts only when objection is raised; acceptance is improper only where defect apparent or enquiry made but wrongly decided. The Court relied on the passage quoted from this case to explain when a Returning Officer's acceptance or rejection can be said to be improper under section 100(1)(c).
Pandyan Insurance Co. Ltd. v. K.J. Khambatta (A.I.R. 1955 Bom. 241) Cited for the proposition that High Courts may interfere where an inferior court exercises discretion otherwise than in accordance with established principles. Used by the Court to support the proposition that arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion by a tribunal justifies interference under supervisory jurisdiction.
Brunner Mercantile Co. v. Rodgin (1912 130 La. 358) Cited to characterize the supervisory power as enabling a superior court to examine and correct tribunals; part of exposition of Article 227's nature. Quotations from American authorities including this case were used to describe the breadth and purpose of supervisory control under Article 227 as understood by the Court.
State ex rel. Helena v. Helena Water Works Co. (1911 43 Mont. 169) Cited in the discussion of supervisory power being used to prevent injustice or wilful disregard of law. Used in the opinion as part of a group of American authorities explaining the nature and limits of supervisory power.
State ex rel North American L. Ins Co. v. District Court (1934 97 Mont. 523) Cited to describe supervisory power as summary and concerned with substance and need for speedy relief. Referred to as part of the comparative law exposition on the scope of supervisory power.
Item Co. v. Nu Grape Bottling Co. (1926 La. 631) Cited to illustrate that supervisory power is not limited by forms of procedure; only restrained by discretion of superior court. Used in the opinion's description of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227.
Thomas v. Doughty (1927 163 La. 213) Cited to show that supervisory courts look to substance and need for speedy relief rather than technical form. Part of the opinion's discussion on the character of supervisory power.
State ex rel Regis v. District Court (1936 102 Mont. 74) Cited for the principle that supervisory power may prevent extended and needless litigation. Quoted to support the Court's view that supervisory jurisdiction serves to prevent unnecessary continuation of proceedings.
Keiffe v. La Salle Realty Co. (1927 163 La. 824) Included among authorities describing supervisory power and its objectives. Used in the comparative exposition of supervisory jurisdiction.
State ex rel Red River Brick Corporation v. District Court (1912 24 N.T. 28) Cited as part of the authorities showing supervisory power is directed primarily to inferior tribunals. Referred to in the opinion's survey of supervisory jurisdiction principles.
Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee (A.I.R. 1951 Cal. 193) Cited for the view that supervisory jurisdiction should be resorted to sparingly and only in appropriate cases; referred when discussing limits on Article 227. Used to illustrate the limited and exceptional character of supervisory relief.
Waryam Singh v. Amarnath (A.I.R. 1954 S.O. 215) Cited among Indian authorities that supervisory power should be used sparingly and to keep subordinate courts within bounds. Referenced in the opinion's description of when Article 227 may be exercised.
Shivsingh v. Harjiram (A.I.R. 1957 Rajasthan 39) Cited as an authority where supervisory jurisdiction was exercised because the tribunal did not act in accordance with law or exceeded its authority. Used in the opinion to illustrate circumstances warranting supervisory interference.
Duffin v. Field (1925 208 Ky. 543) Cited to set out the situations where inferior courts should be prohibited from proceeding and supervisory relief is appropriate. Quoted in the opinion's exposition on the tests for issuing supervisory relief.
State ex rel Spinazza v. District Court (1929 83 Mont. 511) Cited for the settled law that supervisory writ issues only when certain stringent conditions are met (erroneous, arbitrary, gross injustice, irreparable injury, no other remedy). Used by the Court to articulate the standard for interference under supervisory jurisdiction.
Pickus v. Perry (1931 59 S.D. 350) Cited to emphasize that supervisory power is an ultimate safeguard to be used in extraordinary situations and not as routine procedure. Referred to in support of the proposition that supervisory power must be used prudently and sparingly.
Re Pierca-Arrow Motor Car Co. (reported authority) Summarised in the opinion as stating general principles governing supervisory jurisdiction: grave exigency required, not a substitute for appeal, plain duty, extraordinary hardship, remedy by appeal inadequate, prompt application required. Quoted to summarize the established principles governing the exercise of supervisory power.
Ray Nicholas Lines v. All India Spinners Association (1947 Pat. 185) Cited for the proposition that section 115 gives discretionary powers to High Courts and they will not usually interfere if another remedy exists. Referred to by the Court in recounting authorities relied upon by the respondent; Court noted its limited relevance to rule 2.
Bai Shri Manharba Chawprajwala v. Dhadhal Raning Amrabha (A.I.R. 1955 N.U.C. 4092) Cited as an unreported decision where refusal to decide a jurisdictional preliminary issue was held not to attract revision; the opinion notes facts not detailed in the report. Mentioned among other authorities relied on by respondent; the Court observed that the facts made that authority of limited relevance.
Tansvkhrai v. Chatur Bhuj (A.I.R. 1955 N.U.C. Ajmer 4781) Cited for the proposition that refusal to decide a question of jurisdiction as a preliminary issue does not amount to illegal exercise of jurisdiction in every case. Noted by the Court as one of the authorities relied on by the respondent but of limited applicability given the present facts.
C. Janardanan v. N.M. Verghese (A.I.R. 1925 Mad. 707) Cited where High Court intervened because a lower court would have been exercising jurisdiction not vested in it and pursuing proceedings would lead to waste of time. Used to illustrate circumstances where higher court interference was warranted to prevent wasteful proceedings.
Udmi Ram v. Ghasi Ram (authority cited) Cited to support that trial court should decide whether a case can be disposed of on issues of law first and if so it must decide them. Used by the Court as supporting authority for mandatory decision of preliminary legal issues when conditions are met.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court conducted a step-by-step legal analysis addressing the three questions framed at the outset:

