1. The common question involved in these two writ applications is whether an appeal lies under Section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Central Act 4 of 1939), (hereinafter called 'the Act') from an order of the Regional Transport Authority made on an application filed under Sub-section (8) of Section 57 of the Act. Hence both the cases have been heard together and are being disposed of by this judgment.

C.W.J.C. No, 462 of 1967.

2. The facts of this case are that petitioner No. 1 was a holder of a permanent stage carriage permit granted under the Act for the route Nasriganj - Dehri - Sasaram. Petitioner No. 2 also held a permanent stage carriage permit for the route Rohtas--Sasaram--Kochas. The first respondent was the holder of a permanent stage carriage permit for the route Sasaram--Dehri--Nasriganj--Kachwa--Sahar. The said respondent applied before the South Bihar Regional Transport Authority for extension of his existing route from Sasaram to Kochas, The mileage of the extension sought for was about 21 miles. This was an application filed under Sub-section (8) of Section 57 of the Act which says -

An application to vary the conditions of any permit, other than a temporary permit, by the inclusion of a new route or routes or a new area or, in the case of a stage carriage permit, by increasing the number of services above the specified maximum, or in the case of a contract carriage permit or a public carrier's permit, by increasing the number of vehicles covered by the permit, shall be treated as an application for the grant of a new permit.

Since the application aforesaid was to be treated as an application for the grant of a new permit, it was duly published and objections were invited in accordance with the provision of law contained in Sub-section (3) of Section 57 applicable to an application for the grant of a new permit. Petitioner No. 1 objected to the extension asked for by the first respondent. The South Bihar Regional Transport Authority, the fourth respondent, by its order dated 2-9-1966 rejected the application of the first respondent. Against the said order of the Regional Transport Authority respondent No. 1 filed an appeal under Section 64 of the Act. The Appeal Board, respondent No. 3, by its order dated 21-1-1967 dismissed the appeal. A copy of the order of the Appeal Board is annexure 'A' to the writ application. Respondent No. 1 filed an application under Section 64-A of the Act, as it stands under the Bihar amendment of the statute. The Minister incharge of the transport Department of the Government of Bihar by his order dated 9-6-1967 partly allowed the application under revision filed under Section 64-A of the Bihar. Act and temporarily granted the extension asked for by the first respondent. A copy of the Minister's order is annexure 'B' to the writ application.

3. In this case two points have been urged by Mr. Amala Kant Choudhury in support of this application: (i) that no appeal lay under Section 64 of the Act to the Appellate Authority from an order of rejection of the application filed by the first respondent under Section 57(8) of the Act and hence no revision under Section 64-A of the Bihar Act was competent; and (ii) that in any view of the matter, the Minister had no jurisdiction to allow a temporary extension or a temporary variation of the conditions of the permit in exercise of his revisional powers under Section 64-A of the Bihar Act.

4. Mr. Saptami Jha, learned Counsel for respondent No. 1, could not combat either of the propositions. The first point will be discussed after stating the facts and the point involved in C. W. J. C. No. 116 of 1968. At this stage it may be stated that the submission on behalf of the petitioners on both the points is well founded and has got to prevail. Apart from the fact that the revision was incompetent for the reasons to be stated hereinafter, the Minister incharge of the Transport Department of the Government of Bihar, in exercise of his revisional power in a proceeding arising on an application under Section 57(8) of the Act had no power to grant a temporary extension or a temporary variation of the conditions of the permit. Such an order is not warranted by any provision of the law and cannot be supported on principle or authority.

5. In the result, the application is allowed. The impugned order of the Minister, dated 9-6-1967 is called up and quashed by grant of a writ of certiorari. The petitioners will get costs of this application from respondent No. 1. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 250/-, because no order of stay was made at the time of the admission of this application and respondent No. 1 continued to take advantage of the illegal order of the revisional authority tinder Section 64-A of the Bihar. Act.

