S.S Sandhawalia, C.J:—Whether the surrender by a scheduled tribe raiyat of his statutory right to hold land for the purposes of cultivation (as defined in section 6) would amount to a transfer within the meaning of S. 71A of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908? In the alternative would such a surrender directly coupled with the subsequent settlement of such land by the landlord be a transfer within the ambit of the said S. 71A of the Act? These are the two significant and inter-related questions which have necessitated this reference to the Full Bench.

2. The facts may be noticed with relative brevity having relevance to the issues aforesaid. On the petitioner's own showing, the land in dispute herein stood recorded in the name of Lalu Oraon, the father of respondent 4. The said Lalu Oraon, by a registered deed executed on the 29th Mar. 1954, surrendered the said land in favour of his landlord, Mahendra Narayan Tiwari. This was then purported to be allotted to one Jogendra Narayan Tiwari said to be one of the co-sharers, who executed a registered deed of settlement dt. 30th March, 1954 in favour of Shrimati Mantoran Kuwari on an annual rental of Rs. 134/-. The said settlee later transferred the land in favour of her daughter, Shrimati Parbati Debi by a registered deed of gift dt. 16th Feb. 1979. In turn the said Shrimati Parbati Debi then transferred the land by a registered sale deed dt. 21st Sept. 1981 in favour of the petitioner Shrimati Bina Rani Ghosh.

3. Subsequently the petitioner was served with a notice dt. 29th Dec. 1981 by respondent 3, the Special Officer, Scheduled Area Regulation, Ranchi, to show cause why the and should not be restored in favour of Gangaram Oraon, respondent 4. In pursuance thereof, the petitioner appeared and showed cause, and after c keen contest, in which evidence was led by the parties, respondent 3, by his order (annexure 4) directed the restoration of the land in favour of respondent No. 4 under S. 71A of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act (hereinafter called the ‘Act’). Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Additional Collector, Ranchi, who, by his considered order (annexure 5) dt. 21st Mar. 1984, dismissed the appeal. The petitioner then filed the revision before the Commissioner, which also met the same fate by the latter's detailed order (annexure 6) dt. 9th April, 1984. The present writ petition seeks to challenge the concurrent orders of the aforesaid three authorities.

4. Now, the core of the argument of Mr. S.B Sinha, the learned counsel for the petitioner, is that a mere surrender by a raiyat of his right was not a transfer which could possibly attract the provisions of S. 71A of the Act. It was contended that the concept of transfer under the said section is identical with that of the transfer of property under S. 5 of the T.P Act. Consequently, according to counsel, a mere surrender by itself or even when coupled with the subsequent settlement of land by the landlord would not amount to a transfer which was hit by S. 71 A. Reliance was placed on Trilochan Panda v. Dinabandhu Panda (1918) 3 Pat LJ 88 : (AIR 1917 Patna 103) and Bhagwandas v. Koka Pahan 1980 BLT (Rep) 35. The larger submission was that the whole proceeding by the authorities below was without jurisdiction and vitiated on this score.

5. At the very threshold it seems apt to clear the decks for the examination of the two questions formulated at the outset because some attempt was made on behalf of the petitioner to befog the real issues involved. On the petitioner's own showing vide annexure 2 (which was her show cause in the court of the Deputy Collector, Scheduled Area Regulation) in reply to the notice under S. 71A issued to her, the firm stand taken on her behalf was in the terms following:

“3. That the land under Khata No. 11 plot No. 672 area 461 decimals and Khata No. 39 plot No. 674 area 4 decimals situated at village Boreya P.S Kanka District Ranchi stand recorded in the name “of Lalu Oraon who surrendered to the ex-landlord in the year 1954 by different registered deed of surrenders.

4. That the ex-landlord took khas possession of the same and thereafter settled the land with Mantoran Kuwari by a registered deed of settlement who built a house over thereafter investing Rs. 25,000/- approximately and soon after Mantoran Kuwari transferred the land with buildings to her daughters against the deed of sale.”

