1. This is a reference made by Mr. Sunder Lal, Additional Sessions Judge, Jullundur, asking for setting aside the order of the Magistrate holding that a complaint under S. 500, Penal Code is not maintainable in regard to a statement made in Court even though it be false.
2. The law of defamation is contained in S. 499, Penal Code which also gives the Exceptions. Exception 9 protects a person if he has made in good faith an imputation for the protection of the interest of the person making it, or of any other person or for the public good.
3. In this case an application was made for appointment of a guardian and imputations were made in the application against the natural guardian, a widowed mother. A witness appeared in support of those allegations.
4. This was a perfectly good ground for supporting the petition and it would indeed be against public policy if people are not allowed to state what they believe to be true in regard to the facts of a case. As a matter of fact this is also accepted in the Penal Code and Sections 150 and 151 of the Evidence Act, and under Section 152 of the Evidence Act power is given to the Court to stop questions which are intended to insult or annoy.
5. I must take it that the Court did allow these questions and therefore I am of the opinion that the case would fall under the rule laid down by the Bombay Court in — ‘Dinshaji Edalji Karkaria v. Jehangir Cowasji Mistri’, AIR 1922 Bom 381 (A), where it was held that a witness cannot be prosecuted for defamation in respect of statements made by him when giving evidence in a judicial proceeding. But it was also said in that ruling that this protection is not available to a complainant who deliberately makes a defamatory statement without the slightest justification. This case is based on the protection given in Excep. 9 to S. 499, Penal Code.
6. Mr. Durga Dass Khanna has relied on certain Madras cases where a contrary view has been taken but I prefer to follow the Bombay view because if a man is not allowed to speak out the truth in a Court of law under a penalty of being exposed to a prosecution under S. 500 the administration of justice would indeed become impossible and it would be hampered to such a great extent that nobody would be prepared to come forward to depose to facts of which he has knowledge. I would therefore reject this recommendation and discharge the rule.
D.H.Z
7. Rule discharged.