C. W. J. C. No. 116 of 1968.

6. The facts of this case are these. M/S Bihar National Transport Company, the petitioner in this case, applied under Section 57(8) of the Act to the South Bihar Regional Transport Authority to vary the conditions of the stage carriage permit which the petitioner company was holding for the route Rohtas-Dehri-Nasriganj by including an extra route Nasriganj-Bikramganj, in other words, by extending the route from Rohtas- Nasriganj to Rohtas - Bikramganj. The second respondent and some others filed objections to the application in accordance with, as already stated with reference to the facts of the other case, Sub-section (3) of Section 57 of the Act. The South Bihar Regional Transport Authority by its order dated 2-9-1966 allowed the application of the petitioner company, a copy of which order is annexure 'A' to the writ application. Respondent No. 2 thereupon filed an appeal before the Appeal Board of the State Transport Authority, Patna. The appeal was dismissed by order dated 9-6-1967, a copy of which is annexure 'B' to the writ application. Against the said order of the Appeal Board the second respondent filed a petition under Section 64-A of the Bihar Act which was allowed by the Minister incharge of the Transport Department of the Government of Bihar by his order dated 14-1-1968, a copy of which is annexure 'C' to. the writ application. The petitioner attacks this order on two grounds: (i) that the revisional application under Section 64-A of the Bihar Act was incompetent as the appeal was incompetent; and (ii) even assuming that the revision was competent, the order suffers from an error of law on its face which is liable to be quashed by grant of a writ in the nature of certiorari.

7. In order to decide whether an appeal under Section 64 of the Act at the instance of any party from an order made by the Regional Transport Authority on an application under Section 57(8) of the Act lies or not, it is necessary to read certain provisions of the Act. Section 48 provides for grant of stage carriage permits, Sub-section (1) of which says -

Subject to the provisions of Section 47, a Regional Transport Authority may, on an application made to it under Section 46, grant a stage carriage permit in accordance with the application or with such modifications as it deems fit or refuse to grant such a permit.

Sub-section (3) of Section 48 empowers the Regional Transport Authority to "attach to the permit any one or more of the following conditions, namely:

In exercise of the power conferred on the Regional Transport Authority under Sub-section (3) of Section 48, it can attach to the permit numerous conditions enumerated in that sub-section and one of such conditions can be as extracted from Clause (xxi) which clause in turn empowers the Regional Transport Authority to vary the conditions of the permit or to attach to the permit further conditions. The power which the Regional Transport Authority can exercise under Clause (xxi) of Sub-section (3) of Section 48 of the Act can be so exercised suo motu by the Authority and it may be either in favour of the permit holder or against him. The power which can be exercised by the Regional Transport Authority on an application made to it under Sub-section (8) of Section 57 of the Act is of a different kind. It seems to me that the conditions of any permit on such an application can be varied only in favour of the permit holder and not against him. Such variation, however, may affect other persons and specially those who had been provided transport facilities on the portion of the route which is sought to be included in the route of the permit holder on an application filed by him under Section 57(8) of the Act. In this background I shall now quote the whole of Section 64 of the Act.

64. Any person -

(a) aggrieved by the refusal of the State or a Regional Transport Authority to grant a permit, or by any condition attached to a permit, granted to him, or

(b) aggrieved by the revocation or suspension of the permit or by any variation of the conditions thereof, or

(c). aggrieved by the refusal to transfer the permit to the person succeeding on the death of the holder of a permit, or

(d) aggrieved by the refusal of the State or a Regional Transport Authority to countersign a permit, or by any condition attached to such countersignature, or

(e) aggrieved by the refusal of renewal of a permit, or

(f) being a local authority or police authority or an association which, or a person providing transport facilities who, having opposed the grant of a permit, is aggrieved by the grant thereof or by any condition attached thereto, or

(g) aggrieved by the refusal to grant permission under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) of Section 59, or

(h) aggrieved by a reduction under Sub-section (1A) of Section 60 in the number of vehicles or routes or area covered by a permit, or

(i) aggrieved by any other order which may be. prescribed, may, within the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner, appeal to the prescribed authority who shall give such person and the original authority an opportunity of being heard.

