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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal was brought by defendant No. 1 against decrees in an ejectment suit instituted by the plaintiff. The plaintiff sued for eviction of defendant No. 1 from the property described in Schedule A of the plaint, for removal of structures raised by defendant No. 1 on the land, and claimed damages and compensation.

The plaintiff's pleaded position was that the disputed land (2 kathas 10 dhurs) originally belonged to proforma defendant No. 2, who had let it to defendant No. 1 as a monthly tenant. Defendant No. 2 later sold the land to the plaintiff by a registered sale deed dated 10 October 1953. The plaintiff alleged that, being the new owner, he required possession and had served a notice for delivery of possession and removal of structures; defendant No. 1 did not comply, prompting the suit.

Defendant No. 1 contested the suit. She asserted that defendant No. 2 had permanently settled the land with her by a patta dated 8 June 1936 on payment of a premium and at an annual rent, that she was put in possession under that settlement, had her name mutated as an assessee in the Jugselai Notified Area Committee, paid municipal taxes and rent, and had erected some construction which she used for residential purposes. She therefore denied liability to eviction.

The trial court (learned Munsif) decreed the plaintiff's suit, ordering removal of structures within fifteen days and delivery of possession; damages were to be ascertained in a separate proceeding. On appeal the learned Additional Sub-ordinate Judge affirmed the decree. Defendant No. 1 then appealed to this court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Is the defendant a permanent tenant of the suit land or a monthly tenant, and is she liable to be evicted? (This was the first issue framed in the suit.)
  2. Whether the provisions of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act apply to the facts of the case (i.e., whether defendant No. 1 can claim protection under the doctrine of part performance / Section 53-A).
  3. How the proviso to Section 53-A operates here: who bears the onus of proof on the question of notice of the contract or of part performance — the plaintiff (transferee for consideration) or the defendant?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Defendant No. 1) — Principal Arguments

  • Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act protects her from eviction because she was inducted into possession in pursuance of the patta/settlement and has continued in possession.
  • Even if the patta was not executed by both parties or registered, Section 53-A applies: the plaintiff is imputed with notice of the defendant's title (relying on Section 3 Explanation II of the Transfer of Property Act and analogy to Illustration to Section 27(b) of the Specific Relief Act and Section 27-A), so the onus was on the plaintiff to prove he had no notice.
  • As a factual matter, defendant had been put into possession, had mutation as assessee, had paid municipal tax/rent, and had raised constructions — facts that attract the protection of Section 53-A.
  • Argued (in this Court) that lower court erred in placing the burden of proving notice on defendant rather than on the plaintiff, and erred in requiring proof of 'substantial' construction or hardship to invoke Section 53-A.

Respondent (Plaintiff) — Principal Arguments (as advanced by Learned Advocate General)

