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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Letters Patent Appeal)

Factual and Procedural Background

This Letters Patent appeal was brought by the legal representatives of deceased respondent No. 6 challenging the judgment dated 16-9-1989 in First Appeal No. 91 of 1975 of this Court. That First Appeal had been preferred against the judgment and decree in Title Suit No. 28 of 1972-I of the Court of Subordinate Judge, Bhadrak. The plaintiff in the original Title Suit No. 28/1972 (who is now respondent No. 1 in this Letters Patent appeal) sued for partition claiming to be the daughter of late Sanatan (who died after the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force). Parties are Hindus governed by the Mitakshara School and the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

Defendant No. 6 alone contested the suit; his written statement denied that the plaintiff was Sanatan’s daughter and asserted she was the daughter of one Brundaban Bhanja. Reference was made to a prior partition suit (Title Suit No. 8/32 of 1966-64) in which Sanatan's branch had been represented by his widow (defendant No. 7) and son (defendant No. 8) on compromise. The trial court (Subordinate Judge, Bhadrak) found that the plaintiff was Sanatan's daughter (issue No. 3) but held that Sanatan's branch had been sufficiently represented in the previous suit (issue No. 6) and dismissed the suit against defendant Nos. 6 and 9 and ex parte as to others.

The plaintiff appealed to the First Appellate Court (F.A. No. 91 of 1975). During that appeal, defendant/respondent No. 6 died and was substituted by his legal representatives. In the judgment under challenge (the First Appeal decision), this Court allowed the appeal and decreed the suit for partition: it found the plaintiff to be Sanatan's daughter, held that defendants Nos. 7 and 8 did not represent all heirs of Sanatan in the previous partition suit, and held that the plaintiff was entitled to a 1/9th share in Sanatan's property while the compromise in the previous suit would bind defendants Nos. 7 and 8 for other properties. The Letters Patent appeal now before the Court was dismissed with costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff is the daughter of late Sanatan.
  2. If she is the daughter of Sanatan, whether her interest was safeguarded and duly represented in the previous partition suit (Title Suit No. 8/32 of 1966-64).
  3. Whether she is entitled to a share without making a prayer to set aside the compromise decree in the previous partition suit.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (legal representatives of deceased defendant No. 6)

  • It was not proved that the plaintiff is the daughter of Sanatan.
  • Even if she is regarded as Sanatan's daughter, she cannot re-open the prior partition because Sanatan's branch was sufficiently represented through defendant Nos. 7 and 8 in the previous partition suit; allowing partition now would create confusion in executing the valid compromise decree passed in the earlier suit, particularly since the plaintiff had not prayed to set aside that compromise decree.
  • Relied upon the principle that a Letters Patent appeal can examine findings of fact (cited Smt. Asha Devi v. Dukhi Sao) — this procedural point was not disputed at the Bar.

Respondent's Arguments (plaintiff / respondent No. 1)

