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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from the dismissal by the Additional Subordinate Judge, Muzaffarpur, of the plaintiff's suit seeking a declaration of title to possession and recovery of certain property formerly belonging to his deceased father-in-law, Sheopragash Singh. Sheopragash died in 1925, leaving two widows, six daughters, and a grandson. By a registered will executed shortly before his death, Sheopragash created a life interest in favor of his widows and appointed the plaintiff as executor with directions to manage the estate during the widows' lifetimes. The plaintiff claimed entitlement to hold and manage the property, meet necessary expenses, and apply income for the widows' support. A declaration to this effect was obtained from the Court in 1942 under section 302 of the Succession Act, 1925.

The plaintiff alleged continuous possession since Sheopragash's death but was dispossessed around June 1944 after failing to register himself as proprietor in Register D, where the widows had their names recorded. The defendant denied the plaintiff's right to hold and manage the property and challenged his possession claim, asserting the suit was time-barred. The Subordinate Judge upheld the plaintiff's right to manage but found against him on possession and limitation grounds.

Procedurally, the plaintiff delayed applying for probate until 1938, citing misplacement of the will. Probate was granted in 1939 with a qualification limiting interference with the life estate of widow Dharohar Kuer. This qualification was later expunged by the High Court, which clarified that probate courts only concern themselves with proving the will. Subsequent proceedings under section 144 Cr.P.C. recognized Dharohar Kuer's possession and management of the estate. The plaintiff's applications for mutation in Register D were dismissed at multiple administrative levels, with findings confirming Dharohar Kuer's possession. The plaintiff obtained a High Court declaration in 1942 affirming his right to manage the estate but did not obtain possession. The suit was filed in December 1944.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff, as executor under the will, had a right to possession and management of the property despite the widows' recorded life interest and possession.
  2. Whether the suit for recovery of possession was barred by limitation, considering the timing of probate and continuous possession.
  3. The legal effect of probate on the vesting of title and possession rights of an executor under the Succession Act, 1925.
  4. Whether the executor's title and right to sue accrue from the testator's death or from the grant of probate.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The plaintiff claimed entitlement under the will and directions therein to hold and manage the property from the death of the testator.
  • He asserted continuous possession since the testator's death and challenged the defendant's recorded proprietorship and possession.
  • He contended that the limitation period should run from the date of probate and that his suit was not barred.
  • He argued the will intended the executor to take possession only after probate was obtained.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The defendant denied the plaintiff's right to hold and manage the property under the will.
  • She asserted that the plaintiff was never in possession since the testator's death, rendering the suit barred by limitation.
  • She relied on documentary evidence of continuous possession, management, payment of revenue, and legal actions in her name.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jamsetji Nassarwanji Ginwalla v. Hirijibhai Naoroji Anklesaria Executor can sue to enforce rights arising under the will after testator's death, provided probate is obtained before decree. Supported the proposition that limitation runs from testator's death and executor's title vests at that time, not from probate.
Chandra Kishore Roy v. Prasanna Kumari Dasi; Charu Chandra Pramamk v. Nahush Chandra Kundu; Dwarka Nath Singh v. Mt. Raj Rani Similar principle to Jamsetji Nassarwanji Ginwalla regarding executor's rights and limitation. Reinforced the view that executor's title and rights vest from death of testator.
Venkata Subamma v. Ramayya Executor's title vests at testator's death, probate authenticates but does not create title. Affirmed the correct view that executor's title exists from death, probate only validates it.
S.M.K.R Meyappa Chetty v. S.N Supramanian Distinguished executor's title from administrator's; executor's title vests at death, administrator's upon grant. Applied distinction to clarify that limitation runs from death for executor, not from probate.
Katraddi Ramiah v. Kadiyala Venkata Subbamma Supported Bombay and Madras High Courts' view that executor's title vests at testator's death, not at probate. Used to reject the Calcutta High Court view and align with the view that executor's title is immediate.
Gopal Lal Chandra v. Amulyakumar Sen Contrary view taken by Calcutta High Court that title vests only upon probate. Distinguished and rejected by the Court in favor of the view that title vests at death.
Administrator-General of Bengal v. Premlal Mullick Executor of Hindu will post-1870 Act treated like Anglo-Indian executor with title vesting at death. Supported the proposition that executor's title vests at death under Hindu Wills Act.
Sarat Chandra Banerjee v. Bhupendra Nath Basu Executor's powers and title as manager pre-probate under Hindu law. Distinguished from current law where executor's title vests immediately.
Kurrutulain Bahadur v. Nazbot-ud-Dowla Abbas Hossein Khan Probate does not create estoppel on validity of will's provisions. Emphasized probate does not create title but authenticates it.
Basunta Kumar Chuckerbutty v. Gopal Chunder Das Estate representation prior to probate or letters of administration. Supported the principle that legal representation must be established to sue.
Bibhuti Bhusan Roy v. Narendra Narayan Ghose Determination of proper legal representative before probate or letters of administration. Applied to clarify executor's legal standing pre-probate.
Fatima v. Shaik Essa; Shaik Moosa v. Shaik Essa Interpretation of executor's authority prior to probate. Rejected view that executor has no title before probate; probate authenticates title.
Mahanth Mahabir Das v. Udit Narain Verma Executor cannot found rights on unprobated will in suit. Distinguished as applying section 213 evidentiary rule, not title vesting.
Durgapada Bera v. Atul Chandra Bera Applications for probate not governed by limitation law. Supported that limitation runs against executor from death, not probate date.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the provisions of the Succession Act, 1925, especially sections 211 and 213, to determine when the executor's title vests and when limitation runs. Section 213 was found to be a rule of evidence requiring probate to establish rights in court, not a rule creating or vesting title. Section 211, in general terms, states the executor is the legal representative and the property vests in him "as such" without specifying the time of vesting. The Court held that the executor's title vests at the death of the testator, not upon probate being granted.

