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Case Number

Misc. Appeal No. 457 of 1993

Attorney(S)

S.Sen
S.K.Mohanty
R.N.Mohanty
N.K.Panda
M.Sinha
B.Singh
B.N.Rath

Judges

Pradipta Ray, J.

Acts

provisions of Section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the M.V Act, 1939)
Section 147 of the M.V Act, 1988. The material provisions of Section 95 of M.V Act, 1939
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the M.V Act, 1988)
Sec. 95(1) of the M.V Act, 1939. The material provisions of Sec. 147
Sec. 95(1)(b) of 1939 Act in Section 147 of the M.V Act, 1988
sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 147. Section 147 of the M.V Act, 1988
Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1994 Section 147(1)(b)(i)
provisions of Section 147(1)(b)(i) of the M.V Act, 1988
vehicle.9. Section 95(1)(b)(i) of the M.V Act, 1939
provisions of Sec. 95(1) of the M.V Act, 1939
Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923),
Section 147(1)(b)(i) of the M.V Act, 1988
Section 95(b)(i) of the M.V Act of 1939.
Sec. 147(1)(b)(i) of the M.V Act, 1988.12.
provisions of Sec. 95 of M.V Act, 1939
MOTOR VEHICLES AMENDMENT ACT
Section 95(1) of the M.V Act, 1939
Sec. 95(1)(b) of the M.V Act, 1939,
Sec. 95(1) of the M.V Act, 1939
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 1986
Sec. 147 of the M.V Act, 1988
147 of the M.V Act, 1988
MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
Section 147(1)(b)(i)
M.V Act, 1988

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal against the judgment and award dated 1 June 1993 passed by the Second Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Cuttack.

The claim arose from a road accident on 17 September 1989 in which the deceased, Jadumani Mohanta, a salesman employed by the Manager, Livestock Breeding and Dairy Farm, Keonjhar, was returning with cows purchased for the farm. The deceased was being carried in a goods truck bearing registration OIS 1749. The truck allegedly proceeded at high speed and collided with another truck coming from the opposite direction. As a result the deceased sustained injuries and later died.

The widow and three minor sons filed a claim petition alleging rash and negligent driving of truck OIS 1749 and pointing out that the offending truck was insured with the Oriental Insurance Company Limited (the appellant). The owner of the offending truck admitted the accident and that the truck was insured with the appellant, but contended the accident happened due to the rash driving of the other truck; the owner did not ultimately contest the claim at hearing. The Insurance Company contested liability on the basis that (a) the policy did not cover passengers carried in a goods vehicle, and (b) the driver of the offending vehicle did not have a driving licence at the time of the accident.

The Tribunal found that the accident occurred and that the deceased was killed due to rash and negligent driving of truck OIS 1749, accepted insurer's liability, and awarded Rs. 1,10,000 together with interest at 6% per annum from 18 October 1989 until realisation. This appeal by the insurer challenges those conclusions.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether, under Section 147(1)(b)(i) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, an insurer is liable to indemnify the owner where a person carried in a goods vehicle (for example, the owner of goods or an authorised representative) dies or suffers bodily injury — i.e., does "any person" include persons being carried in a goods vehicle?
Whether, where two vehicles contributed to the accident, the insurer of one vehicle can be made liable to pay the entire compensation (i.e., the question of apportionment or claimant's right to sue one or more tortfeasors)?
Whether the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal (including the choice of multiplier and the calculation of dependency) is excessive or unreasonable in light of reported authorities?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Oriental Insurance Company) – Arguments

The offending vehicle was a goods vehicle and, therefore, the insurer was not obliged under the policy to cover liability for death or bodily injury to persons carried as passengers in a goods vehicle.
The particular insurance policy in question did not cover liability in respect of passengers carried in a goods vehicle.
The driver of the offending vehicle did not have a valid driving licence at the time of the accident (contended as a ground of contesting liability).
Where two vehicles were responsible, liability should be apportioned and the insurer of one vehicle should not be made to pay the entire compensation.
On quantum, relied on the Supreme Court decision in General Manager, Kerala State RTC v. Susamma Thomas (AIR 1994 SC 1631) to argue that a lower multiplier (than 18) or a different assessment methodology should have been used by the Tribunal, suggesting the Tribunal’s multiplier was excessive.
Relied on the Full Bench decision of this Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Kanchan Bewa (1994 (1) OLR 1 : AIR 1994 NOC 65) to support the contention that passengers carried in goods vehicles were excluded from compulsory insurance coverage under the earlier statute.