  • The patta in favour of defendant No. 1 was not in accordance with Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act (it was executed by the lessor alone and was unregistered), and consequently Section 53-A is not attracted.
  • Under the proviso to Section 53-A, the duty was on defendant No. 1 to prove that the plaintiff had notice of any contract in her favour or of part performance thereof — i.e., the onus to displace the proviso lay on defendant.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Maneklal Mansukhbhai v. Hormusji Jamshedii Ginwalla and Sons (AIR 1950 SC 1) Held that a formal lease is not necessary to attract Section 53-A; an agreement in writing signed by the transferor may suffice; part performance doctrine applies where the transferor has signed. The court relied on the principle to support that a patta executed by the lessor alone (and proving induction into possession) can be sufficient to invoke Section 53-A; the decision was treated as persuasive though facts differed.
Qamar Jahan Begam v. Bansi Dhar (AIR 1942 Oudh 231) Applied Section 53-A where documents (thekanama and qabuliat) were not executed by both parties; held that a transferee in possession was protected and plaintiff was debarred from enforcing rights other than those expressly provided by the contract. The court cited it as an example where Section 53-A protected a person in possession despite defects in execution of instruments; it supported the view that incomplete execution does not necessarily defeat S.53A protection.
Hadu Maharana v. Ramdulal Ghosh (AIR 1944 Pat 35) The two documents did not constitute a validly executed lease, but because the defendant was put into possession, he obtained the benefit of Section 53-A, subject to the proviso. The court used the case to illustrate that absence of a validly executed lease does not preclude Section 53-A protection where possession was given in pursuance of the contract.
Hari Prasad v. Abdul Haq (AIR 1951 Pat 160) Section 53-A embodies an equitable right: it bars the transferor from enforcing rights against a transferee put in possession, except as expressly provided, but does not give a transferee a perfect legal title or a right to sue as plaintiff to recover possession. The court cited the decision to explain the equitable nature and limits of Section 53-A while recognizing that the rule supports protection of transferees in possession.
Noor Zahur Mian v. Islam Mian (1958 B.L.J.R 466) Held that under Explanation II of Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, possession of a person may amount to constructive notice of that person's title. The court relied on it to support the submission that plaintiff must be deemed to have constructive notice of defendant's title because defendant was in possession, thus bearing on operation of proviso to Section 53-A.
Sobharam Jiwan v. Totaram Sitaram (AIR 1952 Nag 244) Addressed actual notice as a factual question; in that case the court held purchaser bought without notice based on pleadings and evidence. The present court found Sobharam's case inapplicable (not in point) and distinguished it because the factual and pleading posture differed from the instant case.
Ko Mar v. Ma May (AIR 1935 Rang 12) Interpreted the proviso to Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act (court below had relied on that interpretation). The present court expressly disagreed with the decision's interpretation of Section 53-A's proviso and declined to follow it for the instant facts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by setting out the findings of the learned Additional Sub-ordinate Judge: that defendant No. 1 had erected a compound wall and one room, had her name mutated as an assessee in the Notified Area Committee, and had paid rent to the Area Committee for some years. Despite these findings, the learned Judge had denied Section 53-A protection on two grounds: (a) that the patta was not in accordance with Section 107 (it was not executed by both lessor and lessee and was unregistered), and (b) that the defendant had not so conducted herself (e.g., by raising substantial constructions or proving serious dislocation on eviction) as to claim protection under Section 53-A. The learned Judge also held that onus lay on defendant to prove the plaintiff had notice of the contract or part performance.

This court analysed Section 53-A's language, especially the phrase “the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefor by the law for the time being in force.” The court interpreted those words as broad enough to cover a lease that had not been executed by both lessor and lessee (i.e., a lease executed by the lessor alone would be an instrument of transfer not completed in the prescribed manner). Therefore, the mere fact of the patta having been executed by the lessor alone did not preclude invocation of Section 53-A if the transferee was inducted into possession in pursuance of the transfer.

The court rejected the lower court's requirement that the transferee must have raised “substantial constructions” or demonstrated serious dislocation to qualify for Section 53-A protection. It emphasised that Section 53-A requires only that a transferee, not previously in possession, has taken possession in part performance of the contract. Proof of induction into possession thus satisfied part of the statutory requirement.

On the proviso to Section 53-A (which preserves the rights of a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or part performance), the court found error in placing the burden on defendant to prove the plaintiff had notice. The court noted that neither party had pleaded the factual issue of notice, and that no findings on that fact were made; accordingly, the question of who bears the burden must be addressed as one of law for the case as presented. The court held that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff (the subsequent transferee for consideration) to allege and prove that he had no notice of the prior contract or part performance, rather than requiring the defendant to prove notice.

The court relied on statutory provisions and analogous authorities: it invoked Explanation II to Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act (which deems an acquirer of immovable property to have notice of the title of the person in actual possession) and drew analogy to Illustration to Section 27(b) of the Specific Relief Act and the proviso to Section 27-A of that Act, to support the proposition that possession can impart constructive notice on a later purchaser. The court applied decisions (Maneklal Mansukhbhai, Qamar Jahan Begam, Hadu Maharana, Hari Prasad and Noor Zahur Mian) to hold that induction into possession under the patta sufficed for Section 53-A protection and that the plaintiff should be deemed to have notice given the possession and attendant indicia (mutation, payment of municipal taxes/rent and erected structures).

