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    Mithilesh Kumar Singh v. State Of Bihar And Others

    1. The petitioner at the material time was a workman working in the Public Works Department, Building Circle, Purnia, In this application he challenges an award, dated 28 February 1989, given by the Labour Court, Patna, in reference No. 1 of 1985/11 of 1987. The reference arose out of an industrial dispute relating to the termination of the petitioenr's service and the terms of the reference was as follows:

    “Whether the termination of service of Sri Mithilesh Kumar Singh, Treasure Guard, Public Works Department, Building Circle, Purnia, by the management from 15 December 1992, is proper and justified? If not, whether he is entitled to reinstatement and/or any other relief?”

    2. The parties appeared before the Labour Court and filed their respective written statements.

    3. The case of the workman-petitioner was that he was initially appointed on muster roll as a daily wager. He continuously worked for over three months and thereafter he was appointed in a regular time-scale of pay as Treasure Guard on a temporary and ad hoc basis. The workman joined the post of Treasure Guard and discharged his duties to the complete satisfaction of the authority. But on 26 August 1992 he was asked to file a show cause why his appointment may not be terminated because it was made in breach of the Government circulars. The workman gave his reply which did nto find favour with the authorities and finally his services were terminated. In the written statement filed on behalf of the workman it was asserted in no uncertain terms that before terminating his service he was not given one month's pay in lieu of one month's notice nor was he given any retrenchment compensation. In other words a case was made out that the termination of his service was bad and non est for not complying with the conditions precedent as mandated under S. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

    4. In the written statement filed on behalf of the management it appears that not much heed was paid to the petitioner's grievance regarding violation of the provisions of S. 25-F of the Act. The management appears to have trained all its efforts to contend that the petitioner's initial appointment/engagement was illegal and invalid and did not confer any right upon him and, hence, it could be terminated without a month's notice or payment in lieu of notice and without paying the retrenchment compensation. The management appears to have gone to the extent of taking a stand that the initial appointment being illegal, the provisions of S. 25-F did not have any application in this case.

    5. The Labour Court in the impugned award appears to have upheld the management's contention. It has recorded a finding that the petitioner's appointment was illegal and invalid. This finding is based on the circumstances that the appointment was made without any advertisement or any selection process. Further there was no sanctioned post against which the appointment could be made. The Labour Court has also noted that the appointment was made by the Executive Engineer in violation of the general bar imposed by the Government against any appointments either on the muster roll or otherwise. This finding of the Labour Court appears to be unexceptionable but where the Labour Court appears to have committed a serious error of law is proceeding on the assumption that the initial appointment being illegal and invalid, the provisions of S. 25-F were not applicable. Such an assumption is clearly unwarranted and unsustainable in the eye of law. The Labour Court has relied upon three decisions of this Court for holding that in a case where the initial appointment itself was illegal and invalid it the employee could not raise a plea of contravention of S. 25-F of the Act. The first decision relied by the Labour Court is reported in 1983 L.I.C 1984 (sic). It is a Full Bench decision of this Court but this decision never considered the provisions of S. 25-F of the Act. The ratio of this decision is simply that in case the initial appointment was illegal and invalid it would not confer any right on the concerned employee and, hence, its termination, will not attract the principles of natural justice. It is to be clarified here that the notice contemplated in this decision was not a statutory notice under S. 25-F of the Act, but a notice based on the principles of natural justice.

    6. The Labour Court has also relied upon decisions reported in 1986 P.L.J.R 873 and 1987 P.L.J.R 1090. In these decisions this Court held that in case the initial appointment was invalid the concerned employee could not claim a writ of mandamus for payment of salary for the period he actually worked under the invalid appointment. These two decisions also do not even refer much less consider the mandatory nature of S. 25-F. These decisions have absolutely no relevance to the case in hand.

    7. I am quite unable to follow how the question of illegal and invalid appointment could be imported in a reference made under the Industrial Disputes Act. The idea of illegal or invalid appointments is quite foreign to the scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act. Section 2(s) of the Act which defines “workman” does not have any such distinction and the definition is counchedui the widest term. Any person including an apprentice doing any manual unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward would qualify as a workman notwithstanding whether the contract of employment was express or implied. Once having qualified, as a workman all that is required for the application of S. 25-F is that the concerned workman should have been in continuous service for 240 days in a calendar year. In fact, the termination of employment of a workman on the ground that his initial appointment was not legal and valid itself qualifies as retrenchment within the meaning of S. 2(oo) as termination for illegal and invalid appointment has not been made an exception to the definition of retrenchment. This aspect of the matter has been considered in a Division Bench decision of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Prabhu Dayal Jat v. Alwar Sahakar Bhumi Vikas Bank, Ltd. [1991 - II L.L.N 1042], wherein Para. 6, at pages 43 and 44 of the judgment, their Lordships held as follows:

    “…The definition of retrenchment as given in the Act is wide and comprehensive to include all types of terminations of service unless the termination falls within any of the excepted categories mentioned therein. The petitioner's case is not covered by nay of the exceptions contained in the definition of retrenchment. As such, the termination of the petitioner's service amounts to retrenchment.”

    8. I am in respectful agreement with the law laid down in the aforesaid decision and I do not find the slightest hesitation in holding that the termination of service of the petitioner amounted to retrenchment and was statutorily required to be in compliance with the provisions of S. 25-F of the Act I am, accordingly, constrained to interfere in the matter and I hereby do so. The impugned award, a copy whereof is at Annexure 10, is hereby set aside. The matter is remitted back to the Labour Court, Patna to examine the pleadings of the parties and, if necessary, to allow them to adduce evidence on the point and to record a finding of fact as to whether or nor not the provisions of S. 25-F of the Act were duly complied with by the management before terminating the petitioner's service. In case his services were terminated in contravention of S. 25-F of the Act, then it is needless to say, the termination order will be non est in the eye of law and the petitioner shall be entitled to reinstatement with back-wages unless there are other circumstances to be recorded in writing by the Labour Court so as not to grant the relief of reinstatement with back-wages but some other reliefs.

    9. The matter being old, it is directed that the Labour Court must give a fresh award within 10 weeks from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order.

    10. In the result this application is allowed. No order as to costs.

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    Mithilesh Kumar Singh v. State Of Bihar And Others
    (Apr 8, 1994)