  1. On the mandatory nature of rule 2, the Court examined the wording of rule 2 of Order 14: "Where issues both of law and of fact arise ... it shall try those issues first ..." The Court reasoned that the use of the word "shall" in a statutory provision addressed to a Court carries an imperative meaning unless context indicates otherwise. The Court found nothing in the context or purpose of the rule suggesting that "shall" was intended to be directory. It observed established interpretive principles (including that in some contexts "may" can acquire the meaning of "shall") and concluded that rule 2 is mandatory in operation when its conditions are met.
  2. The Court distinguished the single discretion that remains: the trial Court has discretion to form an honest judicial opinion whether the case or any part thereof can be disposed of on issues of law only. That is, the Court may assess factual and legal clarity (e.g., whether the objection is clear-cut, whether the question raises mixed questions of law and fact, whether material facts are disputed) but if, on reasonable material, the tribunal concludes that clear legal issues exist which will substantially dispose of the whole or part of the action, it has no discretion to refuse to decide them first.
  3. The Court then examined whether Issues Nos. 3 and 8 are such clear-cut legal issues. On Issue No. 3 (competence to raise objection to the rejected nomination / whether it was improperly rejected), the Court analyzed the textual provisions of section 100(1)(c) and related sections (section 36 and the conclusive nature of the electoral roll) and quoted from Durga Shankar Mehta to explain when a Returning Officer's acceptance/rejection is "improper." The Court concluded it was not necessary for it to decide whether the Returning Officer's decision was right on the facts; rather, it sufficed that Issue No. 3 is a legal question the decision of which at a preliminary stage is likely to dispose of part of the case.
  4. On Issue No. 8 (whether a lambardar is "in the service of Government" under section 123(7)), the Court observed this is a question of law susceptible of decision by reference to statutes, rules and documents of which judicial notice can be taken. The Court concluded that a favourable decision on this issue for the objecting party would dispose of a part of the case.
  5. Considering whether interference under Article 227 was justified, the Court surveyed principles governing supervisory power. It described Article 227 as analogous to the supervisory power of the Court of King's Bench and relied on a range of authorities (including American precedents) to set out the exceptional, summary and preventive nature of supervisory jurisdiction. The opinion recited the tests for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction: that it be used sparingly, only when other remedies are inadequate or would result in great injustice, where the inferior tribunal acted arbitrarily, capriciously, exceeded authority, or refused to exercise jurisdiction according to law.
  6. Applying those tests to the facts, the Court found abundant material showing two clear and distinct issues of law had arisen and that the Tribunal's refusal to treat them as preliminary issues amounted to arbitrary and capricious exercise of discretion, not in accordance with judicial principles. The Court concluded that failure to intervene would impose extraordinary hardship and expense on the petitioner, defeat the legislative intention that election petitions be disposed of expeditiously, and leave no plain, speedy or adequate remedy other than exercise of Article 227.
  7. Consequently, the Court exercised its supervisory power to set aside the Tribunal's order and directed that Issues Nos. 3 and 8 be decided as preliminary issues.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is accepted; the order of the Election Tribunal declining to decide preliminary issues is set aside, and Issues Nos. 3 and 8 are directed to be decided as preliminary issues.

Direct implications for the parties:

  • The Election Tribunal's order refusing to decide the two specified preliminary questions of law is quashed.
  • The Tribunal is directed to decide Issues Nos. 3 and 8 as preliminary issues in accordance with rule 2 of Order 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • The petitioner (S. Partap Singh) obtains immediate relief by way of supervisory intervention under Article 227; the Court found no plain, speedy or adequate alternative remedy by appeal at that stage.

Broader implications: The opinion articulates and applies the legal principle that rule 2 of Order 14 is mandatory when its conditions are satisfied: a tribunal must decide pure questions of law first if, in honest judicial judgment and on reasonable material, it finds those issues will dispose of the whole or part of the case. The Court emphasises that the remaining discretion is limited to forming that honest view on reasonable material and that discretion cannot be used to decline the mandatory duty once the conditions for rule 2 are satisfied. The Court also underscores that supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 is an extraordinary remedy to be used sparingly but is available where inferior tribunals exercise discretion arbitrarily or capriciously and other remedies are inadequate.


Disposition recorded in the opinion: "Petition accepted." (Chopra, J. concurred.)

    The Hon'Ble S. Partap Singh Kairon v. S. Gurmej Singh .

    Bhandari, C.J:— This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India raises the question whether an Election Tribunal is justified in declining to determine certain preliminary questions of law under the provisions of Order 14 rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure which if decided in favour of the party objecting would dispense with any further trial or at any rate with the trial of some substantial issue in the case.