The court distinguished and disagreed with precedents it found inapplicable or wrongly interpreted (Sobharam Jiwan was said not to be in point; Ko Mar was expressly disagreed with). The court also declined to decide a separate point raised in the appeal concerning adverse possession because it found it unnecessary in view of its interpretation and application of Section 53-A.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED — THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF THE COURTS BELOW ARE SET ASIDE; THE PLAINTIFF'S SUIT FOR EJECTMENT IS DISMISSED.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • Defendant No. 1 succeeds and is entitled to continue in possession under the protection of Section 53-A as interpreted by this court on the facts presented.
  • The plaintiff's suit for eviction is dismissed and defendant No. 1 is awarded her costs throughout as against the plaintiff-respondent No. 1.

Broader implications: The court articulated an interpretation of Section 53-A that (a) permits invocation of Section 53-A where a transfer instrument has not been completed in the manner prescribed (including a lease executed by the lessor alone) if the transferee was inducted into possession, and (b) treats the question of notice under the proviso as one the plaintiff (subsequent transferee for consideration) must plead and prove if he seeks to rely on lack of notice. The opinion relied on and applied existing precedents; it does not state that a novel legal principle is being laid down beyond the application and reconciliation of those precedents to the facts.

    Mahadei Haluai v. Ram Krishna Singh And Another

    1. This is an appeal by defendant No. 1. It arises out of a suit instituted by the plaintiff for eviction of defendant No. 1 from the property mentioned in Schedule A of the plaint. There was a prayer for the removal of the structures raised by defendant No. 1 on the land in dispute. The plaintiff had claimed damages and compensation also.

    2. The plaintiff's case, in short, was as follows: The land in dispute measuring 2 kathas 10 dhurs originally belonged to proforma defendant No. 2. The land had been let out to defendant No. 1 as a monthly tenant for temporary residential purposes. Defendant No. 2 had sold the land to the plaintiff by a registered sale deed dated the 10th October 1953. According to the plaintiff defendant No. 1 was, therefore, in possession of the land in dispute as a monthly tenant under the plaintiff. The plaintiff having required the land for his own use, had served a notice upon defendant No. 1 to deliver possession to the plaintiff after removing the structures standing on the land in dispute. Defendant No. 1 not having complied with the notice, the plaintiff was compelled to institute the suit for the reliefs mentioned above.

    3. The suit was contested by defendant No. 1 alone. The defence, in substance, was as follows. According to this defendant, the land in suit had been permanently settle with her by defendant No. 2 by virtue of a Patta dated the 8th Tune 1936, on receipt of a premium of Rs. 500/- and at an annual rent of Rs. 2/2/-. Under the document of settlement, the defendant was given the right to use the land for residential purposes, and the defendant had, in part performance of the contract, taker) possession of the land in dispute and was continuing in possession by payment of rent. The defendant, therefore, contended that she was not liable to eviction. The defendant's further case was that after taking the settlement mentioned above, she had got her name mutated in the Jugselai Notified Area Committee in place of defendant No. 2, and she was paying municipal tax since the settlement. The defendant had applied to the Notified Area Committee for sanctioning the plan of certain structures, but she had not been able to construct the entire structure on account of paucity of funds she had, however, constructed a building which was being used by her. The plaintiff's case that he was entitled to evict the defendant by service of notice was denied. Substantially upon these allegations, defendant No. 1 contended that the plaintiff's suit was liable to be dismissed.

    4. The learned Munsif, who tried the suit decreed the same and directed defendant No. 1 to remove the structures from the land in suit within fifteen days from the date of the decree, and deliver possession of the land to the plaintiff. It was ordered that the amount of damages which the plaintiff could recover, would have to be ascertained in a separate proceeding on the plaintiffs taking proper steps in that connection.

    5. Defendant No. 1 thereafter carried an appeal to the court of appeal below. The learned Additional Sub-ordinate Judge, who heard the appeal, dismissed the appeal affirming the decree passed by the learned Munsif. Defendant No. 11 has come up to this court.

    6. The substantial point that has been urged in this court was covered by the first issue framed in the suit which runs thus:—

    “Is the defendant a permanent tenant of the suit land or is she a monthly tenant of the same and is she liable to be evicted therefrom?”

