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  • provisions of Order II Rule 2 of the CPC.21. Order II, Rule 2, of the Code,
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  • (2), of Rule 2, of Order II, of the Code
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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal by defendants 2 and 3 arises from a partition suit. The plaintiff sought partition of certain properties, specifically a moiety share in Schedule 1 and one-third share in Schedule 2 properties. A prior partition suit was instituted by the plaintiff against other parties involving some of the joint family properties, but certain properties (Schedule 1 plot No. 1194 and item C of Schedule 2) were not included in that suit. The previous suit was decreed in 1946. The present suit, filed in 1953, claims partition of the omitted properties. The learned Subordinate Judge of Purulia decreed the plaintiff's suit for partition, holding that these properties were omitted by mistake in the previous suit and that the plaintiff's share in Schedule 1 was one-half, not one-third as contended by the appellants. The court below rejected the written statement of defendants 3 and 4 and found the suit maintainable.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff's share in Schedule 1 property is one-third or one-half.
  2. Whether the present suit for partition is barred under Order II Rule 2 sub-rule (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) due to a prior partition suit.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The plaintiff's share in Schedule 1 property should be one-third, not one-half.
  • The present suit is barred under Order II Rule 2 sub-rule (2) of the CPC because only one suit for partition lies and the plaintiff had already obtained a decree in a previous partition suit.
  • Relied strongly on the Madras High Court decision in Basavana Gowd v. Doddalingappa, AIR 1923 Mad 584, to support the bar on multiple partition suits.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The plaintiff's share in Schedule 1 property is rightly held to be one-half based on possession and ownership evidence, including records showing the second wife’s entitlement and subsequent possession by the plaintiff’s husband.
  • The present suit is maintainable because the omitted properties were excluded from the prior suit by mistake or inadvertence, a position supported by several precedents.
  • Relied on authorities including Jogendra Nath Rai v. Baldev Das, Sasi Mohan Saha v. Hari Nath Saha, and Subramanian v. Lakshminarasamma, which allow a second partition suit if properties were omitted by mistake or ignorance.
  • Contended that intentional omission without consent or leave of court would bar a second suit, but omission by mistake or inadvertence permits it.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Basavana Gowd v. Doddalingappa, AIR 1923 Mad 584 Only one suit for partition lies; subsequent suits barred under Order II Rule 2 CPC. The court considered this precedent but found it broadly stated and distinguished it on facts, holding that omission by mistake allows a subsequent suit.
Gapulal v. Gajasa, AIR 1932 Nag 92 Dissenting view that subsequent suits for partition are maintainable if properties omitted inadvertently. The court agreed with this dissent and held that subsequent suit is maintainable when properties are omitted by mistake or inadvertence.
Jogendra Nath Rai v. Baldev Das, 6 Cal LJ 735 : ILR 35 Cal 961 Second suit for partition maintainable if omitted properties were excluded by mistake. Relied upon to support that omission by mistake allows a subsequent suit for partition.
Sasi Mohan Saha v. Hari Nath Saha, AIR 1928 Cal 459 Subsequent suit maintainable if omitted properties left out by mistake or consent and no objection to partial partition. Applied to uphold maintainability of present suit as properties were omitted by mistake and no objection was raised.
Subramanian v. Lakshminarasamma, AIR 1927 Mad 213 Subsequent suit maintainable if property omitted due to ignorance or mistake. Used to reinforce the principle that ignorance of omitted property justifies a second partition suit.
Muhammad Hafiz v. Mirza Muhammad Zakariya, AIR 1922 PC 23 Interpretation of Order II Rule 2 CPC regarding inclusion of whole claim in suit. Affirmed the legal principle that a plaintiff cannot sue separately for omitted portions without leave of court.
Kishan Narain v. Pala Mal, AIR 1922 PC 412 Further authority on Order II Rule 2 CPC application. Supported the principle that omitted claims cannot be separately sued after relinquishment.
Shankar Sitaram v. Balkrishna Sitaram, AIR 1954 SC 352 Clarified that omission to sue for relief without leave bars subsequent suit under Order II Rule 2 CPC. Applied to emphasize that intentional omission without leave bars subsequent suits.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first examined the share of the plaintiff in Schedule 1 property, concluding that the plaintiff's share is one-half based on possession, ownership records, and the absence of claim or possession by other parties such as Kalicharan or his widow. The court rejected the appellants' contention that the share was one-third.

