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  • sections mentioned above.4. Sub-section (1) of S. 117
  • provisions of sub-section (3) of section 117
  • sections 107, 108, 109 or 110. Section 112
  • sub-section (3) of Sec. 117
  • sub-section (1) of Sec. 117
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citation codes
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  • sections mentioned above.4. Sub-section (1) of S. 117
  • provisions of sub-section (3) of section 117
  • sections 107, 108, 109 or 110. Section 112
  • sub-section (3) of Sec. 117
  • sub-section (1) of Sec. 117
Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion — Application Challenging Order under Section 117(3) CrPC

Factual and Procedural Background

This application challenges an order dated 7 September 1960 of the Sub-divisional Magistrate in charge of Hajipur directing the petitioner to furnish an interim bond of Rs. 1,000 with two sureties of Rs. 500 each. The impugned order was made in proceedings framed under Section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) which were pending against the petitioner.

Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Ravneshwar Prasad Sinha, advanced three primary objections to the 7 September order (details below). He relied on the Bench decision in Jagdish Prasad Verma v. The State, AIR 1957 Pat 106.

Relevant earlier steps in the administrative record (as set out in the opinion) include:

  • Order dated 10 May 1960 directing that proceedings under Section 107 be drawn up against the petitioner.
  • Order dated 29 June 1960 recording that a petition was filed alleging that the opposite parties were committing certain acts during the pendency of proceedings.
  • Order dated 2 July 1960 noting that the Magistrate heard parties and perused papers and that further verification was to be carried out.
  • A police verification report dated 5 September 1960 from the Inspector of Police stating that, after verification, he was satisfied that members of the opposite party were doing overt acts which might lead to serious trouble and recommending action under S.117(3).
  • The impugned order of 7 September 1960 was passed after the police report was placed before the Magistrate; the Magistrate directed the opposite parties (including the petitioner) to execute interim bonds.

The provided opinion text contains several truncated or unclear portions (represented in the source by "???"). No attempt has been made to fill those gaps; the summary confines itself to material expressly available in the opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an order under Section 117(3) CrPC can be passed before the Magistrate has started recording evidence (i.e., whether the stage for invoking S.117(3) is reached only after the Magistrate proceeds under S.117(1)).
  2. Whether a Magistrate may base action under Section 117(3) upon a police report or similar material.
  3. Whether the Magistrate is obliged to record reasons in writing when passing an order under Section 117(3).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The Magistrate could not validly pass an order under S.117(3) at the stage when the 7 September order was made; S.117(3) can be invoked only after the Magistrate has begun taking evidence in accordance with S.117(1).
  • An order under S.117(3) cannot properly be based upon a police report.
  • The Magistrate was bound to give written reasons when passing an order under S.117(3), and the impugned order failed to do so.
  • Reliance was placed on the Bench decision Jagdish Prasad Verma v. The State, AIR 1957 Pat 106 as supporting these contentions.

The opinion does not set out detailed counter-arguments by the State or other parties in adversarial form; the record discussed in the judgment (orders of the Magistrate and the police report) supplies the factual material considered by the Court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jagdish Prasad Verma v. The State, AIR 1957 Pat 106 Held (as described in the opinion) that an order under Sub-section (3) of Section 117 could only be passed when the stage of Sub-section (1) was reached (i.e., when the Magistrate was proceeding to enquire into the truth of the information on the basis of which proceedings under Sections 107–110 were drawn up). The decision also emphasized that the Magistrate must record reasons in writing when directing execution of an ad interim bond. The Court in the present opinion construes the scope of that decision: it explains that Jagdish Prasad Verma emphasizes the need for written reasons and that Magistrates must pass self-contained orders, but does not preclude a Magistrate from acting on police reports; the present Court clarifies when S.117(3) may be invoked (see reasoning below).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the statutory scheme in detail (Sections 112–117 CrPC) and applied those provisions to the facts before it, proceeding step by step:

  1. The Court examined Section 112 (order to be made in writing when preventive action is taken under Sections 107–110) and the procedural provisions—Section 113 (reading/explaining the order to a person present), Section 114 (summons or warrant to bring the person before the Court) and Section 115 (copy of the order to accompany a summons/warrant). The Court observed that Ss.113–115 provide a complete procedure for making the terms of the order under S.112 known to the person proceeded against.
  2. Turning to Section 117, the Court distinguished sub-section (1) (enquiry into the truth of the information after the order under S.112 has been read/explained or the person brought before the Court) from sub-section (3) (which empowers the Magistrate to detain the person in custody until he executes the interim bond or the enquiry is concluded). The Court reasoned that S.117(3) is the specific provision that allows a Magistrate to safeguard against the commission of a breach of the peace when the person is present before the Court (i.e., after the stage of S.113 or S.114 has been reached).
  3. Addressing the first contention, the Court concluded that S.117(3) does not require the Magistrate to have already started taking evidence under S.117(1) before invoking sub-section (3). In the Court's view, the stage at which a Magistrate can take recourse to S.117(3) is reached once the order under S.112 has been read or explained (S.113) or the person has been brought before the Court in compliance with S.114. The Court therefore rejected the petitioner's argument that S.117(3) is only available after evidence-taking under S.117(1) has commenced.
  4. On the second contention (that a police report cannot be the basis for action under S.117(3)), the Court held that nothing in Jagdish Prasad Verma should be read to mean that a Magistrate cannot act upon a police report. The Court stated that a police report or any other material may suffice to satisfy the Magistrate that action under S.117(3) is necessary, so long as the Magistrate gives reasons in writing as required by the sub-section. The Court explained that the criticism in Jagdish arose because there the Magistrate had not recorded adequate written reasons.
  5. On the third contention (requirement to give written reasons), the Court agreed with the petitioner: sub-section (3) itself requires the Magistrate to record reasons in writing for taking action under it. The Court found that, strictly speaking, the impugned order of 7 September did not set out those reasons in the same order.
  6. The Court then examined the surrounding record and found that, read together, the Magistrate's earlier orders (29 June and 2 July), the direction to verify the allegations, and the Inspector of Police's report of 5 September showing verification and recommending action, constituted reasons apparent on the record for the Magistrate's 7 September decision. The Court characterized the omission to include those reasons within the 7 September order itself as a technical mistake, but concluded there had been substantial compliance with the statutory requirement.
  7. On that basis, the Court declined to interfere with the Magistrate's order: it emphasized that Magistrates must pass self-contained orders and must state written reasons in the very order under S.117(3), but nonetheless dismissed the petition because the record supplied the necessary basis for the Magistrate's action.

Holding and Implications

Final Disposition: APPLICATION DISMISSED.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The Magistrate's order dated 7 September 1960 directing the petitioner to execute the interim bond stands; the petition challenging that order is dismissed.
  • The Court did not set aside the Magistrate's direction because, notwithstanding the technical omission of reciting reasons within the impugned order itself, the reasons were reflected in earlier orders and in the police report placed before the Magistrate.

Broader legal implications (as articulated by the Court in the opinion):

  • The Court clarified the statutory mechanics: S.117(3) can be invoked once the procedural stage of S.113 (reading/explaining the order to a person present) or compliance with S.114 (summons/warrant bringing the person before the Court) has been reached; it is not necessary that formal evidence-taking under S.117(1) have commenced before S.117(3) is used.
  • The Court reaffirmed that Magistrates are bound to give reasons in writing when acting under S.117(3) and should pass self-contained orders; omission to do so is a procedural defect. However, the Court indicated that substantial compliance evident from the record may, in some cases, justify non-interference.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down any new legal principle beyond its statutory interpretation and application to the facts; the Court declined to disturb the Magistrate's order in the circumstances before it.

This summary is confined to the material expressly contained in the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences not present in that text.

    Amir Singh (2Nd Party) v. The State Opposite Party.

    1. This application is directed against an order of the Sub-divisional Magistrate in charge of Hajipur, dated the 7th September, 1960, whereby he has called upon the petitioner to furnish an interim bond of Rs. 1,000/- with two sureties of Rs. 500/- each. He has passed this order in a proceeding under Section 107 of the Cr PC, which was pending against the petitioner. Appearing for the petitioner, Mr. Ravneshwar Prasad Sinha has urged three points. His first point is that the stage at which an order under S. 117(3) could be passed had not been reached when the order dated the 7th September was passed. His contention is that an order under that sub-section can only be passed after the Magistrate has started taking evidence in accordance with sub-sec. (1) of S. 117. His second point is that an order under sub-sec. (3) of S. 117 cannot be based upon a police report. The last point is that the Magistrate was bound to give reasons for passing the order under sub-section (3). In support of all these arguments, he has relied upon a Bench decision of this Court in Jagdish Prasad Verma v. The State, AIR 1957 Pat 106.

