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  • sections 41 and 44 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)
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  • sections 41 and 44 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This application challenges the order dated 19.8.1981 in Case No. 52 G.C. of 1981 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Barh. The magistrate took cognizance under sections 41 and 44 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (the Act) against the petitioners, transferred the case to the file of Sri R.K. Mishra, Judicial Magistrate, Barh, and ordered issuance of summons fixing 30.9.1981 for appearance.

The Bihar State Water Pollution Control & Prevention Board (the Board) filed the complaint against the Manager of Bata India Shoe Company, Mokameh Ghat, and Bata India Limited, Mokamaghat, alleging offences under sections 41 and 44 of the Act arising from discharge of untreated effluents into the Ganges at Mokamaghat. The complaint states that the Board issued notices asking for prescribed information and consent applications, rejected an incomplete consent application filed by the company (letter No. 215 dated 22.2.1980), and sent further registered notices (including on 11.9.1980 and 5.1.1981) asking the company to submit a project report and install a treatment plant. The Board received a chemist’s analysis report (by Shri Binod Bihari Sandwar) dated 5.1.1981 indicating that the effluent from the company had highly polluted the Ganges; copies of correspondence and the report were annexed to the complaint.

The Board resolved in its 5th meeting on 20.11.1980 to file complaints against defaulting industries, including the accused company, and the complaint was filed accordingly. The petitioners challenged the magistrate’s order primarily on the grounds that (1) the prosecution lacked the sanction required by section 49 of the Act and (2) prosecution of petitioner No. 1 (the person who described himself as Manager) was barred under section 47. Other contentions included that the complaint was premature and that the State Board lacked jurisdiction because the Ganges is an inter-state stream under section 17(g) of the Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the magistrate's taking of cognizance was valid given the requirement of prior sanction in writing under section 49 of the Act.
  2. Whether a prosecution and cognizance against petitioner No. 1 (who described himself as the Manager) is permissible under section 47 of the Act.
  3. Whether the complaint was premature because the chemist’s report was dated after the Board’s resolution to file the complaint.
  4. Whether the State Board lacked jurisdiction to prosecute in respect of pollution to the Ganges because section 17(g) excludes inter-state streams from certain powers.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • No prior sanction as required by section 49 of the Act had been obtained; therefore the cognizance is invalid.
  • Prosecution and cognizance against petitioner No. 1 (described as Manager) is bad in law under section 47, because liability under section 47 should attach only to persons who at the time of the offence were in charge of and responsible to the company.
  • The complaint was premature because the chemist’s report (dated 5.1.1981) post-dated the Board’s resolution of 20.11.1980 and, according to the petitioners, that undermines the basis for the resolution.
  • The State Board lacked jurisdiction to initiate prosecution in respect of the Ganges water because section 17(g) refers to "receiving waters (not being water in an inter State stream)", and the Ganges is an inter-state stream.

Respondent (Board)'s Arguments

  • The filing of the complaint complied with section 49 because the complaint was made by the Board itself and the Board had passed a resolution on 20.11.1980 to file the complaint (constituting the required sanction).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi ((1983) 1 SCC 1 : A.I.R. 1983, Supreme Court, 67) Managerial vicarious liability under the relevant pollution-control statute — a Manager, by virtue of the nature of duties, can be vicariously liable for offences under the Act, though not necessarily in the same category as directors. The court relied on this authority to support the conclusion that the person who appeared and described himself as the Manager could prima facie be regarded as an officer in charge and therefore amenable to proceedings under section 47; this undercut the petitioners' contention that prosecution of the Manager was barred.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a provision-by-provision analysis, applying statutory wording and the factual record as presented in the complaint and annexures.

1. Section 49 (Cognizance of offences): The court noted that section 49 permits a court to take cognizance on a complaint made by the State Board or with the Board's prior written sanction. Because the complaint in this case was made by the Board itself and the Board had passed a resolution in its meeting on 20.11.1980 directing that complaints be filed against defaulting industries (including the accused), the court concluded there was "complete compliance" with section 49. The court explained that if a complaint were made by an officer rather than by the Board itself, prior written sanction would be necessary, but that factual scenario was not present here.