It is manifest from the aforesaid crucial pleading that the petitioner contested the matter on the basis of the surrender of his raiyati right by Lalu Oraon to his landlord and the subsequent settlement thereof by the latter. The whole case was fought around the said issue and the parties led evidence on the point. It was on these premises that the Special Officer, Ranchi, arrived at the following findings:

“The opposite party has stated that Laloo Oraon, father of the petitioner, had surrendered the said land to Kame landlord on 30-3-1954. The landlord settled (unintelligible) the said land again on 30-3-1954 which was purchased by the opposite party under a registered deed. Evidence on behalf of both the parties was adduced. Hence I have come to the conclusion that the petitioner is the son of a schedule tribe raiyat recorded in the khatian. The surrender has been forgedly got executed by the father of the petitioner. The date of the surrender and that of the settlement are the same, which is illegal and the land has been occupied fraudulently by illegal means. The opposite party has purchased the land without obtaining permission from the “Deputy Commissioner which contravenes section 46 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act. Hence I order that the aforesaid land and house be restored to the petitioner without compensation under section 71A of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act.”

Equally evident it is from the order of the Additional Collector (vide annexure 5) that in the appellate forum also the issue was the validity or otherwise of the alleged surrender and the subsequent settlement of the land. In the revisional forum before the Commissioner (vide annexure 6) too, the issue primarily was the fraudulent nature or otherwise of the alleged surrender and the subsequent settlement. It is thus plain that herein there is a concurrent finding of as many as three forums on the basic point in issue. However, in fairness, one must notice though regretfully that the learned counsel for the petitioner sought a reappraisal and piece-meal consideration of same evidence in the courts below. Even in the situation of a concurrent finding by as many as three authorities below, we were persistently invited to reappraise and assess for ourselves the evidence of A.W's. 1, 3 and 4 whose isolated statements were placed on record dehors what had been adduced by the other side. It is significant to note that despite repeated opportunities given, the petitioner did not care to produce the registered deeds executed on the 29th or 30th of Mar. 1954. The courts below were entitled to draw an adverse inference therefrom and which, in our opinion, they rightly did. It perhaps deserves reiteration that it is not within the province of the Writ Court to convert itself into a court of first instance or an appellate forum for appraising and appreciating evidence afresh on findings of fact which stand concluded by forums having jurisdiction over the matter. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, persisted for examination of what, according the him, were the violations of the procedural provisions of the Civil P.C by the authorities below and in contending that the findings of fact arrived at were not sustainable and they border on perversity. These submissions have only to be noticed and rejected because it seems settled beyond cavil that the appreciation of evidence is normally beyond the scope of the Writ Court, and we see no reason herein to depart from the said rule. If authority were needed for such a plain proposition, it is there in the recent Full Bench decision in Mahanth Dhansukh Giri v. State of Bihar AIR 1985 Pat 29.

5A. Equally in this context, we wish to notice that before the referring Division Bench also an argument on the basis of an allege forcible dispossession was sought to be raised. However, without adverting closely to the aspect, the case was referred to a larger Bench for consideration of the question of the scop and meaning of the word ‘transfer’ in S. 71 of the Act. The indepth examination of the case above discloses that herein no question of forcible dispossession, etc., can now arise and in essence the sole question here as also in the three forums below is with regard to the validity of the surrender of a tenancy and its subsequent settlement with another on the very same day of the single transaction Learned counsel for the parties ultimate canvassed this very question before us.

6. Inevitably the controversy herein revolves around the language of S. 71A which was inserted in the Act by serial No. 3 of the Bihar Scheduled Areas Regulation, 1969, the relevant part whereof may be read at the very outset:

“71A. Power to restore possession to member of Scheduled Tribes over land unlawfully transferred.—

If at any time it comes to the notice of the Deputy Commissioner that transfer of land belonging to a raiyat who is a member of the Scheduled Tribes has taken place in contravention of Section 46 or any other provision of this Act or by any fraudulent method (including decrees obtained in suit by fraud and collusion) he may, after giving reasonable opportunity to the transferee, why is proposed to be evicted, to show cause an after making necessary enquiry in the matter evict the transferee from such land without payment of compensation and restore it to the transferor or his heir, or, in case the transfers or his heir is not available or is not willing to agree to such restoration, re-settle it with another raiyat belonging to the Schedule Tribes according to the village custom for the disposal of an abandoned holding”.