The Court distinguished the executor from an administrator, who derives title only upon grant of letters of administration. The Court relied on authoritative precedent, including the Judicial Committee's decision in Venkata Subamma v. Ramayya, affirming that probate authenticates but does not create the executor's title. The Court rejected the argument that limitation runs only from probate, holding that limitation runs from the date of the testator's death since the executor's title and right to sue arise then.

The Court also considered the plaintiff's inconsistent claims regarding possession and management, noting that the plaintiff admitted he only began managing the property after the High Court's 1940 judgment. The defendant's continuous possession was supported by substantial documentary evidence, which the Court found more credible than the plaintiff's unconvincing oral evidence.

Regarding the will's directions, the Court observed that the testator's instruction to obtain probate and manage the estate were separate and not intended to delay possession until probate was obtained. The will did not contemplate the widows remaining in possession until probate was granted.

Consequently, the Court affirmed the Subordinate Judge's findings on possession and limitation, holding that the suit was barred by limitation as the plaintiff had not established possession from the death of the testator.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED

The Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the plaintiff's suit for possession was barred by limitation as he failed to prove possession or management of the estate from the testator's death. The Court held that the executor's title vests at the death of the testator, and limitation runs from that date, not from the grant of probate. The decision confirms that probate is evidentiary and authenticatory, not constitutive of title or possession rights. The direct consequence is that the plaintiff cannot recover possession against the defendant who has been in continuous possession. No new precedent was set beyond the application and reaffirmation of established principles regarding executor's title and limitation under the Succession Act, 1925.

    Ramcharan v. Mt. Dharohar

    Reuben, C.J:— This is an appeal by the plaintiff from a decision of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Muzaffarpur, dismissing his suit for the declaration of his title to possession of certain property formerly belonging to his deceased father-in-law Sheopragash Singh and for recovery of possession thereof.

    Sheopragash Singh died on the 21st of January, 1925, leaving two widows, Munga Kuer, now deceased and Dharohar Kuer, defendant no. 1, six daughters, one of whom Krishna Kumari was unmarried, and a grand-son Ramnaresh Singh, son of a pre-deceased daughter. By a registered will executed shortly before he died, he created a life interest in favour of his two widows. He appointed the plaintiff his executor and gave certain directions regarding the management of the estate during the life-time of his widows, which has been the subject-matter of much subsequent litigation. According to the plaintiff he is entitled under these directions to hold and, to manage the properties of the testator, meet Certain necessary expenses from the income thereof and apply the balance of the income to the support, comfort and well-being of the two widows. A declaration to this effect was obtained by him from this Court on the 1st of April 1942, on an application under section 302 of the Succession Act, 1925. The plaintiff's case is that he entered into possession of the property on the death of Sheopragash and that he remained in possession thereof in spite of the fact that Munga Kuer and after her death Dharohar Kuer got themselves recorded as proprietors in Register D, and that he was dispossessed on or about the 7th of June 1944, after his attempt to get himself registered in. Register D had finally failed in the Land Registration Courts. The present suit was filed by him on the 21st of December 1944. The defendant denied the plaintiff's right under the will to hold and manage the property. Secondly, she pleaded that even conceding that the plaintiff had such a right, the plaintiff has not been in possession since Sheopragash died and his suit is, therefore, time-barred. The Subordinate Judge decided in favour of the plaintiff as regards the right to hold and manage the property. As regards possession and limitation, he has decided for the defence.

    Though Sheopragash died in January, 1925, the plaintiff did not apply for probate till the year 1938, alleging in explanation of the delay that the will was mislaid and was only found by bin, in 1936. By that time Munga Kuer, whose daughter is married to the plaintiff had died and the defendant Dharohar Kuer was the sole opposite party in the probate proceeding. Probaie was granted by the District Judge by his order Exhibit N(4), dated the 6th January 1939. The grant was, however, qualified by a note that

    “the executor will not be entitled on the strength of the probate to interfere with the life estate granted to Musammat Dharohar Kuer except by due processes of law.”

    His reasons for making this qualification are thus stated:

    “It is clear from petitions filed in this court that there had been recent disputes regarding the management of the estate. It is also, clear that even on his story the executor can have made no satisfactory search for the will soon after the testator's death or it would have come to light then. Even if the original will was not forthcoming he could have applied for copy from the registration department and taken early steps to obtain probate. It is also clear that for many years the executor has consented to the widows enjoying the estate. Section 227 of the Succession Act provides that probate of a will when granted establishes the will from the death of the testator and renders valid all intermediate acts of the executor as such. Section 332 requires the assent of the executor to complete a legatee's title to his legacy, but under section 333 such assent may be implied from the conduct of the executor and the assent of the executor to specific bequest is sufficient to transfer the subjects of the bequest to the legatee. It is clear therefore that the executor's conduct has amounted to an assent to the life estate given to the widow Musammat Dharohar Kuer and her title to the estate is complete. The grant of probate in this case will therefore not affect the title of the objector Musammat Dharohar Kuer to that life estate.”

    This note was directed to be expunged by the High Court by its order Exhibit 16(a), dated the 13th August 1940, in First Appeal no. 56 of 1939 on the ground that a Court of Probate is in no way concerned with any question other than whether the will, of which probate is asked, has been proved to the satisfaction of that Court or not.

