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citation codes
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  • Order 21 Rule 35 of the Code of Civil Procedure (in short 'the Code')
  • clause (j) (v) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 11 of Order 21 of the Code,
  • Rule 1 l(2)(l)(v) of the Order 21 of the Code
  • Rule 11 of Order 21 of the Code,
  • sub-rule (1),
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Order 21 Rule 35 of the Code of Civil Procedure (in short 'the Code')
  • clause (j) (v) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 11 of Order 21 of the Code,
  • Rule 1 l(2)(l)(v) of the Order 21 of the Code
  • Rule 11 of Order 21 of the Code,
  • sub-rule (1),
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Piara Singh and Bachan Singh (respondents in the revision) instituted a suit against Kehar Singh (defendant-respondent) seeking a permanent injunction restraining him from interfering with their possession of two Abadi plots ((Alf) 2/1 and (Alf) 2/2) in village Gurdaspur, and alternatively, a decree for possession by demolition of any construction on those plots. The plaint alleged that Kehar Singh began stocking building material on his own plot with the intention of encroaching on the disputed plots while the plaintiffs were away.

The trial Court found that Kehar Singh had encroached upon the entire Abadi plot (Alf) 2/1 and 611 sq. ft. of (Alf) 2/2; injunction was granted for the remaining area of (Alf) 2/2, and a decree for possession was granted for the encroached areas. The trial Court's decree did not specifically specify that possession was to be handed over by demolition of the construction.

Kehar Singh's first appeal was dismissed on 4-3-1978, affirming the trial Court's judgment. He then filed a Regular Second Appeal (No. 1345/1978) which this Court dismissed in limine on 25-9-1978. To execute the decree for possession, the decree-holder filed an execution petition invoking Order 21 Rule 35 of the Code of Civil Procedure (provision reproduced in the opinion). The decree-holder later sought an amendment of the decree under newly inserted Section 153A of the Code to add the words "by removal of construction if any" in the relief clause and decree-sheet; the trial Court allowed that amendment. Kehar Singh filed a revision challenging that amendment, and the matter was referred to a larger Bench after a Single Judge (S. S. Sodhi, J.) found that a prior decision on the interpretation of Section 153A deserved reconsideration.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial Court had the power under Section 153A of the Code of Civil Procedure to amend its decree after an appeal against the decree had been summarily dismissed (i.e., dismissed in limine).
  2. Whether a superior Court (here, this Court) may itself exercise powers to amend a decree where the trial Court purportedly amended the decree under Section 153A but that exercise of power is held to be impermissible.
  3. What are the appropriate modes of executing a decree for possession of immoveable property where constructions were made during the pendency of the suit (including whether demolition or handing over possession with the structure may be directed)?

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mohd. Ismail v. Ashiq Husain, A.I.R. 1970 All. 648 Where constructions are made during the pendency of the suit they are deemed to have been made by the judgment-debtor at his own risk; the executing Court may direct removal/demolition of such constructions. If demolition costs exceed material value, the executing Court may allow the decree-holder to decide whether to retain the construction; ownership may pass to the decree-holder if the judgment-debtor releases materials free of charge and the decree-holder accepts them. The Court relied on this authority to support the proposition that the executing Court could direct demolition or otherwise deal with constructions erected during the pendency of the suit and that the judgment-debtor cannot frustrate execution by his own act of constructing on the disputed land.
(1872) 18 WR 527 (Cal) (referred to as the Rangoon case) Where costs of demolition exceed the value of materials, the decree-holder may be allowed to accept the construction standing on the land rather than require demolition; an alternative rule for execution in such circumstances. This older authority was cited within the discussion in Mohd. Ismail to show an alternative approach the executing Court could adopt where demolition costs would exceed material value; the opinion accepts that this rule can be adopted in similar circumstances.
Ghanya Lal v. Punjab National Bank, A.I.R. 1928 Lah. 7 Any method suggested by the decree-holder for satisfaction of his decree which is not prohibited by law falls within the purview of Rule 11(2)(l)(v) of Order 21 of the Code; executing Court can adopt the course indicated by the decree-holder. The Court relied on this authority to indicate that a decree-holder may specify the mode in which the assistance of the Court is required for execution (including demolition or other modes) under Rule 11 of Order 21, and that the executing Court can follow such modes where permissible.
AIR 1926 Oudh 616 (DB judgment referred to in Ghanya Lal) Referred as an earlier decision supporting the principle stated in Ghanya Lal (that decree-holder's suggested methods for satisfaction can fall within the rule permitting specification of the mode of assistance). The opinion records this earlier decision as part of the authorities cited in Ghanya Lal; it is used as supporting background rather than analyzed at length.
Gurbachan Singh v. Maghar Singh, 1983 Rev L.R. 25 Interprets the phrase "the Court which had passed the decree or order in the first instance" in Section 153A as meaning the first appellate Court where a regular first appeal has been dismissed in limine. The Single Judge's reference and the larger Bench consideration were prompted by this decision. The Court in the present opinion expressly agreed with the view taken in Gurbachan Singh and set aside the trial Court's order allowing the amendment (on the ground that the first appellate Court, not the trial Court, is the court referred to under Section 153A in such circumstances).
Ram Bharosey Lal v. Rameshwar Dayal, A.I.R. 1984 All. 167 Section 153A is enabling in character and permits correction; the provision does not divest a superior court of jurisdiction to effect correction in the decree itself. The Court relied on this authority to support its exercise of power as a superior Court to itself amend the decree (even though it set aside the trial Court's amendment) and to hold that the superior Court can correct the decree so as to render substantial justice without forcing the decree-holder to start fresh proceedings.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by first examining the scope and object of Section 153A of the Code and the objects and reasons for its insertion. The material quoted from the objects and reasons indicates a legislative aim to resolve an existing conflict among High Courts as to which Court (original or first appellate) should have power to amend a decree or order where an appeal has been summarily dismissed.