7. Now, whilst construing the aforesaid provision and in particular the word ‘transfer employed therein, one must recall the settle and, indeed, the hallowed principle that word or a phrase in a statute takes its hue from the context in which it is inlaid. Section 71 particularly and the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 generally, are not statutes which have to be construed in isolation and their interpretation inevitably involves some reference to their legislative history and the purpose and object to which it is directed. The historical retrospect here spans a period of more than a century. Its true perspective is against the back-drop or the primordial backwardness of the Scheduled Tribes interspersed into deeply wooded and semitropical forests of Chota Nagpur Division and the adjoining district of Santhal Parganas. The underlying rationale of the regional legislation here including Regulation III of 1872 may well be noticed from the final settlement report in the district of Santhal Parganas by J.F Gantzer, which is supplemental to the earlier and more celebrated and exhaustive report of Sir Hugh Mc Pherson:

“The question of transfers is one of the most important with which this settlement has had to deal, and it is in fact one which affects the very root of the whole Santhal Parganas system. Broadly speaking it may be said that the whole object of the agrarian law of the district since 1872, when Regulation III of that year was introduced, is to ensure that the population should be allowed to remain undisturbed in possession of its ancestral property, and that any reclamation of waste lands which is done in any village shall be done only by the Jamabandi Raiyats of the village. The history of the district plainly shows that the vast majority of the people in it are quite unable to grasp the principle of outsiders taking possession of their land whether legally or illegally, that is to say either by force or by the ordinary means of acquiring land such as sale, mortgage or certain forms of sub-lease.”

For our purposes it would perhaps be unnecessary to delve beyond the year 1879 when the Chota Nagpur Landlord and Tenants Procedure Act of the said year was enacted and apart from the subsequent amendments made therein complementary legislation in the shape of Chota Nagpur Commutation Act, 1897, the Chota Nagpur Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1903 and the Chota Nagpur (Amendment) Act, 1905 were also duly promulgated. Because of the necessity to amend and consolidate the law relating to the landlord and tenant and the settlements of lands in Chota Nagpur the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 was promulgated and the statutes mentioned above were then repealed. Patently, to give further protection to raiyats in general and in particular to those who were members of the Scheduled Tribes amendments were made in the Act by substituting S. 46 by S. 14 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1947 placing restrictions on the transfer of the right by a raiyat. To effectuate the same purpose later S. 71A, which falls for construction, was inserted by serial No. 3 of the Bihar Scheduled Areas Regulation, 1969 with specific reference to the raiyats who were members of the Scheduled Tribes. By the same amending Act, in S. 72 a further limitation was placed on the surrender of land by a raiyat in so far as it could be done only with the previous sanction of the Deputy Commissioner in writing.

8. In the light of the above, it seems plain that from the history of the statute the language employed therein and the tenor of the amendments made that the larger purpose is to protect the transfer of the statutory rights by raiyats in general and those belonging to the Scheduled Tribes in particular. Consequently, a liberal construction to S. 71A and in particular to the word ‘transfer’ employed therein has to be given to aid and advance the purposes of the Act.

9. In the context of the above, the basic stand on behalf of the respondents taken by Mr. Deo (whilst countering the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner) is that the surrender of land by a raiyat to his landlord is by itself a transfer within the meaning of S. 71A and would be affected and hit by its prohibition when the same has been done without the previous sanction of the Deputy Commissioner in writing. The further submission was that in the absence of a specific definition in the Act itself of the word ‘transfer’ section 71A must be widely and liberally construed in favour of the class of Scheduled Tribes which it intends to protect. A frontal challenge was also laid by the respondents to the correctness of Trilochan Panda v. Dinabandhu Panda, (1980) 3 Pat LJ 88 : (AIR 1917 Patna 103) and Bhagwandas v. Koka Pahan, 1980 BLT (Rep) 35 which were relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner.

10. Now, to appreciate the rival contentions forcefully advanced by either side, it is necessary first to advert to S. 6 of the Act and to read the relevant part thereof:

“6. Meaning of ‘raiyat’.— (1) ‘Raiyat’ means primarily a person who has acquired a “right to hold land for the purpose of cultivating it by himself or by members of his family, or by hired servants or with the aid of partners; and includes the successor-in-interest of persons who have acquired such a right, but does not include a Mundari-khunt-kattidar.

Explanation. — Where a tenant of land has the right to bring it under cultivation, he shall be deemed to have acquired a right to hold it for the purpose of cultivation, notwithstanding that he uses it for the purpose of gathering the produce of it or of grazing cattle on it.