  • Evidence on record is sufficient to prove the plaintiff's status as the daughter of Sanatan; both the trial court and the first appellate court recorded concurrent findings on this point which should not be disturbed.
  • Defendant Nos. 7 and 8 did not represent the plaintiff's interest in the previous partition suit, therefore the plaintiff is not bound by that compromise decree and is entitled to her legitimate share even without seeking to set aside the prior compromise decree.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Smt. Asha Devi v. Dukhi Sao, AIR 1974 SC 2048 That a single Judge deciding a First Appeal in a Letters Patent jurisdiction is not subordinate to the appellate court and therefore the restriction under Section 100 CPC on re-appreciation of facts does not apply in that context. The Court noted this procedural principle and recorded that it was not disputed at the Bar; it underpinned the authority to examine and re-evaluate findings of fact in the Letters Patent appeal context.
Bol Gobinda Paricha v. Nimai Charan Misra, AIR 1959 SC 914 Principles under Sections 50 and 60 of the Indian Evidence Act regarding opinion evidence on relationship: (a) when opinion expressed by conduct is relevant; (b) who must hold that opinion; and (c) the manner in which conduct/opinion must be proved under Section 60. The Court applied the principles to assess the probative value of witnesses' testimony on the plaintiff's relationship to Sanatan, treating the testimony of close relatives and neighbours as relevant conduct/opinion under Sections 50 and 60.
Chandu Lal Agarwala v. Khalilar Rahman, ILR (1942) 2 Cal 299 (reported AIR 1943 Cal 76) Supportive exposition of Section 50 (that evidence admissible is opinion as expressed by conduct; conduct is the offered item but court draws from it the opinion). The Court adopted the explanation to reinforce why conduct-based testimony of relatives/neighbours may be admitted and weighed as opinion evidence of relationship.
Lakshmi Reddi v. Venkata Reddi, AIR 1937 PC 201 That Section 50 does not make evidence of more general reputation (without conduct) admissible as proof of relationship. The Court treated this as limiting principle when considering reputation or general statements versus conduct-based opinion evidence; it evaluated the plaintiffs' witnesses as offering conduct-based opinion rather than mere reputation.
N.K. Mohd. Sulairnan Sahib v. M.C. Mohd. Ismail Saheb, AIR 1966 SC 792 Principle of "substantial representation": where a decree holder has made bona fide enquiry and certain legal representatives were represented (e.g., widows and daughter), the estate may be considered substantially represented even if some representatives were not impleaded. The Court compared facts of that case with the present facts and found them distinguishable; it applied the precedent by examining whether widow and son in the prior suit had substantially represented plaintiff's interest and concluded they had not in this instance.
Dolai Maliko v. Krushna Chandra Patnaik, AIR 1967 SC 49 That after bona fide enquiry, if some legal representatives were brought on record and some left out, it need not result in abatement; under some circumstances there can be sufficient representation. The Court noted the principle but held the facts here were different; it found no adequate explanation by defendant No. 6 as to why the plaintiff (a daughter) was not impleaded and therefore concluded there was insufficient representation of her interest in the prior suit.
Amrit Sagar Gupta v. Sudesh Behari Lal, AIR 1970 SC 5 Example of a finding of substantial representation where vested family acceptance (by father and Karta) led the Court to conclude sufficient representation. The Court cited this authority to illustrate the concept but distinguished its facts from the present case and affirmed that the present case did not satisfy the conditions for substantial representation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a structured manner following the three issues framed by the parties.

1. On the first issue (whether the plaintiff is Sanatan's daughter), the Court reviewed witness testimony and documentary evidence. The plaintiff produced five witnesses and relied on a copy of the plaint (Ext. 1) from the earlier partition suit. The original defendant (No. 6) produced his and his son's testimony and other plaint/written statement copies (Ext. G, Ext. H) that omitted the plaintiff from the genealogy.

The trial court had accepted the evidence of P.Ws 2 and 3 (who respectively claimed to be the brother and mother of the plaintiff) as particularly strong under Section 50 of the Evidence Act; it also accepted P.Ws 4–6 as relations and neighbours under Section 50. The appellate court concurred. The Court applied the principles articulated in Bol Gobinda Paricha and related authorities (on Sections 50 and 60) to determine that the witnesses had "special means" of knowledge and that their conduct/opinion evidence could properly be admitted and weighed. The Court found contradictions in plaintiffs' witnesses to be trifling and not sufficient to destroy credibility. The documentary inconsistency (one copy of a plaint listing the plaintiff and another copy not) did not undermine the testimonial evidence. Having discharged her initial burden, the onus shifted to defendant No. 6 to provide credible rebuttal; the defendant's limited evidence (himself and his son) and the absence of corroboration from the alleged Brundaban Bhanja family was insufficient. Accordingly, the Court held the plaintiff proved her status as Sanatan's daughter.

2. On the second issue (whether the plaintiff’s interest was represented in the previous partition suit), the Court examined authorities on "substantial representation" (N.K. Mohd. Sulairnan Sahib, Dolai Maliko, Amrit Sagar Gupta). After comparing facts, the Court concluded those precedents were distinguishable. Notably, defendant No. 6 had not pleaded that the omission to implead the plaintiff was the result of a bona fide belief that she was not Sanatan's daughter or offered any explanation as to why she, a daughter of Sanatan, was not added as a party. The Court observed that the copy of the plaint in the earlier suit indicated the widow and son of Sanatan were not shown as representing all legal representatives. Considering these circumstances, the Court agreed with the First Appellate Court's finding that defendants Nos. 7 and 8 did not represent the plaintiff's interest in the prior suit; consequently the plaintiff was not bound by the compromise decree insofar as her share in Sanatan's property was concerned.

