Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976. Rule 1 of Order 23 of the Code
  • Section 96(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short, the Code).
  • Section 96(3), and Order 43, Rule 1-A
  • Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872)
  • supra.9. Section 96(3) of the Code
  • Order 43, Rule 1-A of the Code,
  • Section 96(3) of the Code
  • Rule 1A(2) of Order 43
  • sub-rule (2) of Rule 1A
  • Indian Contract Act
  • Rule 3A of Order 23.
  • Rule 3 of Order 23
  • Rule 1 of Order 43
  • Order 43, Rule 1(m),
  • sub-rule (2)
  • Rule 1(3)
  • Rule 1(4)
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976. Rule 1 of Order 23 of the Code
  • Section 96(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short, the Code).
  • Section 96(3), and Order 43, Rule 1-A
  • Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872)
  • supra.9. Section 96(3) of the Code
  • Order 43, Rule 1-A of the Code,
  • Section 96(3) of the Code
  • Rule 1A(2) of Order 43
  • sub-rule (2) of Rule 1A
  • Indian Contract Act
  • Rule 3A of Order 23.
  • Rule 3 of Order 23
  • Rule 1 of Order 43
  • Order 43, Rule 1(m),
  • sub-rule (2)
  • Rule 1(3)
  • Rule 1(4)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, as plaintiff, filed a partition suit (O.S. No. 29 of 1990, Class I) in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Balasore. Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 (the appellant's mother and brother) were defendants. On 26-03-1990 a petition for compromise was filed, read over and explained to the parties, and the subordinate Judge recorded the compromise and passed a decree in terms of that compromise; the decree was finally drawn on 28-03-1995. The appellant subsequently appealed, challenging the compromise on grounds that valuable properties were allotted to the defendants, there was unequal partition, improper valuation and misrepresentation. A preliminary point was raised as to the maintainability of the appeal in view of Section 96(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (the "Code"). The parties' counsel were heard at length on that question.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appeal is barred by Section 96(3) of the Code, which states that "No appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of the parties."
  2. Whether Order 43, Rule 1-A (particularly sub‑rule (2)) of the Code permits an appellant to challenge the recording of a compromise in an appeal against the decree (i.e., whether Rule 1A(2) enables such a challenge despite Section 96(3)).
  3. Whether exceptions based on fraud upon the Court or mistake of the Court (and the Court's power under Section 151) permit recall of an order recording a compromise, thereby affecting the decree based on that compromise.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Section 96(3) does not create an absolute bar to the present appeal; Order 43, Rule 1-A of the Code permits challenging non‑appealable orders in an appeal against a decree.
  • Relied on the Apex Court decision in Banwari Lal v. Smt. Chando Devi (AIR 1993 SC 1139) and a decision of a Single Judge in Hakimatun Nisa Bibi v. Md. Fakiruddin Khan (1993 75 Cut LT 457) to contend that the appeal is competent and maintainable.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The ratio of the decisions relied on by the appellant does not apply to the facts of the present case; therefore the appeal is not maintainable.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in This Opinion
Banwari Lal v. Smt. Chando Devi (through L.R); AIR 1993 SC 1139 Expresses that Section 96(3) is not a bar to an appeal where the factum of compromise or agreement is in dispute; supports the position that Rule 1A(2) allows challenge to recording of compromise in an appeal against the decree in such cases. The court cited Banwari Lal to show the correct legal position that Section 96(3) does not bar appeals where the fact of compromise is disputed. However, on the facts before it the court held the Banwari Lal principle was inapplicable because the factum of compromise was not disputed in this case.
Hakimatun Nisa Bibi v. Md. Fakiruddin Khan & Others; (1993) 75 Cut LT 457 Holds that where an order recording a compromise was obtained by fraud on the Court or by mistake of the Court, the Court may exercise its power under Section 151 to recall the order so that the decree based on that compromise vanishes. The court noted this authority as recognizing a fraud/mistake exception. It concluded that Hakimatun's rationale did not assist the appellant because no fraud on the Court or mistake of the Court was alleged or shown in the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by identifying and setting out the relevant statutory provisions: Section 96(3) of the Code ("No appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of the parties") and Order 43, Rule 1-A (which permits, in an appeal against a decree, contention that certain non‑appealable orders should not have been made and the judgment should not have been pronounced; sub‑rule (2) permits contesting a decree on the ground that a compromise should or should not have been recorded).