Respondents (Claimants) – Arguments

The accident occurred after the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (M.V. Act, 1988) came into force; therefore prior Full Bench decisions interpreting provisos to Section 95 of the 1939 Act are not applicable to interpretation of Section 147 of the 1988 Act.
Section 147(1)(b)(i) of the M.V. Act, 1988 — by its language ("any person") — requires the insurer to cover liability for death or bodily injury to any person, and therefore includes persons carried in a goods vehicle (including the owner of the goods or his authorised representative).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Kanchan Bewa, 1994 (1) Ori LR 1 : AIR 1994 NOC 65 (Full Bench)	Interpreted proviso (ii) to Section 95(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 as excluding passengers carried by a goods vehicle from compulsory insurance coverage under the 1939 Act.	The court held this Full Bench decision construed the 1939 Act proviso but concluded it is not applicable to Section 147(1)(b)(i) of the 1988 Act because the proviso was omitted in the 1988 Act; therefore the Full Bench decision cannot be applied to restrict "any person" in Section 147 of 1988.
New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Ashok Kumar Acharya, 1994 (1) CJR 293	Explained difference between contributory negligence and composite negligence and established that a claimant may sue any or all negligent persons; claimant need not apportion among tortfeasors.	The court relied on this decision to reject the insurer's contention that liability must be apportioned between two negligent vehicles; held claimant can sue one insurer for full relief subject to limits on recoverable damages.
Laxmi Engineering Works v. P.S.G. Industrial Institute, (1995) 3 SCC 583	Considered effect of adding an explanation/amendment to a statutory definition and held that such an amendment can be clarificatory — making explicit what was implicit.	The court applied this principle to hold the 1994 amendment to Section 147(1)(b)(i) (which expressly added "including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle") was clarificatory and merely made explicit what "any person" already covered.
Pushpabai Parshottam Udeshi v. Ranjit Ginning & Pressing Co. Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1977 SC 1735	Interpreted provisions of Section 95(b)(i) of the 1939 Act in the context of passengers in goods vehicles (relied on historically to exclude such passengers).	The court noted this decision relied upon by appellant is based on the 1939 Act proviso that was omitted in the 1988 Act, and therefore held it inapplicable to interpreting Section 147(1)(b)(i) of the 1988 Act.
General Manager, Kerala State RTC v. Susamma Thomas, AIR 1994 SC 1631	Authority on assessment of compensation — choice of multiplier and taking into account prospects of advancement when calculating future loss; used to justify a multiplier of 12 in that case.	The court considered this decision in evaluating the Tribunal's use of multiplier 18 and differences in assessing income and dependency. It concluded that although multiplier 18 might be on the higher side, given the factual findings (income, lack of evidence of promotion) the Tribunal's award was not excessive or unreasonable.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis focused primarily on statutory interpretation of Section 147(1)(b)(i) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and its differences from Section 95(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.

1. Comparison of statutory text: The court observed that Section 95(1)(b)(i) of the 1939 Act and Section 147(1)(b)(i) of the 1988 Act use similar language, but the 1939 Act contained a proviso (ii) expressly excluding certain classes of persons (including persons being carried in a goods vehicle) from the statutory requirement of compulsory insurance coverage. That proviso was omitted from Section 147 of the 1988 Act.

2. Effect of omission: Because the proviso excluding passengers in goods vehicles was not present in the 1988 Act, the court concluded the omission made a vital difference. The general language of Section 147(1)(b)(i) — which insures against liability in respect of the death of or bodily injury to "any person" — was construed to cover a wider class of persons than merely third parties. The court emphasized that the phrase "any person" should be given its ordinary and wide meaning.

