N.L Untwalia, J.:— Both these miscellaneous appeals under section 110D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, hereinafter called “the Act” are from the judgment and award of the District Judge of Gaya, constituting a Claims Tribunal by the State Government under section 110(1) of the Act. Miscellaneous Appeal No. 58 of 1966 has been preferred by Shri Daya Nath Jha, the claimant and Miscellaneous Appeal No. 53 of 1966 is by Hindusthan General Insurance Society Ltd. respondent No. 1 in the former appeal. Both the appeals are being disposed of by a common judgment wherein hereinafter the parties will be referred to in accordance with their respective position as appellant and respondents in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 58 of 1966.

2. The appellant at the relevant time was the Chief Engineer, Public Health Engineering Department, Government of Bihar, Patna. On the 30th April, 1963, after finishing his tour of Dhanbad, Giridih, etc., he came to Rajauli and took the Nawadah-Rajauli Road and proceeded towards Patna. At about 4 p.m when he had proceeded two miles ahead of that road which runs south to north and had crossed one diversion in his car bearing No. BRR 4356, he saw when he was at a distance of about 500 yards from the said diversion two trucks coming from the opposite direction, that is, north to south. The hinder truck was trying to overtake the truck going ahead. Shri Jha then cautioned his driver to slow the speed and take to left. The first truck passed off, but the hinder truck which was trying to overtake the former truck struck seriously against the car of Shri Jha and an accident occurred. In the car were travelling, besides the claimant, his driver Ram Swarath Jha and his orderly peon, Ram Nagina Ojha. A thikedar and his men were working on a culvert, where he had crossed the diversion and they all ran towards them. Shri Jha and his orderly peon who were seriously injured in the accident were taken on a truck which was passing by the road to Nawadah Hospital. The driver subsequently was taken in the car of one Shri Tripathy, another engineer, who was passing that way, to Nawadah Hospital. After getting first aid there, Shri Jha was admitted into the Patna Medical College Hospital where he was detained for about 27 days. He was in a cottage ward under the treatment of Dr. B. Mukho-padhyaya.

3. The appellant filed his application under section 110A of the Act before the Claims Tribunal, Gaya, claiming Rs. 1,000 as special damages for his expenses on medical treatment, Rs. 95,000 as compensation on account of the permanent injury caused to him in his hip bones which shortened the expectation of his life and Rs. 6,239.32 for the repairs of the damaged car. Besides the Hindusthan General Insurance Society Ltd., respondent No. 1, Sardar Jogendra Singh, respondent No. 2, the driver of Truck No. BRP-1441, which caused the accident and Sardar Singar Singh, respondent No. 3, the owner of the truck, were also impleaded as opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3. The case was contested only by respondent No. 1. Its defence was that it had no contractual or legal liability to compensate the applicant for any amount, that the driver of the truck in question was not negligent, rather Ram Nagina Ojha, the appellant's peon, was driving the car and was negligent. He had no licence for driving and, perhaps, he was allowed to learn driving. The claim of the applicant was highly exaggerated and fantastic. He was declared fit at the examination held by the medical board and was allowed to join his work in a regular manner. The life of the applicant was not expected to have shortened nor his health impaired. In an additional written statement filed by the company, a new plea was taken that the truck in question was standing on the left side of the road for filling water. In the mean time, the applicant's car came in high speed; and as it was going on the wrong side of the road, it dashed against the standing truck.

4. The Tribunal framed as many as five points for determination in the case before it; and, on the oral and documentary evidence adduced, it held:

“(1) that there was a collision between the truck and the car on the alleged date and time and it was due to the rash and negligent act of the driver of the truck, namely, opposite party No. 2;

(2) that in this very proceeding the applicant is entitled to claim damages for the repairs of his car and on this account, it awarded a sum of Rs. 4,000 as against the claim of Rs. 6,239.32;

(3) that the applicant is entitled to get Rs. 750 under the head ‘Medical expenses’ as against his claim of Rs. 1,000;

(4) that a sum of Rs. 15,000 should be awarded to Shri Jha on account of compensation for the bodily injury suffered by him in the accident; and,

(5) that Shri Jha will get the sums of Rs. 750 and Rs. 15,000 from respondent No. 1 besides the costs and respondents Nos. 2 and 3 would jointly pay the sum of Rs. 4,000 which has been awarded to him to meet the expenses of repairing the car.”