The Court placed the present dispute in the context of legislative amendments to Order 23 introduced to reduce multiplicity of litigation and curb vexatious challenges to compromise decrees. Those amendments included:

  • Providing procedural safeguards before recording a compromise (writing and signatures, proviso and explanation regarding void/voidable agreements under the Indian Contract Act).
  • Introducing Rule 3A (bar to instituting a separate suit to set aside a decree on the ground that the underlying compromise was not lawful).
  • Deleting the earlier clause (Order 43, Rule 1(m)) that permitted appeals against orders recording or refusing to record compromise, and instead adding Rule 1A to allow challenge to the recording of a compromise only in the course of an appeal against the decree.

The Court analysed the interaction between Section 96(3) and Rule 1A(2): Section 96(3) applies to decrees passed with the consent of parties and generally bars appeals from such decrees where the factum of compromise is not in dispute; Rule 1A(2) was introduced to permit contestation of a decree in an appeal where the recording (or refusal to record) of a compromise is disputed. The Court emphasised that sub‑rule (2) of Rule 1A operates only when an appeal against the decree is before the Court — it is an enabling provision that allows an appellant to contest the validity of the recording of a compromise as part of an appeal against the decree.

Applying these principles to the facts, the Court found:

  • There was no allegation or material before the Court showing fraud on the Court or mistake of the Court in recording the compromise — the compromise petition had been read over and explained to the parties and recorded by the subordinate Judge.
  • The appellant's complaints were that there was unequal and irregular allotment of shares, improper valuation and misrepresentation. The Court observed that some inequality in compromise allotments is common and does not by itself render a compromise invalid; the appellant had not shown how valuation was improper or presented evidence of fraud or a judicial mistake.
  • Because the factum of the compromise (i.e., that a compromise was arrived at and recorded) was not in dispute, Section 96(3) was applicable and constituted a bar to the appeal. The Rule 1A(2) exception applies only where the compromise itself is contested as to its having been arrived at or recorded lawfully — which was not the situation here.
  • The precedents relied upon by the appellant were examined: Banwari Lal supports the proposition that Section 96(3) will not bar appeals where the factum of compromise is disputed; Hakimatun Nisa supports the view that fraud or mistake can justify recall under Section 151 — but neither precedent was applicable to the present facts because the factum was not disputed and no fraud/mistake was pleaded or proved.

On this basis the Court concluded that the appeal was not maintainable because it amounted to an attempt to reopen a compromise whose existence and recording were not disputed and where no fraud or mistake on the Court was established.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court's final decision was that the appeal is not maintainable. The Court DISMISSED the appeal (the opinion states: "the appeal is not maintainable, is not entertained and is dismissed"). S.C. Datta, J. concurred.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The appellant's appeal was dismissed and the decree, which had been passed by consent in terms of the recorded compromise, remains operative.
  • Legal consequence explained within the opinion: Section 96(3) operates as a bar where the factum of compromise is not in dispute; Rule 1A(2) permits contesting the recording of a compromise only in the context of an appeal against the decree and only where the compromise's existence or lawful recording is itself in dispute. Allegations of unequal allotment or improper valuation, absent proof of fraud or mistake of the Court, are generally insufficient to set aside a compromise decree at the appellate stage under the amended Code regime described in the opinion.
  • The Court did not purport to lay down a novel precedent beyond interpreting the existing statutory scheme and applying the cited authorities to the facts; the decision enforces the legislative purpose behind amendments to Order 23 to curb multiplicity of suits and restrict collateral attacks on compromise decrees except in specified situations (disputed factum, fraud or mistake).
Appeal dismissed.

    Pradip Kumar Das v. Smt. Abanti Das And Another

    Pasayat, J.:— A point regarding maintainability of the appeal has been raised on the ground that the appeal is incompetent in view of the bar imposed under Section 96(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short, the ‘Code’). The learned counsel for parties were heard at length on the question.

