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  • Order 21, rule 90 of the CPC, hereinafter called the Code,
  • provision of section 311 of the Code,
  • provisions of section 64 of the Code,
  • provisions of section 47 of the Code
  • Order 21, rule 100 of the Code
  • Order 21, rule 90 of the Code.
  • Order 21, rule 97 of the Code
  • 21, rule 90 of the Code
  • rule 58 of Order 21
  • Order 21, rule 90
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Order 21, rule 90 of the CPC, hereinafter called the Code,
  • provision of section 311 of the Code,
  • provisions of section 64 of the Code,
  • provisions of section 47 of the Code
  • Order 21, rule 100 of the Code
  • Order 21, rule 90 of the Code.
  • Order 21, rule 97 of the Code
  • 21, rule 90 of the Code
  • rule 58 of Order 21
  • Order 21, rule 90
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion recounts undisputed facts derived from the lower appellate court. A house in Monghyr bearing Municipal holding no. 223 belonged to Dayanand Purbey (opposite party no. 2). Akshaya Kumar Mandal (the petitioner in the civil revision and appellant in the appeal) sued opposite party no. 2 in Money Suit No. 64 of 1952 for recovery of about Rs. 13,000 and obtained a decree on 26 November 1959. He executed that decree by initiating Execution Case No. 4 of 1960; the property was attached on 11 February 1960 and he purchased it in the court auction on 13 July 1960 for Rs. 4,000 (the judgments below mistakenly recorded the year as 1961). The sale was confirmed and he received actual delivery of possession on 27 May 1962.

Binod Kumar Sinha (opposite party no. 1) was a usufructuary mortgagee of the same property for Rs. 7,000, having obtained a decree for arrears of rent and executing it in Execution Case No. 217 of 1957. That execution attached the property on 28 February 1960—after the attachment in the petitioner's execution but before the petitioner's delivery of possession. After the petitioner obtained delivery of possession (27 May 1962) and paid Rs. 7,000 to opposite party no. 1 who endorsed receipt on the mortgage bond, opposite party no. 1 nonetheless caused the property to be sold again in Execution Case No. 217 on 29 May 1962 for Rs. 1,000 (the decretal amount).

The petitioner learned of the 29 May 1962 sale in June 1962 and filed an application on 28 June 1962 to set aside that sale within 30 days. The Munsif allowed the application, setting aside the sale on grounds that the execution processes had not been served on the judgment-debtor, that the sale price was grossly inadequate, and that the sale held on 29 May 1962 was bad. Opposite party no. 1 appealed (Misc. Appeal No. 30/3 of 1964/65) to the lower appellate court, which allowed the appeal and set aside the Munsif's order. Uncertain whether the petitioner's application amounted to one under Order 21, rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure ("the Code") or under section 47 of the Code, the petitioner pursued both a civil revision and a miscellaneous second appeal to this Court from the lower appellate judgment and order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner's application to set aside the sale of 29 May 1962 was maintainable under Order 21, Rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  2. Whether the petitioner's application was maintainable under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure (i.e., whether he was a "representative of the judgment-debtor" within the meaning of section 47).
  3. Whether a prior court auction purchase (by the petitioner) and subsequent payment to the mortgagee affected the validity of a later sale in a different execution proceeding (including the relevance of Section 64 of the Code to the petitioner's court-auction purchase).
  4. Whether the second sale (29 May 1962) should be set aside on grounds of irregularity, inadequate price, or defect in service of execution processes.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bhiku Mal v. Firm Ram Chandar Babu Lal, AIR 1946 Lah 134 Principle: A sale by the judgment-debtor to a third party after attachment can be treated as a private sale such that the purchaser becomes the representative of the judgment-debtor and may invoke section 47 if the sale was within the scope of section 64 (i.e., sale after attachment but before court sale). The court held this case is not covered by Bhiku Mal because the petitioner purchased by court auction in his own execution (not by private sale). Therefore Bhiku Mal's principle (applicable to private sales after attachment) did not invalidate the petitioner's title from the auction sale.
Veerayya v. Y. Veeraraghavavya, AIR 1961 Andh Pra 298 Held (Andhra Bench): where property was first sold in execution of an award and then again sold in execution of another decree, the earlier purchaser (although not a private purchaser) could come under section 47 to object to the second sale on the ground he had already purchased the property. The court respectfully disagreed with this view, stating it departs from the prevailing principle that a purchaser whose interest is not affected either by the decree or by the later sale cannot be treated as a representative of the judgment-debtor under section 47 or as a person affected within the meaning of Order 21, rule 90.
Asmutunnissa Begum v. Ashruff Ali, (1888) ILR 15 Cal 488 (Full Bench) Interpreting (corresponding) provision of section 311/Order 21 rule 90: a sale is not to be set aside unless the purchaser (applicant) proves substantial injury that is the direct result of an irregularity; the applicant's interest must have been legally affected by the sale. The court relied on this Full Bench principle to stress that the petitioner’s interest was not legally affected by the second sale; hence the sale could not be set aside under Order 21, rule 90 on the basis claimed by the petitioner.
Jagat Narayan Singh v. Khartar Sah, AIR 1941 PC 45 Observation: A subsequent purchaser from a judgment-debtor who wished to oppose an execution sale should have made a claim under Order 21, rule 58 (if he wished to be treated as a third party whose property was being wrongfully taken); treating such an objection as merely an irregularity for rule 90 relief was misconceived. The Judicial Committee did not approve treating such a purchaser as a representative under section 47. The court cited this case to support the conclusion that the petitioner should have applied under Order 21, rule 58 before the sale and that an application under rule 90 was misconceived; further, the petitioner could not be treated as a representative of the judgment-debtor under section 47.
Surendra Kumar Singh v. Srichand Mahata, ILR 15 Pat 308 : AIR 1936 Pat 97 (Full Bench) Full Bench decision (as cited): bears upon the effect of selling property twice and the possible bar to realizing decretal amounts by a second execution. The court observed that opposite party no. 1 is "probably" liable to be affected by that Full Bench decision and that his remedy to realise his decretal amount by a second execution may be barred; the court noted this as a likely consequence but did not decide that matter in the present proceeding.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by applying statutory provisions and the principles established in the cited precedents to the undisputed chronology and transactions between the parties. The key analytical steps were:

  1. The court examined the nature of the petitioner's purchase: he bought the property in a court auction in Execution Case No. 4 of 1960 (attachment in that case occurred on 11 February 1960) and obtained actual delivery of possession on 27 May 1962 after paying the auction price and Rs. 7,000 to the usufructuary mortgagee. The court emphasized that the petitioner's acquisition arose from a court sale, not a private sale by the judgment-debtor.
  2. The court considered whether the petitioner could invoke Section 47 of the Code (which allows a representative of the judgment-debtor to apply in execution proceeding to attach the sale of property). It concluded that the petitioner was not a "representative of the judgment-debtor" within section 47 because he had not purchased by a private sale from the judgment-debtor; rather he purchased by a court auction (so section 47 did not afford the petitioner any ground to attack the subsequent sale).
  3. The court rejected the applicability of Section 64 of the Code to invalidate the petitioner's court auction purchase, noting that Section 64 does not render a court-auction purchase void simply because another execution proceeding also attached the property later.
  4. The court distinguished Bhiku Mal (which concerned a private sale by the judgment-debtor after attachment and held the purchaser could be treated as a representative) on the ground that Bhiku Mal addressed private sales and was not applicable to a prior court-auction sale such as the petitioner's.
  5. Addressing lower appellate findings, the court accepted that the lower appellate court found no material irregularity in publication or conduct of the second sale, but had also found the sale was for a grossly inadequate price. Despite that, the court held the petitioner's application to set aside the sale was not maintainable under Order 21, rule 90 because his interest was not legally affected by the second sale in the sense required by authorities such as Asmutunnissa Begum.
  6. The court invoked Jagat Narayan Singh to emphasize procedural propriety: a subsequent purchaser wishing to assert rights in the execution proceeding should have resorted to Order 21, rule 58 before the sale (i.e., by making a third-party claim) and could not rely on an application under rule 90 after the event; treating the petitioner's recourse under rule 90 was therefore "misconceived."
  7. The court concluded that the second sale (29 May 1962) was, as against the petitioner's interest, a nullity; but the appropriate relief process and the petitioner's standing to set aside that sale under section 47 or under rule 90 were absent. The court indicated alternative remedies available to the petitioner if opposite party no. 1 sought delivery of possession: resist delivery and, if necessary, the execution court may decide under Order 21, rule 97 whether resistance is justified; if the petitioner is dispossessed he may seek restoration under Order 21, rule 100.
  8. Finally, the court held that the Munsif's order setting aside the sale was without jurisdiction, and that since the lower appellate court entertained a miscellaneous appeal and set aside the Munsif's order, this Court must maintain that result. The Court therefore dismissed both the miscellaneous appeal and the civil revision (or, in the alternative, dismissed them in exercise of revisional powers).