5. The insurance company has preferred the appeal challenging the award made against it and the applicant, Shri Jha, has preferred the appeal for enhancing the amount of damages and compensation under all the heads. It may be stated here that respondent No. 3 had preferred a cross objection in the appeal of the appellant objecting to the award of Rs. 4,000 made against him jointly with respondent No. 2. The cross-objection was filed out of time and the petition to condone the delay was rejected. The cross objection was, accordingly, dismissed on the 9th March, 1970. Thus, the award of damages of Rs. 4,000 against respondents Nos. 2 and 3 is final so far as they are concerned. It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that the amount should be enhanced to Rs. 6,239.32 as claimed by the appellant on the basis of the estimate prepared by Govind Lal Kumar (A.W 1) the proprietor of Kumar Engineering Works, Patna. Having appreciated all the arguments submitted on behalf of the appellant in this regard and having gone through the judgment of the Tribunal, I am of the opinion that the Tribunal has committed no error in awarding a sum of Rs. 4,000 only by way of damages for the serious damage caused to the car in the accident. Cogent reasons have been given by the Tribunal for not accepting in full the total estimate of Rs. 6,239.32 made by A.W 1. It may be pointed out here that the estimate was prepared by A.W 1 on the 8th of August, 1963, a few days before the appellant filed his claim; and, even till the time of his deposition in the year 1965, two years later, he was not in a position to produce any material before the Tribunal to show that as a matter of fact he had to incur the amount of Rs. 6,000 and odd in the repair of his car. The car was a second hand Standard Vanguard, 1951 model and I do not think that the amount of Rs. 4,000 awarded by the Tribunal as damages on account of the damage to the car, is in any way fit to be interfered with in appeal. The Tribunal is of the view that in view of the Bench decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Dr. Om Prakash Mishra v. National Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. A.I.R 1962 M.P 19. in this very proceeding in which the question for compensation for bodily injury was involved, damages on account of the damage to the car could also be awarded. This question is not open to challenge in the appeal by the appellant as the cross-objection filed by respondent No. 3 has stood dismissed. I may, however, add that I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court.

6. Arguments, however, have been strenuously advanced on behalf of the appellant and the first respondent with respect to the award made against the latter. I shall state the several points urged on behalf of the parties as I proceed to discuss them. The first question, which falls for determination in these appeals, is the scope of the defence which an insurer can take in a claim case filed before a motor accident claims tribunal. In British India General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Captain Itbar Singh [1959] 29 Comp. Cas. Ins. 60, A.K Sarkar J., as he then was, expressed the view that an insurer made a defendant to the action is not entitled to take any defence which is not specified in sub-section (2) of section 96 of the Act. A Bench of the Madras High Court, however, has pointed out in K. Gopalkrishnan v. Sankara Narayanan A.I.R 1968 Mad. 436. at page 446, that the decision of the Punjab High Court in Vanguard Fire and General Insurance Co. v. Sarla Devi A.I.R 1959 Punj. 297. as also of the Supreme Court in the above mentioned British India General Insurance Co.'s case [1959] 29 Comp. Cas. Ins. 60 holding that an insurer is not entitled to take any defence which is not mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 96 of the Act are all decisions in which the insurers were given notice in proceedings by way of suit and the same principle will not be applicable when the insurer is made a party as it has to be before the claims tribunal. Hence, in the opinion of the Madras High Court, expressed in K. Gopala Krishnan's case it is open to the insurer to take all pleas in defence as may be available over and above the grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 96. I respectfully venture to differ from this view of the Madras High Court.

