Untwalia, C.J:— This is a miscellaneous first appeal filed by the claimant — the East India Coal Company Limited — under Section 20 of the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957 (hereinafter called the Act). A certain mining lease in respect of land measuring 700 bighas and odd in Sutikdih was acquired under the Act and the proceeding was initiated by issuance of a preliminary notification under Section 4 of the Act. Eventually, a declaration of acquisition under Section 9 was issued on 18-12-61. On the issuance of such a declaration, the land and rights in the Sutikdih Colliery vested in the Central Government under Section 10. The Central Government under Section 10. The Central Government determined the amount of compensation to the tune of Rs. 36,449.83 payable to the claimant. The claimant did not agree to this amount and accepted the Payment under protest. It filed its claim before the Tribunal appointed under the Act and as against its claim put forward before the Central Government to the tune of Rs. 19,35,902.03, it put forward a claim of Rs. 14,79,149/- before the Tribunal. The Tribunal has considered the matter in detail and allowed a total compensation of Rs. 3,37,929.52. It thus allowed an extra amount of Rs. 3,01,479.69 including interest under Section 13(2)(iv) of the Act. The claimant has filed this appeal to claim more amount of compensation under some head, interest under Section 16 of the Act on the extra sum of compensation allowed or to be allowed and costs under Section 15 in respect of the reference. The respondent, namely, the Central Government, on service of a notice of appeal, filed a cross-objection objecting to the awarding of certain items of compensation to the appellant.

2. The learned Advocate-General appearing in support of the appeal urged five points—

(i) That compensation under Section 13(4) of the Act also ought to have been awarded and the Tribunal has not done it.

(ii) That it is compulsory for the Tribunal to award interest in accordance with Section 16 or in any event without exercise of judicial discretion and without mentioning any valid ground interest under Section 16 could not be disallowed.

(iii) That cost ought to have been allowed under Section 15 of the Act.

(iv) That certain items of compensation claimed by the appellant have wrongly been disallowed by the Tribunal.

(v) That the cross-objection filed by the respondent is not maintainable and cannot be entertained.

3. The first point urged on behalf of the appellant is not sound and must be rejected. When a notification under Section 4 is issued then the effect of such notification on prospecting licences and mining leases is provided in Section 5, clause (b) which reads as follows—

“On the issue of a notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4 in respect of any land—

(b) any mining lease shall, in so far as it authorises the lessee or any person claiming through him to undertake any operation in the land, cease to have effect for so long as the notification under that sub-section is in force.”

4. If land in respect of which notification under Section 4 has been issued is not acquired within the maximum period of three years then under Section 7(2) of the Act the notification issued under sub-section (1) of Section 4 ceases to have effect on the expiration of three years from the date thereof. If, however, within the said period a declaration of acquisition is made under Section 9 then there is no question of the effect of, notification ceasing or the effect under Section 5(b) coming to an end. In that event the land vests in the Central Government and becomes its property. When land is acquired then under S. 13(2)(iii) the expenditure if any, incurred by way of dead rent or minimum royalty during any year or years when there was no production of coal is fully paid irrespective of the question whether the non-production of coal was because of the mining operations not going on or because of the effect brought about under Section 5(b) of the Act. If however, land is not acquired the notification under Section 4(1) as also the effect brought about under Section 5(b) comes to an end. In that event to the owner of the land a compensation of 5 per centum has been provided under sub-section (4) of Section 13 which says—

“Where a mining lease ceases to have effect for any period under clause (b) of Section 5, there shall be paid by way of compensation for the period during which the lease so ceased to have effect, a sum equivalent to five Per centum of any such expenditure as is referred to in clauses (i) and (iii) of sub-section (2) for each year during which the lease remains suspended.”

5. It is to be noticed that under sub-section (4) a sum equivalent to 5 per centum of the expenditure provided in clause (iii) of sub-section (2) of Section 13 is not to be paid if there were no mining operations carried on by the owner of the land but the amount is to be paid only if he was prevented from carrying on the operations because of the effect brought about under Section 5(b) of the Act. That being so it is difficult to accept the argument that the appellant is entitled over and above the full amount awarded under Section 13(2)(iii), to 5 per centum more under Section 13(4). Similarly, nothing more can be allowed under Section 13(4) over and above the amount allowed under Section 13(2)(i). The first point, therefore, fails and is rejected.

6. The second point urged on behalf of the appellant is well grounded and must be accepted as correct. Section 16 reads as follows—

“If the sum which in the opinion of the Tribunal ought to have been awarded as compensation is in excess of the sum which the Central Government has stated to be a fair amount of compensation the award of the Tribunal may direct that the Central Government shall pay interest on such excess at the rate of five Per centum per annum from the date on which it became payable to the date of payment of such excess.”

7. Whatever extra sum has been determined by the Tribunal including the interest under Section 13(2)(iv) is the amount of compensation payable to the claimant. If the whole of this amount would have been paid to the claimant then over and above the amount already paid, it would have not an extra sum of Rs. 3,01,479.69. This sum it was entitled to set on the vesting of the land in the Central Government under Section 10. That being so ordinarily and generally the Tribunal has got to direct under Section 16 that the Central Government shall pay interest on such excess at the rate of 5 per centum per annum from the date on which it became payable to the date of payment of such excess. Although the word ‘may’ has been used, it is a well settled proposition of law that when a Statute confers power on a Tribunal then, ordinarily and generally, the word ‘may’ is used and except in a few exceptional circumstances ‘may’ must mean ‘must’. Even if we assume, as was argued by Mr. K.D Chatterji, learned Counsel for the respondent, that the power is discretionary, it is plain that the discretion has to be judicially exercised. And, if the Statute has conferred power on the Tribunal to allow interest on the excess sum under Section 16 of the Act, without any rhyme or reason and without there being some justifiable and exceptional circumstances for exercising the discretion against the claimant, it cannot be so done. In this particular case, the Tribunal has given no reasons for not awarding interest under Section 16 of the Act. That being so this point must succeed.