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Both the miscellaneous appeal and the civil revision are dismissed.

Direct consequences and implications (as stated in the opinion):

  • The petitioner's application to set aside the sale of 29 May 1962 was not maintainable under Section 47 of the Code nor under Order 21, Rule 90 of the Code; the Munsif's order setting aside that sale was therefore held to be without jurisdiction.
  • The petitioner's purchase by court auction (and subsequent payment to the mortgagee and actual delivery of possession) established his right which the second sale did not affect; the second sale was a nullity as against the petitioner's interest.
  • The petitioner’s correct procedural remedy, if he wished to challenge prior to or at the time of sale, was to have applied under Order 21, Rule 58; an after-the-event application under Rule 90 was misconceived for his circumstances.
  • If opposite party no. 1 attempts to take delivery of possession, the petitioner may resist; opposite party no. 1 may then apply under Order 21, Rule 97 to complain of resistance, and if the petitioner is dispossessed he may apply for restoration under Order 21, Rule 100.
  • The court noted (without deciding) that opposite party no. 1 may be adversely affected by a Full Bench decision (Surendra Kumar Singh v. Srichand Mahata) and that his remedy to realise his decretal amount by a second execution may be barred; the court did not decide that issue in this case but flagged it as a likely consequence of his conduct.
  • No new legal precedent was laid down by this decision beyond the application of established principles to the facts: the Court applied settled authorities to conclude the petition was not maintainable and dismissed the proceedings. The direct effect is the dismissal of the revision and appeal and the maintenance of the lower appellate result setting aside the Munsif's order.
SSG/D.V.C

Disposition: Appeal and revision dismissed. There will be no order as to costs in either proceeding.

    Akshaya Kumar Mandal v. Binod Kumar Sinha .

    1. The undisputed facts as mentioned in the judgment of the lower appellate court are these. A house situate in the town of Monghyr bearing Municipal holding no. 223 belonged to Dayanand Purbey opposite party no. 2 in the Civil revision and respondent no. 2 in the miscellaneous second appeal. Akshaya Kumar Mandal the petitioner in the civil revision and the appellant in the appeal, filed Money Suit no. 64 of 1952 against opposite party no. 2 for realisation of Rs. 13,000 and odd he finally got a decree on the 26th November, 1959. He put that decree in execution in Execution Case no. 4 of 1960. The holding aforesaid was attached in execution of that decree on the 11th February, 1960. The petitioner purchased it for Rs. 4,000 on the 13th July, 1960 (the year 1961 mentioned in the judgments of the Courts below is a mistake). Eventually the sale was confirmed and the petitioner obtained delivery of posspssion also on the 27th May, 1962.

    2. Binod Kumar Sinha who is opposite party no. 1 in the civil revision and respondent no. 1 in the appeal, was a usufructuary mortgagee of the property bearing holding no. 223 for Rs. 7,000. The mortgage had been executed by opposite party no. 2 in his favour, but the latter remained in actual occupation of the house as the tenant of the former. Since rent was not paid, opposite party no. 1 obtained a decree for arrears of rent against opposite party no. 2. The decree was put in execution in Execution Case no. 217 of 1957. In this execution case also the holding was attached on 28-2-60. 17 days after it was attached in Execution Case no. 4 of 1960 filed by the petitioner against the same judgment-debtor. Now comes the curious history of the case. When the petitioner obtained delivery of possession on the 27th May, 1962 over the house in question, opposite party no. 1 received Rs. 7,000, his mortgage dues, in full from him, made the endorsement on the usufructuary mortgage bond clearly stating therein that he had received the sum of Rs. 7,000 from Akshaya Kumar Mandal, the auction purchaser of the house. Thus, the petitioner became the full owner of the house after having purchased it for Rs. 4,000 in the auction sale, and, after having paid Rs. 7,000 to opposite party no. 1. He got unobs-structed delivery of possession, not symbolical but actual, on the 27th May, 1962, after having spent a sum of Rs. 11,000 in acquiring the property. In spite of the clear knowledge of opposite party no. 1 that the petitioner had purchased the property and had got actual delivery of possession after redeeming the mortgage, it is strange that in his Execution Case no. 217 of 1957, opposite party no. 1 got the house sold again on 29-5-62, two days after the delivery of possession in favour of the petitioner, for a sum of Rs. 1,000, the amount of his decretal dues.