Regarding the maintainability of the present suit under Order II Rule 2 CPC, the court analyzed the principle that ordinarily only one suit for partition lies, but recognized exceptions where properties were omitted by mistake, ignorance, inadvertence, or with consent of co-owners. The court reviewed various precedents, including the Madras High Court’s restrictive view and the Nagpur High Court’s dissenting and more flexible approach.

The court distinguished the present case from one where omission was intentional without consent or leave of court. It held that the omission of Schedule 1 and item C of Schedule 2 properties in the previous suit was a bona fide mistake. Consequently, the present suit is maintainable as it concerns omitted properties still held in joint possession.

The court stressed the importance of including the whole claim in a suit but allowed for the exception of excusable omission. It rejected the appellants’ argument that the omission was deliberate, finding it excusable and in good faith.

Finally, the court addressed the procedural issue of jurisdiction due to territorial changes, ordering transfer of the suit to the court of the Judicial Commissioner at Ranchi for further proceedings.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is dismissed with costs.

The court upheld the decree of the learned Subordinate Judge decreeing the plaintiff’s suit for partition of the omitted properties. It confirmed that the plaintiff’s share in Schedule 1 property is one-half. The decision clarifies that a subsequent suit for partition is maintainable if properties were omitted by mistake or inadvertence in a prior suit, provided no objection was taken to partial partition and the omitted properties remain jointly held.

This ruling does not establish a new precedent but affirms existing principles regarding the maintainability of partition suits under Order II Rule 2 CPC, emphasizing the distinction between excusable omission and intentional relinquishment without leave of court.

    Sm. Jasoda Kumari Sewani And Others v. Sm. Satyabhama Sewani And Others

    1. This appeal by defendants 2 and 3 arises out of a partition suit. The appeal is from the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge of Punilia decreeing the plaintiff's suit for partition in respect of a moiety share in Schedule I and one-third share in Schedule 2 properties of the plaint.

    2. Only two points have been pressed in support of the appeal by Mr. S.K Sarkar: first, that the plaintiff's share should be one third, and not a naif in the Schedule 1 property, and, seoondly, that the present suit was barred under O. II nile 2 sub-rule (2) of the CPC. For a proper decision of the two points raised to the appeal, it is necessary to state the material facts of the case:

    There was one Ram Sunder Sao who had two wives, Basudi and Biranchi Kumari. From Basudi, Ram Sundar had four sons, namely, Mahant Ram, who died issueless; Durga Prasad, husband of defendants 1 and 2; Kalicharan husband of Daulat Kumari, who died issueless before the institution of the present suit and, Devicharan alias Chutu, husband of the plaintiff. Ram Sunder through his wife, Basudi had also two daughters, who are defendants 3 and 4 to the present litigation. Ram Sunder got no issue from his second wife, Biranchi Kumari.

    3. Previous to the present suit for partition another suit for partition was brought by the present plaintiff against the two widows of Durga Prasaa and Daulat Kumari, the widow of Kalicharan who was then alive. At the time of the previous partition, Mahant Ram, one of the four sons of Ram Sunder, died issueless, and, therefore, the suit was confined to the heirs of the three brothers, namely, Durga Prasad, Kalicharan and Devicharan alias Chutu, the three remaining sons of Ram Sunder Sao. In that partition suit admittedly plot No. 1194, which is Schedule 1, and, item No. C of Schedule 2, of the present suit were not the subject matter of partition and were not included in the previous suit for partition. The previous suit for partition brought dv the plaintiff was decreed on 28-1-1946, as will appear from the decree of the previous suit Ext. 6(a). The present suit for partition was brought on 26-2-1953, claiming partition of Schedule 1 and also item C of Schedule 2 of the properties under partition which were not included in the previous partition suit.