3. Role of the 1994 amendment: Section 147(1)(b)(i) was later amended in 1994 to substitute the words “injury to any person, including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle” for “injury to any person.” The court treated that amendment as clarificatory rather than expanding the prior scope. Relying on the reasoning in Laxmi Engineering Works v. P.S.G. Industrial Institute, the court held the amendment made explicit what was already implicit in the unamended Section 147(1)(b)(i).

4. Inapplicability of earlier Full Bench and Supreme Court authorities founded on the 1939 Act: Decisions such as the Full Bench in New India Assurance v. Kanchan Bewa and the Supreme Court in Pushpabai were grounded on the proviso in the 1939 Act. Given the omission of that proviso in the 1988 Act, those earlier interpretations were not applicable to Section 147(1)(b)(i) of the 1988 Act.

5. Multiple tortfeasors / apportionment: On the contention that liability should be apportioned where two vehicles were involved, the court relied on New India Assurance v. Ashok Kumar Acharya, observing that a claimant may sue any one or more of the negligent persons and is entitled to recover his entire damage (subject to the overall limit of damages). Therefore the insurer of one vehicle could be held liable to pay the whole compensation to the claimant.

6. Quantum of compensation: The court considered the insurer's submission on multiplier and relied authorities (notably Susamma Thomas). It examined the facts: the deceased's monthly pay was found to be Rs. 1195, and the Tribunal recorded no evidence of prospects of promotion. The Tribunal used a multiplier of 18 and permitted half the income as contribution to dependants. The court noted the Supreme Court in Susamma Thomas used a multiplier of 12 but also enhanced the assessed income because of prospects. Balancing these factors, the court concluded that even if the multiplier appeared high, the overall award was not excessive or unreasonable and was modest compared to the cited Supreme Court assessment in the other case.

7. Conclusion of statutory liability: Combining the interpretative conclusions and the analysis of comparative authorities, the court concluded that under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 the words "any person" in Section 147(1)(b)(i) include persons carried in a goods vehicle; accordingly the insurer could not escape statutory liability.

Holding and Implications

Holding: APPEAL DISMISSED.

Immediate consequences and directions:

The appeal by the Oriental Insurance Company is dismissed.
The Insurance Company is directed to pay the entire compensation awarded by the Tribunal (Rs. 1,10,000 plus interest at 6% per annum from 18 October 1989 until realisation) if not already paid, within two months from the date of the judgment.
No order as to costs was made by the court.

Broader implications (as expressed in the opinion):

Interpretation of Section 147(1)(b)(i) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988: the phrase "any person" is to be given a wide meaning and includes persons being carried in a goods vehicle. Therefore, under the 1988 Act insurers cannot rely on the proviso that existed in the 1939 Act to exclude liability for persons carried in goods vehicles.
The 1994 amendment to Section 147(1)(b)(i), which expressly referenced "including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle", was treated as clarificatory — making explicit what the court found was already implicitly covered by "any person".
The decision reaffirms that a claimant may sue one negligent tortfeasor and recover the whole of his damages from that party/insurer, leaving issues of contribution among tortfeasors to those parties rather than limiting the claimant's remedy.

Note: This summary is restricted to and based exclusively on the information contained in the provided opinion. No additional facts or external materials have been inferred beyond what the opinion states.

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The Divisional Manager Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Cuttack Divisional Office v. Jasoda Mohanta And Others

1. The present appeal is against the judgment and award dated June 1, 1993 passed by the Second Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Cuttack.

2. This appeal has been preferred by the Insurance Company mainly on the grounds that the offending vehicle carrying the deceased being a goods vehicle, the Insurance Company is not liable for any compensation to the deceased; that where two vehicles are responsible for the accident, there should be apportionment of the liability between the offending vehicles and that the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal is excessive and unreasonable.

3. It appears from the pleadings and the evidence on record that the deceased Jadumani Mohanta was a Salesman in the office of the Manager, Livestock Breeding and Diary Farm, Koenjhar. On September 17, 1989, he was returning with some cows purchased for the farm and carried in the offending truck having registration number OIS 1749. The said truck was moving in a high speed and dashed against another truck coming from opposite direction. As a result of the accident said Jadumani Mohanta was seriously injured and ultimately died. The widow and three minor sons of the deceased filed the claim petition complaining that the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the truck No. OIS 1749; that the deceased died in course of his employment and that the said vehicle being duly insured with the Oriental Insurance Company Limited, the present appellant, the Insurance Company is liable to pay compensation.