    2. S. Partap Singh Kairon, Chief Minister of the Punjab, was elected a member of the Punjab Legislative Assembly from the Sarhali Constituency of the Amritsar district defeating his rival candidate S. Gurmej Singh by a majority of over 20,000 votes. On the 11th April, 1957 S. Gurmej Singh presented an election petition in which he challenged the election of S. Partap Singh on a number of grounds among others being (1) that the nomination paper filed by one Santa Singh was improperly rejected by the Returning Officer, and (2) that S. Partap Singh had obtained the assistance of latnbardars for the furtherance of the prospects of his election.

    3. S. Partap Singh controverted these allegations and prayed that the election petition be rejected as the nomination paper of Santa Singh was not improperly rejected and as the office of lambardar is not covered by the provisions of section 123(7) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. In view of the pleadings of the parties the Election Tribunal framed a number of issues, including issues Nos. 3 and 8 which were in the following terms:—

    “3. Is it competent for the petitioner to raise any objection at this stage that the nomination paper filed by Santa Singh should not have been rejected by the Returning Officer? Was the same improperly rejected?

    4. Is a lambardar a person in the service of Government under section 123(7) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951?”

    4. S. Partap Singh stated that these two points should be disposed of as preliminary points in accordance with the provisions of rule 2 of Order 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure as they would substantially dispose of the whole action. The Election Tribunal declined to accede to this request.

    5. S. Partap Singh has now presented a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure in which he prays that the election petition filed by S. Gurmej Singh may be dismissed without its trial on facts and merits and that the order of the Election Tribunal declining to decide the preliminary questions of law be quashed. This petition has come up for hearing before us and has been argued with conspicuous ability by Mr. C.K Daphtary on behalf of the petitioner and Mr. Anand Sarup on behalf of the respondent.

    6. Three questions arise for decision in the present case, namely (1) Are the provisions of rule 2 of Order 14 mandatory? (2) Can the case or any part thereof be disposed of on issues Nos. 3 and 8? and (3) If the answers to the first two questions are in the affirmative, have any grounds been made out which would justify interference by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution.

    7. rule 2 of Order 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure is in the following terms:—

    “2. Where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the Court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on the issues of law only, it shall try those issues first, and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit postpone the settlement of the issues of fact until after the issues of law have been determined.”

    8. Mr. Anand Sarup, who appears for S. Gurmej Singh, admits that where a point of law which if decided one way is going to be decisive of litigation, the Court is at liberty to take advantage of the facilities afforded by this rule, but he contends that the rule places no obligation on the Court to do so and leaves it to the presiding officer to decide for himself whether circumstances exist in such particular case calling for the exercise of that power (Union of India v. Govind Ram . A.I.R 1956 Hyd. 62., Lachmi Narain Singh v. Rap Narain . 85 I.C 29.). He submits that it is the duty of the Court to reconcile two somewhat conflicting and mutually contradictory principles. The first is that in appealable cases the Court should as far as possible decide on all the issues joined, for their Lordships of the Privy Council have pointed out repeatedly that lower Courts should pronounce their opinions on all important points as fragmentary decisions of a case are most inconvenient and tend to delay the administration of justice (Gobind Ram v. Chuni Lal . 119 I.C 330., Mahomed Solaiman v. Kumar Birendra Chandra . 74 I.C 906 P.C. Baga Mal v. Shib Parshad . 120 I.C 686., Mahomed Sulaiman v. Birendra Chandra Singh . I.L.R 50 Cal. 243., Jagannatk Rao Dani v. Rambkarosa . A.I.R 1933 P.C 33., Rayarappan Nayanar v. Volia Madhavi . A.I.R 1950 F.C 140.). The second is that where issues of law going to the root of the whole case and capable of being decided without evidence arise, the Court should try those issues first.

    9. In order to maintain harmony between the general principle that it is undesirable to try cases piecemeal and the specific and wholesome provisions of Order 14 rule 2 that certain points of law which are decisive of the matters in controversy between the parties should be dealt with as a preliminary point, it is open to the Court to exercise its own judgment and discretion (Jankidas v. Kalu Ram . 162 I.C 486.). A party to the litigation is not at liberty to claim as of right that the Court should decide questions of law in the first instance (Shanta Nand Gir v. Basudeva . A.I.R 1934 All. 986.).