    4. The suit was contested by defendants 1 and 2 and also by defendants 3 and 4, but the written statement filed by defendants 3 and 4 was rejected by the court below. Before the learned Subordinate Judge also the question as to whether the present suit for partition was barred in respect or Schedule 1 and item C of Schedule 2 properties of the plaint in view of the decree of the previous partition suit was raised. The learned Subordinate Judge held that these two properties were not included in the previous partition suit by mistake and, therefore, the present suit for partition was maintainable. He further found that the share of the plaintiff in Schedule 1 was one-half, and not one-third, as contended by the appellants. He accordingly decreed the plaintiff's suit for partition as mentioned earlier.

    5. As regards the first contention regarding the share of the plaintiff in Sch. 1 of the plaint, I have no manner of doubt that the decision of the court below is correct. Apart from the reason given by the learned Subordinate Judge, Mr. J.M Ghosh, who appeared for the respondents, put forward some other grounds in support of the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge, and, in my opinion, those grounds are quite substantial. In the Khatian (Ext. 9), in respect of plot No. 1194, under Khata No. 86, which is Schedule 1 of the plaint, in the remarks column Biranchi Kumari Dasi, widow of Ram Sunder Sao and his second wife, is recorded to be entitled 8 annas share of rent of lac bearing trees. In paragraph 4 of the plaint the plaintiff specifically averred that Schedule 1 was in possession of the plaintiffs husband's step-mother, Biranchi Kumari Devi and after her death, plaintiff's husband and Durga Charan, husband of defendants 1 and 2, got possession of these properties in equal shares as ner heirs.

    6. This specific assertion of the plaintiff is not denied by defendants 1 and 2 in their written statement; on the other hand it is specifically at-firmed to be correct by defendants 3 and 4 in their written statement. It may be mentioned at this stage that defendants 3 and 4, who are daughters of Ram Sundar Sao, as mentioned before, were made parties to the present suit for partition as heirs of Kalicharan, husband of Daulat Kumari after her death. Defendants 1 and 2 in paragraph 5 of their written statement simply stated that they had transferred the right in Schedule 1 and in item C of Schedule 2 of the plaint to defendant No. 3 and since then she was in possession of the same to the knowledge of the plaintiff. It appears further that a suit in ejectment was brought by Udhab Chandra Singh, landlord, for khas possession of the trees standing on plots 1194 and 1202, which included plot No. 1194 which is in dispute in the present suit.

    7. To that suit only the husband of the plaintiff and the present defendants 1 and 2 were mada parties as defendants 12, 11 and 11(ka) respectively along with others. The suit was brought in 1937 when Daulat Kumari widow of Kalicharan was admittedly alive, because she was aslo made a defendant to the previous partition suit in 1943. If Kalicharan, and, after him, his widow, Daulat kumari had also an interest in Schedule 1 of the present suit, namely, plot No. 1194, and, he or she would have been in possession of it, surely the landlord must have made Kalicharan, if he was alive, or his widow, Daulat Kumari, who was said to be alive, a party to this suit. Exhibit 6(b) is the decree of that title suit which was decreed on the 22nd September, 1938 and it clearly shows that neither Kalicharan nor his widow was a party to that suit. The decree was brought in appeal to this Court as will appear from the judgment of this Court (Ext. 3(a)) and its decree (Ext. 6). In this decree (Ext. 6) also the widow of Kalicharan is not a party to the appeal. The only inference which can be drawn from the facts mentioned above as also from the reasons given by the learned Subordinate Tudge based on Ext. 5 is that Schedule 1 belonged to and was in possession of Devicharan, husband of the plaintiff and Durga Prasad, husband of defendants 1 and 2, and, as such, the share of the plaintiff has rightly been found to be a half in Schedule 1, and not one-third, as contended by the appellants. I would accordingly affirm the finding of the court below that the share of the plaintiff in Schedule 1 of the plaint is one-half, and not one-third.