    It was urged on behalf of defendant No. 1 in the court of the learned Munsif that she was protected from eviction by virtue of the provisions of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. The learned Munsif stated as one of the points for decision thus:

    Whether the plaintiff was estopped from evicting defendant No. 1 by virtue of the provisions of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act.

    The facts upon which the provisions of Section 53-A were invoked are these. The document dated the 8th of June 1936, exhibited as Ext. A in this case, had been executed only by defendant No. 2 and the document was not registered. The document was described as a Korfa Patta. The patta purported to settle the land in dispute with defendant No. 1 permanently after taking a salami of Rs. 500/- and fixing a rent of Rs. 2/2/- per year. The learned Munsif held that as the patta had not been executed by both the lessor and the lessee, it contravened the provisions of section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act.

    7. Thereafter, the learned Munsif, after a consideration of certain decisions, came to the conclusion that as the patta (Ext. A) was not only unregistered but was also not in accordance with section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, defendant No. 1 could not invoke the doctrine of part performance provided under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. As defendant No. 1 was held not to be able to invoke the provisions of Section 53-A, she failed in the court of the learned Munsif in her contentions, and the plaintiffs suit was decreed.

    8. The learned Additional Sub-ordinate Judge framed four points for consideration, the fourth one of which was framed thus:

    “Will the provisions of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act apply to the facts and circumstances of this suit?”

    The learned Judge decided the point against the contentions of defendant No. 1, substantially on the grounds that defendant No. 1 had not so conducted herself as to seek protection under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, and that the onus was on defendant No. 1 to establish that the plaintiff had notice of the settlement in favour of defendant No. 1 and of the constructions raised by her by way of part performance of the contract, and that she had failed to discharge the onus. In the result, defendant No. 1 failed also in her contentions before the learned Additional Sub-ordinate Judge based upon the provisions of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act.

    9. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the learned Additional Sub-ordinate Judge has put an erroneous construction upon Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act it is urged that even on the facts found by the learned Judge, the provisions of section 53A are attracted, and the plaintiff is precluded from evicting the appellant. It is further urged that on the facts of this case, it has been erroneously held by the learned Additional Sub-ordinate Judge that the onus was upon defendant No. 1 to establish that the plaintiff had notice of the settlement in favour of defendant No. 1 and of the constructions made by her. It is contended that under the law the plaintiff will be imputed with notice of the title of defendant No. 1, and the onus was on the plaintiff to establish that he had in fact no notice of the contract in favour of defendant No. 1 or of the part performance thereof.

    10. Learned Advocate General appearing for the plaintiff-respondent has, on the other hand, submitted that inasmuch as the patta in favour of defendant No. 1 was not in accordance with the provisions of section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, section 53A of the Act was not attracted. Secondly, it has been urged that under the proviso to Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, it was the duty of defendant No. 1 to prove that the plaintiff had notice of any contract in her favour or the part performance thereof.

    11. In order to come to a decision upon the contentions raised by learned counsel for the parties, it is necessary to state the findings to which the learned Additional Sub-ordinate Judge has arrived. The learned Judge has come to the following conclusion. He has held that defendant No. 1 had erected a compound wall and one room on the land in dispute. He has held that the name of defendant No. 1 and been mutated in the office of the Jugselai Notified Area Committee as an assessee. He has held that defendant No. 1 has proved that she has paid rent to the Area Committee for at least some years.

    12. In spite of these findings, the learned Judge has held that defendant No. 1 cannot derive benefit of the provisions of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act for the following reasons. The learned Judge has held that defendant No. 1 should have placed some evidence in Court which would have proved that her eviction would cause serious dislocation and inconvenience to her. He has held that defendant No. 1 does not appear to have raised any substantial building on the land in suit. He has also held that

    “defendant No. 1 has not so conducted herself as she claims to have done by virtue of which she can now seek protection under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act”.