    10. I regret with all respect to the very learned Judges on whose opinion the above argument is based, that I am unable to concur in the view that even if a case or a part thereof can be decided on a preliminary point of law the Court has a discretion to say that it shall not be so decided. Rule 2 provides that if the Court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on the issues of law only it shall decide those issues first. Where the word “shall” is used in a statute the presumption is that its use is imperative and not merely directory, particularly when it is addressed to a Court or a public servant and when a right or benefit depends on its imperative use. Indeed, it has been held that in such circumstances even the expression “may” may acquire the meaning of the expression “shall”. There is nothing in the context or manifest purpose of the rule to indicate that the Legislature did not intend to use the word “shall” appearing in rule 2 as a word of command. It seems to me therefore that when the Court is of opinion that an objection raises a serious question of law which, if decided in favour of the party objecting, would dispense with any further trial or at any rate with the trial of some substantial issue in the action, it has no option but to decide that issue first (Union Ram Ram Sarup v. Ghasi Ram-Sohan Lal . A.I.R 1933 All. 753., Sher Singh Kahan Singh v. Ajmer Singh . A.I.R 1954 Pepsu 9.). It has discretion to determine whether the case or any part thereof can or cannot be disposed of on issues of law only (T. Ganapathia Pillai v. ??? Pillai . A.I.R 1950 Mad. 213.). It may hold, for example, that the objection in point of law is not clear and explicit, or that the allegation wears a doubtful aspect or that it raises a mixed question of law and fact, or that the matter is one which by reason of the obscurity either of the fats or if law ought to be decided at the conclusion of the trial, or that the facts are in dispute, or that a vital and undetermined question of fact is presented. In such a case the Court may decline to determine the points of law as points of law. If, however, clear cut issues of law are presented and there are no matters on which further light would be thrown at the trial and the decision on the points of law will substantially dispose of the whole or a part of the action, it has no discretion in the matter. It has discretion indeed to determine whether the case or any part thereof can or cannot be disposed of on issues of law only, but if it finds in the exercise of its own honest judgment and discretion that it can, it must decide those issues first. It cannot decline to decide those issues on extraneous grounds, for example that piecemeal decision of suits is not desirable or that the Representation of the People Act, 1951, requires that election petitions should be disposed of expeditiously. The Court has discretion to determine whether the occasion for the exorcise of the power has arisen but if it holds that the occasion has arisen, it has no discretion to decline to exercise that power (Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, Tenth Edition, page 249). This conclusion flows from the commonsense principle that where power is conferred on a Court or tribunal and its exercise is made mandatory on the existence of certain conditions, and those conditions exist in fact, it has no discretion as to whether in good faith or otherwise the power shall be exercised. I am of the opinion that the provisions of rule 2 are mandatory and that the only discretion left to the Court is to form and express an opinion as to whether the case can be disposed of on the issues of law (P.C Gangulee v. Sm. Kadhuri Devi . A.I.R 1952 Patna 281., Jankidas v. Kalu Ram, Udmi Ram v. Ghasi Ram, Sher Singh Kahan Singh v. Ajmer Singh). The opinion must, however, be expressed on reasonable material (Jankidas v. Kalu Ram). The Tribunal has not said in the present case that these two issue are not issues of law or that their decision will not put an end to the case.

    11. The question now arises whether the case or any part thereof can be disposed of on issues Nos. 3 and 8 Issue No. 3 runs as follows:—

    “3. Is it competent for the petitioner to raise any objection at this stage that the nomination paper filed by Santa Singh should not have been rejected by the Returning Officer? Was the same improperly rejected?”

    12. The relevant portions of section 100 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, are as follows:—

    “100. (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), if the Tribunal is of opinion—

    (a) that on the date of his election a returned candidate was not qualified, or was disqualified, to be chosen to fill the seat under the Constitution or this Act or the Government of Part C States Act, 1951 (49 of 1951); or

    (b) ****

    (c) that any nomination has been improperly rejected; or

    (d) that the result of the election, in so far as it concerns a returned candidate, has been materially affected—

    (i) ****

    (ii) ****

    (iii) ****

    (iv) by any non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution or of this Act or any rules or orders made under this Act,

    the Tribunal shall declare the election of the returned candidate to be void.”

    13. It is common ground that the provisions of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 100 are not applicable to this cane and that the validity of the election can be challenged only on the basis of clause (c) or clause (d)(iv) of the said sub-section. Mr. Daphtary contends that the facts and circumstances of the present case make it quite clear that the nomination has not been improperly rejected. It appears that S. Santa Singh filed his nomination paper on the 29th January, 1957 in which he stated that he had completed 34 years of age. The nomination paper came up for scrutiny before the Returning Officer on the 1st February, 1967. An objection was promptly raised on behalf of S. Partap Singh that S. Santa Singh candidate was shown to be 24 years of age in the electoral roll, that he had not attainted the age of 25 even on the date of the scrutiny and that as the minimum age for a candidate is 25 he was not entitled to be nominated. The Returning Officer found that the age of Santa Singh was stated in the electoral roll to be 24, that there was no entry in the supplementary electoral roll showing any correction in the age of the candidate, that neither the candidate nor any of his supporters had appeared to refute the objection which had been taken and that the statement appearing in the nomination paper that he had attained the age of 34 had not been substantiated. He accordingly proceeded to make the following order:—

    “The candidate was given due notice of the date and time of scrutiny, but neither he himself nor his election agent, nor his proposer and nor any other person duly authorised by him has attended the scrutiny. The objection therefore stands unrebutted. It is clearly mentioned in Chapter 2 para 7 page 10 of the. Hand Book for candidates, that if the age of any candidate is near the legal minimum and there is a charge of an objection being raised by a rival candidate he should arm himself with a sufficient proof of his age, but the candidate on any person authority to appear on his behalf has not appeared and furnished any proof of his age. Article 173 of the Constitution clearly lays down that a person shall not be qualified to be chosen to fill a seat in the Legislative Assembly if he is less than 25 years of age. The said Santa Singh candidate, therefore, has not fulfilled the provisions of section 36 of the Representation of People Act, 1951, as modified up to August 1956 and as such, it is in my opinion a material defect.

    The question at once arises whether a nomination paper which has been rejected on these grounds can be said to have been improperly rejected. The expression “improper” means not suitable, unfit not suited to the character, time and place. When applied to human conduct “improper” is defined to be such conduct as a man of ordinary and reasonable care and prudence would not, under the circumstances, have been guilty of. It is not synonymous with the expression “illegal”, that is something unlawful or contrary to law (Words and Phrases Volume 20).

