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  • Hari Lal Agrawal, J.
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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The court disposed of two civil revision applications together because the facts and the legal question were common and identical. Two title suits were instituted in the court of the Third Munsif at Patna under the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 ("the Act"). Title Suit No. 152 of 1976 (corresponding to C.R. No. 596 of 1979) was instituted by the petitioner himself; the other title suit was instituted by the petitioner's father who died during the pendency of the application in this Court.

Both suits were initially founded on the single ground of eviction for the "expiry of the period of tenancy." According to the petitioners, the opposite party in the first case stopped remitting monthly rent from November 1976 and in C.R. 881 from March 1975. The petitioners filed applications to amend the respective plaints (on 18-1-1979 and 2-2-1979) to add paragraph 11A, alleging default in lawful payment/remittance of rent for various months and seeking to rely on that as an additional ground for eviction.

The opposite parties opposed the amendment applications on the ground that allowing them would change the nature of the suits and introduce a new cause of action to their prejudice. The trial court rejected the amendment applications as not appearing to be necessary, but observed the question would be considered at the hearing of the suits. The petitioners filed the present revision applications challenging those orders. The opposite parties did not appear before this Court; the matter was heard ex parte.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial court should have allowed amendment of the plaints to add a subsequent ground for eviction (default in payment of rent) where the suits were originally instituted only on the ground of expiry of the period of tenancy.
  2. Whether a plaintiff in a suit under the Rent Control Acts may, during the pendency of the suit, introduce by amendment a cause of action or ground for eviction that arose after the institution of the suit.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The petitioners sought to amend the plaints to add paragraph 11A, alleging default in lawful payment/remittance of rent for various months, and to rely on that default as an additional ground for eviction in suits originally based on expiry of tenancy.
  • Learned counsel for the petitioners relied on several authorities (including Prem Lal v. Jadav Ghand and other High Court decisions) to show that an additional ground arising during the pendency of a suit may be introduced by amendment.
  • They argued that permitting the amendment would shorten litigation, preserve parties' rights and subserve the ends of justice; and that the court can take into account subsequent events that give rise to additional grounds for relief.

Opposite Parties' Arguments

  • The opposite parties opposed the amendments on the principal ground that allowing them would change the nature of the suits and introduce a new cause of action, to their great prejudice.
  • Other detailed defenses or factual responses of the opposite parties are not recorded in the opinion (the opposite parties did not appear before this Court and the matter was heard ex parte).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ran Vijaya Shahi v. Bala Prasad Motani, AIR 1978 Pat 91 Appellate court may take notice that, during pendency, the lease terminated by efflux of time and the renewal period was over, even though the suit was instituted only for recovery of arrears of rent. The court cited this decision to support the proposition that a subsequent event (termination of lease) occurring during pendency can be noticed and relied upon to support relief not originally pleaded.
Smt. Abnash Kaur v. Dr. Avinash Nayyar, AIR 1975 Delhi 46 (Full Bench) There is no inflexible rule preventing addition of a cause of action arising after filing of the eviction petition by amendment while the matter is before the Rent Controller; amendments have been allowed where a new ground arises during pendency. The court relied on the Full Bench's review of decisions to show that amendments introducing subsequent causes of action can be permitted when the matter remains before the Rent Controller.
Tarakpada Kirti v. Ruplekha Chatterjee, AIR 1978 Cal 189 Permitted amendment of the plaint where plaintiff originally sued for default in payment and subletting but later amended to plead expiry of the lease period—illustrating allowance of subsequent grounds by amendment. The court referenced this decision as another High Court example where a later-arising ground (expiry of lease) was allowed to be introduced by amendment.
Prem Lal v. Jadav Ghand, AIR 1979 Raj 44 Landlord filed suit for eviction on bona fide requirements; during pendency tenant defaulted in payment of rent and the plaintiff's amendment to introduce default as a new ground for eviction was allowed. The court treated this as a direct supporting authority for permitting amendment to introduce a new ground of eviction arising during pendency of the suit, and followed it in allowing the present amendments.
V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal, AIR 1979 SC 1745 Holding that giving of notice under Section 106, Transfer of Property Act, for determination of the lease was unnecessary; making out a case under the Rent Act for eviction was sufficient. The court relied on this Supreme Court decision to support the view that termination of tenancy (by notice under S.106 T.P. Act) is not a necessary component of cause of action under the Rent Control Acts, reinforcing the permissibility of pleading grounds for eviction that arise subsequently.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a statutory and purposive analysis. It noted that Section 11 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 prescribes multiple grounds for eviction, including (a) non-payment of rent (two months' rent lawfully payable not paid) and (b) expiry of the period of tenancy for tenants holding on a lease for a specified period.

