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  • Section 26 of that Code
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  • Section 26 of that Code
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Respondent No. 1 filed, in the court below, an application under Order 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) for permission to sue in forma pauperis. He also applied under Order 39 of the CPC for an injunction restraining the appellant from proceeding with a specified execution case until the final disposal of his application to sue in forma pauperis. The court below allowed the application for injunction and passed an order restraining the appellant from proceeding with the execution. The appellant challenged that order by way of the present appeal.

On initial hearing before Sinha and Dayal, JJ., counsel for the appellant argued that Order 39 could not apply until the application to sue in forma pauperis was allowed because, they said, there was no suit in which an injunction could be granted. Because of differing views among High Courts on this point, Sinha and Dayal, JJ. referred the following question of law to a larger Bench for decision:

“Whether the filing of the application in forma pauperis is equivalent to the filing of a plaint commencing the suit for the purpose of an application for an injunction under O. 39 of the CPC?”

The present Bench was constituted to decide that referred question. The opinion records the submissions of both sides and then proceeds to examine statutory provisions and authorities before answering the referred question. The three-judge Bench delivered a unanimous answer.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the filing of an application to sue in forma pauperis is equivalent to the filing of a plaint (i.e., commences the suit) for the purpose of making an application for injunction under Order 39 of the CPC.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Order 39 of the CPC has no application until the application to sue in forma pauperis has been allowed.
  • So long as the application for leave to sue as a pauper remains undecided, there is no suit in which an order of injunction can be passed.

Respondent No. 1's Arguments

  • The suit is instituted as soon as an application to sue in forma pauperis is filed; accordingly Order 39 can be invoked while that application is pending.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Stuart Skinner v. William Orde, ILR 2 All 241 (PC) Held that the petition to sue in forma pauperis was a composite document containing the plaint and the prayer for permission to sue as a pauper. Cited as an authority adopting the view that the pauper petition may be treated as containing the plaint; noted that it was under the old Code.
Bank of Bihar Ltd. v. S. Ramchanderji Maharaj, ILR 9 Pat 439; AIR 1929 Pat 637 Accepted the principle that an application to sue in forma pauperis may be equivalent to a plaint (as applied by some High Courts under the present Code). Referred to as one of the Patna decisions accepting the principle; the opinion notes its existence but declines to resolve the correctness of earlier conflicting authorities on that precise point.
Chunna Mai v. Bhagwant Kishore, AIR 1936 All 584 (FB) Represents a contrary view (i.e., that there is no suit until leave to sue as pauper is granted). Cited as an example of High Court decisions taking the opposite view to those that treat the application as commencing a suit.
Gupteshwar Missir v. Chaturanand Misir, AIR 1950 Pat 309 Another Patna decision taking the extreme view that until pauperism is decided the court had no jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction. Referred to as a decision whose correctness was doubted by the Bench, but the opinion states that reconsideration of that case is unnecessary for deciding the present referred question.
Channulal Semi v. Shama Ramcharan, AIR 1955 Nag 259 Division Bench of Nagpur High Court took the view that the suit commences with presentation of the application for permission to sue as a pauper. Cited as supporting the view adopted in the present opinion that the suit commences on presentation of the application.
Chidambaram v. Nataraja Mudaliar, AIR 1939 Mad 80 Held that on presentation of the petition to sue as a pauper the suit is to be deemed to have been instituted; applied Order 39 procedure (appointment of commissioner) despite leave not yet granted. Relied on as authority supporting the proposition that Order 39 can apply while the pauper application is pending.
Totaram Ichharam v. Dattu Mangu, AIR 1943 Bom 143 Divisional Bench view that filing the application in the form of a plaint, taken on the file as a plaint, commences the suit. Cited as additional authority in support of the view that the suit commences on filing the pauper application.
Puma Chandra v. Tara Prosed, 21 Cal WN 870; 25 Cal LJ 159; AIR 1917 Cal 852 Held (per the cited report) that until the judge has determined whether leave to sue as a pauper should be granted there is no suit before the court — i.e., a contrary view. Discussed as an authority taking the opposite view; the present opinion characterises that view as wrong (insofar as it fails to consider Section 26) and distinguishes it.
Thimmayya v. Sadasivappa, AIR 1952 Mys 76 Held that the provisions of Order 39 could not apply as there was no suit but only an application for leave to sue as a pauper. Cited as a contrary decision; the opinion notes that Section 26 of the CPC was overlooked in that decision and expresses inability to agree with that view.
11 Mys CCR 90 Earlier Mysore decision followed in Thimmayya. Mentioned as a precedent that Thimmayya followed; the present opinion notes reliance but does not adopt that view.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court framed the issue narrowly around whether an application to sue in forma pauperis must be treated as commencing a suit for the purpose of invoking Order 39 CPC. The analysis proceeded in these steps, as reflected in the opinion:

  1. Statutory starting point: The Court emphasised Section 26 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that every suit shall be instituted by presentation of a plaint "or in such other manner as may be prescribed". This means that institution of a suit is not confined to presentation of a plaint alone.
  2. Order 33 as the prescribed mode: The Court observed that Order 33 of the CPC, headed "Suits by Paupers", prescribes the mode for institution of a suit by a pauper. Rule 1 of Order 33 permits suits to be instituted by a pauper subject to the order's other provisions; Rule 2 prescribes that an application for permission to sue as a pauper must contain particulars required in plaints and be signed and verified like pleadings.
  3. Conclusion on commencement: Because Order 33 prescribes an alternative mode for institution pursuant to Section 26, the Court concluded that a suit by a pauper is instituted from the moment the application for permission to sue in forma pauperis (as required by Order 33) is presented.
  4. Applicability of Order 39: Given the above conclusion that the suit is instituted on presentation of the pauper application, the Court held there is no difficulty in applying the provisions of Order 39 CPC to make an injunction while the application to sue as a pauper is pending.
  5. Treatment of authorities: The opinion reviewed conflicting authorities. It distinguished and relied on decisions (e.g., Chidambaram; Totaram Ichharam; Nagpur decision) that treat the suit as commencing on the presentation of the pauper petition, and disagreed with authorities (e.g., Puma Chandra; Thimmayya; certain Patna decisions) that held there is no suit until leave is granted. The Court noted that some contrary decisions had overlooked Section 26 and therefore could not be accepted.
  6. Final formulation: The Court avoided resolving whether the pauper application is strictly "equivalent" to a plaint from the date of presentation; instead it held that whether or not it is strictly equivalent, presentation of the application does commence the suit for purposes of seeking injunction under Order 39.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The filing of the application in forma pauperis, whether it is equivalent to the filing of a plaint or not, commences the suit for the purpose of an application for injunction under Order 39(1) of the CPC.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: An applicant who files an application to sue in forma pauperis may invoke Order 39 remedies (including seeking injunctions) while the pauper application remains pending, because the suit is treated as commenced from the filing of that application.
  • Scope and precedent: The Court's answer resolves the referred question by emphasising the role of Section 26 and Order 33 in treating the pauper application as instituting the suit for the limited purpose of Order 39. The opinion notes conflicting authorities and distinguishes them; it does not undertake a general, exhaustive overruling of every contrary decision, but it expressly answers the referred question in the terms set out above.
  • Final procedural note: The Bench recorded concurrence of Sinha, J. and Dayal, J. with the answer given.

    Matuki Mistry v. Kamakhaya Prasad And Others

    Choudhary, J.:— Respondent no. 1 filed an application in the court below for permission to sue in forma pauperis under the provisions of O. 33 of the CPC. He also made an application under the provisions of O. 39 of the CPC for an injunction restraining the appellant from proceeding with certain execution case until the final disposal of his application to sue in forma pauperis. The court below allowed that application and passed an order of injunction restraining the appellant from proceeding with the aforesaid execution case. Being thus aggrieved the appellant preferred the present appeal.