3. On the third issue (whether the plaintiff is entitled to a share without setting aside the prior compromise decree), the Court relied on the reasoning in the impugned judgment which provided that after carving out Sanatan's share, the plaintiff would receive 1/9th of Sanatan's property and that the prior compromise would continue to bind defendants Nos. 7 and 8 for the remaining properties, with their interests reduced accordingly. Thus the Court held that the plaintiff could obtain her legitimate share without a prayer to set aside the prior compromise decree, as she had not been represented in that compromise.

As a consequence of the above findings, the Court directed that the trial court should re-determine the plaintiff's share in the disputed properties: the trial court's decree was set aside and the matter remitted for the trial court to pass a fresh preliminary decree after hearing the parties on materials on record and permitting further evidence if the parties so advised.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Letters Patent appeal is DISMISSED (the opinion concludes: "In the result, the letters patent appeal is dismissed with costs.").

Direct implications and immediate consequences:

  • The First Appellate Court's conclusion that the plaintiff is Sanatan's daughter and entitled to a 1/9th share in Sanatan's property is upheld in substance and the earlier trial decree is set aside for re-determination of shares.
  • The trial court is directed to re-determine and pass a fresh preliminary decree after hearing the parties on the record materials and allowing parties to adduce further evidence if so advised.
  • The prior compromise decree in the earlier partition suit will continue to bind defendants Nos. 7 and 8 with reduced effect after giving the plaintiff her legitimate share; the plaintiff need not first set aside that compromise decree to obtain her share given the finding that she was not represented in the earlier compromise.
  • The appeal was dismissed with costs (final order as to costs).

Broader precedent impact: The opinion applies and distinguishes several Supreme Court authorities on substantial representation and on the evaluation of conduct-based opinion evidence under Sections 50 and 60 of the Evidence Act. The Court applied established principles to the facts and did not purport to create any novel legal doctrine; the decision is fact-specific in its application of those authorities.

    Gourhari Das v. Smt. Santilata Singh And Others

    P.K Tripathi, J.:— In this Letters Patent appeal, the legal representatives of deceased respondent No. 6 have challenged the judgment dated 16-9-1989 in First Appeal No. 91 of 1975 of this Court, which had been preferred against the judgment and decree in Title Suit No. 28 of 1972-I of the Court of Subordinate Judge, Bhadrak. Plaintiff in that suit was the appellant and now respondent No. 1 in this appeal. Defendant No. 6 was the respondent No. 6 in the First Appeal, but his widow and son filed this Letters Patent appeal and the widow being dead, out on prayer of the above appellant her name has been deleted from the record.

    2. The brief narration of the background fact will reveal the dispute between the parties.

    The plaintiff in title Suit No. 28 of 1972 of the Court of Subordinate Judge, Bhadrak has given the following genealogical table to show the inter se relationship between the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 8.

    The plaintiff filed the aforesaid suit for partition claiming herself to be the daughter of Sanatan, who admittedly died after the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force. Admittedly, parties are Hindus governed by the Mitakshara School of personal law and Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Defendant No. 6 only contested the suit. In the written statement, inter alia, he stated that plaintiff is not the daughter of Sanatan, but the daughter of one Brundaban Bhanja of Sola Sahi who had married to the sister of Kalandi, who is the husband of defendant No. 2 and father of defendant Nos. 1 and 3 and that Title Suit No. 8/32 of 1966-64, a suit for partition in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Balasore, was decreed on compromise wherein Sanatan's branch was duly represented by his widow Adiri Dei (defendant No. 7) and son Eakadasi Das (defendant No. 8). He further pleaded that plaintiff not being the daughter of late Sanatan was not a party in that suit. His further case is that after the final decree in the suit, at the stage of delivery of possession in accordance with that decree, this case has been foisted with false assertion at the instance of defendant Nos. 7 and 8 who are not related to the plaintiff as mother and brother.

    Defendant No. 9, an outsider, also filed a written statement as the purchaser of lands from some of the persons described in the genealogy and prayed that in case the suit property is partitioned, a separate allotment should be made in respect of the properties which he had purchased from that family.

    3. Except disputing inclusion of the name of the plaintiff as the daughter of Sanatan and omissions relating to the names of the wife and son of defendant No. 6 and the wives of defendant Nos. and 5, the correctness of the genealogy is not disputed.