(2) A person shall not be deemed to be a raiyat unless he holds land either under a proprietor or immediately under a tenure-holder or immediately under a Mundari-khunt-kattidar.

It seems plain from the language of the statute that the law in terms recognises the raiyat's right to hold and cultivate the land either by himself or by members of his family or by hired servants, etc. Because of this peculiarity, one may coin it into the terminological phrase of a raiyati right. Viewed either from the aspect of a conferment by statute or a recognition of a legally acquired right, the result would indeed be the same. Once it is held, as it must be, that the raiyati right is a statutory legal right, it necessarily follows that either surrendering or in a way passing on the same to the landlord would involve the transfer of such a right. Reference may next be made to S. 46 of the Act which again places stringent restrictions on the transfer of the rights by a raiyat. Particular reference is called to clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) of the said section which invalidates all such transfers by sale, gift or any other contract or agreement and equally any mortgage or lease which may or tend to go beyond a period of five years. The proviso to sub-sec. (1) of S. 46, within very narrow confines, permits transfer of the rights by the raiyat if the detailed conditions specified therein stand well satisfied. Learned counsel for the respondents had rightly relied on S. 47 as highlighting the fact that the restrictions on the sale of a raiyat's right even under the orders of the court were stringency placed by the said section. This would again indicate how zealously the law wished to safeguard the raiyats from the inroads of any private depredations.

11. Coming now to S. 71A, what first meet the eye is the fact that here exceptional protection has been given to the raiyati right of persons who are members of the Scheduled Tribes. Apparently, the working of the Act had shown that the existing protection generally afforded by the statute were inadequate with regard to the majority of the unsophisticated members of the Scheduled Tribes and, therefore, by serial No. 3 of the Bihar Scheduled Areas Regulation, 1969, this section was specially inserted for their benefits Again, the protection given here is in wide ranging terms against all unlawful transfers. It embraces in its wide sweep not only the contraventions of S. 46 or of any other provisions of the Act but equally transfers by any fraudulent method including decree obtained in a suit by fraud and collusion. It is plain that the protection has been given in the widest amplitude. Yet again the power to set aside such illegal transfer is given to the Deputy Commissioner without any limit of time when it comes to his notice. Obviously enough the Deputy Commissioner can here act suo motu.

12. Lastly reference may also be made to S. 72 with regard to the surrender of a land by a raiyat. By virtue of the amending Act of 1947 such a surrender can only be with the previous sanction of the Deputy Commissioner in writing. The significance, therefore, which the law now attaches to the surrender of land by raiyats is not to be easily lost sight of. Where read with S. 6, such a surrender is a transfer of the statutory right of the raiyat to both hold the land and cultivate it either by himself or through others. As long as the raiyati right remains intact, the landlord has merely a right to claim rent from the raiyat and no more. The surrender of the raiyati right, therefore involves a transfer of a statutory right in property which would convert the mere right to rent into one of entering into khas possession of the land and retaining or cultivating the same to the exclusion of all others. This is expressly recognised and conferred by sub-sec. (4) of S. 72 which provides that when a raiyat surrenders his holding, the landlord may enter on the holding and either let it to another tenant or take it into cultivation himself. I would thus seem that a raiyati right as defined in S. 6 and flowing from the other provisions of the Act is valuable right in property which cannot in the eye of law escape the label of a transfer of such property rights. The solicitude with which the law herein stands guard over the raiyati right and more so when these raiyats are members of Scheduled Tribes, seems evident from the wide ranging provision of S. 71A. Therefore, it must be held that looking at the wider scheme of the Act a surrender of land by a raiyat would by itself amount to a transfer and if done without the previous sanction of the Deputy Commissioner in writing, it would obviously be in contravention of the said S. 72.