8. Clause (a) gives the right, of appeal only to that person who was the applicant for grant of a permit and whose prayer has been refused or who feels aggrieved by any condition attached to his permit by the Regional Transport Authority in exercise of its power under Sub-section (3) of Section 48 of the Act. It is difficult to take the view that merely because an application filed under Sub-section (8) of Section 57 has got to be treated as an application for the grant of a new permit, refusal of such application will tantamount to refusal to grant a permit and will give a right of appeal to the applicant under Clause (a) of Section 64 of the Act, Sub-section (8) being a part of Section 57 which provides for the procedure for the application and its disposal for stage carriage permit, must be limited to the procedural aspect of the disposal of the application filed under Sub-section (8). The purpose of treating such an application as an application for the grant of a new permit must be limited to the procedure prescribed in Section 57 of the Act. The treatment aforesaid cannot be meant to imply the fight of appeal which is not a procedural matter, but a substantive right under Section 64 of the Act. This view finds support from a Bench decision of this Court in Anil Krishna Ghosh v. The Minister of Transport, Bihar and Ors. C.W.J.C 165 of 1965 decided on 12th Oct. 1966 and the Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Bhan Singh v. Regional Transport Authority, Meerut .

9. Mr. R.P. Srivastava, appearing for respondent No. 2 in C. W. J. C. 116 of 1968, submitted that the said respondent had a right of appeal either under Clause (b) or under Clause (f) of Section 64 of the Act. I have no appreciable difficulty in rejecting the contention with reference to Clause (f), but the argument as presented on the basis of Clause (b) cannot be said to be free from difficulty. But, on a careful consideration of the matter I find myself in respectful agreement with the view expressed by a Bench of this Court in Nandlal Thana Ram v. Ghani Khan Monaf Khan and cases of other High Courts which will be referred to hereinafter. Clause (c) of Section 64 is again a right of appeal conferred in one sense to the permit holder as in express term it is the right of the person succeeding on the death of the permit holder who feels aggrieved by the refusal to transfer the permit to him. Clause (d) obviously confers a right of appeal on the permit holder, so does Clause (e). Rights of appeal conferred by Clauses (g) and (h) are also of a limited nature and give such right to a limited person. In accordance with Clause (i) a right of appeal may be conferred from any other order which may be prescribed. It is the admitted position in both the cases that by such prescription an order made on an application under Sub-section (8) of Section 57 of the Act has not been made appealable. Clause (f) again gives a right of appeal besides a local authority or police authority or an association to a person providing transport facilities who, having opposed the grant of a permit, feels aggrieved by its grant or by any condition attached thereto. Obviously this right of appeal to such a person is from the order made by the Regional Transport Authority either under Sub-section (1) or under Sub-section (3) of Section 48 of the Act. On a parity of reasons which I have given with reference to the expression "grant a permit" occurring in Clause (a) it is manifest, the same expression in Clause (f) cannot cover within its ambit an order made by the Regional Transport Authority on an application under Section 57(8) of the Act. The variation of the condition on such an application, in my opinion, cannot be characterised as an attachment of the condition to confer a right of appeal on a person who had opposed the variation of the condition under Clause (f) of Section 64 of the Act.