    8. As regards the second contention, Mr. Sarkar relied very strongly on a Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Basavana Gowd v. Doddalingappa, AIR 1923 Mad 584, in support of his contention that only one suit for partition lies, and, therefore the present second suit for partition is barred under Order II Rule 2 of the CPC.

    9. In the above Madras case their Lordships observed:

    “In our opinion, the contention that generally only one suit for partition will lie represents the settled law. That is the only view reconcilable with the terms of Section 11, explanation 4 and order 2 R. 2 of the CPC”

    10. It was, later, further observed that:

    “The cause of action in a partition suit of joint family property must be regarded as exhaustive of the whole property available for division, so far as its existence is known at the date of the plaint.”

    11. In that case, in reply to the bar of Order II Rule 2 of the Code pleaded, it was contended at the Bar that the suit properties were situated in two jurisdiction, and, therefore, sections 16 and 17 of the Code gave the plaintiff the option to bring either two suits in the two courts for the property in the jurisdiction of each or one suit in whichever court he may prefer for the whole property, and, that the plaintiff has simply exercised his option in choosing the former alternative. This argument was repelled by their Lordships on the ground that the position that the suit properties were situated in two jurisdiction did not make any difference in the application of the principle involved in Order II Rule 2 of the CPC, which was not overriden by the provisions of Ss. 16 and 17 of the Code. Their Lordships, therefore, held that the suit before them, which was substantially for one item of what was admittedly joint family property, was not maintainable in view of the fact that the plaintiff of that suit had already brought a suit earlier and obtained a decree for partition for other items.

    12. Relying on the above decision, Mr. Sarkar strenuously argued that similar was the situation here because the plaintiff had admittedly obtained a decree for partition previously in respect of other properties, and, therefore, the present suit for partition in respect of the two properties, mentioned before, which, according to the plaintiffs own cause, formed part of the joint family properties of the parties, and, were not included in the previous suit for partition, was not maintainable.

    13. This Madras case was considered by a learned single Judge of the Nagpur High Court in Gapulal v. Gajasa, AIR 1932 Nag 92. In that case, his Lordship Grille, A.J.C dissented from the dictum, quoted above, in the just mentioned Madras case, “that it is settled law that only one suit for partition would lie.” In view of a contrary view having been taken in the other High Courts, after a consideration of the decisions of the Calcutta High Court, Bombay High Court and Judicial Commissioner's Court in Sind, and, an earlier decision of the Nagpur High Court itself, his Lordship said:

    “It is clear from the rulings cited that the preponderance of opinion is that where there has been an inadvertent omission to partition some of the joint family property a subsequent suit may bo brought for partitioning the same. The property which has not been partitioned must remain joint family property, and as such, susceptible to partition at a future date……….”

    14. After a consideration of the other cases, which I shall presently notice, I too have no doubt that the dictum that “it is settled law that only one suit for partition will lie” laid down in the above Madras case, AIR 1923 Mad 584 has been very broadly stated, and it has rightly, if I may say so with respect, been dissented from by the Nagpur High Court.

    15. Mr. Ghosh, in reply, contended that if by mistake or inadvertence some properties had been omitted in the previous partition suit, then a subsequent suit for partition for such omitted properties would be maintainable. He relied on Jogendra Nath Rai v. Baldev Das. 6 Cal LJ 735 : ILR 35 Cal 961, Sasi Mohan Saha v. Hari Nath Saha, AIR 1928 Cal 459 and Subramanian v. Lakshminarasamma, AIR 1927 Mad 213.