    Prima facie the Returning Officer's action in rejecting the nomination paper was not improper as on the date on which the order was made such rejection was a prop rejection. In Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh . 1955 1 S.C.R 267., their Lordships of the Supreme Court were called upon to decide whether the nomination of one Vasant Rao was improperly accepted by the Returning Officer. It was contended before their Lordships that the candidate was not qualified to fill the seat under the Constitution or the Act and that as the Returning Officer did not reject his nomination on this ground his act amounted to an improper acceptance of the nomination within the meaning of section 100(1)(c) of the statute. In repelling this contention their Lordships said:—

    “We do not think that this contention is sound. If the want of qualification of a candidate does not appear on the face of the nomination paper or of the electoral roll, but is a matter which could be established only by evidence, an enquiry at the stage of scrutiny of the nomination papers is required under the Act only if there is any objection to the nomination. The Returning Officer is then bound to make such enquiry as he thinks proper on the result of which he can either accept or reject the nomination. But when the candidate appears to be properly qualified on the face of the electoral roll and the nomination paper and no objection is raised to the nomination, the Returning Officer has no other alternative but to accept the nomination. This would be apparent from section 36, sub-section (7) of the Act which runs as follows:—

    ‘(7) For the purposes of this section—

    (a) the production of any certified copy of an entry made in the electoral roll of any constituency shall be conclusive evidence of the right of any elector named in that entry to stand for election or to subscribe a nomination paper, as the case may be, unless it is proved that the candidate is disqualified under the Constitution or this Act, or that the proposer or seconder, as the case may be, is disqualified under sub-section (2) of section 33.’

    In other words, the electoral roll is conclusive as to the qualification of the elector except where a disqualification is expressly alleged or proved. The electoral roll in the case of Vasant Rao did describe him as having been of proper age and on the face of it therefore he was fully qualified to be chosen a member of the State Legislative-Assembly. As no objection was taken to his nomination before the Returning Officer at the time of scrutiny, the latter was bound to take the entry in the electoral ??? as conclusive; and if in these circumstances he did not reject the nomination of Vasant Rao, it cannot be said that this was an improper acceptance of nomination on his part which section 100(1)(c) of the Act contemplates. It would have been an improper acceptance, if the want of qualification was apparent on the electoral roll itself or on the face of the nomination paper and the Returning Officer overlooked that defect or if any objection was raised and enquiry made as to the absence of qualification in the candidate and the Returning Officer came to a wrong conclusion on the materials placed before him. When neither of these things happened, the acceptance of the nomination by the Returning Officer must be deemed to be a proper acceptance.”

    14. It Santa Singh was should to be 24 years of age on the 1st October, 1958 when the electoral roll was finally published and if he had not attained the age of 25 on the 1st February, 1957 when the objection was taken and ??? on that date neither Santa Singh nor any of his supporters appeared before the Returning Officer to rebut the objection, it is possible to contend that the Returning Officer had no alternative but to accept the objection ex parte and ??? the nomination. It may also be contended the in the circumstance the nomination was not improperly rejected. But it is not for us to decide at this stags whether the objection raised on behalf of S. Partap Singh should or should not be upheld. This is a matter prima facie for the decision of the Tribunal. All that need be decided by us is whether issue No. 3 is an issue of law the decision of which at a preliminary stage will decide a part of the case. It is not necessary to decide issue No. 7 which has been framed with the object of ascertaining whether Santa Singh was qualified to be a candidate for election to the State. As embay, and if so, what is the effect of the rejection of his nomination paper.

    15. But Mr. Anand Sarup contends that the election of S. Partap Singh must be declared to be void by virtue of the provisions of section 100(1)(d)(iv) which provides that such a declaration shall be made if the Tribunal is of opinion that the result of the election, in so far as it concerns a returned candidate, has been materially affected by any non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution or of this Act or of any rules or orders made under this Act. A question may well be asked: “Who was the person or authority who has not complied with the provisions of the Constitution or of the Act or of the rules or orders made under this Act? Clearly, the Returning Officer has complied with the rules, for he has rejected a nomination paper on the basis of the material which was placed before him. There is nothing to show that he has not complied with the provisions of the Constitution or of the Act or of the rules or orders made under the Act. It is true that section 5 of the Act of 1951 declares that a person shall not be qualified to be chosen to fill a seat in the Legislative Assembly of a State unless be fulfils certain qualifications but it does not declare that every person who fulfils those qualifications shall be chosen. Similarly section 6 declares that a pert on shall not be qualified to be chosen to fill a seat in the Legislative Council of a State to be filled by election unless he is an elector for any Assembly constituency in that State, but it does not state that every elector for any Assembly constituency shall be chosen Mr. Anand Sarup was unable to invite our attention to any provision of the Constitution or of the Act or of any rules or orders made under the Act which were not complied with by the Returning Officer. He was unable to show how the decision of issue No. 3 depends upon the decision of issue No. 7 namely whether Santa Singh was qualified to be a candidate for election to the State Assembly and if so what is the effect of the rejection of his nomination paper. It seems to me, therefore, that the only ground on which the election of S. Partap Singh can be declared void under section 100 is that the nomination of Santa Singh has been improperly rejected. I am of the opinion therefore that issue No. 3 raises a preliminary point of law the decision of which is likely to dispose of a part of the case.