    4. In Title suit No. 8/32 of 1966-64 the present defendant Nos. 7 and 8 were figuring as defendant Nos. 1 and 2 and the present defendant No. 6 with his wife Rambhamani and son Gaurahari were the plaintiffs. The other branches were duly represented. In the present suit for partition. (Title Suit No. 28 of 1972) in answering issue No. 3 learned Subordinate Judge, Bhadrak held that plaintiff is the daughter of late Sanatan and Adiri (defendant No. 7). However, while answering issue No. 6 and consequentially issue No. 7 he held that in the previous suit for partition (T.S No. 6/32 of 1966-64) the branch of Sanatan was sufficiently represented through his widow and son i.e, the present defendant Nos. 7 and 8. Accordingly, he dismissed the suit on context against defendant Nos. 6 and 9 and ex parte against the rest. Plaintiff challenged the said judgment and decree in F.A No. 91 of 1975. During pendency of that appeal, defendant/respondent no. 6 died and was substituted by his legal representatives Rambhamani Dei and Gaurahari Das.

    5. In the judgment under challenge, this Court allowed the appeal and decreed the suit for partition recording the findings that plaintiff is the daughter of Sanatan and in Title Suit No. 8/32 of 1966-64 the present defendant Nos. 7 and 8 did not represent all the heirs of Sanatan and that is how plaintiff's interest was not safeguarded. Accordingly, it was held that plaintiff is entitled to 1/9th share in the property of late Sanatan and in respect of the rest of the properties the compromise in the previous suit for partition would prevail by and would bind defendant Nos. 7 and 8.

    6. A description of reference of the suit property is not necessary thus not stated in view of the limited points raised during the course of argument.

    7. Mr. Ashok Mukherji, learned counsel for the appellant argued that it has not been proved that plaintiff is the daughter of Sanatan. He further argued that for the sake of argument if the plaintiff is regarded as the daughter of Sanatan then also she is not entitled to re-open the partition inasmuch as Sanatan's branch was sufficiently represented through defendant Nos. 7 and 8 as defendant Nos. 1 and 2 in the previous suit for partition and a decree for partition in favour of the plaintiff would lead to a confusing state relating to execution of valid compromise decree passed in the previous partition suit inasmuch as plaintiff has not prayed to set aside the compromise decree passed in Title Suit No. 8/32 of 1966-64.

    8. Mr. R.K Mohapatra, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 supporting the findings in the impugned judgment argued that evidence in record is sufficient to prove plaintiff's status and in that respect trial and first appellate Court having recorded concurrent finding, it is not required to be disturbed. He further argued that defendant Nos. 7 and 8 were not representing the interest of plaintiff in the previous suit for partition, therefore plaintiff is not bound by the compromise decree. She has claimed for her legitimate share and when law permits, she is entitled to get without praying to set aside the compromise decree in the previous suit for partition inasmuch she is not bound by that decree.

    9. In view of the aforesaid argument, the issues are confined to the following points:—

    i) Whether plaintiff is the daughter of late Sanatan;

    ii) If she is held to be the daughter of Sanatan, whether her interest was safeguarded and duly represented in the previous suit for partition; and

    iii) Whether she is entitled to a share without making a prayer to set aside the compromise decree in the previous suit for partition?

    10. During the course of hearing, there was reference to facts and evidence relating to the aforesaid points. Mr. Mukherjee has cited the case of Smt. Asha Devi v. Dukhi Sao, AIR 1974 SC 2048 in which the apex Court has propounded that a single Judge deciding a First Appeal being not subordinate to the appellate court hearing a Letters Patent appeal, the restriction of not going into finding of fact as per the provisions in Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply. This position is not disputed at the Bar.

    11. Point No. 1 as above is covered by issue No. 3 of the trial Court's judgment. To prove her status as daughter of Sanatan plaintiff examined five witnesses and relied upon Ext. 1, a copy of the plaint in T.S No. 8/32 of 1966-64 wherein plaintiff has been mentioned as daughter of Sanatan. In challenging that evidence the original defendant No. 6 and the present appellant tendered their evidence as D.Ws 2 and 1 and also Ext. G, a copy of the plaint in T.S No. 8/32 of 1966-64, wherein plaintiff's name does not appear in genealogical table, and Ext. H, a copy of the written statement filed by defendants 1 to 4 and 6 in that suit giving genealogy of the family but not showing plaintiff as the daughter of Sanatan. Learned trial Court did not accept Ext. 1 on the ground that in the copy of the plaint, Ext. G, her name does not appear as the daughter of Sanatan. On a reference to the evidence of P.Ws 1 to 6 vis-a-vis the evidence of P.Ws 1 and 2, learned trial Court found that the evidence of P.Ws 2 and 3 in particular is very much appreciable to prove the relationship of the plaintiff with late Sanatan. He also accepted the evidence of P.Ws 4, 5 and 6 as the evidence of relations and neighbours in terms of section 50 of the Indian Evidence Act. In the First Appeal this Court concurred with the said finding.