    16. In the first case, 6 Cal LJ 735 his Lord-ship Sir Asutosh Mookerjee, who delivered the judgment of the Division Bench, examined at length, amongst other matters, also the question of maintainability of a suit for partition, having been brought in respect of a part only by mistake. In that case, by mistake, the lands in suit in the second suit for partition were excluded from the report of the commissioner, and, therefore were not dealt with by the final decree for partition. In this connection, his Lordship, after an exhaustive examination of all the cases of the different High Courts, including the English decision in Cartmell v. Chambers. (1899) 54 S.W 362 and the observation of the Privy Council in Jagatjit Singh v. Sarabjit Singh, ILR 19 Cal 159(172) at p. 740, summed up his conclusion in the following words:

    “We must, consequently affirm without hesitation, the doctrine that, although a co-owner cannot enforce a partition of a part only of the common lands, leaving the rest undivided, and although the entire property must be included in the partition, yet if by mistake or by consent of the coowners, acting innocently and fairly, a partition on a portion only of their estate has been made, whether by order of the Court or otherwise, there is no reason why the Court should not grant a division of the remainder at the instance of one or more of the co-owners.”

    17. Their Lordships, accordingly, held that the conclusion, therefore, was irresistible that the effect of the previous decree in the partition suit was to leave untouched the joint title and possession of the parties in respect of the lands covered by the subsequent suit, which were not included by mistake in the previous suit and as such the second suit before them for recovery of joint possession may well be maintained.

    18. A similar view was taken by a learned single Judge, of the Madras High Court in AIR 1927 Mad 213. In that case, Devadoss, J., observed that when parties are ignorant as to the existence of some family property and divide the property that is known to them and if afterwards it be discovered that some property belonging to the joint family has been left undivided, there is no ground for refusing to give relief to the party who asked for partition. In this case also, the earlier case of the Madras High Court, so strongly relied upon by Mr. Sarkar, namely, AIR 1923 Mad 584, was referred to. His Lordship quoted with approval the observation of Venkatasubba Rao, J., who was a party to the decision in AIR 1923 Mad 584, in Vasudevan v. Arunachala Ayyar, 1926 Mad WN 94, to the following effect:

    “But it has been held that there could be no omission to sue within the meaning of this rule unless the plaintiff was at some time prior to the suit aware or informed of the claim or of the facts which would give him a cause of action.”

    After a consideration of the above two earlier Madras cases, his Lordship came to the conclusion that when a person was not aware of the existence of an item of property which belonged to the family and wanted to sue for its division, it could not be said that he ought to have included it in the previous suit.

    19. In_the second Calcutta case, namely, AIR 1928 Cal 459, on which strong reliance was placed by Mr. Ghosh, it was held that if in the previous suit for partition, a property was left out either intentionally or by mistake and no objection was taken by any of the party to a partial partition and the properties in that suit were partitioned, a subsequent suit for partition of the property so left out and still held in joint possession was maintainable. His Lordship Shnhrawardv, J. with whom Graham J. agreed examined the earlier cases of that Court including the decision in 6 Cal LJ 735 above mentioned, as also a decision of the Bombay High Court, and, on an examination of these authorities at p. 461, inter alia, observed:

    “On an examination of these authorities and on considerations of justice and equity and of the law applicable, the following results seem to be evident; (1) if in the previous suit for partition a property is left out either intentionally or by mistake and no objection is taken by party to a partial partition and the properties in that suit are partitioned, a subsequent suit for partition of the property so left out and still held in joint possession is maintainable; ….”

    Mr. Ghosh, relying on the above observation, urged that even if a property is left out intentionally, and no objection is taken by the party concerned to a partial partition a second suit for partition of the omitted property will lie.