10. Coming to Clause (b), it is to be pointed out first that under its first part the person who can feel aggrieved and file an appeal must be the permit holder and, none else. He and he alone can be the person who may be aggrieved by the revocation or suspension of "the permit" granted to him. Reading the second part of Clause (b) in the context of its first part as also in the context of Clauses (a) and (c) to (e), as a matter of construction it has got to be held that the only person who has been given a right of appeal under the second part of Clause (b) is again the permit holder and none else. He can feel aggrieved by any variation of the conditions attached to his permit if made by the Regional Transport Authority in accordance with the conditions attached to the permit under Clause (xxi) of Sub-section (3) of Section 48 of the Act. I am inclined to think that the permit holder cannot be a person who can feel aggrieved by any variation of the conditions made on his application under Section 57(8) of the Act, He seeks the variation in his favour. The variation may be allowed to the fullest extent asked for or may be partly allowed. He may feel aggrieved by refusal of his application in toto or by the part refusal of his application, but he cannot be said to be a person who can feel aggrieved by any variation either full or part made in his favour. In my opinion, therefore, Clause (b) of Section 64 of the Act obviously cannot confer a right of appeal on the permit holder whose application under Section 57(8) has been wholly or partly disallowed. The question then arises as to whether any person entitled to oppose an application under Section 57(8) of the Act in accordance with its third sub section can be said to be a person aggrieved by any variation of the conditions of the permit. It is to be pointed out here that a wide category of persons have been given the right to oppose an application for grant of a stage carriage permit under Sub-section (3) of Section 57 of the Act and consequently the same wide category can oppose the application for variation of the condition filed under Section 57(8) of the Act. But it is significant to note that while under Clause (f) of Section 64, only a limited number of persons who had provided transport facilities and who had opposed the grant of a permit have been given the right of appeal, it would be congruous to hold that under Clause (b) of Section 64 a wider category of persons have been given a right of appeal in respect of an order which is concerned only with the variation of the conditions of the permit. It must also be pointed out again that the permit holder who feels aggrieved by the adverse order against him made on his application under Section 57(8) of the Act has not got any right of appeal. On consideration of the matters discussed by me, I have come to the conclusion that Clause (b) of Section 64 must derive its colour and must be interpreted in the context and setting up of the various other clauses mentioned in that section. I, therefore, hold that no appeal can lie under Section 64 of the Act at the instance of any person from an order made by the Regional Transport Authority on an application filed under Section 57(8) of the Act.

11. That being so, it is beyond any dispute, in view of the authority of the Supreme Court in Tansukh Rai v. Nilratan Prasad , that the revision under Section 64-A of the Bihar Act was incompetent. The order being not appealable a revision lay to the State Transport Authority under Section 64-A of the Central Act and a second revision lay to the State Government under Section 64-A of the Bihar Act.

12. The unreported decision of this Court in referred to above, relies upon the decision of the Madras High Court in V. Krishnamurthy v. The Ceded District Auto Transport Co, Ltd. Kurnool and the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in A. Jaliardhana Rao v. Deputy Transport Commissioner, Kakinada and Ors. . The Bench decision of the Patna High Court in the case of Nandlal Thana Ram v. Ghani Khan Monaf Khan while taking the same view, if I may say so with respect, as the one I have expressed above, on interpretation of Clause (b) of Section 64, seems to have opined further that an appeal by a person of the kind mentioned in Clause (f), as undoubtedly respondent No. 2 in C.W.J.C. 116 of 1968 was, competent. This observation in the judgment aforesaid is obiter dictum as on the facts found it was held that the person who sought the right of appeal under Clause (f) had filed his objection beyond time under Sub-section (3) of Section 57 of the Act. That being so, the said observation is riot binding on us and I venture to take a different view on an interpretation of the language of Clause (f) of Section 64 of the Act. A learned, single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in S. Bhan Singh v. Regional Transport Authority, Meerut on discussion of the various authorities has fallen in line with the Patna decision expressed in the case of Nandlal Thana Ram. The view of the Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in Jairamdas v. Regional Transport followed by a Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in Heeralal and Ors. v. The State of Rajasthan and Ors. holding that an appeal lies under Clause (b) of Section 64 of the Act at the instance of a person who feels aggrieved by the variation of the conditions of the permit inspite of whose opposition the conditions were varied, if I may say so with respect, does not seem to be the correct view. A similar view was expressed by a Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case already referred to. For the reasons mentioned and discussed by me above, the view taken in the two cases of the Rajasthan High Court and one of the Allahabad High Court is not acceptable to me. If I may say so with utmost respect, the view has been taken on too literal an interpretation of Clause (b) of Section 64 of the Act which does not seem to be warranted and reasonable on reading the. said clause in the light of its first part and the context of the other clauses and the scheme of the Act.

13. I, therefore, hold that the impugned order made by the Minister incharge of the Transport Department of the Government of Bihar in C.W.J C. No. 116 of 1968 was ultra vires and without jurisdiction and the revision was incompetent. In that view of the matter I do not propose to express any opinion on the second point urged on behalf of the petitioner in this case. The application is allowed. The impugned order of the Minister is called up and quashed by grant of a writ of certiorari. Since in this case the operation of the order of the Minister had been stayed, I shall make no order as to cost.

S. Wasiuddin, J.

14. I agree.