13. Another aspect which calls for pointed notice here is the fact that the word ‘transfer’ employed in S. 71A is neither defined in the said section nor any where else in the Act. In the context this word is laid in S. 71A would leave little manner of doubt that it was intended to cover all transfers actual or implied. Apart from this, in the absence of a definition, the word ‘transfer’ has to be given its ordinary dictionary meaning and once it is so, it is settled beyond doubt that it is a word of wide import. This seems to be evident on principle. But if authority were needed, it exists in Sashi Bhusan Singha v. Sankar Mahato, AIR 1950 Cal 252. Therein what fell for consideration was the use of the word ‘transfer’ in S. 26F of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885. Their Lordships observed as under:

“(13) As indicated already in S. 26F of the Act, there is no indication that the word ‘transfer’ is used in any restricted sense. It is used in the general and ordinary sense, and if any assistance can be obtained from sub-s. (11) the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the “intention of the Legislature was not to limit the scope of the word ‘transfer’ in any particular manner. If without reference to any other section in the Act the interpretation of the word ‘transfer’ is to be based, we think that it is the wider meaning and not any restricted one which can be put upon the word transfer.”

“(16) The word ‘transfer’ means the passage of a right from one individual to another. Such transfer may take place in one of three different ways. It may be by virtue of an act done by a transferor with an intention, as in the case of a conveyance or a gift, or, secondly, it may be by operation of law, as in the case of forfeiture, bankruptcy, intestacy, etc. Or thirdly, it may be an involuntary transfer effected through Court, as in execution of a decree for either enforcing a mortgage, or for recovery of money due under a simple money decree. The word ‘transfer’ in its ordinary sense would include all these different kinds of transfer.”

14. In fairness to Mr. Sinha, one must refer to Trilochan Panda's case (1980 BLT (Rep) 35) (supra) on which firm reliance was sought to be placed. Therein the Division Bench was considering the use of the word ‘transfer’ in S. 46 of the Central Provinces Tenancy Act. The said section pertaining to the devolution of the occupancy right under the said Act is materially different and has, in no way, any identity with section 46 of our Act or S. 71A which we are called upon to consider. Even otherwise the provision and purpose of the Central Provinces Tenancy Act, 1898 is materially different from the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908, which we are called upon to construe. None of the considerations which have been adverted to in the earlier part of the judgment would be necessarily applicable to the construction of the provisions of the Central Provinces Tenancy Act. Trilochan Panda's case is, therefore, plainly distinguishable. However, if the observation in the context of the Central Provinces Tenancy Act are sought to be projected as a warrant for the proposition that a surrender of land by a raiyat can never amount to transfer then, with the deepest deference, the judgment does not lay down the law correctly and has to be overruled on that point. The single Bench judgment in Bario Santhal v. Fakir Santhal, AIR 1924 Patna 793 (2) had merely followed Trilochan Panda's case and it missed the distinguishing features of the language employed in the Central Provinces Tenancy Act and those employed in our Act. It also deserves recalling that Kanhaiya Singh, J., in Golap Gadi Goala v. Rampariksha Rewani, AIR 1958 Pat 553, after expressly referring to this judgment, took a contrary view. Later on, Golap Gadi Goala's case has been expressly approved in Lakhia Singh Patra v. Jotilal Aditya Deo, AIR 1968 Pat 160. Apparently, Bario Santhal's case (supra) can no longer hold the field but even otherwise, for the reasons recorded earlier, I would expressly overrule the same.

15. Lastly reference must also be made to the Division Bench judgment in Bhagwandas v. Koka Pahan, 1980 BLT (Rep) 35. Therein it was observed that the transfer as envisaged in section 71A must be understood as in the T.P Act and, therefore, a surrender by a raiyat would not be a transfer within the meaning of S. 71A. Reference to the very brief discussion on that point would indicate that the issue was not adequately and fully canvassed before the Bench. Learned counsel for the parties apparently were remiss in not citing either principle or precedent relevant to the point nor was the attention of the Bench drawn to the history and the purpose of the legislation and the provisions of the connected sections. It seems to hive been observed, as a matter of first impression, that the word ‘transfer’ in S. 71A must be given the same meaning as the phrase ‘transfer of property’ referred to by S. 5 of the T.P Act. With the greatest respect, it seems to me that the error has crept in from the failure to notice that S. 71A in a very wide ranging context talks of transfer alone, while S. 5 of the T.P Act employs the composite term of a “transfer of property” as a special term of art. Equally it has to be borne in mind that the concept of transfer of property is not in the defining S. 2 but appears in a later elaboration for the particular purposes of S. 5 and peculiar to the said statute. It is in this context that the salient warning in Laurence Arthur Adamson v. Melbourne and Metropolitan Board of Works, AIR 1929 PC 181 has to be recalled that it is unsatisfactory and unsafe to seek a meaning of the word used in an Act in the definition clause of another statute dealing with cognate matter even by the same legislature — much more so by other legislature. That view has been again forcefully reiterated in Jainarayan v. Motiram Gangaram, AIR 1949 Nag 34. With the deepest deference, therefore, it must be held that the passing observation on this point in Bhagwan Das v. Koka Pahan (supra) does not lay down the law correctly and is hereby overruled.