    The decision of the High Court was followed soon after by a proceeding under section 144, Criminal Procedure Code, in which the Subdivisional Magistrate of Hajipur, by his order Exhibit N, dated the 26th December 1940 made the rule absolute against the plaintiff executor. The relevant portion of his order is:

    “Now there is dispute regarding possession over the properties covered by the will. It may be noted that the name of the widow Musammat Dharohar Kuer was duly recorded in Reigster D. She has been paying revenue and has filed chadan. She has been suing tenants for rent and has obtained decrees. She has paid rents to landlords and obtained receipts. She filed petition for reduction of rent under section 112A, B.T Act and obtained decree. In short she has been exercising her right over the properties and his been in possession over the same. It is now contended on behalf of the second party that the second party having obtained probate he should in the eye of law be deemed to be in possession since the death of the testator and I have been referred to section 227, Succession Act. The grant of probate only proves the title of the executor to administer the estate. In this particular case there is difficulty in the way of the executor as it is a question whether he consented to the legacy and thus allowed Musammat Dharohar Kuer to have management of her life estate. This can only be decided by a competent court. As far as the criminal court is concerned it comes in only to maintain peace between the parties. There is paddy standing on some land and there may be breach of peace in reaping the same. Therefore the rule is made absolute against the second party, who has a claim to possession but who in my, opinion is not in Actual possession”.

    At about the same time the executor had applied for the mutation of his name in Register D in place of that of Dharohar Kuer. His applications for mutation were dismissed by the Land Registration Deputy Collector by his order Exhibit L(1), dated the 20th January, 1941. He summed up his reasons thus:

    “The testator died some 14 years ago and the applicant has now come forward to get his name mutated in place of the testator. But the name of the testator no longer stands recorded in Register D. His name was cancelled long ago and now Mussammat Dharohar Kuer's name stands. From the judgment of he District Judge it is clear that it is the Musammat Dharohar Kuer who is in possession of the property and Register D., also proves this. If the applicant wants to get his name entered in place of Musammat Dharohar Kuer he should first go to civil court for his claim. After the entry of Musammat Dharohar Kuer's name in Register D the property ceased to be the estate of the testator and became the property of the Musammat and I do not see any ground to allow the prayer of the applicant.”

    The appeal against this decision was dismissed on the 11th March, 1941 (Exhibit L), the appellate Deputy Collector observing:

    “The appellant has not yet exercised any act of management or possession in respect of any portion of the disputed properties. It is the respondent who has been in possession of the disputed properties since the death of the testator (Sheopargash Singh), and whose name was mutated in place of the testator long ago.”

    The executor moved the Commissioner in revision and was again unsuccessful [Exhibit N(3), dated the 19th July, 1941]. In giving his reasons for dismissing the petition in revision the Commissioner observed:

    “It is not in my view the business of the courts administering the Land Registration Act to enter into discussions of the exact legal position of the petitioner as an executor. I consider that it has been sufficiently proved in this case that Musammat Dharohar Kuer is in possession of the property and I agree with the findings of the Land Registration Deputy Collector that it is for the petitioner to establish his claim in a civil court if he desires to do so.”

    It was after this that on the 4th February, 1942, the executor filed his petition, Exhibit O, under section 302 of the Succession Act of 1925 asking the High Court to

    “allow the petitioner to manage the properties and give such other direction or directions to your petitioner as may be deemed fit and proper.”

    The first four paragraphs of his petition give the substance of the will so far as it was relevant to the case and speak of the proceedings in probate. Paragraph 5 then continues:

    “That after the judgment of this Hon'ble Court the petitioner began to manage the properties but he was obstructed by the men of the opposite party in the management and possession of the properties as a result of which a proceeding under section 144, Cr. P.C was started and the rule was made absolute against the petitioner, and discharged against the opposite party. Thus the petitioner was prevented from managing the bakashta and Kashta lands.”

    This judgment of the High Court, as I have mentioned, was delivered on the 13th August, 1940, that is, over, fifteen years after the death of the testator. It is significant that in this petition the executor said nothing, about the possession of the property between the death of Sheopragash and the order of the High Court. On the contrary, his statement that after the judgment of the High Court he ‘began to manage the properties suggests that up to that time he was not managing them, an inference which is contrary to his present case, which is that since the death of Sheopragash he has been managing the properties, that he performed the sradh ceremony of Sheopragash and of Munga Kuer and that it was he who met the expenses of the marriage of Krishna Kumari. At the hearing of the petition it was explained on behalf of the executor that he was not seeking from the Court an order directing delivery of possession of the estate to him, but was merely asking for the interpretation of the will. Accordingly, Agarwala, J., as he then was, by his order. Exhibit 16, dated the 1st April, 1942, declared that

    “on a proper construction of the will the testator intended the management of the estate to be in the hands of the executor”.

    It is not necessary for the purposes of this case to consider whether a declaration of this kind is covered by the provisions of section 302 of the Succession Act of 1925.

    Having succeeded in getting this declaration from the High Court, the executor again applied for mutation (Exhibit S, dated the 12th July; 1942). The relevant portion of his petition runs:

    “It is submitted that Babu Sheopragash Singh, the father-in-law of this applicant died after executing a registered will, dated 10th June 1924 and under the will Babu Sheopragash Singh aforesaid appointed the applicant as executor for the management of the entire movable and immovable properties constituting his inheritance. Accordingly the applicant obtained a probate of the said will on 6th January 1939 and by report (probate?) he acquired title to the movable and immovable properties of Babu Sheopragash Singh as executor. The applicant tried to get his name registered in Register D in place of Musammat Dharohar Kuer but was unsuccessful. Thereafter the applicant filed a petition under section (under punch?) 302 (sic) of Succession Act in the Hon'ble High Court of Judicature at Patna in which an objection petition was filed on behalf of Musammat Dharohar Kuer and after-hearing both the parties it was adjudicated and ordered by the High Court that Musammat Dharohar Kuer had no right to manage the inheritance of Babu Sheopragash Singh, aforesaid and that the applicant had every right to manage the said property. In fact, the applicant was appointed manager on 1st April 1942 by the High Court for the management of the entire movable and immovable property inherited from the said Babu Sheopragash Singh, deceased. Accordingly the applicant has been managing the estate of Babu Sheopragash Singh aforesaid as executor-manager since 1st April 1942.”