2. Section 47 (Offences by companies): The court examined the contention that petitioner No. 1 could not be proceeded against under section 47. The complaint described an accused as the Manager and petitioner No. 1 appeared describing himself as the Manager. The court observed that the complaint and related correspondences revealed that the company and its officers had knowledge of statutory obligations and potential penal consequences. Citing Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, the court observed that a Manager, from the nature of duties, can be vicariously liable under the Act. On these bases the court found no substance in the petitioners' objection: petitioner No. 1's appearance as Manager and the factual record prima facie indicated he was the person in charge within the meaning of section 47.

3. Prematurity argument (timing of chemist's report): The petitioners argued that because the chemist’s report was dated 5.1.1981 whereas the Board resolution was dated 20.11.1980, the resolution lacked material support. The court rejected this, explaining the prosecution was for contraventions of sections 20, 24, 25, 26 and 30, many of which impose duties (e.g., to furnish information, to obtain consent) and apply to existing discharges by virtue of section 26. The complaint record showed repeated notices and opportunities given to the company to comply before filing, and that the contraventions had occurred before the resolution. The chemist's report was treated as additional evidence of pollution rather than a precondition for the Board's resolution.

4. Jurisdiction under section 17(g) (inter-state stream issue): The petitioners urged that section 17(g), which addresses setting effluent standards "not being water in an inter State stream," deprived the State Board of jurisdiction with respect to the Ganges. The court found this was a misappreciation of section 17(g). It reasoned that section 17(g) concerns setting or modifying effluent standards for receiving waters that are not inter-state streams but does not oust the Board's jurisdiction to address pollution occurring at a particular point on a river that flows through the State. The court emphasized that the alleged pollution affected a particular local spot and inhabitants, and that the Scheme of the Act contemplates regulatory intervention to prevent and control pollution in furtherance of public welfare.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court held that the petition is without merit and is dismissed.

Implications:

  • The impugned order dated 19.8.1981 (taking cognizance under sections 41 and 44 and transferring the case) stands; there was no infirmity in the magistrate’s order concerning the element of sanction under section 49.
  • Proceedings against petitioner No. 1 (who described himself as the Manager) are not barred under section 47 on the facts before the court; prima facie the Manager may be treated as an officer in charge and liable to be proceeded against.
  • The court treated the chemist’s report as corroborative evidence rather than as a prerequisite that would render the Board's earlier resolution invalid or the complaint premature.
  • The State Board's jurisdiction was not ousted merely because the waterbody is the Ganges; section 17(g) does not deprive the Board of power to take action with respect to pollution at the particular location alleged.
  • No broader precedent was announced by this judgment beyond applying existing statutory provisions and the cited authority; the decision resolves the petitioners' challenges on the facts and statutory interpretation presented.

    Dr. Z. Kotasek v. M/S. Bata India Limited

    Anand Prasad Sinha, J.:— This application is directed against the order dated 19.8.1981 passed in Case No. 52 G.C of 1981 by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Barh, who has taken cognizance under sections 41 and 44 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) against the petitioners and transferred the case to the file of Sri R.K Mishra, Judicial Magistrate, Barh, for disposal. Further, he passed an order for the issue of summons fixing 30.9.1981 for appearance.

    2. A complaint had been filed by the Bihar State Water Pollution Control & Prevention Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board’) against the Manager, Bata India Shoe Company, Mokameh Ghat and also Bata India Limited, Mokamaghat, P.O Hathidah, District Patna. The offences, alleged to have been committed, were stated to be under sections 41 and 44 of the Act. In the complaint petition, it has been stated that the main purpose of the Act has been for establishing or restoring of wholesomeness of water for the benefit of the society at large and environmental protection. It has been found that the industries were mainly responsible for polluting water and the streams by discharging their poisonous effluents in the water of streams without getting them treated by some treatment plant, which is detrimental to society at large. The Board has been authorised to give direction requiring any person incharge of any establishment of any industry or trade being carried out to furnish to it information regarding the construction, installation or operation of such establishment of any disposal system or of any extension or addition thereto in the establishment.

