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  • case.6. Section 3(2) (f) of the Essential Commodities Act reads:3(1) (2)
  • provisions of Section 3(2) (f) of the Essential Commodities Act.
  • provision of Section 3(2) (f) of the Essential Commodities Act.
  • Section 3(2) (f) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955,
  • Section 3(2) (f). Thus, the Essential Commodities Act
  • ESSENTIAL COMMODITIES ACT
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  • case.6. Section 3(2) (f) of the Essential Commodities Act reads:3(1) (2)
  • provisions of Section 3(2) (f) of the Essential Commodities Act.
  • provision of Section 3(2) (f) of the Essential Commodities Act.
  • Section 3(2) (f) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955,
  • Section 3(2) (f). Thus, the Essential Commodities Act
  • ESSENTIAL COMMODITIES ACT
Smart Summary

Summary of the Opinion (S.K. Jha, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution in which the petitioner sought writs quashing two demand notices (Annexures - 1 and 2). Annexure - 1 (dated 9-12-1974) was a notice under the Bihar Rice and Paddy Procurement Order, 1974 (the "1974 Order") demanding delivery of 750 quintals of rice as levy, with an installment direction to deliver 200 quintals by 15-12-1974. Annexure - 2 (dated 31-12-1974) was a notice from the District Magistrate and Collector stating alleged non-compliance with Annexure - 1 and directing delivery, failing which the petitioner would be proceeded against under clause 22 of the 1974 Order and be liable to prosecution under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955.

The petitioner is a licensee under the Bihar Foodgrains Dealers' Dealers' Licensing Order, 1967 and acts as a commission agent (Arahtia) in rice and paddy. According to the uncontroverted factual account in the petition, the petitioner did not hold any stock of its own; cultivators and other persons brought and kept stock in the petitioner's Arhat, and the petitioner received commission (Re. 1/- to Rs. 2/- per cent.) for facilitating the sale. The petitioner contended it had no ownership or right to retain the third parties' stocks and therefore could not be held liable to deliver levy in respect of such stocks.

Two questions were identified for determination: (1) whether commission agents (Arahtias) engaged merely as agents and not holding stock as their own are covered by the 1974 Order and thus liable to deliver levy in respect of stocks held for principals; and (2) if the 1974 Order on its plain language covers such commission agents, whether that provision is ultra vires Section 3(2)(f) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955.

Procedurally, rule was issued and an interim stay was granted by order dated 30-1-1975 conditioned on deposit of 150 quintals by 21-2-1975; by an order dated 14-5-1975 the stay was modified directing delivery at 20% on stock held on 19-2-1975 and on future transactions from that date. The final disposition in this opinion is that the application is allowed and the notices (Annexures - 1 and 2) are quashed, with no order as to costs. The Chief Justice (S.N.P. Singh) agreed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether commission agents or Arahtias who hold stocks on behalf of third parties (and do not hold stock as their own) are covered by the Bihar Rice and Paddy Procurement Order, 1974 (specifically clause 14(2)) and can be made liable to deliver levy in respect of such stocks.
  2. If clause 14(2) of the 1974 Order does cover such commission agents, whether that provision is ultra vires Section 3(2)(f) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner operates as a commission agent (Arahtia) under a licence; it does not hold any stock of its own and merely stores third parties' rice and paddy and earns commission on sales.
  • Because it did not hold the stock as its own and had no right to retain ownership of third parties' stocks, it could not be held liable to deliver levy in respect of those stocks.
  • If the 1974 Order is read to fasten levy-liability on commission agents simpliciter, that portion of the Order would be ultra vires Section 3(2)(f) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955.

