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  • Article 15(4) of the Constitution authorises special provision
  • Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951
  • provision of Article 15 (4)
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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Attorney(S)
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  • Article 15(4) of the Constitution authorises special provision
  • Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951
  • provision of Article 15 (4)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

In 1960 the Bherno Ganja shop was ordered to be shifted to Doranda, Ranchi. The Deputy Commissioner of Ranchi invited applications for settlement of that Doranda Ganja shop and received 39 applications in 1960. Proceedings for settlement were stayed by the High Court in M. J. C. 1229 of 1960 on an application by Abdul Wahab (the licensee of the Lower Bazar Ganja shop) because he contended the shifting would adversely affect his business. M. J. C. No. 1229 of 1960 was dismissed by the High Court on 30 November 1962.

After dismissal, for the year 1963–64 the Deputy Commissioner did not call fresh applications but selected from the 39 applications originally received in 1960. The Superintendent of Excise prepared a list of seven persons (all described as members of scheduled caste or scheduled tribe) from among those 39 applicants. The petitioner, who had applied on 9 May 1963, was not included in that list. On 11 May 1963 the Deputy Commissioner rejected the petitioner's request to be included, on the ground that the petitioner was not a member of a scheduled caste or scheduled tribe, and proceeded to draw lots only among scheduled caste/tribe applicants. The lottery favored Jagmohan Naik (respondent No. 4), and the Deputy Commissioner ordered settlement of the Doranda Ganja shop in his favour.

The petitioner challenged both the State Government order of 20 August 1958 (Excise Commissioner's Memo No. 9520) and the Deputy Commissioner's order of 11 May 1963 by obtaining a rule in the High Court calling on respondents to show cause why those orders should not be quashed by a writ in the nature of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution. Respondents were served and cause was shown by the Advocate General and other counsel.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the State Government order dated 20 August 1958 (which prescribes a procedure and preference to scheduled caste and scheduled tribe candidates in settlement of Excise shops) violates the guarantee under Article 15(1) of the Constitution.
  2. Whether the Deputy Commissioner of Ranchi's order dated 11 May 1963, which implemented the 20 August 1958 Government order in settling the Doranda Ganja shop with respondent No. 4, is illegal and ultra vires and therefore liable to be quashed by certiorari under Article 226.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The effect of the Government notification of 20 August 1958 was not merely to give preference to scheduled caste/tribe candidates but to exclude candidates from all other communities in cases where even a single scheduled caste or scheduled tribe candidate existed.
  • Accordingly, the petitioner argued that the Government notification exceeded the constitutional limits of power granted to the State under Article 15(4) for making special provisions for the advancement of scheduled castes and tribes or other socially and educationally backward classes.

Respondents' Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
M.K. Balaji v. The State of Mysore, AIR 1963 SC 640 The Supreme Court held that Article 15(4) is to be read as a proviso or exception to Article 15(1) and that special provisions (such as reservations) must be within reasonable limits; they must not exclude the rest of society altogether or subvert the object of Article 15(4). A large reservation (68% in that case) was held to be inconsistent with Article 15(4). The court applied the Mysore decision's principle to the present facts: because Article 15(4) is an exception to Article 15(1) and must be limited so as not to exclude the rest of society, the 20 August 1958 Government order (which effectively excluded non‑scheduled candidates where a single scheduled candidate existed) was held unconstitutional and ultra vires.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in the following steps, based on the material in the opinion:

  1. Identification of the central constitutional provision at issue: Article 15(1) (prohibition of discrimination on grounds such as caste) and Article 15(4) (power to make special provisions for advancement of socially and educationally backward classes, including Scheduled Castes and Tribes).
  2. Construction of Article 15(4): The court held Article 15(4) is not an independent or substantive enactment but an exception or qualification to the guarantee under Article 15(1). Therefore Article 15(4) must be interpreted so as not to destroy or nullify the main guarantee of Article 15(1).
  3. Limits on special provisions: The court reasoned that although Article 15(4) authorises the State to make special provision to advance weaker elements of society, such special provisions must not operate so as to completely exclude the remainder of society. To allow an exception that nullified the fundamental guarantee of equality would be impermissible and contrary to the constitutional scheme.
  4. Authoritative support: The court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in M.K. Balaji v. State of Mysore (AIR 1963 SC 640) which treated Article 15(4) as a proviso to Article 15(1) and held that reservation-like special provisions must be within reasonable limits and balanced against the interests of the community as a whole. The Mysore decision condemned a measure reserving a very large proportion of seats (68%) as inconsistent with Article 15(4).
  5. Application to the Government order (20 August 1958): Applying these principles, the court concluded that the 1958 order — which required that, when a single scheduled caste or tribe candidate existed and was "otherwise suitable", the shop should be settled straightaway with that candidate (and when there were more than one suitable SC/ST candidate, the lot should be drawn only among them) — in practice excluded candidates outside the scheduled castes/tribes in cases where a single SC/ST candidate was present. That effect, the court held, exceeded the scope of Article 15(4) because it nullified the guarantee under Article 15(1).
  6. Consequences for the Deputy Commissioner's order: Because the Deputy Commissioner's order of 11 May 1963 was based on and implemented the 20 August 1958 Government order, it was infected by the same illegality and held to be ultra vires.
  7. Remedy: For these reasons the court concluded a writ in the nature of certiorari under Article 226 was appropriate to quash the Deputy Commissioner's order settling the Doranda Ganja shop with respondent No. 4.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