    16. Similarly issue No. 8 namely whether a lambardnr is a person in the service of Government under section 123(7) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 is an issue of law, which if decided in favour of the party objecting would dispose of a part of the case. A candidate is guilty of a corrupt practice under the provisions of this sub-section if he obtains assistance from any person “in the service of the Government” and if he belongs to any of the classes mentioned in clauses (a) to (f) of the said sub-section. It is contended on behalf of S. Partap Singh that a lambardar is not a person in the service of Government and that it is possible to establish the correctness of this contention by referring to various statutes, statutory rules and documents of which judicial notice can be taken by the Tribunal. There is considerable force in this contention and I am of the opinion that the decision of this issue of law will decide a part of the case.

    17. It has been held repeatedly that if an inferior Court or tribunal which is vested with the exercise of discretion exercises it otherwise than in consonance with established principles, it is within the power of the High Court to interfere either under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code or under Article 227 of the Constitution Pandyan Insurance Co. Ltd. v. K.J Khambatta . A.I.R 1955 Bom 241.. There is abundant material on the file to justify the conclusion that two clear and distinct issues of law arose for decision in this case and that the Tribunal is guilty of an arbitrary and capricious exercise of discretion in holding to the contrary.

    18. This brings me to the consideration of the question whether this Court should interfere in this case even though it is satisfied that the Election Tribunal has exercised its discretion arbitrarily or capriciously and not in accordance with recognised judicial principles.

    19. Our Constitution has vested the High Courts in this country with three independent and distinct grants of power or jurisdiction: (1) Original jurisdiction, (2) appellate jurisdiction, (3) general superintending control over all inferior courts and tribunals.

    20. The power of superintending control conferred by Article 227 is similar to the control exercised by the Court of King's Bench over the inferior Courts of England under the common law. According to Blackstone the Court of King's Bench was entitled to a general superintendence over all subordinate Courts for the purpose of keeping them within the bounds of their authority and of preventing usurpation. In order to achieve this object the King's Bench was at liberty to remove their proceedings to be determined by it, to prohibit their progress below and to enforce in inferior tribunals the due exercise of those judicial or ministerial powers which had been vested in them, by restraining their excesses and quickening their negligence and obviating their denial of justice (2 Bl Com. 111). The power which was exercised by the Court of King's Bench was a branch of the power of the King of England, while the power which has been conferred on the High Courts in this country by Article 227 is a branch of the sovereign power of the people as vested in them by the Constitution of a democratic Republic.

    21. The nature and extent of the power of superintendence has come up for consideration in a large number of American cases and has been admirably described in 61 Lawyers Reports Annotated page 33, where an annotator observes as follows:

    “The power of superintending control is an extraordinary power. It is hampered by no specific rules or means for its exercise. It is so general and comprehensive that its complete and full extent and use have practically hitherto not been fully and completely known and exemplified. It is unlimited, being bounded only by the exigencies which call for its exercise. As new instances of these occur, it will be found able to cope with them. And, if required the tribunate having authority to exercise it will, by virtue of it, possess the power to invent, frame, and formulate new and additional means, writs, and processes whereby it may be exerted.”

    22. The constitutional supervisory power is indefinite in character but unlimited in extent and is designed to prevent and correct errors and abuses, to authorise the superior Court to examine any question which it deemed of sufficient importance for examination and decision (Brunner Mercantile Co. v. Rodgin . 1912 130 La. 358.), to control summarily the course of litigation in the inferior Courts, to prevent an injustice being done through a mistake of law, or a wilful disregard of it (State ex rel. Helena v. Helena Water Works Co. . 1911 43 Mont. 169.), to remedy manifest wrongs or tyrannical or arbitrary acts, to meet emergencies, and to promote the harmonious working of our Courts. It is in the nature of a summary appeal (State ex rel North American L. Ins Co. v. District Court . 1934 97 Mont. 523.) and is meant to “emancipate” the Court from the restraints imposed on it by the rules of procedure, the only restraint on the exercise of such power being its own sound discretion (Item Co. v. Nu Grape Bottling Co. . 1926 La. 631). This power is not limited by forms of procedure and the Court will look at the substance of the right sought to be vindicated and the need for speedy relief, rather than to the form in which such relief is sought (Thomas v. Doughty . 1927 163 La. 213.). In the exercise of its supervisory power the Court is concerned in the prevention of abuses or illegal acts, regardless of the amount involved, and in the prevention of extended and needless litigation (State ex rel Regis v. District Court . 1936 102 Mont. 74., Keiffe v. La Salle Realty Co. . 1927 163 La. 824). It is directed primarily to inferior tribunals, and its relation to litigants is only incidental (State ex rel Red River Brick Corporation v. District Court . 1912 24 N.T 28). It should be resorted to most sparingly and only in appropriate cases (Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee . A.I.R 1951 Cal. 193., Waryam Singh v. Amarnath . A.I.R 1954 S.O 215., Shivsingh v. Harjiram . A.I.R 1957 Kajasthan 39.), in order to keep the subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority (Waryam Singh v. Amarnath), or where real injustice would be done if the Court could not interfere under section 115 (Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee), or where a tribunal does not act in accordance with the manner prescribed by law or exceeds its authority or acts arbitrarily or capriciously or transgresses the bounds of its authority (Shivsingh v. Harjiram) It should not be exercised lightly or when other and ordinary remedies are adequate and complete. It should be invoked promptly and employed sparingly and only in extreme cases when the ends of justice imperatively demand it and when grave hardship will follow a refusal to exercise it. It will be used to prevent irreparable mischief, great extraordinary or exceptional hardship, and great burdens in the form of expenses (Re Louis A.M Phelan28). The superior Court has the right in its supervisory capacity to direct the inferior court to proceed so as finally to settle the rights of the parties as expeditiously as possible (Union Bank and Trust Co. of Helena v. State Bank of Townsend . 103 Mont. 260.). The superintending power has been exercised in cases where the ruling of the lower court was merely erroneous (State v. Grimm . 243 N.W 763.) but not in cases when the matter was one within the discretion of the trial Court, unless the discretion was exercised in defiance of recognised judicial principles.