The court explained the general legal principle that Rent Control Acts restrict landlords' rights but do not eliminate the landlord's entitlement to seek eviction on any ground that the statute recognizes. Thus, where a landlord originally sues on one ground (expiry of tenancy), and during pendency another statutory ground (default in rent) arises, there is no plausible reason to deny the plaintiff the opportunity to inform the court and press that additional ground.

The opinion relied on authorities from several High Courts and on a Supreme Court decision to establish two related points: (1) courts may take into account subsequent events that give rise to additional grounds for eviction while the matter is pending, and (2) the termination of tenancy (e.g., by notice under Section 106, T.P. Act) is not necessarily an essential component of the cause of action under Rent Control legislation following the cited Supreme Court authority. The court emphasized established principles favoring amendments to shorten litigation, preserve parties' rights and serve justice.

Finally, the court framed an important procedural safeguard: the introduction of a subsequent cause of action by amendment is permissible so long as the defendant has an opportunity to meet the new case by amending the written statement and by leading evidence in support of any defense. Applying these principles, the court found the trial court had committed an apparent error of jurisdiction in refusing the amendments.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court allowed the two civil revision applications, set aside the trial court's orders refusing the amendments, and directed that the trial court allow the amendments to the plaints.

Specific orders and direct consequences:

  • The impugned orders rejecting the amendment applications were set aside and both amendment applications were allowed.
  • The trial court was directed to permit the amendments and to grant the defendants liberty to amend their written statements or to file additional written statements in response to the newly pleaded grounds.
  • The trial court was directed to dispose of the suits within two months from receipt of the records.
  • The court made no order as to costs.

Implications: The decision directly affects the parties by permitting the landlord-plaintiffs to amend their plaints to rely on a subsequently-arisen ground of eviction and by requiring the trial court to afford defendants an opportunity to meet the new case. The opinion applies and cites existing case law rather than purporting to establish a novel legal principle; it does not state that it is laying down a new precedent beyond its application to the matters before it.

Revision allowed.
Show full summary ...

    Sachchidanand Kishore Varma And Etc. Etc. v. Heeranand And Etc. Opposite Parties.

    1. By this judgment I am disposing of the two civil revision applications as the facts and the question of law are common and identical.

    2. The question is as to whether the amendment of the plaints of the suits giving rise to these applications, on the facts and in the circumstances mentioned hereunder, should have been allowed by the trial court?

    3. Two title suits were instituted in the court of the Third Munsif at Patna for eviction of the opposite parties under the provisions of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 (for short ‘the Act’). Whereas Title Suit No. 152 of 1976, corresponding to C.R No. 596 of 1979, was instituted by the petitioner himself, the other title suit was instituted by the father of the petitioner 1 who died during the pendency of the application in this Court.

    The grounds for eviction of the opposite parties in both the cases are common namely, ‘expiry of the period of tenancy’. According to the case of the petitioners, the opposite party in the first case stopped remitting the monthly rent since November, 1976 and the opposite party in C.R 881 since March, 1975. Applications were filed for amendment of the respective plaints on 18-1-1979 and 2-2-1979, seeking to add a paragraph in each of the plaints as para. 11A, making out a case for eviction of the opposite parties on the ground of default in not lawfully paying or remitting the rent, for various months, of the premises in question. Both the opposite parties opposed the prayer for amendment, inter alia, on the ground that the amendments, if allowed, would change the nature of the suits as well as introduce a new cause of action to their great prejudice.

    The trial court, however, by the impugned orders, rejected the applications on the ground that they did not appear to be necessary, although it further observed that the question would be considered at the time of hearing of the suits. The petitioners have accordingly filed the present applications.

    The opposite parties have chosen not to appear in this Court and, therefore, the matter was heard ex parte.

    4. The question is as to whether the proposed amendments should have been allowed. Section 11 of the Act deals with “eviction of tenants” and prescribes five grounds for their eviction, inter alia, (1) where the amount of two months' rent lawfully payable is not paid within the time fixed by a contract or deposited in accordance with Section 13 thereof and (2) in the case of a tenant holding on a lease for a specified period, on the expiry of the period of tenancy.