THE APPLICATION IS ALLOWED. The court held that the State Government order dated 20 August 1958 violated the guarantee under Article 15(1) and is unconstitutional and ultra vires. Consequently, the Deputy Commissioner of Ranchi's order dated 11 May 1963 making settlement of the Doranda Ganja shop in favour of respondent No. 4 (Jagmohan Naik) was held to be illegal and ultra vires and a writ in the nature of certiorari under Article 226 was to be issued quashing that order.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The Deputy Commissioner's order of 11 May 1963 settling the Doranda Ganja shop with respondent No. 4 is quashed.
  • The petitioner's application is allowed; the court granted certiorari relief. There will be no order as to costs.

Broader implications:

The opinion applied and followed the Supreme Court's principle (in M.K. Balaji) that Article 15(4) is an exception to Article 15(1) and that special provisions must be balanced and within reasonable limits so as not to exclude the rest of society. The opinion does not purport to announce a new constitutional principle beyond applying that authority; it found the particular 20 August 1958 Government order inconsistent with the constitutional guarantee and therefore invalid. The opinion does not set out any additional broader policy or precedent beyond these conclusions.

    Abdul Latiff v. State Of Bihar And Ors

    1. In the year 1960, the Bherno Ganja shop was ordered to be shifted to Doranda in the town of Ranchi and applications were called for by the Deputy Commissioner of Ranchi for settlement of this Ganja shop. About 39 persons submitted applications in that year for settlement of the Doranda Ganja Shop, but proceedings for settlement were stayed by the High Court in M. J. C. 1229 of 1960 on the application of Abdul Wahab. licensee of the Ganja and Bhang shop at Lower Bazar, Ranchi, on the ground that the shifting of the Bherno Ganja shop to Doranda during the currency of his license for the Lower Bazar Ganja shop would adversely affect his business. On the 30th of November, 1962, M. J. C. No. 1229 of 1960 was dismissed by the High Court. After dismissal of that case, the Deput' Commissioner of Ranchi took up the matter of settlement of Doranda 'Ganja shop for the year 1963-64. He did not invite fresh applications but proceeded to make a selection from the 39 applications received for the year 1960-61.

    Out of these 39 applications, the Superintendent of Excise, Ranchi5 prepared a list of seven persons, all of whom were members of scheduled caste or scheduled tribe, amongst whom the final selection for settlement of licence of the shop was to be made. This list did not contain the name of the petitioner Abdul Latiff who made an application on the 9th May, 1963 to the Deputy Commissioner of Ranchi for including his name in the approved list. The application was rejected by the Deputy Commissioner of Ranchi on the nth May, 1963, on the ground that the petitioner was not a member of a scheduled tribe or scheduled caste and thereafter the Deputy Commissioner of Ranchi proceeded to draw a lot for settlement of the Ganja shop only amongst the members of scheduled caste and scheduled tribe applicants. The lottery was drawn in favour oi Jagmohan Naik? respondent No. 4 and the Deputy Commissioner of Ranchi accordingly ordered settlement of the shop to be made with him.

    2. In injecting the application of the petitioner Abdul Latif by his order dated the nth May, 1963^ the Deputy Commissioner of Ranchi relied upon the order of the State Government contained in Excise Commissioner's Memo No. 9520 dated the nth October, 1958, which is to the following effect: --

    It was decided by Government in 1952 to give preference to scheduled caste and scheduled tribe candidates in the settlement of new Excise shops under the Sliding Scale System for a period of one year, in the interest of advancement of such socially and economically backward classes. The concession has been extended from year to year since then, but the implementation of the policy has not been very effective so that the objective has not been fully achieved.

    2. It has; therefore, been decided by Government that preference should continue to be given to the scheduled caste and scheduled tribe candidates, if otherwise suitable, in the matter of settlement of Excise shops under the Sliding Scale ' System and that the standard of suitability in such cases should as in the matter of their appointment and promotion to posts under Government, be lower than that prescribed for candidates of other castes. To achieve the desired objective, it has also been decided by Government that the following procedure should be adopted in settlement of Excise Shops: --

    (a) whenever any Excise shop is proposed to be settled, an intimation about this should be sent to the Welfare Department who will give due publicity to the matter amongst scheduled caste and scheduled tribe candidates.

    (b) When there are several candidates for an Excise shop, out of whom one is a scheduled caste or scheduled tribe candidate and he is otherwise suitable, the shop should not be settled by lot but could be settled straightway with the scheduled caste or scheduled tribe candidate.

    (c) If there are more than one suitable scheduled caste or scheduled tribe candidate for the same shop, the lot should be drawn only among the suitable scheduled caste and scheduled tribe candidates and the winner should get the shop.