4. The owner of the offending truck filed a written statement admitting the accident. He, however, has contended that the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the other truck coming from the opposite direction. The owner also admitted that his truck was insured with the Oriental Insurance Company Limited. Although the owner filed his written statement, he did not ultimately contest the claim during hearing.

5. The Insurance Company contested the claim contending, inter alia, that the claimants are not entitled to get any compensation from the Insurance Company because the policy did not cover the risk of any passenger carried in the vehicle which was a goods vehicles and that the driver of the offending vehicle did not have driving licence at the time of the accident.

6. The Tribunal held that the accident had taken place and the deceased was killed in the said accident. It has also been held that the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending truck OIS 1749. The Tribunal accepted the Insurer's Liability upon the view that the Insurance Company was liable to undertake the risk of a person moving in a goods vehicle as owner of the goods. The Tribunal ultimately awarded a total compensation of Rs. 1,10,000/- and interest on the awarded amount at the rate of six per cent per annum from the date of the claim application, i.e October 18, 1989, till realisation.

7. On behalf of the appellant-Insurance Company Mr. Sinha has urged that the offending vehicle being a goods vehicle it was not obligatory on the part of the insurer to insure any liability of the owner in respect of death or bodily injury to any one carried as a passenger in a goods vehicle. He has also stated that as a matter of fact, the concerned Insurance Policy did not cover such liability in respect of a passenger of the goods vehicle. Mr. Sinha has relied upon the Full Bench decision of this Court in New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Kanchan Bewa, reported in 1994 (Vol. I) OLR 1 : (AIR 1994 NOC 65) in support of his contention.

8. Mr. B.N Rath, learned Advocate for the claimant-respondents on the other hand, has submitted that the accident having taken place after the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘M.V Act, 1988’) came into operation, the Full Bench decision on the provisions of Section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘M.V Act, 1939’) is not applicable to the present case. Referring to the provisions of Section 147(1)(b)(i) of the M.V Act, 1988 Mr. Rath has contended that the insurer was bound to insure the owner of the vehicle against death or bodily injury to any person even if the vehicle was a goods vehicle.

9. Section 95(1)(b)(i) of the M.V Act, 1939 contained the same language as Section 147(1)(b)(i) as it stood before the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1994. But one of the provisions of Sec. 95 of M.V Act, 1939 excluding specified classes of persons from the statutory requirement of insurance coverage, has been omitted in Section 147 of the M.V Act, 1988. The material provisions of Section 95 of M.V Act, 1939 are quoted below:—

“95. Requirements of policies and limits of liability— (1) In order to comply with the requirements of this chapter, a policy of insurance may be a policy which—

(a) is issued by a person who is an authorised or by a co-operative society allowed under Sec. 108 to transact the business of an insurer, and

(b) insured the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2)—

(i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place;

(ii) against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place:

Provided that a policy shall not be required—

(i) to cover liability in respect of the death, arising out of and in the course of his employment, of the employees of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment other than a liability arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923), in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, any such employee—

(a) engaged in driving the vehicle, or

(b) if it is a public service vehicle, engaged as a conductor of the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle, or

(ii) except where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment, to cover liability in respect of the death of or bodily injury to persons being carried in or upon or entering or mounting or alighting from the vehicle at the time of the occurrence of the event out of which a claim arises, or

(iii) to cover any contractual liability.”