    20. If I may say so with respect, I express my cordial assent to the view of their Lordships that if a property is left out by mistake and no objection is taken by party to a partial partition, a second suit for partition for such left out property would lie. But, with respects, I differ from their Lordships' other observation that if a property is left out even intentionally and no objection is taken by party to such partition, a second suit for partition for such left out property will lie. It would appear, on an examination of the facts of that case, that this view of their Lordships appears to have been expressed orbiter, because, in that case in the first place, in none of the cases noticed in the judgment of their Lordships such a wide proposition of law seems to have been laid down, and, in the second place, in that case before their Lordships some of the properties were omitted intentionally and left joint with the consent of the parties. If, therefore, some property is left out intentionally with the consent of the parties, certainly a second suit for partition in respect of such left out property would lie. But if some property is left out intentionally without the consent of the parties or without the leave of the Court, or without any justifying reason, I cannot understand how a second suit for partition in respect of such left out property would lie. If this view is accepted, then it will defeat the provisions of Order II Rule 2 of the CPC.

    21. Order II, Rule 2, of the Code, excluding the Explanation which is not material here, is to the following effect:

    Order II. ‘2(1) Every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled in make in respect of the cause of action; but a plaintiff may relinquish any portion of his claim in order to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any Court.

    (2) Where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omittad or relinquished.

    (3) A person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action may sue for all or any of such reliefs; but if he omits, except with the leave of the Court, to sue for all such reliefs, he shall not, afterwards sue for any relief so omitted.”

    22. From the plain language of sub-r. (2), of Rule 2, of Order II, of the Code it is clear enough that where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes any portion of his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so relinquished or omitted. Sub-rule (3) of R. 2, of Order II, no doubt, gives an option to a plaintiff to sue for all or any of such reliefs, if he is entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action, but, it, further, provides that if such plaintiff omits to sue for all such reliefs, without the leave of the Court, he shall not afterwards sue for any relief so omitted. The cause of action referred to in R. 2 of O. II, is the cause of action which gives occasion to and forms the foundation of the suit, and if that cause enables a man to ask for larger and wider relief than that to which he limits his claim, he cannot afterwards seek to recover the balance by independent proceedings: Muhammad Hafiz v. Mirza Muhammad Zakariya, 49 Ind App 9 : AIR 1922 PC 23, per Lord Buckmaster, which was relied upon by the Privy Council in a later case in Kishan Narain v. Pala Mal, AIR 1922 PC 412 : 50 Ind App 115.

    23. In a partition suit all the properties of the joint family must be included; because a coowner cannot enforce a partition of a part only of the common lands, and, as such, the entire property must be included in the partition suit. It is not open to a member of the joint family to ask for a partition of a certain item and leave the rest, except in certain cases, such as, where some of the items could not be divided by reason of their being in possession of usufructuary mortgagees, or, being under a long lease, or set apart for maintenance of a widow or some member of the family, or, some other reasons. It is not left to the option of the plaintiff in such a partition suit to ask for relief in respect of certain properties and then to say that he would ask for partition of the other properties at some future time, when the circumstances above adverted to are not present, and, when he is not ignorant of the existence of the other omitted properties. When therefore, a plaintiff intentionally, not by mistake or inadvertence, nor due to ignorance or oversight, nor with the consent of the co-owners, nor with the leave of the court, does not include a property in his previous partition suit, although he knows about its existence, and, none of the circumstances above mentioned exist, the provisions of sub-r. (2) of R. 2 of Order II of the Code will apply. The cause of action, in such a case, in the two suits being the same, the plaintiffs suit will come within the mischief of Order II R. 2 of the Code. Rule 2 of Order II provides that every suit shall include the whole of the claim. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 2 of Order II clearly lays down that if a person omits, except with the leave of the Court, to sue for all reliefs to which he is entitled, he snail not afterwards sue for any relief so omitted: Shankar Sitaram v. Balkrishna Sitaram, AIR 1954 SC 352. The suit so brought by the plaintiff does not include it and this consequently barred the institution of a further suit in respect thereof.