    It is significant that he says nothing about possession following the death of Sheopragash Singh. According to his petition he was appointed manager by the High Court, on the 1st April, 1942, and has been managing the property since that date. His petition succeeded before the Land Registration Deputy Collector and the appellate Deputy Collector, but was dismissed in revision by the Commissioner by his order Exhibit N(2), dated the 2nd September 1943. The ground given by the Commissioner for his order is important. The Commissioner says:

    “There has been no official delivery of possession and it is not disputed that Musammat Dharohar Kuer is still in possession. In these circumstances I think it is wrong for the lower courts to record, the present respondent. So far he has merely got an order that he is entitled to possession. It is for him to get possession before he can be recorded. It is to be noted that this is not a case which was referred to the civil court under section 55 of the Act, and there is no direction of the civil court that the respondent be put in possession. Before he can be recorded he must get an order of the civil court giving him possession or else he must obtain possession by negotiations with the lady.”.

    Apparently, before the Commissioner Dharohar Kuer's possession over the property was not disputed.

    In support of her claim of possession Dharohar Kuer has put in evidence rent receipts and counterfoil receipt books, jamabandis, siahas and other village; account books, chaukidari receipts, a kabuliyat certified copy of a wit of dakhaldehani, a rent reduction schedule, certified copies of rent decrees, land revenue chalans and other papers. On the other side the plaintiff has proved (1) two lists of the testator's dents, and one list of the testator's properties, which lists, to the Subordinate Judge, appeared not to look as old as they should have done and which might has been prepared by the plaintiff in ordinary course to help his mother-in-law Munsra Kuer, who was the senior widow and recorded in Register D., as the proprietor after the death of Sheopragash; (2) a jamabandi and a produce book which had not been produced in Court before; (3) rent counterfoil books, the realisation shown, in one of which, according to the Subordinate Judge, does not tally with the plaintiff's account book for 1342 Fasli and (4) jamakharch books written by the plaintiff's brother although there is a patwari for the estate and which refer to the brother in terms which he was unlikely to use with reference to himself. The Subordinate Judge was not impressed with the oral evidence of possession adduced by the plaintiff and a perusal of the evidence given by the plaintiff the witness-box is very unconvincing. In these circumstances, the finding of possession was advisedly not seriously attacked by Counsel for the appellant.

    The appeal was principally pressed on the ground that the finding of the Subordinate Judge regarding limitation is incorrect. A doubt has been urged as to the Article of the Schedule to the Limitation Act applicable to the suit and it has been suggested that the Subordinate Judge was wrong in applying Article 142 relating to a suit

    “for possession of immovable property when the plaintiff, while in possession of the property, has been dispossessed, or has discontinued the possession”

    It is pointed out that the plaintiff is not claiming title to the property as such but only the right to manage it. For myself, I do not see why this should make a difference to the applicability of Article 142. But even if the contention is accepted, it seems to me that the plaintiff would not be in a better position for limitation that case would be governed by Article 120 and would be six years from the time “when the right to sue accrues” instead of twelve ears from “the date of the dispossession or discontinuance”. Whichever Article applies the point which arises for determination is when the right to possession accrued. I should note here that there never was any bar to the institution of a suit by the plaintiff for recovery of possession on the basis of the will, because it is well settled that an executor appointed under a will can sue to enforce a right arising under the will at any time after the death of the testator, and it will be sufficient for the purposes of section 213 of the Succession Act, 1925, if probate is obtained before the passing of the decree in the suit Jamsetji Nassarwanji Ginwalla v. Hirijibhai Naoroji Anklesaria, vide also Chandra Kishore Roy v. Prasanna Kumari Dasi, Charu Chandra Pramamk v. Nahush Chandra Kundu, and Dwarka Nath Singh v. Mt. Raj Rani. The contention, however, is that under the terms of the Succession Act 1925, title in the testator's estate did not vest in the executor till probate was granted and that till that time there was no legal representative, of the testator against whom limitation could run.

    The contention is based on section 213 of the Succession Act, 1925, the relevant portion of which is:

    “213. (1) No right as executor or legatee can be established in any Court of Justice, unless a Court of competent jurisdiction in India has granted probate of the will under which the right is claimed, or has granted, letters of administration with the will or with a copy of an authenticated copy of the will annexed.”

    Other relevant provisions of the Act are:

    “2. In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,—

    (a) ‘administrator’ means a person appointed by competent authority to administer the estate of a deceased person when there is no executor;

    (c) ‘executor’ means a person to whom the execution, of the last will of a deceased person is, by the testator's appointment, confided;

    (f) ‘probate’ means the copy of a will certified under the seal of a Court of competent jurisdiction with a grant of administration to the estate of the testator.

    Section 119:

    Where by the terms of a bequest the legatee is not entitled to immediate possession of the thing bequathed, a right to receive it at the proper time shall, unless a contrary intention appears by the will, become vested in the legatee on the testator's death, and shall pass to the legatee's representatives if he dies before that time and without having received the legacy, and in such cases the Jegacy is from the testator's death said to be vested in interest.

    Section 174:

    Where the will directs that an annuity shall be provided for any person out of the proceeds of property, or out of property generally, or where money is bequeathed to be invested in the purchase of any annuity for any person, on the testator's death the legacy vests in interest in the legatee; and he is entitled at, his option to have an annuity purchased for him or to receive the money appropriated for that purpose by the will.