    Therefore, apart from the question of the proviso under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, the learned Judge has held that defendant No. 1 is not entitled to invoke the provisions of Section 53A of the Act. In my opinion, the conclusions of the learned Judge upon this aspect of the case are erroneous and are not supported by the provisions of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. To my mind, all that is necessary to invoke section 53A of the Act is to consider whether the transferee, who was not in possession prior to the transfer in question, was inducted upon the land in pursuance of the transfer in question or not. The learned Judge has himself found that defendant No. 1 was, in fact, inducted upon the land in question and she was in possession in pursuance of the transfer in question.

    13. Whether defendant No. 1 has raised substantial constructions on the land or has not been able to raise substantial constructions on the land, is not a question which is within the purview of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. When it has been proved that defendant No. 1 came in possession of the land in dispute by virtue of the purported lease, one part of the requirement of section 53A has been established. The relevant portion of section 53A only requires that the transferee not being already in possession has to take possession of the property in part performance of the contract. The statute does not require that over and above taking possession of the property, it must further be established that the transferee has built constructions or substantial constructions upon the property transferred.

    14. In my opinion, the conclusion of the learned Additional Sub-ordinate Judge that defendant No. 1 cannot invoke Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act because she has not so conducted herself as to invoke its and is an erroneous conclusion. The contention of learned Advocate General appearing for the plaintiff-respondent that Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act cannot be invoked by defendant No. 1 because the patta was not executed also by the lessee, is not an acceptable contention. It is submitted that if a document is hit by the provisions of section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act to the extent that it fails as a lease of immoveable property because of not being executed both by the lessor and the lessee, the document cannot be relied upon for the purposes of section 53A of the Act. In my opinion, this contention is not valid. The relevant words in Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act may be noticed. These are:—

    “Notwithstanding that the contract, though required to be registered, has not been registered, or, where there is fin instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefor by the law for the time being in force, the transferor or any person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession, other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract”.

    It appears to my mind that the words “the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefor by the law for the time being in force” are sufficient to cover a lease which has not been executed both by the lessor and the lessee. If a lease is executed by the lessor alone after amendment of section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, then in my opinion, it ought to be held that it is an instrument of transfer not having been completed in the manner prescribed therefor within the meaning of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. The contention of the learned Advocate General that the meaning of the expression “instrument of transfer which has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefor” in connection with a lease required to be registered, is that the lease must have been executed both by the lessor and the lessee but not registered, cannot be accepted as sound.

    The decision in Maneklal Mansukhbhai v. Hormusji Jamshedii Ginwalla and Sons (AIR 1950 SC 1) was cited before the learned Additional Sub-ordinate Judge, and he distinguished the decision by stating that the facts and circumstances of that case were very much different from the facts of the instant case. It appears, however, that the principle upon which Maneklal's case, AIR 1950 SC 1, was decided cannot be ignored altogether. The defence under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act succeeded in Maneklal's case, AIR 1950 SC 1, upon the ground that the evidence had disclosed that there was an agreement in writing which had been signed by the transferor in that case. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court stated thus:

    “A formal lease is not necessary to attract the application of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. All that is required is that an agreement in writing signed by the transferor can be gathered from the evidence.”

    If an agreement in writing signed by the transferor can be gathered even from secondary evidence adduced in court, as was the case in the decision reported in AIR 1950 SC 1, I cannot see how a patta executed by the lessor alone can have less force. The original patta is on the record signed by defendant No. 2. By virtue of that patta, it has been proved that defendant No. 1 came in possession. It is quite clear to my mind that defendant No. 1 is entitled to invoke the provisions of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. In this connection the decision in Qamar Jahan Begam v. Bansi Dhar, AIR 1942 Oudh 231 may be noticed.