    3. The Board had given notices to each establishment including the accused Company to furnish the information in the prescribed form about their installation or their discharging of effluents system, if any. The accused company is situate by the side of the river Ganges at Mokamaghat and it discharge vast mass of effluent without proper treatment directly to river Ganges causing pollution giving rise to problems to the inhabitants and surrounding environments. The Board had asked the accused Company to file the consent application and the project report of the treatment plant, if any, for the approval and consent of the Board. The accused Company on 15.12.1979 filed an incomplete and irrelevant consent application to the Board for the purpose of consent.

    4. Shri Shiv Kumar Singh, an Engineer of the Board had varified the said consent application and it was found faulty and it was not in accordance with the particulars which had been required. A letter bearing No. 215 dated 22.2.1980, which has been annexed an Annexure 1 to the complaint petition, had been sent to the accused Company by Board rejecting the consent application and that was communicated to the Company. The accused Company was asked to submit a detailed project report regarding the effluent treatment plant. The accused Company did not file any application, inspire of the repeated reminders, to the State Board, on the other hand the discharge of effluent continued. Ultimately, when even on repeated reminders no such consent petition had been filed by the accused Company, a registered letter on 11.9.1980 was sent to the accused Company to submit a project report at the earliest, but in spite of that the project report had not been submitted. It appears that the accused Company by letter dated 26.9.1980 had ackowledged that registered letter it had intimated that it would install the treatment plant very shortly, but inspite of that no treatment plant had been installed.

    5. On 5.1.1981 Shri Binod Bihari Sandwar, Assistant Chemist of the State Board submitted a report that he has made analysis of the water discharged made by the accused Company in the stream of Ganges and after due analysis, it was found that the effluent discharged by the accused Company had highly polluted Ganges water. A true copy of the report has also been annexed with the complaint petition and marked as Annexure 2.

    6. Ultimately, the Board on 5.1.1981 gave a registered letter to the Company giving them one month's time, as a last chance, to install the treatment plant, but they did not install the same. It appears that the accused Company situating just by the side of river Ganges at Mokamaghat, pollutes mass of water of the river at that place continuously causing a great problem.

    7. That being so, the accused Company had contravened sections 20, 24, 25 and 30 of the Act which is punishable under section 41, 42(d) and 44 of the Act.

    8. It appears from the statements made in the complaint petition that the State Board in its 5th meeting held on 20.11.1980 had passed a resolution that the complaint should be filed against the defaulting industries including the accused Company involved in the present case and consequently the complaint has been filed.

    9. It appears that inspite of publication in the local daily newspapers ‘Indian Nation’ fend ‘Searchlight’ dated 16.9.1980, the project report had not been filed.

    10. Mr. Balbhadra Prasad Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, has challenged the impugned order on the ground that no sanction as contemplated under section 49 of the Act has been obtained and that being so, the cognizance taken is bad in law. Mr. Tara Kant Jha, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Board, has submitted that there is compliance of the provisions of section 49 of the Act regarding the mandate of sanction.

    11. Section 49 of the Act reads as follows:—

    “49. Cognizance of offences.—(1) No court shall take cognizance of any offence under this Act except on a complaint made by, or with previous sanction in writing of the State Board, and no court inferior to that of a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence punishable under this Act.”

    12. Therefore, perusal of section 49 of the Act will make it clear that a complaint is to be made by or with previous sanction in writing of the Board. It will mean that a complaint made by the Board will be a valid complaint regarding its maintainability, even taking into consideration the element of sanction. Further, it will mean that if the complaint is made by some one else, meaning thereby, any Officer of the Board, in that situation that complaint can be said to be valid considering the element of sanction only when prior to making a complaint, sanction has been accorded in writing by the Board.