    12. During the course of argument reference has been made to the case of Bol Gobinda Paricha v. Nimai Charan Misra, AIR 1959 SC 914 relating to the principle under Sections 50 and 60 of the Evidence Act in assessing and evaluating the opinion evidence on relationship Apex Court has said that at page 918:

    “……………It appears to us that the essential requirements of the section are — (1) there must be a case where the Court has to form an opinion as to the relationship of one person to another; (2) in such a case, the opinion expressed by conduct as to the existence of such relationship is a relevant fact; (3) but the person whose opinion expressed by conduct is relevant must be a person who is a member of the family or otherwise has special means of knowledge on the particular subject of relationship; in other words, the person must fulfil the condition laid down in the latter part of the section. If the person fulfils that condition, then what is relevant is his opinion expressed by conduct. Opinion means something more than mere retailing of gossip or of hearsay; it means judgment or belief, that is, a belief or a conviction resulting from what one thinks on a particular question. Now, the “belief” or conviction may manifest itself in conduct or behaviour which indicates the existence of the belief or opinion. What the section says is that such conduct or outward behaviour as evidence of the opinion held is relevant & may, therefore, be proved. We are of the view that the true scope and effect of Section 50 of the Evidence Act has been correctly and succinctly put in the following observations made in Chandu Lal Agarwala v. Khalilar Rahman, ILR (1942) 2 Cal 299 at p. 309 : (AIR 1943 Cal 76 at p. 80).

    “It is only ‘opinion as expressed by conduct’ which is made relevant. This is how the conduct comes in. The offered item of evidence is ‘the conduct’, but what is made admissible in evidence is ‘the opinion’, the opinion as expressed by such conduct. The offered item of evidence thus only moves the Court to an intermediate decision; its immediate effect is only to move the Court to see if this conduct establishes any ‘opinion’ of the person, whose conduct is in evidence, as to the relationship in question. In order to enable the Court to infer ‘the opinion’, the conduct must be of a tenor which cannot well be supposed to have been willed without the inner existence of the ‘opinion’.

    When the conduct is of such a tenor, the Court only gets to a relevant piece of evidence, namely, ‘the opinion of a person’. It still remains for the Court to weigh such evidence and come to its own opinion as to the ‘factum probandum’ — as to the relationship in question”.

    “also accept as correct the view that S. 50 does not make evidence of more general reputation (without conduct) admissible as proof of relationship; ‘Lakshmi Reddi v. Venkata Reddi, AIR 1937 PC 201.”

    (From paragraph 6 at pages 918 and 919).

    Considering the scope of section 60 of the Evidence Act and its import on Section 50, the Apex Court has further held that:

    “……………It we remember that the offered item of evidence under S. 50 is conduct in the sense explained above, then there is no difficulty in holding that such conduct or outward behaviour must be proved in the manner laid down in S. 60; if the conduct relates to something which can be seen, it must be proved by the person who saw it; if it is something which can be heard, then it must be proved by the person who heard it; and so on. The conduct must be of the person who fulfils the essential conditions of S. 50, and it must be proved in the manner laid down in the provisions relating to proof. It appears to us that portion of S. 60 which provides that the person who holds an opinion must be called to prove his opinion does not necessarily delimit the scope of S. 50 in the sense that opinion expressed by conduct must be proved only by the person whose conduct expressed the opinion. Conduct, as an external perceptible fact, may be proved either by the testimony of the person himself whose opinion is evidence under S. 50 or by some other person acquainted with the facts which express such opinion, and as the testimony must relate to external facts which constitute conduct and is given by persons personally acquainted with such facts, the testimony is in each case direct within the meaning of S. 60. This, in our opinion, is the true interrelation between S. 50 and S. 60 of the Evidence Act………”

    (From paragraph 7 at pages 918-919)