16. To conclude on this aspect, it must be held that on the larger purpose of the statute, and the language of S. 71A, that a surrender by a Scheduled Tribe raiyat of his statutory right to hold land would amount to a transfer within the meaning of the said section of the Act.

17. The learned counsel for the respondents rightly contended on his alternative ground that such a surrender directly coupled with the subsequent settlement of such land by the landlord would be a transfer. He is indeed on a firmer ground. Herein there is a consistent and concurrent finding that the surrender and the subsequent settlement was, indeed, one transaction for the purposes of circumventing the restriction imposed by the Act. As has been noticed earlier, these concurrent findings are unassailable. Once that is so, it seems well settled by a consistent line of precedent in this Court that a surrender coupled with a settlement, which, in essence, is one transaction, would amount to a transfer within the ambit of S. 46 or 71A. These judgments make it clear that if the surrender and settlement form one transaction or otherwise then it would be transfer even in an extreme case when the settlement takes place nearly three years after the original surrender. In Golap Gadi Goala case (AIR 1958 Pat 553) (supra) it was categorically observed as follows:

“Unsophisticated as the people of that area are, but for the legislation, they would have been wiped out by people with superior intellect and bigger purse. Here also, the main object of the arrangement was to effect a transfer of the disputed land to the plaintiffs in satisfaction of their debts, and since this could not have been done directly because of the prohibition contained in S. 46 of the Act they took recourse to this circuitous arrangement. Their object is too patent to be discussed. In my opinion, such a transaction amounts to a clear circumvention of S. 46 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act and cannot be legally given effect to.”

The aforesaid view stands affirmed in Lakhi Singh Patra v. Jotilal Aditya Deo (AIR 1968 Patna 160) (supra). Lastly, in Bhagwandas v. Koka Pahan, (1980 B.L.T (Rep) 35) it was held to be axiomatic as under within this jurisdiction:

“There is no dispute about the legal position that if it is proved that the surrender of a raiyat land of a member of the Scheduled Tribe was brought about in order to take “settlement of the same and in other words surrender and settlement are proved to be one transaction or both are parts of the same transaction. Section 46 of the Act will be attracted consequently the proceeding under S. 71-A of the Act will be maintainable.”

18. Affirming the aforesaid judgments, would hold that a surrender by a Scheduled Tribe raiyat directly coupled with the subsequent settlement of such land by the landlord would be a transfer within the ambit of section 71A of the Act.

19. Both the meaningful questions formulated at the outset having been answered in the terms above, the present writ petition must fail and is hereby dismissed. However, here will be no order as to costs.

S. Roy, J., 20. I agree with learned the Chief Justice that the writ petition should be dismissed without cost. I also agree that the word ‘transfer’ in S. 71A Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 (the Act) as interpreted in Bhagwan Das v. Koka Pahan, (1980 B.L.T (Rep) 35 supra) must be overruled. I was a party to that decision and, therefore, recording some reasons for differing with what was laid down in that case. I also adopt the reasons given by the earned Chief Justice.

21. Admittedly Lalu Oraon surrendered the land in question to the ex-landlord without the previous sanction of the Deputy Commissioner. This was purported to have been done under S. 72 of the Act. The questions to be answered in this case have been formulated by the learned Chief Justice. Relevant portions of S. 71A have been quoted in the judgment of Hon'ble the Chief Justice. The relevant portion of S. 72 reads as follows:—

“Section 72(1): Surrender of land by raiyat, — A raiyat not bound by a lease or other agreement for a fixed period may, at the end of any agricultural year, surrender his holding with the previous sanction of the Deputy Commissioner in writing.”

In sub-sec. (5) provision has been made for enabling the raiyat to surrender whole or part of holding with the previous sanction of the Deputy Commissioner in writing.