    15. In Qamar Jahan Begam's case, AIR 1942 Oudh 231, there was a lease which had been effected by a registered thekanama and a registered qabuliat neither of which had been executed by both the lessor and the lessee. It was held that under the main provisions of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, the defendant, who had taken the lease of a Bazar and was in possession of the property, was protected and that the plaintiff was debarred from enforcing any right in respect of the property “other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract”. In the case. Hadu Maharana… v. Ramdulal Ghosh…., AIR 1944 Pat 35, the plaintiff had instituted a suit for rent at a stipulated rate. The defendant had been inducted on the land under a patta and a qabuliat. The patta had been executed by the landlord and not by the tenant and the qabuliat had been executed by the tenant and not by the landlord. The case was governed by the amended section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. Rowland, J. stated thus:

    “In the result it must be held that the two documents even read together do not constitute a validly executed lease of immovable property; but admittedly the defendant was put into possession. That being so, although the lease did not operate to transfer to the defendant the right of enjoyment which ordinarily passed by a lease, S. 105, the defendant would obtain in respect of the property the benefit of section 53A which bars the transferor from enforcing against him any right in respect of immovable property other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract, subject to the proviso that the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract.”

    It was held that the claim based on the stipulation in the documents had been rightly decreed. In the case, Hari Prasad v. Abdul Haq, AIR 1951 Pat 160, the plaintiffs had filed a suit for certain declarations including a declaration that they were in possession as Maiyadi lessees. It was held that Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act gave no right to a transferee to come to Court as a plaintiff either to maintain his possession or to recover possession, if dispossessed after having been put in possession in pursuance of the contract. Sinha, J. in dealing with this point, stated thus:

    “A transferee who is not clothed with title in the manner recognised by law, cannot be said to be a person having a valid title in law and therefore, Courts of law cannot recognise such a title. If the transferee though not clothed with a perfect legal title has been put in possession or continued in possession, the Court on grounds of equity alone can refuse to enforce the rights of the transferor except so far as those rights are expressly mentioned in the contract in writing and the equitable right in favour of the transferee has been embodied in S. 53A.”

    In my opinion, although the three decisions referred to above do not cover the facts of the instant case, the principle is quite clear that if a lease is executed by the lessor alone after amendment of section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act and the lessee is put in possession, the latter can invoke to his and the doctrine of part performance under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. This, of course, is subject to the interpretation of the proviso to section 53A.

    16. The proviso to Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act runs thus:

    “Provided that nothing in the section shall affect the rights of a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or of the part performance thereof.”

    In my opinion, the conclusion of the learned Additional Sub-ordinate Judge that defendant No. 1 had to establish that the plaintiff had notice of the settlement in favour of defendant No. 1 and also of the constructions raised by her by way of part performance of the contract is an erroneous conclusion. It appears that in the instant case neither the plaintiff alleged that he had no notice of the contract in favour of defendant No. 1, nor did defendant No. 1 allege that the plaintiff had notice of the contract. Therefore, no issue on this point was framed and no findings have been given on facts. It will have to be decided as a question of law as to who will fail in the absence of agitating the point that the plaintiff had or did not have notice of the contract in question. It appears to me that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to allege and prove that defendant No. 1 could not invoke the protection of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act because the plaintiff had no notice of the contract in her favour, I or of the part performance of the contract. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that under Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, the plaintiff must be deemed to have notice of the title under which defendant No. 1 was claiming to hold the property in question.

    17. It is submitted that the plaintiff must be taken to have notice of the contract or of the part performance thereof, because he would have had actual notice but for his wilful abstention from an enquiry in purchasing a property which was in possession of defendant No. 1 and not in possession of the plaintiffs vendor. My attention has been drawn to one of the Illustrations under Section 27, clause (b) of the Specific Relief Act. The Illustration runs thus:

    “A contracts to sell land to B for Rs. 5,000/-. B takes possession of the land. Afterwards A sells it to G for Rs. 6,000. C makes no inquiry of B relating to his interest in land. B's possession is sufficient to affect C with notice of his interest, and he may enforce specific performance of the contract against C.”

    Learned counsel for the appellant has advanced the following argument by way of analogy, lie has submitted that under Section 27-A of the Specific. Relief Act, a plaintiff suing for specific performance of a contract to lease is also governed by a proviso which runs thus:

    “Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or of the part performance thereof.”

    It is submitted that the Illustration to Section 27(b) of the Specific Relief Act quoted above makes it clear that the possession of a contractee is notice to a subsequent transfer. It is urged that a duty has been cast upon the subsequent transferee to enquire about the right under which the person in actual possession claims to hold a property of which he is in possession. It is, therefore, submitted that in the instant case which is governed by the proviso to Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, which, word per word, is the same as the proviso to Section 27-A of the Specific Relief Act the possession of defendant No. 1 must be held to affect the plaintiff with notice of the interest of defendant No. 1.