    2. This case was placed for hearing before Sinha and Dayai, JJ., before whom an argument was put forward on behalf of the appellant that O. 39 of the CPC has no application until the application to sue in forma pauperis has been allowed, and there is no suit in which an order of injunction can be passed. Since there appeared difference of opinion amongst the several High Courts on the question relating to the point at issue, their Lordships referred the following question of law for decision by a larger Bench:

    “Whether the filing of the application in forma pauperis is equivalent to the filing of a plaint commencing the suit for the purpose of an application for an injunction under O. 39 of the CPC?”

    3. This Bench has, therefore, been constituted for deciding the above question of law. It has been submitted on behalf of the appellant that an application to sue in forma pauperis is deemed to be a plaint in the suit when it is granted and till then there is no suit in which an order of injunction under O. 39 can be passed. On behalf of respondent no. 1, the pauper applicant, it has been contended that the suit is instituted as soon as an application to sue in forma pauperis is filed.

    4. Various decisions have been cited before us by both the parties for and against the proposition that an application to sue in forma pauperis is a composite document containing a plaint and a prayer for permission to sue as a pauper and that such an application is equivalent to plaint from the date of the presentation of the application itself. In Stuart Skinner v. William Orde, ILR 2 All 241 (PC) (A), their Lordships of the Judicial Committee held that the petition to sue in forma pauperis was a composite document containing the plaint and the prayer for permission to sue as a pauper.

    5. That was a case governed by the old Code of Civil Procedure. That principle has, however, been accepted by different High Courts in some of the cases which were covered by the present Code of Civil Procedure. Reference may be made in this connection to the case of Bank of Bihar Ltd. v. S. Ramchanderji Maharaj, ILR 9 Pat 439 : (AIR 1929 Pat 637) (B). A contrary view was taken in other cases. A reference may be made to the case of Chunna Mai v. Bhagwant Kishore, AIR 1936 All 584 (FB) (C) and Gupteshwar Missir v. Chaturanand Misir, AIR 1950 Pat 309 (D).

    6. In my opinion, however, it is not necessary for the purpose of answering the question in the present case to examine the correctness or otherwise of the decisions in the above cases on this point, because as I will presently show, whether such an application is equivalent to a plaint or not from the very date of its presentation, the suit undoubtedly commences on its presentation so as to attract the application of O. 39 of the CPC. I may, however, make a reference to the above Patna Case in AIR 1950 Pat 309 (D). In that case a Bench of this Court took the extreme view that so long as the question of pauperism has not been decided the court had no jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction.

    7. A contrary view has been taken by a Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court in Channulal Semi v. Shama Ramcharan, (S) AIR 1955 Nag 259 (E). Sinha and Dayal, JJ., in their order of reference doubted the correctness of the above Patna decision and observed that the same required reconsideration. I perfectly agree with the view of their Lordships that the above case needs reconsideration but, in my view, it is not necessary to do so in the present case because the question that has been referred to this Bench can be answered with reference to the point which has not been decided in the above Patna Case. The correctness of that decision, therefore, may have to be examined on a proper occasion.

    8. An order of injunction under the provisions of O. 39 has to be made in a suit. Before such order for injunction can, therefore, be passed, the suit must have commenced, or, in other words, must have been instituted. Ordinarily, as provided in O. 4, R. 1 of the CPC, a suit is instituted by presentation of a plaint. But that is not the only mode of the institution of a suit. Section 26 of that Code provides that every suit shall be instituted by the presentation of a plaint or in such other manner as may be prescribed.

    9. Therefore, a suit can be instituted even without presentation of a plaint in a manner as may have been prescribed in the Code. Order 33 of the CPC which is headed as “Suits by Paupers” prescribes the mode for institution of a suit by a pauper and R. 1 of that Order says that, subject to the other provisions of that Order, any suit may be instituted by a pauper. Rule 2 of that Order prescribes as to how that suit by a pauper is to be instituted and enacts that an application should be made for permission to sue as a pauper which must contain the particulars required in regard to plaints in suits, a schedule of any movable or immovable property belonging to the applicant with the estimated value thereof and it has to be signed and varified in the manner prescribed for the signing and verification of pleadings.