    2. The factual position is almost undisputed, and noted in brief is as follows:

    A suit was filed by the appellant as plaintiff for partition by metes and bounds. Same was numbered as O.S No. 29 of 1990, Class I in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Balasore, (as the Court was designated then). Respondents 1 and 2 are mother and brother of the appellant respectively, who were defendants in the suit. On 26-3-1990 a petition for compromise was filed which was read over and explained to the parties and was admitted. The learned subordinate Judge recorded the compromise, and decreed the suit finally in terms of the compromise petition being of the view that the petition for compromise was lawfully recorded. The decree was finally drawn on 28-3-1995.

    3. In this appeal challenge is made to the compromise on the ground that valuable properties were allotted to the share of defendants. The appellant acted in good faith while entering into the compromise, and there has been unequal partition and improper allotment of share. It is also alleged that the compromise is bad due to improper valuation and non-allotment of legitimate share.

    4. Miss Mira Ghose, learned counsel for appellant submitted that Section 96(3) of the Code does not put an absolute bar as would be evident from a bare reading of Order 43, Rule 1-A of the Code, which deals with right to challenge non-appealable orders in appeal against decrees. Strong reliance has also been placed on a decision of the Apex Court in Banwari Lal v. Smt. Chando Devi (through L.R); AIR 1993 SC 1139; and a decision rendered by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Hakimatun Nisa Bibi… v. Md. Fakiruddin Khan & Others…Opp. Parties. (1993) 75 Cut LT 457, to contend that the appeal is competent and is maintainable.

    Mr. A.K Mahakud, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 2 submitted that the appeal is not maintainable as ratio of the aforesaid two decisions does not apply to the facts of the present case.

    5. In order to appreciate the rival submissions, it is necessary to take note of a few provisions. Section 96(3), and Order 43, Rule 1-A read as follows:

    “96. Appeal from orginal decree.

    (1) & (2) xx xx xx

    (3) No appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of parties.”

    “43. 1. xx xx xx

    1-A. Right to challenge non-appealable orders in appeal against decrees. Where any order is made under this Code against a party and thereupon any judgment is pronounced against such party and a decree is drawn up, such party may, in an appeal against the decree, contend that such order should not have been made and the judgment should not have been pronounced.

    (2) In an appeal against a decree passed in a suit after recording a compromise or refusing to record a compromise, it shall be open to the appellant to contest the decree on the ground that the compromise should, or should not, have been recorded.”

    6. The experience of the courts has been that on many occasions parties having filed petitions of compromise on basis of which decrees are prepared later for one reason or other challenge the validity of such compromise. For setting aside such decrees suits used to be filed which dragged on for years including appeals to different Courts, Keeping in view the predicament of the Courts and the public, several amendments have been introduced in Order 23 of the Code which contain provisions relating to withdrawal and adjustment of suit, by Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976. Rule 1 of Order 23 of the Code prescribes that at any time after the institution of the suit, the plaintiff may abandon his suit or abandon a part of his claim. Rule 1(3) provides that where the Court is satisfied (a) that a suit must fail by reason of some formal defect, or (b) that there are sufficient grounds for allowing the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit for the subject-matter of a suit or part of a claim, it may, on such terms as it thinks fit grant the plaintiff permission to withdraw such suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit. In view of Rule 1(4) if plaintiff abandons his suit or withdraws such suit without permission referred to above, he shall be precluded from instituting any such suit in respect of such subject-matter. Rule 3 of Order 23 which contained the procedure regarding compromise of the suit was also amended to curtail vexatious and tiring litigation while challenging a compromise decree. Not only in Rule 3 some special requirements were introduced before a compromise is recorded by the Court including that the lawful agreement or a compromise must be in writing and signed by the parties, a proviso with an explanation was also added which is as follows:

    “Provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the question; but no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment.

    Explanation. — An agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872) shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this rule.”

    7. By adding the proviso along with an explanation the purpose and the object of the amending Act appears to be to compel the party challenging the compromise to question the same before the Court which had recorded the compromise in question. That Court was enjoined to decide the controversy whether the parties have arrived at an adjustment in a lawful manner. The explanation made it clear that an agreement or a compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of the said Rule. Having introduced the proviso along with the explanation in Rule 3 in order to avoid multiplicity of suit and prolonged litigation, a specific bar was prescribed by Rule 3A in respect of institution of a separate suit for setting aside a decree on basis of compromise saying:—

    “3A. Bar to suit. — No suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful.”