7. It is no doubt true that before the introduction of sections 110 to 11 of in Chapter VIII of the Act by the Motor Vehicles Amendment Act (Act 100 of 1956), a claimant had to file a suit for claiming compensation. In the suit, no other defence could be taken by the insurer except the one mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 96. Even after the introduction of these sections relating to Claims Tribunals, sub-section (2) of section 96 has been left intact, except with addition of a few words in sub-clause (c) of clause (i) of sub-section (2)(b) of section 96, although the other parts of the section have been amended by the same Amending Act. It is, therefore, not a case where due to inadvertence, sub-section (2) has been almost left intact by the legislature. The reasoning of the Madras High Court that this section was necessary to be left in the statute because in all the States Claims Tribunals may not be constituted, I say so with respect, is not sound. In the States where Claims Tribunals function, the claimant has to go to the Tribunal. In the States where such Tribunals have not been constituted, the remedy of going to the civil court is there. In either case, sub-section (2) of section 96 is in operation and covers the restriction placed upon the right of the insurer to take the defence. Section 110B does not make it obligatory upon the applicant to make an insurer a party to the proceeding. The insurer may be made a party by the applicant, or even if he is not made a party, he will be liable for the amount of the award only when in respect of the judgment and award of the Tribunal before or after the commencement of the proceeding in which the judgment is given, the insurer had notice through the court or the Tribunal (the Tribunal will also be a court) of the bringing of the proceeding. The insurer, to whom notice of the bringing of any such proceeding is given, shall be entitled to be made a party thereto and to defend the action on any of the grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 96 of the Act. In making the award, the Claims Tribunal has to specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer as directed by the legislature as laid down in section 110B. But this can be done in either case when the insurer is made a party by the applicant or is added as a party on giving of the notice of the proceeding to him under sub-section (2) of section 96 of the Act. sub-section (1) of section 96 reads as follows:

“If, after a certificate of insurance has been issued under sub-section (4) of section 95 in favour of the person by whom a policy has been effected, judgment in respect of any such liability as is required to be covered by a policy under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 95 (being a liability covered by the terms of the policy) is obtained against any person insured by the policy, then, notwithstanding that the insurer may be entitled to avoid or cancel or may have avoided or cancelled the policy, the insurer shall, subject to the provisions of this section, pay to the person entitled to the benefit of the decree any sum not exceeding the sum assured payable thereunder, as if he were the judgment-debtor, in respect of the liability, together with any amount payable in respect of costs and any sum payable in respect of interest on that sum by virtue of any enactment relating to interest on judgments.”

8. Then sub-section (2) says:

“No sum shall be payable by an insurer under sub-section (1) in respect of any judgment unless before or after the commencement of the proceedings in which the judgment is given the insurer had notice through the court of the bringing of the proceedings, or in respect of any judgment so long as execution is stayed thereon pending an appeal; and an insurer to whom notice of the bringing of any such proceedings is so given shall be entitled to be made a party thereto and to defend the action on any of the following grounds, namely:—………”