    5. It has since been held in a large number of cases that the Rent Control Acts are intended to restrict the rights which the landlords possess either for charging excessive rents or for eviction of tenants, but if within the ambit of those restricted rights the landlord makes out a case for eviction of tenants and a tenant can be evicted from a premises on any of the grounds mentioned for his eviction in the Acts the nature of the suit essentially is one for eviction of the tenant and the landlord can put into service any of the grounds available to him for his eviction.

    The present suits were instituted on only one of the grounds, namely, the expiry of the period of tenancy, and if during the pendency of the suit another ground has become available to the landlord. I do not find any plausible reason for not allowing the plaintiff to inform the court of that subsequent event and press into service this additional ground for the eviction of the opposite parties. Such a view also appears to be justifiable on the well recognised principles that in order to shorten litigation, to preserve the rights of both the parties and to subserve the ends of justice, the court can and should take into consideration the subsequent events and adjudicate the rights of the parties and grant relief available to them.

    In the case of Ran Vijaya Shahi v. Bala Prasad Motani (AIR 1978 Pat 91) it was held that the Appellate Court was entitled to take notice of the fact that during the pendency of the appeal the lease itself had terminated by efflux of time and the period of renewal also was over, although the suit was instituted only for recovery of arrears of rent.

    6. A Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in Smt. Abnash Kaur v. Dr. Avinash Nayyar (AIR 1975 Delhi 46), where the suit was for eviction under the Delhi Rent. Control Act on the ground of non-payment of rent, allowed amendment on the ground that the tenant had caused substantial damage to the premises. On review of a large number of decisions it was observed that there was no inflexible rule that a cause of action arising subsequent to the filing of the petition for eviction cannot be added in the petition by way of amendment, the matter being before the Rent Controller.

    A similar question also fell for consideration before a Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Tarakpada Kirti v. Ruplekha Chatterjee (AIR 1978 Cal 189). There the plaintiff had brought a suit for eviction of the defendant on the ground of default in payment of the monthly rents and also subletting part of the premises. Subsequently the Plaint was amended to the effect that the period of lease having expired the plaintiff was entitled to recovery of possession.

    7. Reliance was also placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners in the case of Prem Lal v. Jadav Ghand (AIR 1979 Raj 44), which is a direct case on the point. There the landlord had filed the suit for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirements and during its pendency the tenant committed default in payment of rent, and the application by the plaintiff for amendment of the plaint seeking to introduce a new ground for eviction was allowed. This decision was rendered before the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal, (AIR 1979 SC 1745) where giving of notice under S. 106, T.P Act for determination of the lease was held to be wholly unnecessary and that making out a case under the Rent Act for eviction of the tenant by itself was sufficient. The learned Acting Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court had made an observation that “the existence of the grounds is not a part of the cause of action” as “what constitutes the cause of action is the termination of the tenancy by service of a notice under S. 106, T.P Act………… the grounds of eviction do not constitute a necessary part of a cause of action for eviction of a tenant from an accommodation………”. Although it is not necessary for me to adhere to this aspect of the matter, since I am following the said authority I may observe that in view of the aforesaid authoritative decision of the Supreme Court, it now cannot be gainsaid that the termination of the tenancy would not constitute the cause of action any more. A cause of action in a suit under the Rent Control Acts for eviction of the tenant would be certainly the accrual of a disability against a tenant pertaining to the grounds mentioned for his eviction due to his conduct or laches, thus disentitling him from the protection against his eviction. There is nothing which precludes a court from permitting the introduction of a cause of action arising subsequent to the filing of a suit by way of amendment so long as the defendant has an opportunity of meeting the new case by amendment of his written statement and by leading evidence in support of the defence, if any.

    8. Instances of amendment of Plaints in other cases can be well cited: for example, where in a suit for confirmation of possession the plaintiff is dispossessed a relief for recovery of possession is allowed. In a suit only for injunction where the mischief is committed, substantive relief is allowed by amendment of the plaint. In a suit for declaration that the order of suspension was illegal, and the plaintiff is dismissed from the service, the dismissal is also challenged by the amendment or the like.

    9. In my considered opinion, therefore the trial Court has committed an apparent error of jurisdiction in refusing to allow the amendment of the plaints. I would accordingly set aside the orders under revision and allow both the applications and direct the trial Court to allow the amendment of the plaints with liberty to the defendants to either amend the written statements or file additional written statements. The trial Court is also directed to dispose of the suits within a period of two months from receipt of the records. In the circumstances, however, I shall make no order as to costs.

    Revision allowed.

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    Comments

    Sachchidanand Kishore Varma And Etc. Etc. v. Heeranand And Etc. Opposite Parties.
    (Jan 27, 1983)