The Court accepted the interpretation in Gurbachan Singh v. Maghar Singh that, where a regular first appeal has been dismissed in limine, the phrase "the Court which had passed the decree or order in the first instance" in Section 153A refers to the first appellate Court (not the trial Court). On that basis the trial Court's exercise of power under Section 153A to amend its decree was found to be incorrect, and that order was set aside.

However, rather than requiring the decree-holder to approach the first appellate Court afresh (which would entail further delay), the Court considered whether it could itself exercise superior powers to effect the amendment so as to secure the substantive relief originally decreed. The Court noted:

  • Section 153A is an enabling provision and does not operate to deprive a superior Court of jurisdiction to correct or amend the decree.
  • There was a long delay — the suit was instituted on 17-7-1976 and the litigation culminated on 25-9-1978; the relief had not been made available to the decree-holder for many years.
  • On the merits, the defendant (judgment-debtor) had failed to prove ownership of the immoveable property on which he had constructed.

The Court relied on Ram Bharosey Lal v. Rameshwar Dayal to support the proposition that the superior Court is not divested of jurisdiction to effect corrections in a decree and that the superior Court may therefore correct the decree when necessary to render substantial justice.

Having considered these factors, the Court concluded that although the trial Court's order purporting to amend under Section 153A was set aside for being beyond the trial Court's competence in the circumstances, the Court itself would exercise its powers to maintain the amendment so that the decree-holder could obtain the relief by execution (including demolition or removal of construction as appropriate under executing provisions and authorities like Mohd. Ismail v. Ashiq Husain).

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The trial Court's order allowing the amendment under Section 153A was set aside as incorrectly made by the trial Court in the circumstances (where the first appeal was dismissed in limine). At the same time, this Court exercised its superior powers and maintained the amendment itself so that the decree would read (as sought) with the words "by removal of construction if any" in the relief clause and decree-sheet.

Implications

  • Direct effect on the parties: The amendment sought by the decree-holder is preserved by this Court's exercise of power, enabling the decree-holder to proceed to execution for delivery of possession (including demolition or other directions as execution may require).
  • Merits-based observation: The Court noted that the judgment-debtor did not prove ownership of the land on which construction was made; this supported granting the substantive relief to the decree-holder.
  • Broader implications: The opinion does not elaborate on any novel precedent being laid down; the Court relied on existing authorities (including Gurbachan Singh and Ram Bharosey Lal) to interpret Section 153A and to justify the superior Court's corrective power. Accordingly, the immediate consequence is the correction/amendment of the decree in this case so that the decree-holder can execute it; the opinion does not state that it is announcing a new, broader rule of law beyond its application to the facts before the Court.

This summary is limited to and strictly derived from the content of the provided opinion; no facts or legal propositions beyond those contained in the text have been added.