9. There seems to be some confusion in view of the phrase “in respect of any judgment so long as execution is stayed thereon pending an appeal” occurring in sub-section (2) that a notice of the proceeding may be-given even after the judgment. In my opinion, this is not the correct view. The notice of the proceeding is to be given to the insurer before the judgment is obtained in the proceeding or the suit. Of course, the notice may be given if the insurer is made a party, or otherwise it may be given after the commencement of the proceeding and in that event the insurer has got to be added as a party. The judgment cannot be obtained against the insurer unless the insurer is given an opportunity to defend the action on any of the grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 96 of the Act. The word “or” before the phrase, extracted above, must mean “and” in the context and thus read the meaning will be clear to the effect that no sum shall be payable by an insurer under sub-section (1) of section 96 in respect of any judgment unless the insurer had notice of the bringing of the proceedings; and in respect of any judgment so long as execution is stayed thereon pending an appeal the liability will not be there. It is difficult to accept the construction of sub-section (2) of section 96 as seems to have been put by the Madras High Court that the notice of the proceedings by way of suit can be given even after the judgment is obtained. It will be a contradiction in terms to say so, as it would be a complete denial to the insurer of its right to defend the action on the grounds mentioned in sub-section (2). I find no difference for the purpose of the application of the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 96 of the Act to the proceedings by way of suit or the proceeding brought before the Claims Tribunal. A reference to this question was made before a Bench of this court in Bihar Co-operative Motor Vehicles Insurance Society Ltd. v. Rameshwar Raut, but since the defence in regard to negligence had not been set up by the insurance company, it was not decided in that case whether the Madras view was correct. Mr. J.C Sinha, learned counsel for the insurance company, however, pointed out that, even so, Tarkeshwar Nath J. went into the question of quantum of compensation in that case and reduced it at the instance of the insurance company. Learned counsel submitted that, if it was not open to the insurance company to take any other defence at its instance, the quantum of compensation could not be reduced. But, in my opinion, there is a clear distinction, though subtle, between defending an action to escape the liability altogether and asking the court or the Tribunal not to make a decree or award for the sum of compensation asked for by the suitor but to make a decree for a lesser sum. It would be noticed that to defend the action on any of the grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 96 means that the insurer is not liable at all. So will be the case if the insurer defends the action on the ground of want of negligence; but to ask the court or tribunal not to pass a decree or an award for the amount claimed by the suitor is, strictly speaking, not to defend the action but is to ask the court or the Tribunal to award such sum of compensation as the suitor may be entitled under the law. It seems to me that there is a reason behind the provision engrafted in sub-section (2) of section 96 of the Act. The liability of the insurer is unqualified under sub-section (5) of section 95 of the Act. Notwithstanding anything elsewhere contained in any law if the insurer has issued a policy of insurance under the section, then he is liable to indemnify the person or classes of persons specified in the policy in respect of any liability which the policy purports to cover in the case of that person or those classes of persons. As held by the Madras High Court in Gopalakrishnan's case referred to above, the liability under clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (2) of section 95 is limited in the case of a vehicle which is a goods vehicle or is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward, provided in the former case it relates to the death of, or bodily injury to, employees other than the driver, not exceeding six in number, being carried in the vehicle, as mentioned in section 95(2)(a) of the Act and in the latter case of a passenger vehicle as mentioned in clause (b) of section 95(2). Of course, in the case of any other class of vehicle, the liability is to the extent of the amount of liability incurred as provided in clause (c) thereof; but, then, it is to be remembered that under sub-section (1) of section 96 the insurer is liable to an amount not beyond the sum assured. It is on account of this reason that it seems to me that the insurer has been given a right to defend the action on limited grounds which, more or less, relate to the conditions of the policy and not on the general grounds which may be available by way of defence to the driver or to the owner of the vehicle. But, that is not to say that the insurer cannot ask the court or the tribunal not to pass a decree or an award for an exhorbitant amount to which the suitor is not entitled in law. It will be doing violence to the principles of natural justice, if it were to be held so.

10. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the first respondent was wrongly allowed to take all sorts of pleas in its defence-pleas which were not open to it to be taken. I may also add that after having perused the relevant pieces of evidence and the judgment of the Tribunal, I have unhesitatingly come to the conclusion that its finding on the factum of accident which was beyond challenge as also that it was caused due to the negligence of the driver of the truck in question is absolutely correct. Even if it were open to the first respondent to attack the finding in that regard, it was extremely difficult, nay, impossible to challenge the finding. Now, coming to the question of damages it should be pointed out in the beginning that the claim by the appellant of the amount of Rs. 1,000 on account of the expenses incurred by him for his treatment or in relation to that was a claim for special damages. The Tribunal, on a careful consideration of the evidence and the materials placed before it, has awarded a sum of Rs. 750 on that account. Neither the appellant nor the first respondent could advance any argument of substance to attack the decision of the Tribunal in that regard. The award of Rs. 750, therefore, is affirmed.

11. The appellant, however, seems to have been under some confusion in making a claim of Rs. 95,000 on account of the compensation in respect of bodily injury suffered by him in the accident in question. To clear up the confusion one thing should be stated at the outset. The actual loss of earning is not a claim for general damages. It is a claim for special damages. The appellant did not succeed in proving any loss on that account as he had incurred none. Shortly after his discharge from the hospital, he was examined by a medical board consisting of the civil surgeon, a physician and an eye specialist. His X'ray plates were examined; and as exhibit A shows he was found fit to join his duties. According to the evidence of the appellant himself, he joined his duty two months later and in about six months' time he was able to perform his normal duties. He incurred no loss of salary for any period on account of the bodily injury sustained by him. The period of his absence from duty was allowed as leave and presumably on full pay, as there is nothing to the contrary in the records of this case to show that there was any subtraction from his pay when he joined his duties even though he was not able to perform his normal duties. It is, therefore, manifest that the appellant did not claim any special damage on account of actual loss of his earning.