Section 147 of the M.V Act, 1988 does not contain proviso (ii) to Sec. 95(1) of the M.V Act, 1939. The material provisions of Sec. 147 as it stood before the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1994 are quoted below:—

“147. Requirements of policies and limits of liability— (1) In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which—

(a) is issued by a person who is an authorised insurer; and

(b) insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2)—

(ii) against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place:

Provided that a policy shall not be required—

(i) to cover liability in respect of the death, arising out of and in the course of his employment of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment other than a liability arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923), in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, any such employee—

(a) engaged in driving the vehicle, or

(b) if it is a public service vehicle engaged as a conductor of the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle, or

(ii) to cover any contractual liability……

10. As already stated the proviso (ii) to Sec. 95(1) of the M.V Act, 1939 brought the liability in respect of certain classes of persons out of the statutory requirement of compulsory insurance coverage. The Full Bench of this Court in 1994 (1) Ori LR 1 : (AIR 1994 NOC 65) (New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Kanchan Bewa) interpreted and contrued the said proviso (ii) to Section 95(1) of the M.V Act, 1939 and held that the said proviso excluded the passengers carried by a goods vehicle from the compulsory requirement of insurance coverage. From a study of the provisions of Sec. 95(1) of the M.V Act, 1939 and the discussion contained in the Full Bench judgment it appears that if the said proviso (ii) was not there, the liability in respect of death or bodily injury inflicted on any person by any vehicle in a public place would have been required to be covered by the Insurance Policy. Insertion of the said proviso (ii) to Sec. 95(1) of the M.V Act, 1939 was intended to carve out the specified classes of persons from the general sweep of the main provision of Sec. 95(1)(b)(i) and (ii). There being a separate clause i.e Sec. 95(1)(b)(ii) for passenger of a public service vehicle it was obvious that Sec. 95(1)(b)(i) covered persons other than the passengers of a public service vehicle.

11. The absence of any provision like the proviso (ii) to Sec. 95(1)(b) of 1939 Act in Section 147 of the M.V Act, 1988 makes a vital difference. The general sweep of Section 147(1)(b)(i) covers liability in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person covered by or arising out of a vehicle excepting the passengers of a public service vehicle mentioned in Sec. 147(1)(b)(ii) and the classes of employees enumerated in proviso (i) to sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 147. Section 147 of the M.V Act, 1988 not having contained similar provisions as proviso (ii) to Sec. 95(1)(b) of the M.V Act, 1939, the Full Bench decision does not appear to be applicable in the matter of interpretation of Sec. 147(1)(b)(i) of the M.V Act, 1988.

12. An analysis of the language of Section 147(1)(b)(i) of the M.V Act, 1988 leaves no doubt that the words “any person” mean not only third party, but also other persons and the word “vehicle” covers all kinds of vehicles including a goods vehicle. In case of death or bodily injury the legislature has used the words “any person” while in case of damage to property the legislature has confined it only to property of a third party. This difference in language is indicative of the wider coverage in case of death or bodily injury.

13. By the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1994 Section 147(1)(b)(i) has been amended substituting the words “injury to any person, including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle” for the words “injury to any person”. The said amendment has made it further clear that “any person” has been used in a wider sense. It has been argued on behalf of the appellant that the said amendment indicates that prior to such amendment the words “any person” did not include the owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle. As already stated hereinbefore that the words “any person” even prior to the amendment were not confined to only third party, but the same had a wider coverage. The nature of the amendment shows that the same is clarificatory by nature. The plain meaning of the words “any person” is “all persons” and accordingly it was not at all necessary to insert the words “including the owner of the goods or the authorised representative carried in the vehicle”. In view of the conflicting and divergent interpretations by different Courts the said words have been added to put an end to all possible controversies. It is well known that in many cases legislature has added or deleted words in order to clarify the position, to clear up an ambiguity and to prevent any scope for conflicting interpretation. It is also an accepted rule of interpretation of statutes that when an amendment is made to clarify things it ordinarily means that the unamended provision had included and covered time introduced by way of clarification. The Supreme Court in Laxmi Engineering Works v. P.S.G Industrial Institute, reported in (1995) 3 SCC 583 has considered the effect of adding an explanation to the definition of ‘consumer’ by way of amendment in the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 to find out whether the amendment expanded the meaning or was in the nature of a clarification. While considering the nature of the explanation added to the definition of the expression ‘consumer’ in the said Consumer Protection Act, 1986 the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision has held:—

“…..It merely makes explicit what was implicit in the Act. It is not as if the law is changed by the said explanation; it has been merely made clearer.”

Applying the test adopted in the aforesaid decision it should be held that Amendment of 1994 by insertion of the said words in Sec. 147 of the M.V Act, 1988 has only made explicit what was implicit in the original provision.