    13. In the instant case, it has been specifically mentioned that the Board in its meeting held on 20.11.1980 had passed resolution for filing a complaint against the accused Company. In the instant case, it appears that the complainant is the Board itself. That being so, when the complainant is the Board itself and not any of its Officers and the Board has passed a resolution for filing a complaint against the accused Company, there is complete compliance of the provisions of sanction as laid down in section 49 of the Act.

    14. Therefore, absolutely there is no infirmity or illegality in the impugned order so far as the element of sanction both for presenting the complaint petition and for taking cognizance is concerned.

    15. The another point raised on behalf of the petitioners is that the prosecution and the cognizance against petitioner No. 1, who has described himself as the Manager of Bata Shoe Company, is bad in law as no prosecution can be launched against him under section 47 of the Act.

    16. This submission has been based on the plea that only a person who at the time the offence was committed was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of, the business of the company, as well as the company, can be liable to be proceeded against for punishment. Section 47 of the Act reads as follows:—

    “47. Offences by companies.—(1) Where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company, every person who at the time the offence was committed was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of, the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly:

    Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to any punishment provided in this Act if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence.

    (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.”

    17. In the facts and circumstances of the case, I do not find any substance in this contention even. It will appear from the complaint petition that the name of petitioner No. 1 had not been mentioned in the complaint petition, but accused No. 1 mentioned to be is the Manager of the Company. Thereafter, petitioner No. 1 appeared himself describing to be the Manager of the Company. The details need not to be mentioned here. But, simply the only relevant fact arising out of the correspondences will be that the contraventions, the legal obligation, the duties both of the Company and the management and also the penal consequences had been well exposed and within the knowledge of the Company and its Officers. Thereafter, the appearance of petitioner No. 1 as the Manager of the Company on the basis of the description in the complaint petition of accused being the Manager of the Company, will, prima facie, indicate that petitioner No. 1 happened to be the Manager of the Company, relevant for the purposes of the Act.

    18. In the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi ((1983) 1 SCC 1 : A.I.R 1983, Supreme Court, 67), this aspect of the case has been considered and it has been laid down that “so far as the Manager is concerned, we are satisfied that from the very nature of his duties it can be safely inferred that he would undoubtedly be vicariously liable for the offence, vicarious liability being an incident of an offence under the Act.” “We, however, do not agree that even accused No. 3, respondent No. 1, who is Manager, of the Company and, therefore, directly in charge of its affairs, could fall in the same category as the Directors.”

    19. In the instant case, as discussed above, it can safely be said that petition No. 1 has taken the responsibility of being the Officer Incharge of the affairs without any exception or objection and that being so, it is difficult to accept the plea raised on behalf of petitioner No. 1 that the prosecution or the cognisance against him is bad in law as provided under section 47 of the Act.

    20. It has been urged that the complaint filed was premature and the basis of the argument is that according to the statement made in the complaint petition, Sri B.B Sandwar, Assistant Chemist of the Board had submitted his report on 5.1.1981 According to his analysis it has been found that the effluent discharged by the accused company was highly polluted and that being so, if the report had been submitted on 5.1.1981, then it will indicate that the resolution of the Board, which had been adopted in its meeting held on 20.11.1980 was without any material what-so over.

    21. I do not find any force in this contention even. From a perusal of the complaint, it will appear that the prosecution has been launched for contraventions of the provisions of sections 20, 24, 25, 26 and 30 of the Act. Section 20 of the Act requires certain information primarily with a view of preventing or controlling pollution of water. Section 24 of the Act is regarding prohibition on use of stream or well for disposal of polluting matter etc. Further it requires certain statutory obligations for the Company or factory to be fulfilled in order to check the pollution. One of the important and relevant conditions laid down under section 24 of the Act is section 24(d) of the Act which runs as follows:—

    “(d) causing or permitting, with the consent of the State Board, the deposit accumulated in a well, pond or reservoir to enter into any stream.”