    Section 211:

    The executor or administrator, as the case may be, of a deceased person is his legal representative for all purposes, and all the property of the deceased person vests in him as such.

    Section 216:

    After any grant of probate or letters of administration, no other than the person to whom the same may have been granted shall have power to sue or prosecute, any suit, or otherwise act as representative of the deceased, throughout the province in which the same may have been granted, until such probate or letters of administration has or have been recalled or revoked.

    Section 220:

    Letters of administration entitles the administrator to all rights belonging to the intestate as effectually as if the administration had been granted at the moment after his death.

    Section 221:

    Letters of administration do not render valid any intermediate acts of the administrator tending to the diminution or damage of the intestate's estate.

    Section 222:

    (1) Probate shall, be granted only to an executor appointed by the will.

    Section 227:

    Probate of a will when granted establishes the will from the death of the testator and renders valid all intermediate acts of the executor as such.

    Section 273:

    Probate or letters of administration shall have effect over all the property and estate, movable or immovable, of the deceased throughout the province in which the same is or are granted, and shall be conclusive, as to the representative title, against all debtors of the deceased, and all persons, holding property which belongs to him, and shall afford full indemnity to all debtors paying their debts and all persons delivering up such property to the person to whom such probate or letters of administration have been granted.

    Section 291:

    (1) Every person to whom any grant of betters of administration, other than a grant under section 241, is committed, shall give a bond to the District Judge with one or more safety or sureties, engaging for the due collection, getting in, and administering the estate of the deceased, which bond shall be in such form as the Judge may, by general or special order, direct.

    Section 305:

    An executor or administrator has the same power to sue in respect of all causes of action that survive the deceased, and may exercise the same power for the recovery of debts as the deceased had when living.

    Section 307:

    Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), an executor or administrator has power to dispose of the property of the deceased, vested in him under section 211, either wholly, or in part, in such manner as he may think fit.

    (2) If the deceased was Hindu, Muhammadan, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina or an exempted person, the general power conferred by sub-section (1) shall be subject to the following restrictions and conditions, namely:—

    (i) The power of an executor to dispose of immovable property so vested in him is subject to any restriction which may be imposed in this behalf by the will appointing him, unless probate has been granted to him and the Court which granted the probate permits him by an order in writing, notwithstanding the restriction, to dispose of any immovable property specified in the order in a manner permitted by the order.

    Section 338:

    Where an annuity is given by a will, and no time is fixed for its commencement, it shall commence from the testator's death, and the first payment shall be made at the expiration of a year next after that event.”

    Under section 213 a right as executor or legatee cannot be established in a Court of Justice unless probate of the will or letters of administration in respect of the will have been obtained. On the face of it this appears to be a rule of evidence similar to sub-section (1) of section 212 which provides that no right to any part of the property of a person who has died intestate can be established in a Court of Justice unless letters of administration have first been granted by a Court of competent jurisdiction. Probate, as defined in section 2, is merely a copy of the will certified under the seal of a Court of competent jurisdiction with a grant of administration to the estate of the testator. The effect, as explained by section 273, is to provide a ready means of establishing the genuineness of the will conclusively against all the world. The definition in clauses (a) and (c) of section 2 distinguishes between an administrator and an executor, the executor being appointed by the testator, whereas the administrator is appointed. “by competent authority”. This is the reason why under section 222 probate can be granted only to the executor appointed by the will. The distinction is recognised later by the Court being directed by section 291 to insist on the execution of an administration bond and the furnishing of security by an administrator while no such provision as made in respect of an executor. An administrator by definition requires an order appointing him. He, therefore, comes into existence only when there has been a grant of letters of administration. The definition of executor makes no reference to a grant of probate and there is no reason to read such a reference into the definition. The executor, therefore, comes into existence as soon as the will becomes an operative document, that is to say, when the testator dies.

    It is section 211, and not section 213, which deals with the vesting of the property of a deceased person, and it says without any specification as to time, that the executor or the administrator, as the case may be, is the legal representative of the deceased for all purposes and the property of the deceased person vests in him as such. The corresponding provisions in the former statutes, namely, the Succession Act, 1865, and the Probate and Administration Act, 1881, were contained in the Chapter of those Acts dealing with the grant of probate and letters of administration. This fact was relied on in some reported decisions as an argument supporting the proposition that the vesting in the executor occurs when probate is granted. Section 211, however, occurs in Part VIII of the Act entitled “Representative Title to Property of Deceased”, while Part IX deals with “Probate, Letters of Administration and Administration of Assets of the Deceased”. This argument, is, therefore, no longer available. On the terms of section 211 there is no reason to limit the vesting of property in the executor in the manner contended for. The section being in general terms which speak of the property as vesting in the executor, or the administrator “as such”, the vesting would occur as soon as there is an individual answering to the description of an executor or administrator as the case may be. This happens in the case of an administrator when he is appointed by a competent authority and in the case of the executor when the testator dies. Had it been intended that the vesting of the property in the executor would be dependent on the grant of probate the necessary provision would have been made in the statute as was done by section 220 relating to letters of administration in cases of intestacy. This section is in strong contrast to section 213 dealing as it does with rights, whereas section 213 deals with evidence. The reason for this difference is that in the case of succession under a will, section 211 had already provided for the vesting of the property of the deceased. The Calcutta view, to which I shall refer later, was that the property vests on the grant of probate, but the vesting dates back to the death of the testator. In this connection there is a difference to be noted between the provisions of section 220 relating to an administrator in intestacy and section 227 relating to an executor. The vesting in the former case is a vesting, by an order of the Court and is subject to section 221, that is to say, letter of administration do not render valid intermediate acts of an administator tending to the diminution or damage of the intestate's estate.