12. Under the head “general damages”, however, the appellant was entitled to claim his future loss of earning, if expected. He seems to have been advised to lead evidence to base his entire claim of damages on that account, as he says that he would have served for four more years even after his retirement, had he not been involved in the accident. The salary which he was getting was Rs. 2,000 per month and thus in four more years after retirement he would have earned a sum of Rs. 96,000. On such an ill-advisedly mathematical calculation, it seems that the appellant, without sufficient basis and material, claimed the amount of compensation at Rs. 95,000. It is to be pointed out here that there is no evidence in the case worth the name that after his retirement he would have got an extension from the Government or that his name would have been recommended to the Central Government as was asked for in the letter (exhibit 7). There is nothing in the records of this case to show that at the time of the trial of this case before the Tribunal in the year 1965 when the appellant was still in active service his chance of getting either an extension or a recommendation to the Central Government was impaired because of bodily injury suffered by him or because of his allegedly physical disability. The appellant retired in 1966. The appellant was allowed to join the normal duties of his office as Chief Engineer in 1963 soon after the accident. At the time of the trial of this case in 1965, he did not claim that he was suffering from any such physical disability which hampered with his normal duties in the office or even at home. In my opinion, it was just a wishful thinking of the appellant that even after his retirement he must have been in active service getting Rs. 2,000 per month for four years but would not be so because of the bodily injury suffered by him in the accident. In my opinion, therefore, while awarding general damages to the appellant, the question of his expected loss of income was not relevant as he was not under such disability which impaired the chance of his earning in future either when he was in active service of the Government or if he would have been taken in by extension of his service or otherwise.

13. On the evidence of Dr. B. Mukhopadhyaya (A.W 2), Dr. Jogendra Prasad Sinha (A.W 4) and Dr. Anirudha Prasad (A.W 5) with the aid of exhibits 8 and 8(a), it has rightly been held by the Tribunal that the appellant did suffer fracture of the bone in his hip which was not of a minor character but was also not such as to bring any appreciable permanent disability. The said materials indicate that the appellant had to remain in the Patna Medical College Hospital for four weeks, was not able to join his normal duties thereafter for about two months and was able to perform some duties in his office in a period of about six months. He had to undergo physiotheraphy treatment for a considerable period even till the time of his deposition in the year 1965. All that indicates that the appellant had suffered such bodily injury which entitled him to be compensated for the loss caused to him on account of that injury; the bodily injury bringing pain in the body, shock and hindrance in the enjoyment of life and the like. Although the appellant in his evidence, as it seems, was afraid of claiming that he was suffering from any kind of physical disability at the time of his deposition before the Tribunal, because that might have created a risk in his continuing in service, on a careful consideration of the evidence of Dr. Mukhopadhyaya, it would be evident that the appellant got a defect in his hip bone which would not be perfectly cured and caused a partial permanent disability. But, the amount of disability was not such as to entitle him to claim an exhorbitant compensation as claimed on his behalf in this appeal; nor was it so minor as to say that the award of Rs. 15,000 by the Tribunal taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case exhorbitant or such as to call for any interference in appeal. A number of cases have been considered on the point by Tarkeshwar Nath J. in Bihar Co-operative Motor Vehicles Insurance Society Ltd. v. Rameshwar Raut at page 929 onwards. It would be advantageous to requote the law, quoted by the learned judge, from the case of Flint v. Lovell to the following effect:

“In order to justify reversing the trial judge on the question of the amount of damages it will generally be necessary that this court should be convinced either that the judge acted upon some wrong principle of law, or that the amount awarded was so extremely high or so very small as to make it, in the judgment of this court, an entirely erroneous estimate of the damage to which the plaintiff is entitled.”