8. I do not think that in this appeal cost can be awarded to the appellant under Section 15. Under this section every award made by the Tribunal has also to state the amount of costs incurred in the proceedings before it and it has also to state by what persons and in what proportions they are to be paid. The language of the 15th section of the Act is comprehensive enough to enable the Tribunal, in a given case and on its facts and in its circumstances, not to award cost to any party. Here since the success was divided, as stated by the Tribunal, the parties have been directed to bear their own cost. That being so, it is difficult to accept the argument put forward on behalf of the appellant that there has been a violation of the provision contained in the 15th section and that this Court would be justified in awarding costs incurred in the proceedings before the Tribunal.

9. All the items disallowed by the Tribunal were not pressed before us. Mr. Umesh Prasad Singh, learned Junior Counsel to the Advocate General, who followed him pressed two or three items. But in absence of inclusion of the evidence in the paper book either documentary or oral, he could not press the matter in any detail. He drew our attention to certain Portions of the judgment and award of the Tribunal. But on appreciation of the same, it was found that the Tribunal has committed no error. Such of the amounts claimed under the various clauses of sub-section (2) of Section 13 as have been disallowed by the Tribunal have rightly been disallowed. It does not seem necessary to enter into any discussion in detail in respect of any item. Suffice it to say that either the amount was not found to have been spent in relation to the mining lease in the land acquired or there was no sufficient evidence to connect the expenditure with the land in question.

10. Mr. K.D Chatterji submitted, to resist the claim of the appellant as also in support of the cross-objection filed by the respondent, that compensation on the basis of the original mining lease granted by the Jharia Raj ought not to have been allowed. It ought to have been held, according to his submission that a new lease was granted to the claimant on the vesting of the intermediary's interest under the Bihar Land Reforms Act and, therefore, the claimant was entitled to compensation for losing its new lease and not the original one. This point has been stated merely to be rejected. In this connection reference may be made to a Bench decision of this Court in Bokaro and Ramgur Ltd. v. Kathara Coal Co. Ltd., (AIR 1969 Pat 235 at p. 245 Column 1).

11. We did not permit Mr. K.D Chatterji to press his cross-objection on merits because, as held by the Bench of this Court in AIR 1969 Pat 235 paragraph 12 at p. 239 a cross objection in an appeal filed under Section 20 of the Act is not maintainable. Mr. Chatterji submitted that the view expressed in that decision is not correct. He cited before us from a decision of the House of Lords in National Telephone Company Limited v. His Majesty's Postmaster-General (1913 AC 546) a passage in the speech of Viscount Haldane L.G at page 552 and submitted that when a provision for appeal has been made in Section 20 of the Act, the appeal has got to be disposed of under some procedure preferably in accordance with the procedure prescribed under Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter called the Code). Counsel, therefore, submitted that the provision of Order 41 Rule 22 of the Code will apply to this case and a right of filing cross-objection must be granted to the respondent. I am unable to accept this contention as correct. The principle enunciated by the learned Lord Chancellor in the case of National Telephone Company Limited is of different nature. A reference under the Telegraph (Arbitration) Act, 1909 was to be conducted by the Commission under the Acts of 1873 and 1888. In such a situation it was observed:—

“When a question is stated to be referred to an established Court without more, it in my opinion, imports that the ordinary incidents of the procedure of that Court are to attach, and also that any general right of appeal from its decisions likewise attaches.”

12. In the instant case it is difficult to accept the argument that the procedure prescribed under Order 41 of the Code will apply in the matter of disposal of an appeal filed under Section 20 of the Act. This Court can dispose of the appeal according to the procedure devised by it. Ordinarily and generally, the procedure of disposal of appeal filed under the Code would be adopted. But that is not to say that the Central Legislature had adopted the procedure prescribed in Order 41 of the Code for disposal of the appeals filed under Section 20 of the Act. This Court, while devising the procedure for the disposal of the appeal in accordance with Order 41 of the Code, cannot confer the right of filing cross-objection which has been so expressly provided in Order 41 Rule 22 of the Code. The remedy of the Central Government, if it wanted to challenge any portion of the award was to file its own appeal under Section 20 within the period of thirty days prescribed therein. Having not done so it cannot take shelter behind the provision of Order 41 Rule 22 of the Code to press its cross-objection in order to get over the bar of limitation provided for the filing of an appeal under Section 20 of the Act. For the reasons stated above, this appeal is allowed in part: the award of the Tribunal is modified. It is held that the appellant is entitled to interest at the rate of five per cent per annum on the excess amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal, i.e on the sum of Rs. 3,01,479.69 from the date on which it became Payable to the date of payment of such excess, i.e, from 18th of December, 1961 till the date of payment. A direction in accordance with Section 16 of the Act is given to the Central Government for payment of the sum of interest awarded by us. The appellant will have the costs of this appeal. Costs, are assessed at a round figure of Rs. 250/- only including the hearing fee.

S.K Jha, J.:— I agree.

13. Appeal partly allowed.