    3. The petitioner learnt about the sale some time in June, 1962, and filed the application on 28-6-62 for setting aside the sale within 30 days from the date it was held. The application was allowed by the first court holding that the processes in the execution esse had not been served on the judgment-debtor that the property was sold for a grossly inadequate price and that the sale held on 29.5.62 was bad. Opposite party no. 1 filed Miscellaneous Appeal no. 30/3 of 1964/65 before the lower appellate court and it has allowed the appeal and has set aside the order of the learned Munsif setting aside the sale. The petitioner being not sure of the position as to whether his application in effect would be one under Order 21, rule 90 of the CPC, hereinafter called the Code, or one under section 47 of the Code, has preferred this Civil revision application as also the miscellaneous second appeal from the same judgment and order of the lower appellate Court.

    4. After stating the undisputed facts, as I have mentioned above, the lower appellate court has recorded the following ???:

    (1). That there was no substantial material on the record to show that the processes in the execution case were suppressed or that there was any material irregularity in publishing and conducting the sale;.

    (2). That opposite party no. 1 has purchased the holding for a grossly inadequate price; and.

    (3). That the application filed by the petitioner for setting aside the sale was maintainable under order 21, rule 90 of the Code as he is a person whose interests are affected by the impugned sale held on 29-5-62.

    5. But, taking the view that in view of his finding that there was no material irregularity in publishing or conducting the sale, the sale could not be set aside under Order 21, rule 90 of the Code, he set aside the order of the learned Munsif setting aside the sale.

    6. In my opinion, the application filed by the petitioner for setting aside the sale was not maintainable either under section 47 or under Order 21, rule 90 of the Code. He was not a representative of the judgment-debtor within the meaning of section 47 of the Code. He had not purchased the property from the judgment-debtor opposite party no. 2 by a private sale. Section 64 of the Code did not make his purchase in court auction in another execution case invalid or void. Moreover, as I have said above, the property had been attached in his execution case before it was attached in the execution case filed by opposite party no. 1. That being so, the case is not covered by the principle of law decided by the Full Bench of the Lahore Court in the case of Bhiku Mal v. Firm Ram Chandar Babu Lal, AIR 1946 Lah 134. It would be noticed that in that case the effect of the sale by the judgment-debtor in favour of the person who was attacking the sale was held to be that of a private sale and not a court sale. In that view of the matter, since the property sold was hit by the provisions of section 64 of the Code, if that sale had taken place after attachment and before the Court sale, it was held that the purchaser had become the representative of the judgment-debtor and the provisions of section 47 of the Code were available to him for attaching the sale.

    7. It is well settled that the sale by a judgment-debtor to a third party, after the property has been attached in execution of a decree, is not void for all purposes and against the whole world. The mere attachment of the property does not extinguish the title of the judgment-debtor the judgment-debtor continues to be the owner of the property until the property is validly sold in the execution. The effect of the attachment is prohibiting him from selling the property by private sale. But, if he does so, the purchaser has been held to be his representative to seek such reliefs as he can the execution case under section 47 of the Code. But this is not the case here. As I have pointed out the distinction, the petitioner had purchased the property in court sale in pursuance of his earlier attachment. Therefore, the attachment effected in the execution case filed by opposite party No. 1 against opposite party no. 2, and the sale held therein did not affect the right, title and interest which the petitioner got by the auction sale held in his execution case on the 13th July, 1961.

    8. My attention was also drawn to a Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Veerayya v. Y. Veeraraghavavya, AIR 1961 Andh Pra 298. There, the property was first sold in execution of an award granted by the co-operative Deputy Registrar and then again sold in execution of another decree. In such a situation it was held that although the first purchaser was not a purchaser by a private sale, yet it was opinion to him to come to the execution court under section 47 and object to the second sale on the ground that he had already purchased the property. I venture to differ respectfully from this view. The principle decided in numerous cases is that if the purchaser's interest is not affected either by the decree or by the sale, he can neither be treated as a representative of the judgment-debtor within the meaning of section 47 of the Code for a person whose interests are affected by the sale within the meaning of Order 21, rule 90 of the Code.