    Applying the above lest if the evidence in record is analysed, it is seen that PWs. 2 and 3 have claimed themselves respectively as the brother and mother of the plaintiff and that is how they claim their knowledge that plaintiff is the daughter of Sanatan. P.W 4 has claimed himself to be an agnatic cousin of Brunda Bhanja and stated that defendant no. 6 had married the sister of Brunda Bhanja and that Brunda had no daughter. P.W 4 has further stated that being a relation he knows that P.W 3 is the widow and plaintiff is the daughter of Sanatan and that he had attended the marriage ceremony of the plaintiff. P.W 5 has deposed that he is an agnatic relation of Brunda Bhanja and said Brunda had no daughter and that P.W 3 is his agnatic sister. He has stated that plaintiff is the daughter of P.W 3 and Sanatan and he had attended the 21st day ceremony after birth of the plaintiff. P.W 6 has deposed as a neighbour of late Sanatan and stated that plaintiff and P.W 2 are the daughter and son of P.W 3 and Sanatan and that he had attended the marriage ceremony of the plaintiff. It is thus seen that each of P.Ws 2 of 6 have special means to know about the relationship between plaintiff and late Sanatan. While speaking on such relationship, their opinion is based upon either the relationship or knowledge as neighbour to opine that plaintiff is the daughter of Sanatan and that Brunda Bhanja had no daughter; thereby rebutting to contention of the defendant no. 6 and the defence evidence.

    Inviting attention to some contradictions in the evidence of plaintiff's witnesses, Mr. Mukherjee argued that such contradictions conduct-wise prove that, P.Ws 4 to 6 could not have any such special means of knowledge and they are untruthful witnesses. On a careful perusal of their evidence, the above argument is found not acceptable. The contradictions are of trifle nature and does not shake the credibility of plaintiff's witnesses. Trial court and the 1st appellate court have also accepted that evidence of plaintiff's witnesses. Thus, without quoting and making a detailed discussion; being not necessary, of such contradictions, one or two instances may be noted here to show justification on the above conclusion that; such contradictions have not affected credibility of the plaintiff's witnesses relating to plaintiff's status as the daughter of Sanatan.

    Plaintiff as P.W 1, in cross-examination has stated that she has been partitioned from her brother and mother, she is not pulling on well with them. P.Ws 2 and 3, on the other hand, have stated that at regular intervals plaintiffs come to the suit village and at that time stay with them. This is not a contradiction of a serious nature so as to destroy the conduct of P.Ws 2 and 3 to not to know the relationship of plaintiff with late Sanatan or with them. It cannot be deduced from that contradiction that, P.W 2 who by means of his birth in the family knows plaintiff as his sister and P.W 3, who gave birth and states plaintiff is her daughter, are not competent to speak about the relationship or that their evidence on the factum of relationship is not acceptable. Other contradictions in the evidence of P.Ws 4 to 6, is of similar type and need no discussion. In the First Appeal this Court has rightly held that the evidence of P.Ws 2 and 3 are the strongest piece of evidence under Section 50 of the Evidence Act to prove the inter se relationship inasmuch as if the P.Ws 2 and 3 claim plaintiff as the daughter of late Sanatan then their right over the property is proportionately minimised. Only with a view to create problem with the defendant no. 6, 7 No. P.Ws 2 and 3 could not have taken such a risk.

    13. So far documentary evidence is concerned, plaintiff relied upon Ext. 1 but trial court rightly rejected the same because in another copy of plaint i.e Ext. 6 and in the genealogy in written statement i.e Ext. 11 plaintiff had not been shown in the genealogy. As rightly recorded by the trial court and not disturbed by the first appellate court, the above position relating to Ext. 1 has not deteriorated the case of the plaintiff. Undoubtedly, the initial burden was with the plaintiff to prove that she is the daughter of Sanatan. Once she discharged that burden, the onus shifted to the other side i.e the defendant no. 6 to adduce rebuttal evidence and also to prove that she is the daughter of Brunda Bhanja. In that context, except tendering the evidence of himself and his son as D.Ws 2 and 1 respectively, the defendant no. 6 did not adduce any other evidence. Even no other co-defendants belonging to the same family have deposed in support of defendant no. 6. Nobody from the house of Brunda Bhanja was even examined. Trial court has discussed and did not find defendants' evidence credible and reliable. Like the first appellate court this court concurs with the said finding and decision on issue no. 3 i.e point no. 1 as formulated in preceding paragraph to hold that plaintiff has proved her status as the daughter of late Sanatan.