    2. In my judgment the learned counsel has misconceived the scope of the above decision. In that case, the learned Magistrate had, by the same order, drawn up a proceeding under S. 107 against the petitioners and had called upon them to execute bonds under sub-section (3) of Sec. 117. Their Lordships held that an order under sub-section (3) of Sec. 117 could only be passed when the stage of sub-section (1) of Sec. 117 was reached or, in other words, when the Magistrate was proceeding to enquire into the truth of the information on the basis of which he had drawn up the proceeding under sections 107, 108, 109 or 110. Section 112 provides, when the Magistrate considers it necessary to take preventive action under any of these four sections, he shall make an order in writing setting forth several matters mentioned in the section. If the person who is proceeded against is present in Court, the order drawn up under S. 112 has to be read over or explained to him under S. 113. If he is not present in Court, the Magistrate has ordinarily to issue a summons, under S. 114, requiring him to appear. If he is in custody, a warrant has to be issued directing the officer, in whose custody he is detained, to produce him before the Court.

    3. The proviso to Section 114, lays down that, whenever it appears to the Magistrate that there is reason to fear the commission of a breach of the peace and that such breach of the peace cannot be prevented otherwise than by the immediate arrest of the person concerned, he may issue a warrant in the very first instance. Under Sec. 115, every summons or warrant issued under Sec. 114 is to be accompanied by a copy of the order made under S. 112, and the copy has to be delivered by the officer serving or executing the summons or warrant to the person upon whom it is served or executed. It is perfectly clear from Ss. 113, 114 and 115 that they provide a complete procedure for making the terms of the order drawn up under Sec. 112 known to the person against whom preventive action is taken under any of the four sections mentioned above.

    4. Sub-section (1) of S. 117 provides for the Magistrate to enquire into the truth of the information Upon which he has taken action. It lays down that the Magistrate will proceed with the enquiry after the order under Sec. 112 has been read or explained under S. 113 or the person concerned has been brought before him in compliance with, or in execution of, the summons or warrant issued by him under Sec. 114. If it appears to the Magistrate at any time before the person proceeded against is brought to his Court that there is Likelihood of a breach of the peace and that it cannot be prevented otherwise than by immediate arrest of the person proceeded against, he any issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of that person. There is no provision for keeping the person in custody after he has been brought to Court in compliance with the summons or in execution of the warrant issued under Sec. 114 except that in Sec. 117(3), which empowers a Magistrate to detain the person in custody until he executes the interim bond or the enquiry is concluded.

    5. It seems to me therefore, that, when the person proceeded against is present in Court and the index under Sec. 112 is read or explained to him under Sec. 113, or, when he is brought to Court in compliance with, or in execution of, a summons or warrant issued under Sec. 114, the manner in which the Magistrate can safeguard against commission of a breach of the peace by that person is provided for in sub-section (3) of Sec. 117 only. It as of at all necessary that he should start taking evidence before taking action under that sub-section. In other words, the stage at which a Magistrate can take recourse to sub-section (3) is reached as soon as the stage of Section 113 or Sec. 114 is passed. Banerji, J., who delivered the judgment of the Bench in Jagdish Prasad Verma's case, AIR 1957 Pat 106 has made this clear by the flowing observation:

    “It is only when the person is present in Court or has been brought before the Court that a Magistrate can take into consideration whether circumstances do exist for taking immediate measures and, when he is fully satisfied that such circumstances do exist, then and then only he can direct the execution of an ad interim bond, but, before taking recourse to this action, he has to put his reasons in writing.”

    6. In my judgment, therefore, there is absolutely no sub-stance in the argument that an order under sub-section (3) of Sec. 117 cannot be passed until the Magistrate has started recording evidence. In the present case, it was by his order dated the 10th May, 1960, that the learned Magistrate directer a proceeding under Sec. 107 to be drawn up against the petitioner. He passed the order which is impugned by the present application only after the petitioner appeared before him in pursuance of the summons issued under Sec. 114. The first point, therefore, fails.