    22. Section 25 of the Act puts restrictions on new outlets and new discharges. It will be relevant to mention section 5 of the Act, which runs as follows:—

    “25. Restrictions on new outlets and new discharges.—(1) Subject to the provisions of this section no person shall, without the previous consent of the State Board, bring into use any new or altered outlet for the discharge of sewage or trade effluent into a stream or well or begin to make any new discharge of sewage or trade effluent into a stream or well.

    (2) An application for consent of the State Board under sub-section (1) shall be made in the prescribed form and shall contain particulars regarding the proposed construction, installation or operation of the industrial’ or commercial establishment or of any treatment and disposal system or of any extension or addition thereto and such other particulars as may be prescribed.”

    23. Section 26 of the Act reads as follows:—

    “26. Provision regarding existing discharge of sewage or trade effluent.—Where immediately before the commencement of this Act any person was discharging any sewage or trade effluent into a stream or well, the provisions of Section 25 shall, so far as may be, apply in relation to such person as they apply in relation to the person referred to in that section subject to the modification that the application for consent to be made under sub-section (2) of that section shall be made within a period of three months of the constitution of the State Board.”

    24. Section 30 of the Act relates to the provisions regarding the power of the Board to carry out certain works and this is primarily for the purpose of mitigating the acuteness of pollution.

    25. It will appear from a perusal of the complaint petition that the Board, in all fairness, had given repeated and extensive opportunities to the accused Company for compliance of sections 20, 24, 25, 26 and 30 of the Act with the sole purpose of implementing the social scheme of the Act for maintaining the minimum standard of the water by avoiding harshness of pollution for the general welfare of the inhabitants, their health and healthy conditions of living.

    26. In the course of argument, it has been urged that section 25 of the Act is concerned only with new outlets and new discharges and that being so, the prosecution is misconceived. If this argument is judged with the aid of section 26 of the Act, the plea raised vanishes and becomes unacceptable as it will appear that the Act has been made applicable in a condition where immediately before the commencement of this Act any person was discharging the effluent into streams etc.

    27. Therefore, from the facts stated above and also considering the nature of prosecution involved in the instant case, the contraventions alleged to have been committed by the accused Company had occurred before the resolution of the Board, as stated above, and the report of the chemist was not relevant for the resolution.

    28. However, it appears that before filing of the complaint, a report of the Chemist had been obtained and simply it can be mentioned that a piece of evidence has been added to the allegation that there has been pollution of water quite independent of the fact, which existed, that the accused Company discharged the effluent rendering that portion of the Ganges completely polluted.

    29. The another point urged is that the State Board has no jurisdiction to launch a prosecution with respect to Ganges water as provided under section 17(g) of the Act, the Ganges water being an Inter-State stream Section 17(g) of the Act reads as follows:—

    “(g) to lay down, modify or annul effluent standards for the sewage and trade effluents and for the quality of receiving waters (not being water in an inter State stream) resulting from the discharge of effluents and to classify waters of the State.”

    30. I am afraid, section 17(g) of the Act has not been correctly appreciated. It has not limited the powers and the provisions involved in the instant case. Moreover, according to the meaning of section 17(g) of the Act, it relates to the water exclusively belonging to the inter State stream. The flow of the Ganges water being continuous and the pollution alleged is for a particular point or spot, the jurisdiction of the State Board cannot be said to have been ousted. The law pre-supposes organised society in the manner that any organisation or Company must be functioning in accordance with any law meant for regulation of its conduct. Law is thus an instrument by which the legal functioning of any organisation or Company is achieved. It controls individual purposes and helps in moulding them near to social or legal purposes. If there is failure in any legal duty, coercion by implementation of law is adopted for the realisation of the legal purposes in order to implement the legal system to secure the conditions of social life as in this case by implementation of the Act, an attempt has been made to achieve the normal condition of healthy living.

    31. In the result, I do not find any merit in this application which fails and is dismissed.

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    Comments

    Dr. Z. Kotasek v. M/S. Bata India Limited
    (May 4, 1983)