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  • sub-section (2) of S. 23 of the Hindu Marriage Act (hereinafter referred
  • provisions of S. 23(ii) of the Hindu Marriage Act
  • provision of S. 23(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act
  • S. 23(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act
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  • sub-section (2) of S. 23 of the Hindu Marriage Act (hereinafter referred
  • provisions of S. 23(ii) of the Hindu Marriage Act
  • provision of S. 23(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act
  • S. 23(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The revision application arises from a matrimonial case involving a petition for restitution of conjugal rights filed by the opposite party, alleging that the petitioner and Sushma Kumari were lawfully married but she withdrew from his society without reasonable excuse. During the pendency of the case, the opposite party sought the court's intervention under section 23(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act to make endeavours for reconciliation between the parties. The trial court allowed this prayer by order dated 9-5-1991. The petitioner challenged this order by filing the present revision application, contending that the provision under section 23(2) is not mandatory and that the court below erred in directing reconciliation efforts at the initial stage.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the duty imposed by section 23(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act to make every endeavour for reconciliation between parties before granting relief is mandatory or discretionary.
  2. At what stage of the matrimonial proceeding the court should exercise its power under section 23(2) — at the very beginning of the case or after evidence is concluded and before granting relief.
  3. Whether the court must determine the existence of a husband-wife relationship before initiating reconciliation efforts under section 23(2).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • The provision of section 23(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act is not mandatory and the trial court erred in treating it as such.
  • If the provision is mandatory, the power to make reconciliation efforts should be exercised only after evidence is complete and the court decides to grant relief, not at the outset.
  • The court should first determine whether a husband-wife relationship exists before following the procedure under section 23(2).

Opposite Party’s Arguments

  • The words of section 23(2) are mandatory, imposing a duty on the court to make reconciliation efforts at the very first instance before proceeding further.
  • The legislative intent is to maintain marital ties and restore peace, so reconciliation attempts must be made at the initial stage of the proceeding.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Smt. Leelawati v. Ram Sewak, AIR 1979 Allahabad 285 Section 23(2) is not absolute; discretion exists due to the phrase "where it is possible." Distinguished on facts; provision cannot be completely ignored but is not absolute.
Dilipbhai Chhaganlal Patel v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1983 Bombay 128 Procedure under section 23(2) not mandatory before disposing of maintenance applications under section 24. Held not authority for ignoring section 23(2) entirely; relates to different procedural context.
Raj Rani v. Harbans Singh Chhabra, AIR 1972 Patna 392 Non-observance of section 23(2) does not vitiate jurisdiction; appellate court can make reconciliation efforts. Court held failure to follow procedure is not jurisdictional defect but procedural irregularity.
Chhote Lal v. Kamla Devi, AIR 1967 Patna 269 Section 23(2) imposes duty on court to make sincere efforts at reconciliation at first instance. Supportive of mandatory nature but superseded by Division Bench ruling.
Ram Kumar v. Kamla Dutta, AIR 1981 J. & K. 9 Supports mandatory duty of court to attempt reconciliation under section 23(2). Referenced for interpretation of section 23(2) duty.
Jivubai v. Ningappa Adriashappa Yadwad, AIR 1963 Mys 3 Section 23(2) duty to endeavour reconciliation starts at first instance but can be exercised at any later stage. Supports view that reconciliation efforts may be made throughout the case; not confined to initial stage only.
Raghunath v. Urmila Devi, AIR 1973 All 203 Duty to make reconciliation efforts consistently with case circumstances; efforts not limited to initial stage. Reinforces flexible timing of reconciliation attempts under section 23(2).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by interpreting section 23(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, emphasizing that its language imposes a duty on the court to make every endeavour to bring about reconciliation before granting relief, but only where it is possible consistent with the case's nature and circumstances. Applying principles of statutory interpretation, the court held that the provision is clear and unambiguous, requiring adherence to its plain meaning.

Upon examining precedents cited by both parties, the court distinguished cases relied upon by the petitioner, clarifying that these do not render the provision non-mandatory but rather recognize that the duty is qualified by the case circumstances and can be exercised by appellate courts if omitted by trial courts.

The court rejected the petitioner's contention that reconciliation efforts should be deferred until after evidence, holding instead that the legislature intended for such efforts to commence "in the first instance," meaning from the beginning of the case, but not exclusively limited to that stage. This interpretation aligns with judgments from Mysore and Allahabad High Courts, which emphasize continuous duty of the court to attempt reconciliation whenever circumstances permit.

The court further held that there is no requirement under the Act to preliminarily determine the existence of a husband-wife relationship before invoking section 23(2), as such a requirement would amount to an unwarranted preliminary trial not contemplated by the statute.