22. It is common knowledge that some of the provisions of the Act are in the nature of beneficial legislation because provisions have been made therein to protect the interest of raiyats who are members of the scheduled tribes in their raiyati holdings. Section 71A, therefore, must be construed liberally. I am aware that the Supreme Court in Regional Director, Employees' State Insurance Corporation v. Ramanuja (AIR 1985 SC 278) put a caution to this by observing that “but where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own, there is no warrant for the Court to travel beyond the scheme and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered by the scheme.” We must, therefore, guard ourselves not to construe the word ‘transfer’ in S. 71A to include such transactions which were not intended to be included by the legislature. Section 71A is based on the principle of distributive justice. This section is intended and meant as an instrument for alleviating oppression, redressing bargaining imbalance, cancelling unfair advantages and generally overseeing and insuring probity and fair dealing. It seeks to reopen transactions between parties having unequal bargaining power resulting in transfer of title from one to another due to force of circumstances and also seeks to restitute the parties to their original position, (see Lingappa Pochanna Appelwar v. State of Maharastra (1985) 1 SCC 479 : (AIR 1985 SC 389)).

23. In S. 46 of the Act by sub-sec. (1) transfer by a raiyat of his right in his holding or any portion thereof has been prohibited, except mortgage or lease for a period expressed or implied for a period not exceeding five years and bhugat bandha mortgage to a registered Co-operative Society for a period not exceeding seven years. It provides that an occupancy raiyat who is a member of Scheduled Tribes may transfer with the previous sanction of the Deputy Commissioner, his right in his holding or a portion of his holding by sale, exchange, gift or will to another person who is a member of the Scheduled Tribes and who is a resident within the local limits of the area of the Police Station within which the holding is situate. It will be noticed that in this section not only for transfer inter vivos as understood under the Transfer of Property Act viz., sale, exchange and gift, previous sanction of the Deputy Commissioner is required to be obtained, but also for the purpose of will previous sanction of the Deputy Commissioner is necessary. In S. 46, the word ‘transfer’ is not what is meant under the T.P Act because will is not a transfer under the T.P Act. The meaning of the word ‘transfer’ in S. 46 is, therefore, wider than what is under the T.P Act.

24. If we analyse S. 71A we will notice that the Deputy Commissioner has been given power to restore raiyati land of a member of the Scheduled Tribes, if a transfer has taken place:—

(i) in contravention of Section 46;

(ii) in contravention of any other provisions of the Act;

(iii) by any fraudulent method including decree obtained in suit by fraud and collusion.

Decree of a Court by which the title of person is declared is not ‘transfer’ as generally understood; but by Cl. (iii) it has also been included as a mode of transfer, albeit if the decree was obtained by fraud and collusion. There is no difficulty in understanding Cl. (i) because what is transfer within the meaning of Section 46 has been enumerated in that Section. Clause (ii) speaks about transfer in contravention of any other provisions of the Act. In other words, besides S. 46, there are sections, transactions under which may amount to transfer. It is well settled that each word of a section must be given effect and so the words in Cl. (ii) must have full play. Section 72 mandates that a raiyat whose lease is not for a fixed period, may surrender his holding or part thereof with the previous sanction of the Deputy Commissioner in writing. Any surrender made in contravention of S. 72 must be held to be bad in law. By surrender, right to hold land is given up by a raiyat in favour of another, who becomes entitled to hold the same. In effect, by surrender the raiyat looses his title in the land. The Legislature, therefore, provided that surrender may be made only with previous sanction of the Deputy Commissioner in writing. It must, therefore, be held that provisions referred to in Cl. (ii) is S. 72. Surrender of right by a raiyat in his land must be held to be transfer within the meaning of Section 71A and statute provides that if it was made in contravention of S. 72, the surrender may be annuled.

25. In the proceeding under S. 71A, it was also held that there was clear nexus between the surrender and the settlement and they formed one single transaction. Mr. Sinha strenuously argued that this finding was perverse as it was not supported by evidence. Apart from what have been stated by the learned Chief Justice, even assuming that there was no evidence on the basis of which that finding can be sustained, in view of the fact that as the surrender was made without the previous sanction in writing of the Deputy Commissioner there had been contravention of S. 72 consequently, it must be held that land so surrendered could have been restored under S. 71A of the Act.

26. I agree with the event expressed by Mr. Lord the Chief Justice.

Petition dismissed.