    14. After recording the aforesaid finding, the problem on point no. 2 becomes easier. Mr. Mukherjee has led great stress on the plea of substantial representation from the family of late Sanatan in the previous partition suit. In support of his argument, he relied upon the cases of N.K Mohd. Sulairnan Sahib v. M.C Mohd. Ismail Saheb, AIR 1966 SC 792, Dolai Maliko v. Krushna Chandra Patnaik, AIR 1967 SC 49 and Amrit Sagar Gupta v. Sudesh Behari Lal, AIR 1970 SC 5. In the case of N.K Mohd. Sulairnan Sahib (supra) a suit for redemption of mortgage was decreed, against two out of three mortgagors and the widows and daughter of the deceased mortgager (third mortgager). In execution of that decree the mortgaged property was sold. One of the two sons of the deceased mortgager filed suit for partition with other ancillary and consequential relief on the ground that being not impleaded in the previous suit, he is not bound by that decree and execution sale. The decree holder-defendant in contesting the suit took the plea that after making bona fide enquiry he impleaded the legal representatives of deceased mortgager. In that context, after analysing the provision of procedural law, the Apex Court has held that the decree holder had made bona fide enquiry and the estate was duly represented by the widows and daughter, hence there was substantial representation.

    In the case of Dolai Maliko (supra) while considering the question of abatement due to bona fide omission in impleading one of the legal representatives of the deceased defendant, Apex Court, under the facts and circumstances of that case held that after a bona fide enquiry if some legal representatives were brought on record and some were left over, it need not result in abatement and apart from that, in the context under reference, there was sufficient representation.

    In the case of Amrit Sagar Gupta (supra) a gift made by the deceased owner to the family of the plaintiff was accepted by the father and the Karta. In a suit brought by person claiming the property to have been gifted in his favour, he impleaded that Karta as the defendant and not the other family members. While considering that aspect, apex Court has held that there was substantial representation.

    It is thus clear that the facts and the circumstance in the cited cases are quite distinguishable from the facts and circumstance of the present case. In that context, it may be noted that defendant no. 6 did not plead that on a bona fide belief that plaintiff is not the daughter of Sanatan, she was not arrayed as a party. Apart from that, when the plaintiff is a daughter in that family belonging to the branch of Sanatan defendant no. 6 could not have lost sight of her existence as well as relationship with late Sanatan. It might have so happened that by the date of institution of the suit, plaintiff being a married daughter and residing in her in-law's house at Midnapur, might not have been impleaded as a party. But that is not the case of defendant No. 6. Without making a venture to make out a third case from the pleadings of the parties, it may be noted here that defendant No. 6 does not come with any explanation, save and except denying the relationship as to why plaintiff as the daughter of Sanatan, was not added as a party. The copy of the plaint — Ext. 1 (Ext. 6) of the previous partition suit goes to show that widow and son of Sanatan were not added as a party with a view to represent all the legal representatives of late Sanatan. While deciding the First Appeal, this Court has taken note of that fact and circumstance to hold that the defendant nos. 7 and 8 while appearing as defendant nos. 1 and 2 in the previous suit for partition were not representing the interest of plaintiff who has a legitimate share in the property of late Sanatan. In that view of the matter, finding recorded by the 1st appellate court is found to be correct and accordingly confirmed.

    15. Coming to the third point, there is no necessity to make any further discussion in view of the cogent and reasoned order in the following terms passed by the Hon'ble single Judge in the impugned judgment.

    “16.……… After Sanatan's share is carved out, plaintiff would get her 1/9th share in Sanatan's property and in respect of rest of the properties, compromise in Ext. J would prevail and would bind defendant Nos. 7 and 8. Thus, they would not get any higher interest in the present case. Their right under the compromise decree would be reduced after giving plaintiff her legitimate share………..”

    17. On the aforesaid findings, trial court is required to re-determine the share of plaintiff in the disputed properties. Accordingly, the decree is to be set aside and the matter is to be remitted back to the trial court to pass a fresh preliminary decree after hearing the parties on the materials available on record and giving opportunity to parties to adduce further evidence if so advised.”

    In the result, the letters patent appeal is dismissed with costs.

    S.N Phukan, C.J:— 16. I agree.

    Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

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