Applying these principles to the facts, the court found that the trial court erred by ordering reconciliation efforts solely on the basis that section 23(2) is mandatory and at the initial stage, without considering the facts and circumstances of the case. This amounted to a jurisdictional irregularity.

Holding and Implications

The court set aside the impugned order directing reconciliation efforts at the initial stage without factual consideration and remitted the case to the court below for reconsideration in accordance with the law and observations made regarding the timing and applicability of section 23(2).

The direct effect is that the trial court must now assess, based on the facts and circumstances, whether and when it is appropriate to make endeavours for reconciliation. No new precedent was created; rather, existing principles were reaffirmed and clarified.

    Sushma Kumari v. Om Prakash Opposite Party.

    Nagendra Rai, J.:— The present revision application arises out of matrimonial case. The petitioner is aggrieved by the order dated 9-5-91 passed by VIth Addl. District Judge, Patna, in Matrimonial Case No. 105 of 1989, by which he allowed the prayer of the Opp. party for making endeavour for reconciliation between the parties, as provided under sub-section (2) of S. 23 of the Hindu Marriage Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act).

    2. The opp. party filed the aforesaid petition for restitution of conjugal rights on the allegation that his marriage with Sushma Kumari was solemnised in a Kali Mandir at Darbhanga house on 30-11-1987 in presence of friends and well-wishers. The father of the girl was not agreeable to the marriage on the ground that his son was married with the sister of the opp. party. Both lived as husband and wife for sometime at his house and later on Sushma Kumari went to her father's place and when he went to his father-in-law's place for Bidai of his wife he was not allowed to take her with him on one pretext or the other and, lastly, on 17-12-89 Sushma Kumari also refused to come along with him. She has withdrawn from his society without any reasonable excuse and hence the necessity for filing the petition for restitution of conjugal rights.

    3. During the pendency of the case, a petition was filed on behalf of the opposite party before the court for taking steps for reconciliation as provided under S. 23(2) of the Act. The petitioner objected to the aforesaid prayer of the opp. party by filing a rejoinder stating therein that there was no relationship of husband and wife between the parties and as such there is no question of taking steps for reconciliation between the parties.

    4. The court below, after hearing the parties, by the impugned order allowed the prayer of the opp. party for making an endeavour to bring about reconciliation between the parties.

    5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that the provision of S. 23(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act is not a mandatory one and the court below wrongly held so, and, accordingly, directed the petitioner to be present for reconciliation. He also contended that even if it is held that the said provision is a mandatory one, the proper stage to exercise power under S. 23(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act is when the court decides to grant relief under the Act. In other words, the power under the said section is to be exercised after the evidence is over and the court decides to grant relief to the party concerned.

    6. Learned counsel appearing for the opp. party, on the other hand contended that the words of S. 23(2) are mandatory one and the duty is cast on the court to make endeavour to bring about reconciliation at the very first instance before proceeding in the matter. Elaborating his submission, he contended that object behind the aforesaid provision is to provide all help in the maintenance of marital ties and to restore peace to the alienated couple and as such the attempt to bring about a reconciliation is to be made at the initial stage of the proceeding and for that reason the legislature purposely said in the said section that the attempt for reconciliation should be made at the first instance.

    7. As the controversy between the parties centers round the provision of S. 23(2) of the Act it is apt to quote the same which runs as follows:—

    “Sec. 23(2): Before proceeding to grant any relief under this Act, it shall be the duty of the court in the first instance, in every case where it is possible so to do consistently with the nature and circumstances of the case, to make every endeavour to bring about a reconciliation between the parties.”

    It is well settled rule of interpretation that where the provision of the section is clear and unambiguous then the same to be interpreted according to its plain meaning and only in cases of ambiguity the other rules of interpretation are to be resorted to find out the intent of the legislature. A bare reading of the aforesaid provision shows that a duty is cast on the court before grant of relief under the Act in every case where it is possible so to do consistently with the nature and circumstances of the case to make every endeavour to bring about reconciliation between the parties.

    8. The first question to be determined in this case is as to whether the aforesaid provision is mandatory or not. The learned counsel, in support of his submission that the provision is not a mandatory provision relied upon the cases of Smt. Leelawati… v. Ram Sewak…., AIR 1979 Allahabad 285, Dilipbhai Chhaganlal Patel v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1983 Bombay 128 and a Division Bench decision of this Court in Raj Rani… v. Harbans Singh Chhabra…., AIR 1972 Patna 392 whereas, the learned counsel appearing for the opp. party, in support of his submission, relied upon a single Judge decision of this Court in the case of Chhote Lal v. Kamla Devi, AIR 1967 Patna 269 and the decision of J. & K. High Court in the case of Ram Kumar v. Kamla Dutta, AIR 1981 J. & K. 9.