    10. The other rules thereof relate to the further procedure to be adopted on filing of such application. In my view, therefore, O. 33 prescribes the mode for institution of a suit by a pauper as contemplated by the words “in such other manner as may be prescribed” used in Section 26 of the CPC. The suit, therefore, is instituted or commenced from the moment the application for permission to sue in forma pauperis as required by O. 33 of the CPC is presented.

    11. In that view of the matter, there is no difficulty in applying the provisions of O. 39 of the CPC for making an order of injunction while the application of the pauper to Sue in forma pauperis is pending consideration.

    12. The above view is borne out by several authorities. In Chidambaram v. Nataraja Mudaliar, AIR 1939 Mad 80 (F), an applicant who had made an application to sue in forma pauperis made a prayer for an order for the appointment of a commissioner for taking an inventory of certain properties. The prayer for appointment of a commissioner was objected on the ground that the right to apply for the appointment of a commissioner arises under O. 39, R. 7 of the CPC, which could be applicable only if there was already a suit pending and it was contended that inasmuch as the application to sue in forma pauperis had not been granted, there was no suit pending.

    13. That objection was repelled and the commissioner was appointed as it was held that on presentation of the petition to sue as a pauper, the suit is to be deemed to have been instituted. In Totaram Ichharam v. Dattu Mangu, AIR 1943 Bom 143 (G), a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court took the same view. Beaumont, C.J, who gave the judgment in that case referring to the decision in Puma Chandra v. Tara Prosed, 21 Cal WN 870 : 25 Cal LJ 159 : (AIR 1917 Cal 852) (H), in which it was held that until the Judge has determined whether or not the plaintiff should be permitted to sue as a pauper, there is no suit before the court and it is merely an application, observed that view was wrong, and held that the filing of the application in the form of a plaint, which is taken on the file as a plaint, commences the suit.

    14. His Lordship further observed that it would be a strange thing if a plaintiff who desires leave to sue as a pauper, cannot apply to prevent the defendants from making away with the property in suit until his application for leave has been disposed of. The decision of the Nagpur High Court also in the case of (S) AIR 1955 Nag 259 (E) referred to above is to the same effect. Their Lordships referring to Section 26 of the CPC held that the suit commences for the purposes of O. 39 with the making of an application for permission to sue in forma pauperis.

    15. A contrary view has been taken on this point in some of the cases to which it is necessary to make a reference. In 25 Cal LJ 159 : (AIR 1917 Cal 852) (H), referred to above, during the pendency of an application to sue as a pauper an application was made for attachment before judgment. It was held that the prayer for such attachment could not be granted inasmuch as there was no suit pending until the application to sue in forma pauperis was granted. The provisions of Section 26 of the CPC was not at all considered in that case for deciding the question about the commencement of the suit.

    16. In Thimmayya v. Sadasivappa, AIR 1952 Mys 76 (I) also it was held that the provisions of O. 39 of the CPC could not apply as there was no suit but only an application for leave to sue as a pauper. No reason has been given apart from following a decision of that court in 11 Mys CCR 90 (J), for taking that view. In this case also Section 26 of the CPC has been overlooked. With due respect to the Judges who decided those cases, I am unable to agree with their view.

    17. On consideration of the provisions of law as embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure as well as of the authorities referred to above, it is manifest that whether or not an application to sue in forma pauperis is equivalent to a plaint from the very date of its presentation, the suit is instituted and commences from the moment that application is made and as such the provisions of O. 39 are applicable to it.

    18. I would accordingly answer the question as follows:—

    “The filing of the application in forma pauperis, whether it is equivalent to the filing of a plaint or not, commences the suit for the purpose of an application for injunction under O. 391 of the CPC.”

    19. Sinha, J.:— I agree.

    20. Dayal, J.:— I agree.

    K.S.B

    21. Answer accordingly.

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    Matuki Mistry v. Kamakhaya Prasad And Others
    (Jan 13, 1958)