    18. Under these circumstances, it is submitted that unless the plaintiff could prove, as a matter of fact, that he had no notice of the contract in favour of defendant No. 1 or of the part performance by defendant No. 1, the plaintiff cannot take advantage of the proviso to Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act and throw the burden, as a matter of law, upon defendant No. 1 in order to defeat her defence under Sec. 53A. My attention has also been drawn to Explanation II inserted in Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act which runs thus:

    “Any person acquiring any immoveable property jot any share or interest in any such property shall be deemed to have notice of the title, if any of any person who is for the time being in actual possession thereof.”

    It is Submitted that under Sec. 3, the plaintiff in this case must be deemed to have constructive notice of the contract in favour of the appellant or of the part performance thereof and under Explanation II of Sec. 3, the plaintiff shall be deemed to have notice of the “title” of the appellant. Upon the interpretation of Explanation II under Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, learned counsel has referred to the decision in Noor Zahur Mian v. Islam Mian, 1958 B.L.J.R 466. In Noor Zahur Mian's case, 1958 BLJR 466, the main contention was whether the possession of the plaintiff was tantamount to constructive notice to defendant No. 2 as regards the plaintiff's right under a contract for sale.

    19. Their Lordships held that the plaintiff in the suit, who was in possession as a mortgagee, could take recourse to Explanation II of Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act. In my opinion, the submission of learned counsel for the appellant based upon Section 27-A of the Specific Relief Act and upon the principle underlying Noor Zahur Mian's case, 1958 BLJR 466 is of substance in the instant case. The appellant was in possession by virtue of the patta of the year 1936, and the plaintiff must be deemed to have notice of the appellant's title in this case.

    20. Learned Advocate-General has relied upon; the case of Sobharam Jiwan v. Totaram Sitaram, AIR 1952 Nag 244. In my opinion. Sobharam's case, AIR 1952 Nag 244 is not in point. In that, decision, the question of actual notice of the con-j tract was agitated in the Courts. The learned Judge held that the case upon this point, as pleaded, was different from the case upon which evidence was adduced in Court. The learned Judge stated that under the circumstances it must be held that the appellants in that case had purchased the property without notice of the previous transaction in the respondent's favour. In the instant case, tile onus under the proviso to Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act has been raised as a question of law and not upon pleadings and the evidence of the parties.

    21. My attention has been drawn to the case of Ko Mar v. Ma May, AIR 1935 Rang 12 upon interpretation of the proviso to Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. In Ko Mar's case, AIR 1935 Rang 12, however, the learned Judge did not deal with Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act. With great respect I differ from the decision of the learned Judge in Ko Mar's case. AIR 1935 Rang 12 upon his interpretation of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. In my opinion, in the instant case, the plaintiff cannot defeat the appellant's defence under Sec. 53A due to proviso to Sec. 53A of the Act.

    22. Learned counsel for the appellant has furthermore relied upon the nineteenth ground taken in this Court to the effect that the title of defendant No. 1 had been perfected by adverse possession. Learned Advocate-General has submitted that the appellant is not entitled to agitate this point for the first time in this Court not having raised the question in any of the Courts below. I do not propose to deal with this last question raised by learned counsel for the appellant as in my opinion, upon the interpretation of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, the defence put forward by defendant No. 1 must be held to succeed.

    23. For the reasons given above. I am of the opinion, that the plaintiffs suit in ejectment was erroneously decreed by the Courts below. The appeal is allowed, the judgment & decree passed by the learned Additional Sub-ordinate Judge are set aside and the plaintiffs suit is dismissed.

    24. The appellant-defendant No. 1 is entitled to her costs throughout as against the plaintiff-respondent No. 1.

    ED/V.B.B

    25. Appeal allowed.

    section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act,section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act.

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    Mahadei Haluai v. Ram Krishna Singh And Another
    (Feb 22, 1960)