14. It is not possible to accept the submission that the words “any person” used in unamended Sec. 147(1)(b)(i) were to be given a restricted meaning and kept confined to third party only. Such a restricted meaning would be doing violence to the common and dictionary meaning of the words used in the section. Moreover, it is an accepted principle of interpretation of statutes that in case of beneficial legislation construction of any provision, which is more favourable to the persons for whose benefits the law has been enacted, should be adopted. There cannot be any dispute that Motor Vehicles Act particularly the provisions relating to compensation for the victims of road accidents and the requirement of compulsory insurance coverage are meant for the benefit of the victims and the members of their family.

15. Mr. Sinha referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Pushpabai Parshottam Udeshi v. Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Company Pvt. Ltd., reported in AIR 1977 SC 1735 in support of his contention that insurance coverage is not necessary for persons carried in goods vehicle. The said decision of the Supreme Court was rendered relying upon proviso (ii) to Section 95(b)(i) of the M.V Act of 1939. As already explained that the said provision has been omitted in the 1988 Act. Accordingly, the said decision cannot be relied upon for the purpose of interpretation of the words “any person” in Section 147(1)(b)(i) of the Act of 1988.

16. In view of the discussions herein above, it is not at all necessary to go into the question whether the amendment of 1994 is retrospective in operation or the same should be made applicable to the claim proceedings pending on the date of the amendment. As it has been held that under M.V Act, 1988 the words “any person” used in Sec. 147(1)(b)(i) include persons carried by even a goods vehicle and are not confined to third party only, the Insurance Company cannot escape their statutory liability.

17. The next contention raised on behalf of the appellant is that when admittedly two vehicles were involved in the accident the insurer of one of the vehicles cannot be made liable to pay the entire compensation because the other tort feasor is also equally liable. The said question has been set at rest by this Court in its decision in New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Ashok Kumar Acharya, (1994 (1) Current Judicial Reports 293). Pointing out the difference between “contributory negligence” and “composite negligence” in paragraph 5 of the said judgment it has been held:—

“Where negligent acts of two or more independent persons have between them caused damage to a third, the sufferer is not driven to apply any such analysis to find out whom he can sue. He is entitled, of course, within the limits set by the general rules as to remoteness of damage to sue all or any one of the negligent persons. It is no concern of his whether there is any duty of contribution or indemnity as between these persons though in any case he cannot recover in the whole more than his whole damage.”

Accordingly, the said contention of Mr. Sinha cannot be accepted.

18. Mr. Sinha on behalf of the Insurance Company has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in General Manager, Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, Trivandrum v. Mrs. Susamma Thomas, AIR 1994 SC 1631 and urged that the Tribunal committed error in applying a multiplier of 18 in assessing the compensation. In the said case a person aged about 38 years having a monthly income of Rs. 1032/- succumbed to an unfortunate motor accident. In the said case the Supreme Court applied a multiplier of 12, but while computing the income of the deceased the Supreme Court also took into account the prospects of advancement of the future career and assessed his monthly income at Rupees 2000/-. The 1/3rd of the gross income was deducted as the amount liable to have been spent towards the personal living expenses of the deceased. The total amount awarded in the said case was Rs. 2,25,000/-.

19. In the present case the monthly pay of deceased was found to be Rs. 1195/-. The Tribunal recorded that no evidence has been adduced to prove that the deceased had further scope of promotion. But the Tribunal did not consider the prospects of pay revision in calculating the total loss. The Tribunal took only half of the income as monthly contribution to the dependants, whereas the Supreme Court took 2/3rd of the gross income as the contribution to the dependants. May be the multiplier of 18 in this case is to the higher side, but considering the other factors, it cannot be held that the total compensation as awarded is high or unreasonable. Rather, the assessment is quite modest, compared to the assessment made by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision in AIR 1994 SC 1631 (supra).

20. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is dismissed. The Insurance Company is directed to pay the entire compensation, if not already paid, within two months from the date of the judgment.

No order as to costs.

Appeal dismissed.

The Divisional Manag... v. Jasoda Mohanta And O...