1. By this judgment I am disposing of the two civil revision applications as the facts and the question of law are common and identical.
2. The question is as to whether the amendment of the plaints of the suits giving rise to these applications, on the facts and in the circumstances mentioned hereunder, should have been allowed by the trial Court?
3. Two title suits were instituted in the Court of the Third Munsif at Patna for eviction of the opposite parties under the provisions of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 (for short 'the Act'). Whereas Title Suit No. 152 of 1976, corresponding to C.R. No. 596 of 1979, was instituted by the petitioner himself, the other title suit was instituted by the father of the petitioner No. 1, who died during the pendency of the application in this Court.
The grounds for eviction of the opposite parties in both the cases are common, namely, 'expiry of the period of tenancy'. According to the case of the petitioners, the opposite party in the first case stopped remitting the monthly rent since November, 1976, and the opposite party in C. R. 881 since March, 1975. Applications, were filed for amendment of the respective plaints on 18.1.1979 and 2.2.1979, seeking to add a paragraph in each of the plaints as paragraph No. 11A, making out a case for eviction of the opposite parties on the ground of default is not lawfully paying or remitting the rent for various months, of the premises in question. Both the opposite parties opposed the prayer for amendment, inter alia, on the ground that the amendments, if allowed, would change the nature of the suits as well as introduce a new cause of action to their great prejudice.
The trial Court, however, by the impugned orders, rejected the applications on the ground that they did not appear to be necessary, although it further observed that the question would be considered at the time of hearing of the suits. The petitioners have accordingly filed the present applications.
The opposite parties have chosen not to appear in this Court and, therefore, the matter was heard ex parte.
4. The question is as to whether the proposed amendments should have been allowed. Section 11 of the Act deals with "eviction of tenants" and prescribes five grounds for their eviction, inter alia, (1) where the amount of two months' rent lawfully payable is not paid within the time fixed by a contract or deposited in accordance with Section 13 thereof, and (2) in the case of a tenant holding on a lease for a specified period, on the expiry of the period of tenancy.
5. It has since been held in a large number of cases that the Rent Control Acts are intended to restrict the rights which the landlords possess either for charging excessive rents or for eviction of tenants, but if within the ambit of those restricted rights the landlord makes out a case for eviction of tenants and a tenant can be evicted from a premises on any of the grounds mentioned for his eviction in the Acts, the nature of the suit essentially is one for eviction of the tenant and the landlord can put into service any of the grounds available to him for his eviction.
The present suits were instituted on only one of the grounds, namely, the expiry of the period of tenancy, and if during the pendency of the suit another ground has become available to the landlord, I do not find any plausible reason for not allowing the plaintiff to inform the Court of that subsequent event and press into service this additional ground for the eviction of the opposite parties, Such a view also appears to be justifiable on the well recognised principles that in order to shorten litigation, to preserve the rights of both the parties and to subserve the ends of justice, the Court can and should take into consideration the subsequent events and adjudicate the rights of the parties and grant relief available to them.
In the case of Ran Vijaya Shahi v. Bala Prasad Motanit it was held that the appellate Court was entitled to take notice of the fact that during the pendency of the appeal the lease itself had terminated by efflux of time and the period of renewal also was over, although the suit was instituted only for recovery of arrears of rent.
6. A Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in Smt. Abnash Kaur v. Dr. Avinash Nayyar and Ors. A.I.R. 1975 Del. 46 where the suit was for eviction under the Delhi Rent Control Act on the ground of non-payment of rent, allowed amendment on the ground that the tenant had caused substantial damage to the premises. On review of a large number of decisions it was observed that there was no inflexible rule that a cause of action arising subsequent to the filing of the petition for eviction cannot be added in the petition by way of amendment, the matter being before the Rent Controller.
A similar question also fell for consideration before a Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Tarakpada Kirti v. Ruplekha Chatterjee There the plaintiff had brought a suit for eviction of the defendant on the ground of default in payment of the monthly rents and also sub letting part of the premises. Subsequently the plaint was amended to the effect that the period of lease having expired the plaintiff was entitled to recovery of possession.
7. Reliance was also placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioners in the case of Prem Lal v. Jadav Chand and Anr. which is a direct case on the point. There the landlord had filed the suit for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirements and during its pendency the tenant committed default in payment of rent, and the application by the plaintiff for amendment of the plaint seeking to introduce a new ground for eviction was allowed. This decision was rendered before the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dhanpal Chettiar v. Yesodai Arnmal where giving of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act for determination of the lease was held to be wholly unnecessary and that making out a case under the Rent Act for eviction of the tenant by itself was sufficient. The learned Acting Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court had made an observation that" the existence of the grounds is not a part of the cause of action" as "what constitutes the cause of action is the termination of the tenancy by service of a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act...the grounds of eviction do not constitute a necessary part of a cause of action for eviction of a tenant from an accommodation...". Although it is not necessary for me to adhere to this aspect of the matter, since I am following the said authority I may observe that in view of the aforesaid authoritative decision of the Supreme Court, it now cannot be gainsaid that the termination of the tenancy would not constitute the cause of action any more. A cause of action in a suit under the Rent Control Acts for eviction of the tenant, would be certainly the accrual of a disability against a tenant, pertaining to the grounds mentioned for his eviction due to his conduct of laches, thus disentitling him from the protection against his eviction. There is nothing which precludes a Court from permitting the introduction of a cause of action arising subsequent to the filing of a suit by way of amendment so long as the defendant has an opportunity of meeting the new case by amendment of his written statement and by leading evidence in support of the defence, if any.
8. Instances of amendment of plaints in other cases can be well cited: for example, wherein a suit for confirmation of possession for plaintiff is dispossessed, a relief for recovery of possession is allowed. In a suit only for injunction where the mischief is committed, substantive relief is allowed by amendment of the plaint. In a suit for declaration that the order of supsension was illegal, and the plaintiff is dismissed from the service, the dismissal is also challenged by the amendment or the like.
9. In my considered opinion, therefore, the trial Court has committed an apparent error of jurisdiction in refusing to allow the amendment of the plaints. I would accordingly set aside the orders under provision and allow both the applications and direct the trial court to allow the amendment of the plaints with liberty to the defendants to either amend the written statements or file additional written statements. The trial court is also directed to dispose of the suits within a period of two months from receipt of the records. In the circumstances, however, I shall make no order as to costs