    9. I may refer in this connection to the decision of the Full Bench if the Calcutta High Court in the case of Asmutunnissa Begum v. Ashruff Ali, (1888) ILR 15 Cal 488 (FB). Considering the provision of section 311 of the Code, which corresponds to Order 21, rule 90, where the expression was “any person whose immoveable property has been sold under this chapter may apply,” Chief Justice Petheram delivering the opinion of the Full Bench, said that the sale is not to be set aside unless the purchaser of the property before judgment, as was the case there, proves that he has sustained substantial inquiry therefore their Lordships said—

    “We think that this means that the substantial injury must be the direct result of the irregularity, and that this could only be the case where the property of the person applying had not only been put up for sale and knocked down, but had been sold in the sense that the applicant's interest had been legally affected by such sale as I have said above, in the instant case the petitioner's interest was not legally affected by the second sale.

    10. In the case of Jagat Narayan Singh v. Khartar Sah, AIR 1941 PC 45, Sir George Rankin, delivering the judgment on behalf of the Board had stated, with reference to a subsequent purchaser from the iudement-debtor whose name was Madhusudan Singh that—

    “Madhusudan on his own case ought in the later execution proceeding as in the earlier to have made a claim under rule 58 of Order 21 if he desired to take up the attitude of a third party whose property was being wrongfully taken for another's debt. To treat this objection to the sale as a matter of irregularity in publishing or conducting the sale was not open to him, and the application under rule 90 was altogether misconceived”

    11. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee also did not seem to have approved the view that Madhusudan was a representative of the judgment-debtor within the meaning of section 47 of the Code as had been held at an earlier stage of the litigation between the parties. I am, therefore, definitely of the view that the petitioner was neither a representative of the judgment-debtor nor his interest had been affected by the impugned sale He, therefore, had no right to apply for the setting aside of the sale either under section 47 or under Order 21, rule 90 of the Code. His remedy was to apply under Order 21, R. 58 of the Code before the sale was held. The second sale as against his interest is a nullity the first sale in favour of the petitioner was not only valid but was accepted as a good and valid sale by opposite party no. 1 when he accepted Rs. 7,000 from the petitioner on the date of delivery of possession in his favour to his knowledge, therefore, opposite party No. 2 had no saleable interest in the property on the 29th May, 1962, when he (opposite party no. 1) again purchased the property in execution of his decree.

    12. The petitioner is not under a necessity to get rid of the sale. Now the remedy which may be available to him will be to resist the delivery of possession when opposite party No. 1 endeavours to take delivery of possession although, I hope that being a practising lawyer of Monghyr he will never embark upon this misadventure If, however, delivery of possession is taken out by opposite party No. 1 and resisted by the petitioner, the remedy of the former will be to apply to the execution court under Order 21, rule 97 of the Code complaining of such resistance and in that proceeding it may be decided whether the resistance is justified or not if however the petitioner is dispossessed some how or other by opposite party No. 1 the remedy of the former would be to apply for restoration of possession under Order 21, rule 100 of the Code but it is abundantly clear to me that the present proceeding started by the petitioner for setting aside the sale was misconceived and has got to fail as being redundant and not maintainable.

    13. Before I part with this case, I may also state that since the sale held on the 29th March, 1962 has not been set aside in pursuance of the judgment of the lower appellate Court which Judgment ??? being upheld by me for different reasons opposite party no. 1 probably will be hit by the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Surendra Kumar Singh v. Srichand Mahata, ILR 15 Pat 308 : (AIR 1936 Pat 97 (FB)) and his remedy to realise his money by second execution will also probably be barred.

    14. Of course, this is not a matter which falls for my decision in this case, but I am referring to the decision of the Full Bench for the sake of showing that how opposite party no. 1 is likely to lose his decretal amount because he was ill-advised to put the property to sale on the 29th May, 1962 — a property which had already been validly sold to the petitioner and not only to his knowledge but to his benefit also.

    15. On a consideration of the matter carefully I come to the conclusion that the application for setting aside the sale was not maintainable and hence the order of the first court setting aside the sale was without jurisdiction. Since a miscellaneous appeal was entertained by the appellate court and the order of the first Court was set aside, the setting aside of that order has got to be maintained either by entertaining the miscellaneous appeal on the principle that if a first appeal is entertained by the lower appellate court wrongly, the second appeal to this Court is also maintainable or in the exercise of the revisional powers of this Court. In either view of the matter, both the miscellaneous appeal and the civil revision have got to fail. They are accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs in either of them.

    SSG/D.V.C

    16. Appeal and revision dismissed.

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    Comments

    Akshaya Kumar Mandal v. Binod Kumar Sinha .
    (Aug 1, 1967)