    Kehar Singh v. Piara Singh And Another

    1. Piara Singh and Bachan Singh respondents in this revision filed a suit against Kehar Singh, for a permanent injunction, restraining him from interfering in their possession over the Abadi plots (Alf) 2/1 and (Alf) 2/2, situated in the area of village Gurdaspur or in the alternative for possession of those plots by way of demolition of the construction made over them by Kehar Singh, defendant-respondent. In the plaint it was alleged that Kehar Singh had started stocking building material-on his own plot for making encroachment on the disputed plots while the said plaintiffs were away from the village. The plaintiffs claimed an alternative relief that the decree for possession of the said plots be awarded to them by demolition of construction, if any. The trial Court found that Kehar Singh defendant had encroached upon the whole of Abadi plot (Alf) 2/1 and upon 611 sq. ft. of area out of the Abadi plot (Alf) 2/2. In respect of the rest of the area out of (Alf) 2/2, an injunction was granted, but in respect of the area over which Kehar Singh' had already encroached upon, decree for possession was granted. It was not. specifically mentioned that possession was to be handed over by demolition of the construction. Kehar Singh filed an appeal before the lower appellate Court, but his appeal was also dismissed on 4-3-1978 and the decree and judgment of the trial Court were affirmed. Kehar Singh filed Regular Second Appeal No. 1345/1978, challenging the decrees and judgments of the Courts below; but the same was dismissed in limine by this Court on 25-9-1978. To enforce this decree for getting possession, the decree-holder moved an execution petition under Order 21 Rule 35 of the Code of Civil Procedure (in short 'the Code') relevant part of which is reproduced as under:

    'R. 35. Decree for immoveable property.-

    (i) Where a decree is for the delivery of any immoveable property, possession thereof shall be delivered to the party to whom it has been adjudged, or to such person as he may appoint to receive delivery on his behalf, and, if necessary, by removing any person bound by the decree who refuses to vacate the property."

    As the construction in this case was made during the pendency of the suit, the executing Court could direct removal of the construction and possession to be delivered to the decree-holder, as the defendant- judgment-debtor cannot be allowed to frustrate the result of a suit for possession of immoveable property by his own act. The executing Court could also allow the removal of a building material after demolition by the judgment debtor and if the judgment-debtor was not agreable to remove the construction and have the building material, it could be left to the decree holder. To support this view, reliance can be safely placed on case : Mohd. Ismail v. Ashiq Husain, . A. I. R. 1970 All. 648. wherein the following observation was made:

    "Where the constructions were made before the institution of the suit, the rule laid down in the Rangoon case could be adopted; but where the constructions were made during the pendency of the suit, constructions made are against the law and hence, shall be deemed to have been made by the judgment debtor at his own risk and responsibility namely, that he shall not be able to claim any benefit of such constructions during the execution proceeding. When the judgment-debtor had no right to the constructions, he can raise no objection to the removal of the constructions during the execution. Where it appears to the executing court that the costs of removal or demolition of the constructions would excised the costs of material to be fetched after the demolition and the decree-holder is willing to let the construction stand on the land, the rule laid down in ( 1872) 18 WR 527 (Cal) (supra) can be adopted namely, that it can be left open to the decree-holder to decide what he shall do with the constructions after he is given actual possession of the land along with constructions standing thereon. Thereby the judgment-debtor would not be put to any additional expenses. , But if costs of demolition shall not exceed the costs of the materials and the judgment debtor is willing to release the materials in favour of the deeree -holder free of charges, and the decree-holder is willing to accept the constructions, the executing Court need not direct the demolition of the constructions, the ownership of which would automatically pass to the decree-holder"

    2. In Ghanya Lal v. Punjab National Bank, A. I. R. 1928 Lah. 7. it was laid down that any method suggested by the decree-holder for the satisfaction of his decree, which method is not actually prohibited by law, falls within the purview of Rule 1 l(2)(l)(v) of the Order 21 of the Code and an earlier DB judgment reported in AIR 1926 Oudh 616, A. I. R. 1926 Oudh. 616. was referred. In this view of the matter the course to be addopted by the executing Court in such cases has been clearly indicated in this authority and there was no difficulty in doing so by it. In the instant case, the earlier execution petitions were unnecessarily dismissed without reference to the provisions of the Code. If we refer to Rule 11 of Order 21 of the Code, it clearly indicates that the decree-holder, while making an execution petition in writing, could claim the mode of demolition of the construction in which assistance of the Court was required. In clause (j) (v) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 11 of Order 21 of the Code, it is provided as under :

    "--Written application.