    Sections 119 and 174 show that the vesting of property immediately on the death of the testator, independently of the grant of probate or letters of administration, as the case may be, is not foreign to the Act. Under the former section a bequest in respect of which the legatee is not entitled to immediate possession vests in the legatee on the testator's death. Under the latter section an annuity provided or any person under the will vests on the testator's death and commences from the date of his death (vide section 338).

    Section 273 dealing with the elect of probate and letters of adminstration provides that they shall be conclusive as to the representative title of the executor or the administrator, as the case may be. They thus establish the representative character of the executor in the administrator but in no way do they create that representative character. The creation is the work of the statute itself and it arises under section 211. I am supported by the tennis of section 307, which speaks of the property of the deceased being vested in the executor or the administrator as the case may be “under section 211” and which in clause (i) of sub-section (2) contemplates the possibility of the executor before the, grant of probate disposing of immovable property “so vested in him”. Section 273 should be read along with section 227 which provides that probate of a will, when granted establishes, the will from the death of the testator and renders valid all intermediate acts of the executor as such. In some of the reported cases the reasoning has been put forward about the corresponding provision in former statuses that it shows that the title of the executor prior to the grant of probate is imperfect and is validated by the probate. The answer is given by Sir George Lowndes in the passage which I reproduce below:

    “Section 12, Probate and Administration Act, no doubt implies that until probate is granted the will is not ‘established’, and it validates all intermediate acts of the executor. It is contended for the appellants that this necessarily leads to the inference that before probate there is no valid will and no authority in the executor. This was the view taken by West; J. in Fatima v. Shaik Essa, (1883) 7 Bom. 266, but which failed to find acceptance on appeal: Shaik Moosa v. Shaik Essa, (1884) 8 Bom. 241. It is, their Lordships think based upon a misconception of the object of the section. Before the grant, it is obvious that in every case where either the will itself, or any thing done under it by the executor, is challenged, proof of execution and capacity on the part of the testator, and of the appointment of the executor, would be required. The object of the section is only to get rid of this multiplication of proofs. Probate once granted authenticates the will against all the world; it affords a ready means of proof of the contents of the will: see sections 41 and 91, Evidence Act and it is a complete answer by the executor to any challenge of his authority as such. The provisions of the section do not, in their Lordships' opinion suggest that before probate the executor had no title, but are only intended to simplify the proof of his title as dating from the testator's death.”

    [Venkata Subamma v. Ramayya].

    The absence of qualification as to time which I have noticed in respect of section 211 also applies to section 305 under which all causes of action that survive the deceased accrue to the executor or administrator, as the case may be, and there is nothing to prevent the running of limitation against the executor in respect of such causes of action between the death of the testator and the grant of probate. Limitation in such a case would be governed by section 17 sub-section (1) of the Limitation Act which provides that where a person, who would if he were living have a right to institute a, suit or make an application, dies before the right acerues, the period of limitation shall be computed from the time when there is a legal representative of the deceased capable of instituting or making such suit, or application. Under the terms of section 211, the executor is the legal representative of the deceased person from the date of his death and limitation would run against him from this time. In contrast limitation would run against the administrator from the date of grant of letters of administration. It is difficult to hold that limitation would run against the executor from the earlier date if the title did not vest in him from the earlier date.

    Having considered these provisions of the Succession Act of 1925, there seems to me to be no doubt that an executor is a creature of the will and that his title as such vests in him when the testator dies. This, was the view taken in Jamsetji Nassarwanji Ginwalla v. Hirjibhai Naoroji Anklesaria a decision under the Succession Act, 1865, the relevant provisions of which we re substantially similar to those of the Act of 1925. An administrator, on the contrary, is a, creature of the order of the Court and his title vests on the issue of letters of administration. This distinction between the respective positions of and executor and an administrator was drawn by Lord Parker in S.M.K.R Meyappa Chetty v. S.N Supramanian, and was applied to the Straits Settlements. In that case one Supramanian Chetty died at Singapore in 1904, having by will appointed Ramasamy Chetty as executor. Probate in the Straits Settlements not having been taken out by Ramasamy Chetty, one Meyappa Chetty, on behalf of the testator's widow, obtained letters of administration pendente lite and filed a suit in March 1911, in that capacity in the Supreme Court at Singapore relying, for saving limitation, on a provision similar to section 17 sub-section (1) of the Limitation Act. Their Lordship's, of the Judicial Committee held that the will was capable of probate in the Straits Settlements, that the vesting of the title of a testator as such was independent of the grant of probate and occurred when the testator died, and, therefore, within the, terms of the provision relied on, limitation, ran from the date of the death of the testator and the suit was barred. They explained the difference in the respective positions of an executor and an administrator in the following Words: “It is quite clear that an executor derives his title and authority from the will of his testator and not from any grant of probate. The personal property of the testator, including all rights of action, vests in him upon the testator's death, and the consequence is that be can institute an action in the character of executor before he proves the will. He cannot, it is true, obtain a decree before probate, but this is not because his title, depends on probate, but because the production of probate is the only way in which, by the rules of the Court, he is allowed to prove his title. An administrator, on the other hand, derives title solely under his grant, and cannot, therefore, institute an action as administrator before he gets his grant.”