    23. The court will be justified in prohibiting inferior courts in all cases where (1) they are threatening to proceed, or are proceeding, in a matter of which they have no jurisdiction, and there is no remedy through an application to an intermediate court; and (2) where they, although possessing jurisdiction, are exercising or about to exercise it erroneously, and great injustice and irreparable injury would result to the applicant if they should do so, and there exists no other adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise (Duffin v. Field . 1925 208 Ky. 543) “It is the settled law of this jurisdiction” observed the court in State ex rel Spinazza v. District Court . 1929 83 Mont. 511. “that writ of supervisory control will issue only when a ruling, order, or decision of an inferior court, within its jurisdiction, (1) is erroneous; (2) is arbitrary or tyrannical; (3) does gross injustice to the petitioner; (4) may result in irreparable injury to the petitioner; (5) and there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy other than by issuance of the writ.”

    24. In Pickus v. Perry . 1931 59 S.D 350. the court said:—

    “The existence of this power partakes of the nature of an ultimate safeguard, to be availed of, not as an instrument of routine procedure, but in extraordinary and ungual situations where customary remedial procedure is inadequate and resort must he had to some “such high power for the public good or for the prevention of gross injustice and irreparable injury. The very nature of the power, its scope and lack of limitation, impose upon the court to which it is intrusted a most serious responsibility to make a prudent and a sparing use of it, and to employ it in those cases only where the exercise of a sound judicial discretion clearly indicates a necessity for its use.”

    25. Again the court said:—

    “The exercise of the power of superintending control is always a matter of discretion, never a matter of absolute right, and it is the clear weight of authority that the power will not ordinarily be exercised as a substitute for appellate jurisdiction, or where other remedy exists, excepting only in those cases where the other remedy is so slow, difficult, or inadequate that to compel resort thereto amounts to a denial of justice.”

    26. The general principles governing the exercise of the power of superintending control were admirably summarised in Re Pierca-Arrow Motor Car Co.34 where the court said:—

    “That this jurisdiction is not to be exercised upon light occasion, but only upon some grave exigency; that the writs by which it is exercised will not be used to perform the ordinary functions of an appeal or writ of error; that the duty of the court below must be plain; its refusal to proceed within the line of such duty or, on the other hand, its intent to proceed in violation of such duty, must be clear; the results must be not only prejudicial, but must involve extraordinary hardship; the remedy by appeal or writ of error must be utterly inadequate; and the application for the exercise of the power of superintending control must be speedy and prompt.”

    27. Mr. Anand Sarup has invited our attention to certain authorities in support of the proposition that this Court should refrain from interfering under section 116 of the Code of Civil Procedure or Article 227 of the Constitution when the trial Court fails to decide a preliminary question of law under rule 2 of Order 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The authorities cited by him do not, however, appear to be strictly relevant. The first authority is reported as Shanta Nand Gir v. Basudeva. In this case a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that the refusal of the Court below to take up the question of law first is not a separate and distinct proceeding the termination of which amounts to a case having been decided under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In other words the petition for revision was dismissed on the short ground that no revision was competent. In Ray Nicholas Lines v. All India Spinners Association . 1947 Pat. 185. a Division Bench of the Patna High Court held that section 115 gives discretionary powers to the High Court to interfere or not and that the High Court will not usually interfere if any other remedy is available to the aggrieved party. This decision related to the scope and applicability of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and did not deal with the question of the applicability or otherwise of rule 2 of Order 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Two unreported cases have also been cited. In Bai Shri Manharba Chawprajwala v. Dhadhal Raning Amrabha . A.I.R 1955 N.U.C 4092. the Saurashtra High Court held that if a Court declines to decide an issue of jurisdiction involving; the recording of evidence as a preliminary issue, the High Court will not interfere in revision particularly as it is somewhat doubtful whether a revision is competent. The facts of this case have not been indicated in the report, but it is obvious that the so-called preliminary question of law could not be decided without recording evidence. In Tansvkhrai v. Chatur Bhuj . A.I.R 1955 N.U.C Ajmer 4781. the Judicial Commissioner held that it cannot be said that by refusing to decide the question of jurisdiction as a preliminary issue a Court fails to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it or exercises it illegally or with material irregularity. It will be seen from the above that one case declares merely that section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure gives discretionary powers of interference, while the other three appear to indicate that a petition under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not competent if the trial Court declines to decide a question of law as a preliminary question of law.