    9. In the case of Leelawati (Supra) it has been held as follows:—

    “The provisions of S. 23(ii) of the Hindu Marriage Act are not absolute, while imposing a duty on the court to make every endeavour to bring about reconciliation between the parties, a discretion is left to the court by the use of the qualifying phrase “in every case where it is possible to do consistently with the nature and circumstances of the case.”

    It appears from the facts of that case that the suit was filed for divorce on the ground that in spite of decree for restitution of conjugal rights, the other spouse did not perform her obligation and in that context it was held that in such a situation it would be a rare case where any reconciliation between the parties can be brought about where petition for divorce is pending. The aforesaid observations were made in the peculiar facts of the said case and the same is not an authority for holding that the provision of S. 23(2) of the Act can be completely ignored by the court while deciding a matrimonial case. The other case relied upon by the petitioner in Dilipbhai Chhaganlal Patel (supra) wherein it was held that the provision of S. 23(2) for bringing about reconciliation is not mandatory. In that case the question for consideration before the court was as to whether an application for maintenance pendente lite etc. can be disposed of by the court before adopting the procedure u/S. 23(2) of the Act. In my opinion, that case also cannot be said to be the authority for holding that the said provision is not a mandatory one as on the facts of that case it was held that the application u/S. 24 can be entertained even without following the procedure u/S. 23(2) of the Act.

    10. In the case of Raj Rani (supra) the question before the court was as to whether the judgment and decree passed by the court below are vitiated due to non-observance of the procedure u/S. 23(2) by the court below. Dealing with the matter it was held by a Division Bench of this court that “……We are not inclined to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the apellant that for the failure on the part of the court the endeavour to bring about reconciliation between the parties, its order is without jurisdiction. With respect we think that the view taken by a Bench of the Mysore High Court in Juvubai v. Ningappa Adriashappa Yadwad, AIR 1963 Mys 3, that failure on the part of the trial court to make endeavour to bring about reconciliation does not affect its jurisdiction to try the case and endeavour can also be made by the appellate court is correct”. The observation made by the Bench of this Court is only to the effect that if the procedure u/S. 23(2) has not been followed by the trial court, the same can be followed by the appellate court, but from that no inference can be drawn that the provision of the said section is directory one in the sense that the same can be ignored by the courts. It only shows that if the trial court has failed to follow the procedure u/S. 23(2) of the Act, the said defect can be rectified by the appellate court and on that ground the order passed by the lower court cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. In Chhotelal's case (supra) relied upon by the opp. party it has been held that the “important words in sub-sec. (2) are that it shall be the duty of the court, in the first, instance, in every case where it is possible to do so” to take every endeavour to bring about a reconciliation between the parties. In my judgment the law enjoins upon the court a duty to make sincere effort at reconciliation before proceeding to deal with the case in the usual course. In order that the requirement of making “every endeavour” is fulfilled it is at least requisite that the courts should have a first hand version of the point of view of the lady from her own mouth so that the court might be in a position to appreciate what really has led to the estrangement between the husband and the wife…..”

    11. No doubt, the aforesaid judgment supports the stand of the opp. party but in view of the Division Bench decision of this court, as mentioned above, the view taken in the aforesaid judgment is no longer a good law. Even if the trial court has not resorted to the aforesaid procedure, the step for reconciliation can be taken even by the appellate court. In my opinion, the aforesaid provision cannot be said to be absolute in the sense that non-observance of the said provision will make the final decree/order a nullity, but a duty is cast on the court in every case to make an attempt for reconciliation wherein it is possible so to do consistently with the nature and circumstances of the case. If for some reason the said procedure has not been followed by the trial court, the same can be followed by the appellate court.

    12. The next question for determination is as to whether steps for reconciliation is to be taken at the very start of the proceeding at the first instance as argued by the counsel for the opp. party and has been done by the court below in this case or it is to start after the evidence is over and before the court proceeds to dispose of the case finally as argued by the counsel for the petitioner. As stated above, the very object of this provision is to bring harmony and good relationship between the alienated couple. The intention of the legislature appears to be that the court has to take recourse of this provision at the first instance, which according to me, means from the very beginning. However, this does not mean that this attempt for bringing about reconciliation is to be made only at the very beginning of the case and not thereafter. The endeavour to bring about reconciliation is to make whenever it is possible to do consistently with the nature and circumstances of the case. To hold that reconciliation is to be done at the first instance only and not afterwards would frustrate the very object of the provision. The view taken by me finds support from the view taken by the Mysore High Court in the case of Jivubai v. Ningappa Adriashappa Yadwad, AIR 1963 Mys 3, Raghunath v. Urmila Devi, AIR 1973 All 203.