    The point arose for consideration in Katraddi Ramiah v. Kadiyala Venkata Subbamma in the following circumstances. One Subbamma executed a will in 1914 appointing his wife as executor, giving her certain instructions about dealing with his property and directing in particular that his debts be paid out of the proceeds of one thousand bags of paddy in store. He died in 1916 and, the paddy being no longer available, his wife sold some land for the purpose of satisfying his debts. Probate was not taken out. His daughter's son, to whom a one-third share of the property was left under the will challenged the transfer. The question arose whether under the Probate and Administration. Act of 1881 title vested in the executor before the grant of probate, or whether her position till the grant of probate was merely that of a manager. Kumaraswami Sastri, J., delivering the decision of the Full Bench in a learned judgment, referred to the difference in views, on this point between the Bombay and Madras High Courts on the one side and the Calcutta High Court on the other, and following the view of Bombay and Madras, held, that the title vested in the executor from the moment of the testator's death. In support of this view he cited among other authorities the decision in S.M.K.R Meyappa Chetty v. S.N Supramanian Chetty

    In Gopal Lal Chandra v. Amulyakumar Sen; the contrary view was taken and this decision has been strongly relied on by Counsel for the appellant before us. The facts were that on the 14th of April, 1921, the heir of a co-sharer landlord of a dar mourusi mokarrari tenancy along with his other co-sharers sued for the arrears of rent of the tenancy. The plaintiffs obtained a decree for the arrears and purchased the tenancy in execution of the decree. The executors of the deceased co-sharer landlord obtained probate after the filing of the rent suit. In a suit by a mortgagee of the tenancy to enforce his mortgage it was argued that the title of the mortgagee was not affected by the sale in execution of the decree for arrears of rent on the ground that the title vested in the executors from the death of the co-sharer landlord and to that extent the landlord's share was not represented in the suit and, therefore, the decree obtained therein was a money decree as distinguished from a rent decree. Reliance was placed for this contention on S.M.K.R Meyappa Chetty v. S.N Supramanian, but the decision was distinguished by their Lordships on the ground that it represented the view of the English law on the point. Their Lordships noticed that other High Courts in India took a different view on the point from that taken by the Calcutta High Court, particularly mentioning (Katraddi) Ramiah v. Kadiyala Venkata Subbamma and observed that they “should be content to adopt the view which this Court has taken”. They cited in support of the view taken by them The Administrator-General of Bengal v. Premlal Mullick, Sarat Chandra Banerjee v. Bhupendra Nath Basu and Kurrutulain Bahadur v. Nazbot-ud-Dowla Abbas Hossein Khan. They also referred to Basunta Kumar Chuckerbutty v. Gopal Chunder Das. The Administrator-General of Bengal v. Premlal Mullick related, to a Hindu will of 1889 probate of which was granted in 1891 after which the executor transferred the estate to the Administrator-General of Bengal, professing to act under section 31 of the Administrator-Generals Act, 1874. The only question which arose for decision, in the case was whether the executor of a deceased Hindu is a “private executor” within the meaning of that section. In the course of the decision holding that such an executor came within the terms of the section, Lord Watson pointed out that before the Hindu Wills Act of 1870 the position of an executor under a Hindu Will was different from that of an English executor, his powers and functions being those of a manager and that title in the estate, did not vest in him even after he got probate. After the Act his Lordship observed, a Hindu executor who took advantage of its provisions was “on precisely the same footing as the executor of an Anglo-Indian testator, in so far as concerned the taking out of probate and the vesting in him of the estate of the deceased”. The position of such an executor in the event of probate not being taken out did not arise for consideration. Sarat Chandra Banerjee v. Bhupendra Nath Basu related to a Hindu Will of 1857. No probate was obtained and the executors transferred a portion of the estate of the deceased testator in 1864. The case was, therefore, governed by the law previous the Hindu Wills Act of 1870 when the position of the executor of a Hindu will was that of a manager whether probate was taken out or not Kurutulain Bahadur v. Nazbat-ud-Dowla Abbas Hossein Khan related to a will executed in 1893 by a Muhammadan lady. Probate of the will was obtained in 1900. The facts are sufficiently stated in the head-note. By the will the testatrix confirmed a release, which she had executed in favour of the principal defendant, who had been for some years in her house-hold as her confidential agent and manager of her affairs, by which she declared that certain property he had obtained from her was a free and absolute gift and that neither she nor her heirs had any claim or demand on him in respect of it. Pending the probate proceedings which was opposed by her heirs the heirs instituted the suit out of which the appeal before the Judicial Committee arose to set aside the release and asking for an account and for two thirds share of the property of the testatrix which was outside her testamentary capacity under the Muhammadan law. It was held by the Judicial Committee that the grant of probate did not, under the provisions of the Probate and Administration Act, create an estoppel so as to prevent the plaintiffs from denying the validity of the confirmation of the release to the defendant contained in the will. The question of the date of the vesting of the property in the executor did not arise for consideration: Basunta Kumar Chuckerbutty v. Gopal Chunder Das belongs to another line of decisions relating to the power of persons other than the executor to represent the estate of a deceased testator prior to the grant of probate or letters of administration. In that case the father of the plaintiff having purchased a raiyati holding in execution of a decree and having given notices under section 167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, his son as his heir sued to eject under raiyats from the property. It was held that his right to represent the estate of his father was not affected by the fact that his father had left a will which was still unprobated. Their Lordships followed the decision in Prosunna Chandra Bhattacharya v. Krista Chaitanya Pal in which Markby, J. said: “I think that until some other claimant comes forward, the party who takes possession of the estate of a deceased Hindu must, in the present state of the law, be treated for some purposes as his representative and a judgment obtained against such a representative is not a mere nullity”. The principle of the decision was that unless this was so the remedy of a creditor against the estate might be barred by an intentional delay in taking out probate. As stated in Bibhuti Bhusan Roy v. Narendra Narayan Ghose, the essential question to be considered in such cases is whether the estate of the deceased person was sufficiently represented by the legal representative who has been brought on the record. The decisions belonging to this catena are really an application of section 213 of the Succession Act of 1925. Till probate or letters of administration are obtained there is nobody who can establish in Court his right under the will to represent the estate. Till this is done, therefore, the Court has to determine, on the circumstances of each case, whether the person impleaded is the proper legal representative. This is recognised by section 216 of the Act which expressly provide that after the grant of probate or letters of administration no person other than the one to whom the grant had been made shall have power to sue or prosecute a suit or to act as representative of the deceased until such, probate or letters of administration have been recalled or revoked.