14. There are numerous Indian and English decisions laying down the principles for awarding general damages in case of bodily injury. I may refer only to a few of the English decisions. In British Transport Commission v. Gourley, Lord Goddard in his speech has pointed out at page 51:

“In an action for personal injuries the damages are always divided into two main parts. First, there is what is referred to as special damage, which has to be specially pleaded and proved. This consists of out-of-pocket expenses and loss of earnings incurred down to the date of trial and is generally capable of substantially exact calculation. Secondly, there is general damage which the law implies and is not specially pleaded. This includes compensation for pain and suffering and the like and if the injuries suffered are such as to lead to continuing or permanent disability, compensation for loss of earning power in the future. The basic principle so far as loss of earnings and out-of-pocket expenses are concerned is that the injured person should be placed in the same financial position, so far as can be done by an award of money as he would have been had the accident not happened……”

15. The learned law Lord has said at page 52:

“The assessment of general damages in these cases is always a matter of difficulty. I do not think that restitutio in integrum has any application to general damages. The plaintiff receives compensation and not restitution. If he has lost an eye or a limb he can be compensated by money but that will not restore what he has lost. So, too, if his earning capacity is lessened or destroyed, the loss cannot be measured so as to ensure that he is no worse off in the future than he was in the past and indeed, if it turned out that the amount of his disability was less than was anticipated at the trial, he might even be over-compensated.”

16. In H. West & Son Ltd. v. Shephard the court of appeal refused to interfere with the general damages awarded by the trial judge on the ground that he had not erred in his approach to the assessment of the general damages and that his award, although high, was not so high that it should be interfered with. In the instant case, in my opinion, the award is neither high nor low and is not fit to be interfered on either side. Referring to these two cases, Hinchcliffe, J. has pointed out in S. v. Distillers Company (Biocliemicals) Ltd. that “three propositions emerged; (1) Bodily injury is to be treated as a deprivation which entitles a plaintiff to damages and that the amount of damages varies according to the gravity of the injury; (2) Deprivation may bring with it three consequences—loss of earnings or earning capacity, expenses of having to pay others for what otherwise he would do for himself and loss of enjoyment of life or a diminution in the full pleasures of living; (3) in considering the deprivation the court should have regard to the gravity and degree of the deprivation, that is to say, whether one or more limbs has been lost……”. Lord Reid in Bakery v. Willoughby has observed:

“A man is not compensated for the physical injury: he is compensated for the loss which he suffers as a result of that injury. His loss is not in having a stiff leg; it is in his inability to lead a full life, his inability to enjoy those amenities which depend on freedom of movement and his inability to earn as much as he used to earn or could have earned if there had been no accident.”

17. In regard to a claim for personal injury, it has been laid down in paragraph 427 of the Halsbury's Laws of England, third edition, volume II, at page 255 as under:

“In a claim for damages for personal injury, whether caused by trespass, or by negligence, or by breach of statutory duty, the damages are, apart from special damage, at large and will be given for the physical injury itself and, in case of loss of limb, disfigurement, or disablement, for its effect upon the physical capacity of the injured person to enjoy life, as well as for his bodily pain and suffering and for shock, or injury to health. Such damages cannot be a perfect compensation but must be arrived at by a reasonable consideration of all the heads of damage in respect of which the plaintiff is entitled to compensation and of his circumstances, making allowances for the ordinary accidents and chances of life.”

18. On behalf of the appellant, many cases under the Fatal Accidents Act were cited before the Tribunal and here; but in my opinion, it is not necessary to refer to the principle laid down in those cases for awarding the compensation to a claimant on account of the death of a person which is governed by different sets of principles than those which govern the award of damages for bodily injury. To illustrate my point, suffice it to say that in the case of death of a child, the amount of compensation is much lower than the serious bodily injury caused to him as was the case in S. v. Distillers Company (Biochemicals) Ltd. There are numerous reverse cases also.

19. Taking into consideration, however, the broad facts and circumstances of the instant case, the Tribunal has rightly held that Shri Jha did not receive any serious injury in the sense of any portion of his body being permanently affected, except some defect in the left hip bone joint. It also held that Shri Jha had not been disabled to any appreciable extent. Though his left hip bone joint had become weak, it did not stand in the way of his discharging duty. Taking all the relevant facts into consideration, the Tribunal had justly come to the conclusion that the appellant was entitled to a sum of Rs. 15,000 by way of compensation for the bodily injury suffered by him in the accident. On a careful consideration of the matter, I have also come to the same conclusion. In my opinion, the award of Rs. 15,000 is the just compensation on the facts and in the circumstances of this case.

20. In the result, both the appeals fail and are dismissed; but, in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs in either.

Mukharji, J.:— I agree.