Respondent's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent(s)' legal arguments in opposition to the petitioner's contentions.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Chandrika Prasad Mishra v. State of Bihar (C.W.J.C No. 615 of 1968 and analogous cases) decided 17-12-1968 (Pat) Interpreted the phrase "any person holding in stock" in Section 3(2)(f) of the Essential Commodities Act to relate to holding the stock as his own; a person who retains control of an essential commodity for furthering third parties' business without holding the stock as his own is not covered by S.3(2)(f). The court relied on this interpretation to conclude that Section 3(2)(f) does not contemplate penalising persons who do not hold stock as their own (such as commission agents who merely handle third parties' stock); hence the 1974 Order cannot validly fasten levy on such persons unless liability is ultimately thrown on the owner.
Teknarayan Mahesh Prasad v. State of Bihar (1971 Pat LJR 223; AIR 1972 Pat 250) Held that the phrase "holding in stock" is wide enough to cover cases where a miller or wholesale dealer holds stock on behalf of third parties, provided the ultimate liability to sell has been adequately thrown on the third person (the owner). The court noted that earlier Procurement Orders (1970, 1972, 1973) had clauses (e.g., clause 3(5) of 1970 and clause 13(5) of 1972/1973) which shifted ultimate liability to the owner, and Teknarayan validated such arrangements; the present 1974 Order lacks such a provision, and that absence rendered clause 14(2) ultra vires as applied to commission agents not holding stock as their own.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two principal analytical steps, corresponding to the two issues framed.

  1. Plain-language / definitional analysis: The court examined clause 14(2) of the 1974 Order, which imposes levy-delivery obligations on "every licensed wholesale dealer." It traced the definition of "licensed wholesale dealer" to clause 2(b) of the 1974 Order and thence to the Bihar Foodgrains Dealers' Licensing Order, 1967. The Licensing Order defines "wholesale dealer" to include "any person doing so on behalf of another as a commission agent or arahtia or otherwise." On that plain reading, commission agents or Arahtias fall within the statutory definition of "wholesale dealer" and therefore, as a textual matter, are brought within the sweep of clause 14(2) and made liable on its terms.
  2. Validity under Section 3(2)(f) of the Essential Commodities Act: The court then turned to whether such a textual coverage could be sustained under the power granted by Section 3(2)(f). It relied on prior authority (Chandrika Prasad Mishra) interpreting "any person holding in stock" to mean holding the stock as his own; the Act contemplates compelling sale only from persons who hold stock as their own. The court observed that prior procurement orders (1970, 1972, 1973) contained express provisions (clause 3(5) of 1970 and clause 13(5) of 1972/1973) shifting ultimate liability onto the actual owner of the stock, and that this feature had been critical to sustaining those earlier orders (as accepted in Teknarayan Mahesh Prasad).
  3. Application to the 1974 Order: The court found that the 1974 Order's clause 14(2) lacked any corresponding provision to shift ultimate liability to the owner of the stock. Because Section 3(2)(f) does not extend to persons who do not hold stock as their own, and because the 1974 Order omitted the protective mechanism used in earlier orders, clause 14(2) as applied to commission agents or Arahtias who do not hold stock as their own was beyond the power conferred by Section 3(2)(f). Therefore that part of clause 14(2) was ultra vires.
  4. Limitation and saving: The court expressly confined its decision to cases of commission agents or Arahtias simpliciter (i.e., persons carrying on only the commission-agent business and not engaged otherwise as wholesale dealers holding stock as their own). If a person both acts as a commission agent and also carries on a wholesale-dealer business holding stock as his own, the 1974 Order would apply to that wholesale-dealer activity and liability could be imposed in respect of such stock. The court also observed the administrative remedy by which authorities could direct delivery if the petitioner were found to be engaged in wholesale business other than as a commission agent.
  5. Remedies and interim orders: The court quashed the specific notices (Annexures - 1 and 2). It reviewed prior interim orders: an interim stay (30-1-1975) conditioned on deposit of 150 quintals and a modification (14-5-1975) directing 20% delivery on stock held on 19-2-1975 and on future transactions. The court clarified that any deposit or deliveries made pursuant to those orders would be adjusted against liability if at any future time the petitioner was found to be liable as a wholesale dealer (i.e., insofar as wholesaling activity and holding stock as own is established).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The application is allowed; the notices contained in Annexures - 1 and 2 are quashed. Clause 14(2) of the Bihar Rice and Paddy Procurement Order, 1974 is held to be ultra vires Section 3(2)(f) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 insofar as it seeks to make commission agents or Arahtias who do not hold stock as their own liable to deliver levy in respect of stocks belonging to third parties.