    (d) Candidates of scheduled caste and scheduled tribe should not be rejected as unsuitable except after very careful consideration of the matter. When none of the applicants of the scheduled caste and scheduled tribe is found suitable, the order of Excise Commissioner should be obtained before they are rejected as unsuitable and the full facts as to why they are considered unsuitable should be stated.

    3. The progress achieved in the settlement of Excise shops with the candidates of scheduled caste and .scheduled tribe should be reported to Excise Commissioner for the information of Government in the month of April each year, for chat financial year.

    Sd. K.K. Mitra, 20.8.58 Additional Secretary to Government".

    The petitioner has obtained a rule from the High Court calling upon the respondents to show cause why the order of the State Government dated the 20th August, 1958 and the order of the Deputy Commissioner of Ranchi dated the nth May, 1963 making settlement of the Doranda Ganja shop in favour of respondent No. 4 should not be quashed by grant of a writ in the nature of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution. Cause has been shown by the learned Advocate General and other Counsel on behalf of the respondents to whom notice of the rule was ordered to be given.

    3. The main question presented for determination in this case is whether the order of the State Government dated the 2oth August, 1958 violates the guarantee granted by Article 15 of the Constitution which states:

    "15. (1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them.

    (2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to:

    (4) Nothing in this article or in Clause (2) at Article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.'' Learned Counsel for the petitioner put forward the argument that the effect of the Government notification is not merely to give preference to candidates belonging to scheduled castes or scheduled tribes but to exclude candidates from all other communities in cases where there was a single candidate belonging to scheduled caste or scheduled tribe. It was, therefore, submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the Government notification dated the 2oth August, 1958 exceeds the constitutional limits of the power granted to the State under Article 15(4) of the Constitution for making special provision for the advancement of scheduled castes or scheduled tribes, or any socially and educationally backward classes ''of citizens. In our opinion, the argument put forward on behalf of the petitioner is well" founded and must be accepted as correct.

    As a matter of construction it is manifest that Article 15(4) of the Constitution is not an independent or substantive enactment but it is an exception or a qualification to the main guarantee under Article 15(1) of the Constitution. It is, therefore, not permissible to interpret Article 15(4} of the Constitution in such a way as to destroy or nullify the meaning of guarantee under Article 15(1) of the Constitution. It is because the interest of the society as a whole is served by promoting the advancement of the weaker elements of that society that Article 15(4) of the Constitution authorises special provision to be made. But if a provision which is in the nature of an exception completely excludes the rest of the societv, that clearly is outside the scope of Article 15(4). It is highly unreasonable to assume that in enacting Article 15(4) the Constitution-makers intended to provide 'that where the advancement of the backward classes or the scheduled castes and tribes was concerned, the fundamental rights of the citizens constituting the rest of the society should be completely and absolutely ignored.

    The view that we have expressed is borne out "by the decision of the Supreme Court in M.K. Balaji v. The State of Mysore, AIR 1963 SC 640 where the question was debated with regard to the constitutional validity of an order of the State Government of Mysore dated the 31st July 1962, reserving 68 o£ of the seats in technical institutions for backward classes, scheduled tribes and scheduled castes. It was held by the Supreme Court in that case that Article 15 (4) which was added by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 must be read as a proviso or an exception to Article 15(1} of the Constitution, It was pointed out by the Supreme Court that considerations of national interest and the interests of the community or society as a whole cannot be ignored in determining the question as to whether the special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) can be special provision which excludes the rest of the society altogether.

    It was also pointed out by the Supreme Court that a special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4) must be within reasonable limits. The interests of weaker sections of society which are a first charge on the States and the Centre have to be adjusted with the interests of the community as a whole. Undoubtedly the adjustment of these competing claims is a difficult mater, but if under the guise of making a special provision, a State reserves practically all the seats available in all the colleges, that clearly would be subverting the object of Article 15(4). It was accordingly held by the Supreme Court that the order of the Mysore Government dated the 31st July, 1962 which reserved 68 per cent of the seats in Engineering and Medical Colleges for backward classes, scheduled castes and scheduled tribes was inconsistent with the special provision of Article 15 (4) and was a fraud on the constitutional power conferred on the State by that Article.

    In our opinion, the principle of the decision of the Supreme Court governs the present case also and it must be held that the order of the State Government dated the 20th August, 1958, which is annexure IV to the counter-affidavit and annexure B to the writ application, violates the guarantee under Article 15(1) of the Constitution and is, therefore, unconstitutional and ultra vires. It follows that the order of the Deputy Commissioner of Ranchi dated the nth May, 1963 which is based on the Government order dated the 20th August, 1958 is also illegal and ultra vires and must be quashed by grant of a writ in the nature of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution.

    4. For the reasons expressed, we hold that this application must be allowed and a writ in the nature of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution must be issued quashing the older of the Deputy Commissioner of Ranchi dated the 11th May, 1963 making settlement of the Ganja shop with respondent No. 4. Jagmohan Naik. We accordingly allow this application, but there will be no order as to costs.

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    Abdul Latiff v. State Of Bihar And Ors
    (Mar 27, 1964)