    8. Earlier under Order 43, Rule 1(m), an appeal was maintainable against an order under Rule 3 of Order 23 recording or refusing to record an agreement, compromise or satisfaction. But by the amending Act that clause has been deleted; the result whereof is that now no appeal is maintainable against an order recording or refusing to record an agreement or compromise under Rule 3 of Order 23. Being conscious that the right of appeal against the order recording or refusing to record an agreement or compromise under Rule 3 of Order 23 was being taken away, a new Rule 1A has been added to Order 43 which has been quoted supra.

    9. Section 96(3) of the Code says that no appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of the parties. Rule 1A(2) has been introduced saying that against a decree passed in a suit after recording a compromise, it shall be open to the appellant to contest the decree on the ground that the compromise should not have been recorded. When Section 96(3) bars an appeal against decree passed with the consent of parties, it implies that such decree is valid and binding on the parties unless set aside by the procedure prescribed or available to the parties. One such remedy available was by filing the appeal under Order 43, Rule 1(m). If the order recording the compromise was set aside, there was no necessity or occasion to file an appeal against the decree. Similarly a suit used to be filed for setting aside such decree on the ground that the decree is based on an invalid and illegal compromise not binding on the plaintiff of the second suit. But after the amendments which have been introduced, neither an appeal against the order recording the compromise nor remedy by way of filing a suit is available in cases covered by Rule 3A of Order 23. As such a right has been given under Rule 1A(2) of Order 43 to a party, who challenges the recording of the compromise, to question the validity thereof while preferring an appeal against the decree. Section 96(3) of the Code shall not be a bar to such an appeal because Section 96(3) is applicable to cases where the factum of compromise or agreement is not in dispute. This position has been succinctly stated in Banwarilal's case (AIR 1993 SC 1139) (supra) by the Apex Court.

    10. In Hakimatun's case (1993 (75) Cut LT 457) (supra) it was observed that there may be cases where an order recording compromise was obtained from the Court by practising fraud on it or on account of mistake of the Court. No party should suffer in any such situations. Court can exercise the power under Section 151, of the Code without leaving the party to prefer an appeal to avoid the decree based on mistake of Court or fraud on Court in (kaying) the order recording compromise. Once the order is recalled, basis of the decree vanishes and decree also stands recalled.

    11. A plain reading of sub-rule (2) of Rule 1A would indicate that it postulates an appeal against a decree for its operation. In other words, the said provision would come into operation only in an appeal against a decree passed in a suit after recording or refusing to record a compromise. The sub-rule only enables the appellant to contest the decree on the ground that a compromise should or should not have been recorded. The language of Rule 1A and for that matter of sub-rule (2) thereof contrasted with opening words of Rule 1 of Order 43 clearly indicates that the rule does not contemplate conferring a right of appeal as is done under Rule 1 of Order 43. It is merely an enabling provision.

    12. Present is not the case where any fraud is alleged to have been practised. The plea is unequal and irregular allotment of share and improper valuation. That is stated to be on account of misrepresentation. It is usual in almost every compromise that there is some inequality in allotment of shares. In view of accepted relationship between parties, it appears to be normal. That cannot be a ground to take away the effect of a compromise entered into by the parties. So far as improper valuation is concerned, it is not shown as to how the valuation was improper. An attempt to assail the compromise at this belated stage appears to be out-come of an after-thought. The compromise petition was read over and explained to parties as is evident from the order passed by the learned Subordinate Judge. That being the position, neither the decision of the Apex Court nor the decision rendered by a learned single Judge of this Court has any application to the facts of present case. In the case at hand, there is no assertion or material to show that there was mistake of the Court or fraud on the Court. Right has been given under Rule 1A(2) of Order 43 to a party, who challenges the recording of the compromise, to question the validity thereof while preferring an appeal against the decree. Section 96(3) of the Code is not a bar to such an appeal because Section 96(3) is applicable to cases where the factum of compromise or agreement is not in dispute. This is a case where the factum of compromise or agreement is not in dispute. Challenge is on the grounds indicated above.

    13. The inevitable conclusion is that the appeal is not maintainable, is not entertained and is dismissed.

    S.C Datta, J. 14. I agree.

    Appeal dismissed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Pradip Kumar Das v. Smt. Abanti Das And Another
    (Aug 14, 1997)