Implications and direct effects:

  • The petitioner, insofar as it acts solely as a commission agent or Arahtia and does not hold stock as its own, is not liable under clause 14(2) of the 1974 Order to deliver levy in respect of third-party stocks; the specific notices demanding delivery are quashed.
  • The decision is expressly confined to cases where a person is a commission agent or Arahtia simpliciter. If a person is also engaged in wholesale-dealer business and holds stock as his own, the 1974 Order remains operative in respect of that activity and such stock.
  • Any deposit of 150 quintals made pursuant to the earlier interim order, or any deliveries made pursuant to the interim orders of 30-1-1975 and 14-5-1975, shall be adjusted against any liability that may arise from 19-2-1975 onward if the petitioner is subsequently found to be liable as a wholesale dealer holding stock as his own.
  • The court limited the effect of its decision to the factual category considered and did not purport to invalidate the Procurement Order generally beyond the stated scope.

This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond the text.

    Jadu Sah v. District Supply Officer

    S.K Jha, J.:— In this application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution the petitioner has prayed for the issuance of an appropriate writ quashing the demand notice issued against it by the District Supply Officer, Aurangabad, as contained in Annexures - 1 and 2 to the application. Annexure - 1 dated 9-12-1974 is a notice to the petitioner under the Bihar Rice and Paddy Procurement Order, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the 1974 Order) demanding delivery of 750 quintals of rice as levy from the petitioner. By Annexure - 1 the petitioner had been directed to deliver it in an installments of 200 quintals out of the aforesaid quantity of 750 quintals by the 15th of December, 1974. Annexure - 2 dated 31-12-1974 was a notice from the District Magistrate and Collector, Aurangabad, to the petitioner intimating to it that it had failed to comply with the notice dated 9-12-1974 and that, therefore, it was again directed to deliver the quantity required under Annexure - 1, failing which the petitioner would be proceeded against under clause 22 of the 1974 Order, as also would be liable to prosecution under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The petitioner challenged the validity of both Annexures - 1 and 2.

    2. The relevant facts for the disposal of this application may be shortly stated thus. The petitioner is a licensee under the Bihar Foodgrains Dealers' Licensing Order, 1967 (hereinafter referred to as the Licensing Order). Pursuant to the said licence, the petitioner acts as a commission agent in rice and paddy. According to the case of the petitioner which has not been controverted in any counter-affidavit, it does not hold any stock of its own. The stock of rice and paddy is brought by cultivators and other persons and kept in the Arhat of the petitioner. For assisting in the disposal of the said stock of rice and paddy of the persons to whom the stock belongs the petitioner gets a remuneration varying from Re. 1/- to Rs. 2/- per cent. cash on the sale proceeds of the commodity concerned. The petitioner does not carry on any business or trade in rice or paddy of its own. The petitioner's Sales Tax and Income-tax assessment are also based on its earning commission simpliciter out of the transactions between third parties in his Arhat. It has been submitted in the petition as also argued at the Bar that since the petitioner had no stock of its own nor had it a right to retain other's properties, it could not be held to be liable for delivery of any levy in respect of stocks of foodgrains belonging not to the petitioner itself but to its principal. It was contended that if it be held that a liability had been fastened on the cases of commission agents simpliciter, in which category the petitioner also came, then to that extent the 1974 Order must be held to be ultra vires the provisions of Section 3(2) (f) of the Essential Commodities Act. These being the only relevant and undisputed facts, only two questions fell for determination in this case; firstly, whether the case of commission agents can be held to be covered by the provisions of the 1974 Order, under which they are liable to deliver levy in respect of stocks held by them not of their own but only of a third person, cultivator or otherwise, for facilitating sale to others and thereby earning a commission by way of remuneration on the transaction of sale; secondly, whether, if on the plain language of the 1974 Order the case of such commission agents be held to be so covered by the 1974 Order, such a provision is ultra vires any provision of the Essential Commodities Act. The first question falling for determination must, in my view, be answered in the affirmative for reasons hereinafter given. The relevant portion of clause 14(2) of the 1974 Order reads as follows:

    “Every licensed wholesale dealer shall deliver to the State Government or its agent at procurement price, for the Kharif year 1974–75, at his business premises a minimum of ………… and a maximum of …………”

    3. Thus, under sub-clause (2) of clause 14 the liability to deliver levy has been fastened on every licensed wholesale dealer. The term “licensed wholesale dealer” has been defined in clause 2(b) of the 1974 Order, wherein it has been laid down that “‘licensed wholesale dealer’ means a person holding a valid licence as a wholesale dealer under the Bihar Foodgrains Dealers' Licensing Order, 1967”.