    24. In my opinion, therefore, the observation of their Lordships in the Calcutta case, AIR 1928 Cal 459, to the effect that if a property is left out in the previous suit for partition intentionally and no objection is taken by party to a partial partition, a subsequent suit for partition of the property so left out will lie, even when the plaintiff omits to sue for it, without the leave of the Court, if considered with the facts of that particular case, in which with the consent of the parties certain properties were left out may be correct, but if considered broadly, I do not think, this will be consistent with the provisions of Order II Rule 2 of the Code. I, therefore, respectfully dissent from this particular observation of their Lordships.

    25. On a consideration of the above authorities, however, it is manifest that, after a decree has been passed in a suit for partition of the joint family property, a subsequent suit for partition may be brought in respect of any portion of that property which, by mistake, or, inadvertence, or due to ignorance or to oversight, or by consent of the co-owners, was omitted in the former suit, and if no objection is taken by the party concerned to a partial partition, the subsequent suit for partition of the portion of the property so left out and still held in joint possession, would be maintainable. If by mistake, or the like, acting innocently and fairly, a partition of a portion only of their estate has been made, whether by order of the Court or otherwise, there is no reason why the Court should not grant a division of the remainder at the instance of one or more of the co-owners. In such a case, there could be no omission to sue within the meaning of Rule 2 of Order II of the Code. Mr. Sarkar, however, did not seriously contest the above proposition of law that, if by mistake a property is left out from the previous partition suit, a second partition suit in respect of such left out property will be maintainable; but he strongly contended that such mistake must be excusable, and not inexcusable amounting to negligence on the part of the plaintiff, and that, in the present case, the plaintiffs omission was deligerate in spite of having knowledge of existence of these omitted properties. I have not been able to appreciate this classification of mistake. If it is a mistake, it obviously means a bona fide mistake; otherwise, it, would cease to be a mistake, and, would amount to a deliberate and intentional omission on the part of the plaintiff, and not due to mistake or ignorance. In the present case, however, applying the above principles, extracted from the authorities considered above, I find that the learned Sub. Judge has rightly come to the conclusion that the plaintiff by mistake omitted to include Schedule 1 and item C of the Schedule 2 properties of the present suit in the previous suit for partition.

    26. As this question has been considered by the learned Subordinate Judge it is not necessary to go into detail, but I shall briefly give my own reasons for concurring in the judgment of the court below: (After discussing the evidence the judgment proceeded):

    On the evidence on the record and on the facts of the present case, there is no manner of doubt that the plaintiff by mistake, acting innocently and fairly, did not include these two omitted items of properties in her previous suit for partition, and, therefore, in the words of Mr. Sarkar, her mistake was excusable.

    27. For the reasons given above, I hold that there is no merit in the appeal, and, accordingly, it is dismissed with costs.

    28. The question then arises as to where now the suit should go back for a final decree. The suit was instituted before the Subordinate Judge at Purulia as some of the properties under partition were situated in the district of Manbhum. At the time of the institution of the suit as also at the time of the filing of the present appeal the entire district of Manbhum was within the jurisdiction of this High Court. But during the pendency of the appeal, that part of the district of Mnrbhum where the properties of the district of Manbhum under partition were situated, has ceased to be under the jurisdiction of this High Court. In these circumstances, as admittedly some of the properties under partition are situated in the district of Ranchi, within the jurisdiction of this Court, the proper course would be to transfer the suit to Ranchi.

    29. The suit is accordingly transferred to the court of the Judicial Commissioner at Ranchi for being transferred to the court of the Subordinate Judge at Ranchi, who may be competent to deal with this matter, for disposal of the suit in accordance with law.

    DC/V.B.B

    30. Appeal dismissed.

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    Sm. Jasoda Kumari Sewani And Others v. Sm. Satyabhama Sewani And Others
    (Jan 5, 1959)