    7. There is also no merit in the second point. There is nothing in the decision in Jagdish Prasad Verma's case, AIR 1957 Pat 106 which can be construed to mean that a Magistrate cannot act upon a police report for the purpose of, taking action under sub-section (3) of Sec. 117. Mr. Ravneshwar Prasad Sinha has relied upon one observation of Banerji, J. in that case which reads:

    “Later, on the date fixed for execution of the ad interim bonds, he merely expressed that the police report indicated that the members of the ??? party were likely to create a breach of the peace. To my mind, even this reason is not sufficient to pass an order under Sec. 117(3)”.

    8. In my opinion, this observation does not mean that the Magistrate cannot act upon a police report indeed, there is nothing in Sec. 117 to indicate that the Magistrate must take some preliminary evidence before taking action under sub-section (3). A police report or any other material may be sufficient to satisfy the Magistrate that it is necessary for him to take action under that ??? and there will be absolutely no illegality if he takes action after being so ??? on the material which is before him. The reference to the ??? report in the Magistrate's order was not considered sufficient in the decision in Jagdish Prasad Verma's case, AIR 1957 Pat 106 for the simple reason that the Magistrate, though required by sub-section (3) to give his reasons in writing, had not done so. In these circumstances, this point also fails.

    9. The last point which learned counsel has urged is perfectly correct, as the Magistrate is bound under the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 117 itself to record his reasons in writing for taking action under that sub-section. In the present case, the Magistrate has not given is reasons in writing in the order which is impugned. This omission is wrong. In view of the plain wording of sub-section (3) and also in view of the fact ??? the mistake generally committed by Magistrates has been pointed out in the decision in Jagdish Prasad Verma's case, AIR 1957 Pat 106 Magistrate's must pass self-contained orders, and they must give their reasons in writing for taking action under sub-section (3) in the very same order with ??? under that sub-section. I do not, however, ??? to interfere in this case because there has been a substantial compliance with the requirements of the section.

    10. In an order, dated the 29th June, 1960, the Magistrate has recorded that a petition has been filed to show that the opposite parties (i.e the present petitioner and others) are committing ??? acts even during the pendency of the proceedings. In another order, dated the 2nd July, 1960 the Magistrate has stated that he had heard parties and perused papers including copies of ???. He has also said that it was stated on the 25th May 1960, that the opposite parties had been committing overt acts in spite of the proceedings having been drawn up against them, that they were asked to show cause why interim bonds should not be required from them, that the opposite parties ??? denied the allegation, that the applicant (Lalit Singh, at whose instance the proceeding under S. 107 was drawn up) had filed another petition on the 29th June, 1960, enclosing ??? of three station diary entries, and that this was ??? by the opposite party by saying that the Hajipur police was against them.

    11. On these facts, he directed the Circle ??? of Hajipur to verify the ??? report whether the opposite party were still misbehaving with Lalit Singh. The Inspector of Police, accordingly, submitted a report dated the 5th September, 1960, to the Sub-division 1 Magistrate, stating that he had verified the ??? that he was satisfied that the members of the opposite party were doing overt acts which might lead to serious trouble any day, and that it was necessary for the sake of peace to take action against them under sub-section (3) of Sec. 117. This report was placed before the Magistrate on the 7th September, and it was then urged in behalf of the opposite party that the Inspector of Police was a relation of Lalit Singh. The Magistrate did not accept this allegation, and directed that the opposite party should execute in ??? bonds. The petitioner was one of ??? by the order as he was one of the Opposite Party before the Magistrate.

    12. If all the orders which I have referred to are read together along with the report of the Inspector of Police, it is perfectly clear that there were good reasons on which the Magistrate could take action under sub-section (3) of Sec. 117 which he has done against the petitioner. The only technical mistake which he has committed is that he has not made reference in his order dated the 7th September, 1980, to the reasons which are apparent upon his own orders and upon the Inspector's report as the reasons on the basis of which he was taking action. This is deprecated, and it is hoped that he would not commit even such technical mistakes in future. For the reasons which I have given above, I do not And any merit in this application. It is, accordingly, dismissed.

    JE/I.

    13. Application dismissed.

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    Comments

    Amir Singh (2Nd Party) v. The State Opposite Party.
    (Mar 23, 1961)