    4. Thus, for the definition of the term “licensed wholesale dealer” we are referred to the definition given in the Bihar Foodgrains Dealers' Licensing Order, 1967 (hereinafter referred to as the Licensing Order). Clause 2(d) of the Licensing Order defines “wholesale dealer” in the following terms:

    “‘wholesale dealer’ means a person (including a rice/flour miller) engaged in the business of purchase, sale or storage for purpose other than personal consumption of one or more of the foodgrains in a quantity exceeding one hundred quintas at any one time and includes any person doing so on behalf of another as a commission agent or arahtia or otherwise.” From the definition quoted above there can be no escape from the conclusion that a commission agent or Arahtia engaged in the business on behalf of another, namely his principal, has been brought within the sweep of the term “wholesale dealer”.

    5. Thus, a commission agent or Arahtia, like the present petitioner, is undoubtedly intended to be covered by the 1974 Order and is made liable for the delivery of levy even with regard to business in which he is engaged on behalf of his principal in pursuance of the provisions of clause 14(2) of the 1974 Order. This being the position, it was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that in so far as the 1974 Order may be said to cover such cases of commission agents or Arahtias as the petitioner, such a provision to that extent must be held to be ultra vires the provision of Section 3(2) (f) of the Essential Commodities Act. This at once leads us to the second question posed for consideration in this case.

    6. Section 3(2) (f) of the Essential Commodities Act reads:

    “3(1) ……………

    (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section (1), an order made thereunder may provide—

    … … … … …

    (f) for requiring any person holding in stock any essential commodity to sell the whole or a specified part of the stock to the Central Government or a State Government or to an officer or agent of such Government or to such other person or class of persons and in such circumstances as may be specified in the order.” The term “any person holding in stock” came up for consideration earlier before a Bench of this Court in the case of Chandrika Prasad Mishra v. State of Bihar, (C.W.J.C No. 615 of 1968 and analogous cases) decided on 17-12-1968 (Pat). In that case it was held that the expression “any person holding in stock”, obviously, relates to the holding of stock as his own by the person referred to in Section 3(2) (f). Thus, the Essential Commodities Act confers power to issue an order requiring any person to sell the whole or a specified part of the stock to the Central Government or the State Government or to an authorised officer or agent of Government etc. who is holding in stock as his own any essential commodity. Thus, a person retaining control of an essential commodity for the purpose of furthering the business of third persons who have ownership in the essential commodity concerned, while the agent has none, and not holding any stock of essential commodity as his own is not sought to be covered by the provisions of S. 3(2) (f). Thus, any Order in order to be sustained as valid must be is relation to the stock of any essential commodity held as his own by the person who is sought to be bound by the provisions of such an order. The Act does not contemplate to, more or less, penalise a person who does not hold any stock of foodgrain of his own and over which he cannot exercise any act of ownership even for a limited purpose. It is also pertinent in this context to refer to the procurement Orders of the previous years. A provision similar to that contained in clause 14(2) of the 1974 Order found place in clause 3(2) of the Bihar Rice and Paddy Procurement Order, 1970, clause 13(2) of the Bihar Rice and Paddy Procurement Order, 1972, and clause 13(2) of the Bihar Rice and Paddy Procurement Order, 1973. But in all those three Orders of 1970, 1972 and 1973 there was a provision that even though a minimum liability for delivery of levy was fastened on a commission agent holding stock of foodgrains on behalf of another, the ultimate liability was intended to be shifted over to the owner of the Foodgrains concerned. For instance, in clause 3(5) of the 1970 Order and clause 13(5) of which 1972 and 1973 Orders it was laid down that any person on whose behalf the licensed wholesale dealer (which term also included the commission agent or Arahtia) holds any stock of foodgrain (rice or paddy), the whole or part of which such dealer was required to sell to the State Government, shall notwithstanding any contract or instrument to the contrary, not be entitled to recover from the licensed wholesale dealer on account of the value of the stock so sold anything more than the price payable to the licensed wholesale dealer under the relevant clause. When the vires of provisions of the 1970 Order came to be decided before a Division Bench of this Court, one of the points urged on behalf of the petitioner-dealers for striking down the provisions of that Order was that under clause 3(2) of the 1970 Order commission agents or Arahtias had been made liable for the delivery of levy with regard to the stock of essential foodgrains which was not held by them in their own account and with regard to which they could not exercise any incident of ownership. This objection to the validity of the 1970 Order was replied, and it was held in the case of Teknarayan Mahesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (1971 Pat LJR 223) : (AIR 1972 Pat 250):