    (2) Save as otherwise provided by sub-rule (1), every application for the execution of a decree shall be in writing, signed and verified by the applicant or by some other person proved to the satisfaction of the Court to be acquainted with the facts of the case, and shall contain in a tabular form the following particulars, namely :-

    (a)-----

    (b)-------

    (i) the mode in which the assistance of the Court is required, whether-

    (i)----------

    (ii)------

    (v) otherwise, as the nature of the relief granted may require.-"

    Sub-clause (v) above clearly indicates that the decree-holder may seek the assistance of the Court in a way as the nature of the relief granted may require. In the present case, decree far possession had to be satisfied and for that purpose, delivery of possession of the land decreed was to be made to the decree-holder. For delivering the possession, demolition could be directed by the executing Court. Even otherwise, possession could be delivered along with the building with a direction to the judgment-debtor to remove the structure at his own expense and have the building material himself, or the decree-holder could be asked to have the building and later on demolish it or retain it with him. The judgment-debtor could seek any other remedy if permitted by law, to claim damages or to claim building material (Malba). In any case, this course was not adopted in this case. Ultimately, the decree-holder made an application Under Section 153A, newly added to the Code before the trial Court, to the amendment of the decree and judgment by adding the words "by removal of construction if any" in the penultimate line of the judgment after the words "local commissioner" in the relief clause and also to insert the same words in the decree-sheet after the words "the local commissioner" in the last line of the decree-sheet. The trial Court, purporting to exercise powers under the said section, allowed the amendment as prayed.

    3. Kehar Singh judgment-debtor filed this revision which ultimately came up for final hearing before S. S; Sodhi, J. Vide order order dated 22-12-1988, the learned Single Judge referred to section 153a of the code and judgment in Gurbachan Singh v. Maghar Singh, 1983 Rev L. R. .25. wherein R. N. Mittal, J. interpreted the words "the Court which had passed the decree in the first instance" occuring in section 153a of the code as the first appellate Court in case where the regular first appeal is dismissed in limine. Finding that Gurbachan Singh's case (supra) deserved reconsideration, the learned Judge referred this matter to a larger Bench. This is how the matter has been placed before us.

    4. A bare reading of section 153a of the code and objects and reasons for the addition of this section, make it clear that the words "the Court which had passed the decree or order in the first instance" mean the first appellate Court in a case where regular second appeal is dismissed in limine by this Court. The following part of the objects and reasons do not leave any room for doubt for taking this view :

    "--There is, however, a doubt as to which Court would be competent to amend, decree or order where an appeal against the decree or order has been summarily dismissed. The Bombay aid the Patna High Courts have taken the view that it is the original Court which has the power to amend the decree or order. The High Courts of Allahabad and Andbra Pradesh have taken a contrary view. In view of the divergence of opinion new Section 153A is being inserted to empower the Court which had passed the decree or order appealed against, to amend the decree or order where appeal has been summarily dismissed."

    We fully agree with the view taken in Gurbachan Singh's case (supra). In this view of the matter, the order of the trial Court allowing the amendment is set aside. However, we do no want the decree-holder to start afresh for getting the amendment by the first appellate Court which attempt may again consume sufficient time before he gets the relief. Admittedly, the suit was instituted by the decree-holder on 17-7-1976 and ultimately, the litigation came to an end on 25-9-1978. Since then the relief has not been made available to the decree-holder and it is now after about 11 years, the decree-holder's attempt to get the relief may end in success. We are , therefore, of the view that this Court can and does hereby exercise its own powers to amend the decree. Said section 153a of the code is an enabling section and it does not debar the superior Court to exercise its own powers to amend the decree. We are supported in this view by a case: Ram Bharosey Lal v. Rameshwar Dayal, A. I. R, 1984 All. 167. wherein the following observations have been made:

    "-----On its language, this provision enabling in character which permits the court of first instance also to correct an error in the decree irrespective of the fact that the decree had merged in the decree of a superior court. The provision does not divest the superior court, of the jurisdiction to effect correction in the decree itself"

    The amendment made by the trial Court rendered substantial justice and the real relief to the decree-holder. On merits, the defendant bad failed to prove his ownership to the immoveable property on which he has made the construction. Technicalities as to which Court can allow the amendment should not stand in the way of the decree-holder to get his decree executed for getting him possession of the immoveable property in pursuance of the decree which he obtained on 25-11-1977.

    5. With the foregoing discussion in view, although we set aside the order of the trial Court, but we maintain the amendment under our own powers.

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    Comments

    Kehar Singh v. Piara Singh And Another
    (Jul 12, 1989)