    13. In the case of Jivubai (supra) it was held as follows (at page 5):—

    “……..While we agree that the trial court has a duty to perform by making every endeavour to bring about a reconciliation between the parties we do not see how the matter, goes to the question of jurisdiction. It will be noticed that the endeavour is to be made, where it is possible to do so consistently with the nature and circumstances of the case. It cannot be said that the full nature and circumstances of the case can always be gathered exclusively from the pleadings. It is no doubt true that the provision says that such endeavour is to be made in the first instance, but to say from this that the court cannot make use of its good offices at any later stage would be to defeat the very object of the provision. The intention of the provision undoubtedly is to render all possible assistance in maintenance of the marital bond and if at any stage of the case the circumstances are propitious for reconciliation, it will be the court's duty to make use of such circumstances irrespective of the stage. The use of the words “in the first instance” can in this context only mean that the court's efforts in the direction of reconciliation should commence right from the start of the case and not that such effort should not be made at any later stage. It would therefore, follow that the matter is not one of jurisdiction. If no endeavour had been made by the court, it will undoubtedly be a serious omission which has to be taken into account. But it cannot affect the jurisdiction of the court to try the case. It also follows that, as it is the constant duty of the court to bring about a reconciliation, such efforts are not only open to the appellate court or courts but that it is appropriate that these courts also should make the endeavour.”

    In the case of Raghunath v. Urmila Devi (supra) it was held as follows (at page 204):—

    “In view of the provision of law, it is the duty of the trial Court to make every endeavour to bring about reconciliation between the parties. The duty is to be performed consistently with the nature and circumstances of the case. The object behind this provision is to provide all help in the maintenance of marital ties and restoration of peace of the estranged couple. Emphasis is, however, laid that steps for bringing about reconciliation between the parties should be taken by the Court “in the first instance”. In other words, the endeavour should be made right from the start of the case. This does not, however, mean that the attempt for bringing about reconciliation can be made only at the initial stage of the case and not at any later stage. The effort in that direction should be made by the court whenever the circumstances of the case warrant it to do so. The contention of the learned counsel for the opp. party No. 1 that the endeavour for bringing about reconciliation can be made only after the closure of the final hearing of the case and before the Court proceeds to grant any relief under the Act cannot therefore be sustained. The words “in the first instance”, in sub-sec. (2) of S. 23 do not bear out that contention. These words indicate that the court should make use of its good offices for bringing about reconciliation between the estranged parties at any stage or a later stage whenever it finds it possible to do so regard being had to the nature and circumstances of the case. However, if no endeavour is made by the Court though it was possible to do so consistently with the nature and circumstances of the case the Court would be failing to perform a duty which the law enjoins upon it…..”

    14. In my considered opinion, the stands taken by the counsel of both sides are of extreme views and are not acceptable to me. The true meaning and import of the aforesaid provision is as to what I have said above.

    15. The other submission raised on behalf of the petitioner that no procedure u/S. 23(2) of the Act is to be followed unless there is determination by the court as to whether there is a relationship of husband and wife between the parties or not is without any substance for the simple reason that the provision under the Act does not provide for any such determination before following the procedure u/S. 23(2). If the said submission is accepted that will amount the holding a preliminary trial, which is not warranted under the provision of the Act.

    16. Coming to the facts of the present case, it appears from the impugned order that the only ground for allowing the prayer of the opp. party for a reconciliation between the parties by the court below is that the provision of S. 23(2) is a mandatory one and it has to follow the aforesaid procedure before starts of the evidence. The trial court has not considered the facts of this case before ordering for reconciliation. As I have held above, no doubt, a duty is cast on the court to take steps for reconciliation between the parties, the stage at which this procedure has to be determined by the court after taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of this case. As the court has not applied its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and has passed the impugned order only on erroneous ground, the court below has acted illegally and material irregularities in exercise of jurisdiction in passing the impugned order.

    17. Accordingly, I set aside the impugned order and remit back the case to the court below for reconsideration of the case in accordance with law in the light of the observations made above. It will consider as to whether in the facts and circumstances of the case it is possible to make an endeavour to bring about the reconciliation at the very beginning of the case or at the later stage.

    18. In the result, the application is allowed with the direction and observation made above. However, there shall be no order as to cost.

    Application allowed.

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    Comments

    Sushma Kumari v. Om Prakash Opposite Party.
    (Mar 5, 1992)