    “It is also argued on behalf of the petitioners in some cases that requiring the miller or the wholesale dealer to sell to the Government when he is holding in stock any quantity of rice not on his own account but on account of a third person whose paddy has been dehusked by the miller or has been stocked by the miller as commission agent, is also beyond the power conferred on the State Government under clause (f) of sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act. I am not prepared to accept this argument as sound. In my opinion, the phrase ‘holding in stock’ in Clause (f) is wide enough to cover such cases provided the ultimate liability to sell has been adequately thrown on such third person, which, in this case, for the reasons stated above, has been adequately thrown.”

    7. Thus, in all the Procurement Orders of 1970, 1972 and 1973 the ultimate liability to sell had been adequately thrown upon the person on whose behalf the commission agent was holding the stock, and such a principal could not claim any reimbursement or indemnity with regard to the price of the foodgrains sold to the Government greater in extent than the value which such commission agent or Arahtia was to receive from the Government on account of such sale. It is regrettable that while the previous Procurement Orders' validity in this respect was held to be safeguarded by throwing the ultimate liability to sell on the owners of the stock, such a provision in the 1974 Procurement Order should have been conspicuously missing. The very reason given by this Court for upholding the validity of such a provision in the earlier Procurement Orders is, it seems, albeit by inadvertence, to have been completely overlooked in deleting such a provision from the 1974 Procurement Order. In the absence of any such provision corresponding to clause 3(5) of the 1970 Order or clause 13(5) of both 1972 and 1973 Orders, I am constrained to hold that clause 14(2) of the 1974 Procurement Order in so far as the commission agents or Arahtias not holding any stock of essential foodgrains of their own are concerned must be held to be beyond the power conferred on the Government by Section 3(2) (f) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, and to that extent the provisions of clause 14(2) must be held to be ultra vires. It is hoped that in order to save such provisions the Government will see that provisions akin to those of clause 13(5) of the 1973 Order are inserted in any Procurement Order so as to bind any person not holding any stock of foodgrains of his own, like the commission agent or Arahtia.

    8. It goes without saying that the decision of this case must be confined and limited to only such cases where a person is carrying on trade or business of commission agent or Arahtia simpliciter, not in any way carrying on any trade or business of his own as a wholesale dealer. If, for instance, a person carrying on a business or trade of a Commission agent or Arahtia is at the same time engaged in the business of a wholesale dealer and holds in stock of his own any essential foodgrains, then to that extent the wholesale dealer will not be saved from the operation of the 1974 Procurement Order. If the petitioner at any time be found by the authorities concerned to be engaged in the trade or business of a wholesale dealer other than that of a commission agent or Arahtia, it will be open to the authorities concerned to direct the petitioner for the delivery of levy in respect of such wholesale business.

    9. With the aforesaid observations this application is allowed and the notices as contained in Annexures - 1 and 2 to the application are quashed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.

    10. It may be mentioned here that by an order dated 30th of January, 1975 while rule was issued in this case an interim order of stay of the operation of the notices as contained in Annexure - 2 was passed on the condition that the petitioner deposited 150 quintals of rice on or before 21st of February, 1975. By an order dated 14th of May, 1975 the Bench passing the order dated 30th of January, 1975 modified the stay order and directed that the petitioner would deliver rice or paddy at the rate of 20 per cent. on the stock held by it on 19th of February, 1975 and on all future transactions from that date.

    11. If the petitioner has deposited 150 quintals of rice in pursuance of the stay order, that would be adjusted from the total liability of the petitioner accruing from 19th of February, 1975 if the petitioner has been engaged in wholesale business not as a commission agent. It is also made clear that if the petitioner has, in pursuance of this Court's orders dated 30th of January, 1975 and 15th of May, 1975, delivered any quantity of rice or paddy to the authorities concerned and if at any future date it be held to be liable under the Procurement Order as a wholesale dealer, then to the extent of delivery already effected by the petitioner adjustment would be made by the authorities.

    12. S.N.P Singh, C.J:— I agree.

    13. Application allowed.

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    Jadu Sah v. District Supply Officer
    (Nov 6, 1975)