    28. On the other hand our attention has been invited to a number of cases in which the High Courts have issued directives that the trial Court should determine preliminary questions of law under Order 14 rule 2 before proceeding to determine the other issues of law and fact. In Union of India v. Govind Ram the trial Court dismissed a certain suit on a preliminary question of law without recording evidence on the other issues. The District Judge set aside the decision of the trial Court on the ground that the decision of one issue at one time was not desirable as it was likely to prolong the duration of the suit. The Hyderabad High Court set aside the order of the District Judge and restored that of the trial Court. In Udmi Ram v. Ghasi Ram an application to have an issue of jurisdiction decided first was rejected by the trial Court on the ground that it was undesirable to decide the case piecemeal and that the case should be taken up as a whole. Kendall J. held that the Court should decide whether a case can be disposed of on the issue or issues of law in the first place and if it is of opinion that the case may be disposed of on those issues only it has no option but to decide those issues first. In this view of the law the learned Judge set aside the order of the subordinate Judge and directed him to decide the issue of jurisdiction before proceeding to hear the suit on its merits. In P.C Gangulee v. Sm. Kadhuri Devi the trial Court was satisfied that a preliminary issue of law had arisen in the case but declined to decide the said issue of law as a preliminary issue on the ground that the Court does not favour disposal of suits by decision of preliminary points. Narayan J. held that once the Court comes to the conclusion that there is a pure question of law to be decided as a preliminary issue in the case, an order refusing to decide the preliminary issue is not justified and should be interfered with in revision. In Sher Singh Kahan Singh v. Ajmer Singh the trial Court declined to decide two pure questions of law as preliminary issues. Teja Singh C.J set aside the order of the trial Court and directed that the said issues should be decided as preliminary issues under the provisions of Order 14 rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In C. Janardanan v. N.M Verghese . A.I.R 1925 Mad. 707. the lower Court decided, overruling objections that an election petition to set aside an election disclosed grounds on which an election enquiry could be held under the Election Rules. The High Court held that it could interfere because if the election petition did not disclose any ground for an enquiry, the lower Court would be exercising jurisdiction not vested in it by holding such an enquiry and to hold it would simply lead to waste of time of the Court and of the parties. In Jankidas v. Kalu Ram Courtney Turrell C.J expressed the view that although interlocutory orders are matters of discretion of the lower Court, that discretion must be exercised according to the proper principle of justice and with regard to the proper interpretation of the rules in question. It is the duty of the High Court to interfere when the discretion has not been exercised according to judicial principles. He held further that refusal to exercise revisional jurisdiction by the High Court when the trial Court has declined to try a preliminary issue on a point of law, might give rise to the gravest hardship for the party injured has no right of appeal and a refusal to exercise jurisdiction would mean that the Sub-Judge's unfettered discretion might put the injured party to enormous expense in going into issues which are unnecessary on the mere contention that the ultimate decision would be open to appeal.

    29. It is true that rule 2 of Order 14 vests a large measure of discretion in trial Courts but it must be remembered that this discretion should be exercised in accordance with established principles of justice and not arbitrarily or capriciously, fraudulently or without factual basis. Discretion of trial Courts does not extend to permitting them to ignore or transgress limitations on their powers. The cases mentioned above make it quite clear that if a High Court comes to entertain the view that an inferior Court or tribunal has not allowed its discretion to run in the grooves indicated therefor either by law or by judicial precedents it is at liberty to interfere either under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure or under Article 227 of the Constitution. By holding that issues Nos. 3 and 8 should not be tried as preliminary issues the Election Tribunal in the present case does not appear to have exercised its discretion according to established rules of law but in an arbitrary and capricious manner. It has erred to such an extent as to inflict an extraordinary and exceptional hardship on the petitioner. It seems to me therefore that a clear duty devolves on us to interfere at this stage. If we decline to interfere with the order of the Tribunal at this stage and if the order is allowed to remain unaltered, it is obvious that the parties will be put to the trouble and expense of leading evidence on the numerous issues which have been framed in the case, that the proceedings will continue to remain pending for several weeks, and that the intention of the Legislature that election petitions should be disposed of expeditiously will be largely defeated. I am of the opinion that the Election Tribunal had a clear duty to decide the preliminary issues of law which have arisen in this case, that its intention to embark on a lengthy enquiry in defiance of the provisions of Order 14 rule 2 is manifest, that the results which are likely to flow from this decision will not only be prejudicial to the petitioner but will result in gross injustice to him, that the petitioner has no right to an immediate appeal, and must await the decision of the election petition before he can appeal to this Court, and that there is no plain, speedy or adequate remedy other than by exercise of the powers of superintendence conferred on this Court to set right the hardship and inconvenience that is likely to be occasioned. If the entire case can be disposed of by the decision of a preliminary point of law, there is no reason why leave to argue the point should not be sought or given, and if leave is sought and refused there is no reason why this Court should not interfere under Article 227 of the Constitution. It seems to me therefore that it is an eminently fit case in which the extraordinary powers conferred by Article 227 should be exercised in favour of the petitioner. For these reasons I would accept the petition, set aside the order of the Tribunal, and direct that issues Nos. 3 and 8 should be decided as preliminary issues.

    30. Chopra, J.:— I agree.

    31. Petition accepted.

    rule 2 of Order 14

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    Comments

    The Hon'Ble S. Partap Singh Kairon v. S. Gurmej Singh .
    (Mar 10, 1958)