    The difference in views between the Bombay and Madras High Courts on the one side and the Calcutta High Court on the other was finally resolved by the decision of the Judicial Committee in Venkata Subbamma v. Ramayya affirming in appeal the decision of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in (Katraddi) Ramiah v. Kadiyala Venkata Subbamma. Their Lordships endorsed in high terms all that was said by Kumaraswami Sastri, J.: “The authorities have been discussed at length by Kumaraswami Sastri, J., who delivered the judgment of the Full Bench, and Their Lordships think that nothing can be added by them to his careful examination of the case law on this subject”. The decision in this case and that in Goal Lal Chandra v. Amulya-Kumar Sen relate, to cases governed by the Probate and Administration Act, 1881, under which the taking out of probate was not compulsory, and it was open to the executor to establish his title under the will in the suit itself. For this reason I have been at some pains to consider the question at length in relation to the present law. The decisions, however, would appear not to be deprived of their authoritative character by the enactment of the Succession. Act of 1925. The object of this Act, as stated in the preamble, is consolidate the law applicable to intestate and testamentary succession”. There was no intention to amend the law. Hence, unless the intention to amend the law appears very clearly, we must take it that the decision of the Judicial Committee in Venkata Subbamma v. Ramayya represents the correct view of the law under the present Act. The one substantial difference between the Probate: and Administration Act of 1871 and the Succession Act of 1925 is that under the former Act the taking out of probate was not compulsory. This difference does not exist between the Succession Act of 1865 and that of 1925. A perusal of the judgment of the Judicial Committee shows that they did not attach any importance to the fact that under the Probate add Administration Act the taking out of probate was optional. Their summing up of the reasons in support of the view, they took may usefully be reproduced as it applies mutatis mutandis to the position under the present law. In the extract below I have, for facility in applying the reasoning to the present law, shown in brackets against each section of the Probate and Administration Act, the number of the corresponding section in the Succession Act of 1925:

    “There can be no doubt that in England the title of an executor is derived from the will and not from probate, though it is probate alone which authenticates his right: see Williams on Executors, Edn. 12 p. 1226, s. 12 (= 227). Probate and Administration Act, is a reproduction of s. 188, Succession Act of 1865 and it has always been recognised that the latter Act was largely based on English law. It is not suggested that this doctrine is for any reason inapplicable to the wills of Hindus and Their Lordships think that the material parts of s. 4 and 90 (= 211 and 307) which are set out above, afford a strong indication in themselves that the legislature intended to adopt it.

    Section 4 (= 211) makes no reference to probate nor does the definition of ‘executor’ in s. 3 (= 2) again a reproduction from the Act of 1865 suggest that probate is any part of his title—he is merely the person to whom the testator has confided the carrying out of his dispositions.

    So, too S. 90(2) [= 307(2)] clearly conceives of an executor not clothed with probate being able to, dispose of the property ‘vested in him under S. 4 (= 231)’. It makes such power subject tetany restriction imposed by the will “unless probate has been granted,” in which case the Court may relieve him from the restriction. In view of the terms of this section Their Lordships think it would be impossible to hold that before probate nothing vested in the executor, and that he had no power of disposal at all.

    Mahanth Mahabir Das v. Udit Narain Verma, which has been relied on by Counsel for the appellant is not inconsistent with the conclusion to which I have come. The observation of Manohar Lall, J. that no rights whatever can be founded upon an unprobated will was made in a suit by the landlord of an agricultural tenancy for the ejectment of the defendants first party, who claimed under an unprobated will of the deceased tenant Chaturbhuj. As the will was not probated, the title of the defendant first party under the will could not be established in Court, and in saying what he did Manohar Lall, J. was merely applying section 213 of the Succession Act. Nor does Durgapada Bera v. Atul Chandra Bera to which a reference has been made help the appellant in any way. There is ample authority for the proposition that applications for probate are not governed by the law of limitation. The decision contains nothing to suggest that till probate is obtained, limitation will not run in respect of the causes of action which have accrued to the executor as such.

    Finally an attempt has been made to postpone the commencement of the running of limitation in this case by a reference to the terms of the will itself. The testator says:

    “I appoint my son-in-law Babu Ramcharan Singh as executor for the management of my entire movable and immovable properties After the death of me, the executor Babu Ramcharan Singh aforesaid shall obtain probate and shall manage my entire movable and immovable properties till the life-time of my wives…………”

    The argument is that the testator intended the executor to take possession and to manage the property only after he had obtained probate and, therefore, his cause of action in this suit arose when he obtained probate. I do not think that the testator intended that there should be a particular sequence of time between the obtaining of probate and the taking of possession of the property by the executor. The will indicates that he was unwilling that his property should be in the direct possession and management of his wives and he cannot have contemplated that following his death they should remain in possession until in due course his son-in-law obtained probate. The directions in his will about obtaining probate and about managing the properties are two separate directions, not connected with each other. He was aware that in the usual course, if the executor was to act under the will at all, he would have to take out probate, and he was merely emphasizing the necessity for the probate in directing his son-in-law to take out probate. He was certainly not making the taking of possession of the estate by his son-in-law dependent upon the son-in-law first obtaining probate.

    For the reasons I have given the appeal fails and I would dismiss it with costs.

    Sarjoo Prosad, J.:— I agree.

    Appeal dismissed.
    K.D

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