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  • section 23(4)(a) of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) read with rule 80 of the Orissa Sales Tax Rules, 1947 (hereinafter referred
  • section 23(4)(a) read with rule 80 of the Orissa Sales Tax Rules, 1947.You
  • section 20(2) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957.
  • sub-section (4)(a) of section 23 read with rule 80.10.
  • section 9-B(3) or 11(3). Sub-section (2) of section 23
  • sub-section (4)(a) of section 23 read with rule 80.
  • sub-section (1). Sub-section (3)(a) of section 23
  • sub-section (4)(a) of section 23 and rule 80
  • sub-section (4)(a) of section 23
  • sub-section (2) of section 23
  • sub-section (3) of section 23
  • section 23(4)(a) and rule 80
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • section 23(4)(a) of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) read with rule 80 of the Orissa Sales Tax Rules, 1947 (hereinafter referred
  • section 23(4)(a) read with rule 80 of the Orissa Sales Tax Rules, 1947.You
  • section 20(2) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957.
  • sub-section (4)(a) of section 23 read with rule 80.10.
  • section 9-B(3) or 11(3). Sub-section (2) of section 23
  • sub-section (4)(a) of section 23 read with rule 80.
  • sub-section (1). Sub-section (3)(a) of section 23
  • sub-section (4)(a) of section 23 and rule 80
  • sub-section (4)(a) of section 23
  • sub-section (2) of section 23
  • sub-section (3) of section 23
  • section 23(4)(a) and rule 80
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — R.K. Patra, J. (with D.P. Mohapatra, A.C.J. concurring)

Factual and Procedural Background

Two writ petitions (O.J.C. No. 4496 of 1995 and O.J.C. No. 4497 of 1995) challenged identical notices dated June 9, 1995 issued by the Additional Commissioner of Sales Tax, Orissa, under section 23(4)(a) of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947 read with rule 80 of the Orissa Sales Tax Rules, 1947. The notices purported to invoke the Commissioner's suo motu revisional jurisdiction to revise the first appellate orders passed by the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Cuttack I Range.

O.J.C. No. 4496 concerned the assessment year ending 1993-94: the assessing officer's order was dated June 22, 1994 and the Assistant Commissioner's appellate order was dated September 14, 1994. O.J.C. No. 4497 concerned the assessment year ending 1992-93: the assessing officer's order was dated August 6, 1993 and the Assistant Commissioner's appellate order was dated May 3, 1994. The two petitions were heard together because the parties and the point involved were the same.

Petitioner M/s. Halari Store (a registered dealer dealing in wholesale purchase and sale of betel-nuts) had appeared in response to notices under section 12(4) and produced books of account. The Sales Tax Officer allegedly rejected the books without proper examination and assessed to the best of his judgment. The petitioner appealed under section 23(1); the Assistant Commissioner allowed the appeal in part for 1992-93 and in full for 1993-94. The Revenue did not file further appeals but the Additional Commissioner issued the impugned suo motu revision notices seeking to revisit those appellate orders.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Commissioner (or Additional Commissioner) can, under section 23(4)(a) of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947 and rule 80 of the Orissa Sales Tax Rules, 1947, exercise suo motu revisional jurisdiction to revise or set aside an appellate order passed by the first appellate authority under section 23(2).
  2. Whether rule 80 can be read so as to permit revision of an appellate order, or whether the rule is constrained by and must yield to the specific provisions of section 23.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as advanced by Shri A.K. Ray)

  • The Assistant Commissioner, being the competent first appellate authority under section 23(2), had disposed of the appeals; those appellate orders could only be challenged by filing second appeals under section 23(3).
  • The Additional Commissioner was not competent to invoke suo motu jurisdiction under section 23(4) to nullify first appellate orders which had become final because no second appeal was filed.

Opposite Parties' Contentions (as reflected in counter-affidavit and submissions)

  • The Revenue contended that under the scheme of the Act no right accrues to any person until proceedings attain finality and that the appellate orders were erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue, thereby necessitating the exercise of statutory suo motu revisional power.
  • Learned Standing Counsel for the Commercial Department relied on the Supreme Court decision in State of Andhra Pradesh v. T.G. Lakshmaiah Setty & Sons [1994] 94 STC 190 to support the proposition that the Commissioner is competent to issue the impugned notices.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Andhra Pradesh v. T.G. Lakshmaiah Setty & Sons, [1994] 94 STC 190 Addressed the availability of revision under section 20(2) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957 and held that an assessee cannot invoke the suo motu power under that provision. The court examined the decision and concluded that its ratio did not apply to the present case because the earlier decision did not consider whether revisional jurisdiction could be invoked to assail an order of the first appellate authority in lieu of pursuing a second appeal. Accordingly, the precedent did not assist the Revenue's contention and was rejected as inapplicable on the facts and questions raised in these petitions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in a sequential manner based on the statutory scheme:

  1. Statutory framework: The court set out section 23 (appeals and revision) and rule 80 (revision by the Commissioner suo motu) from the statute and rules. It noted that section 23 distinguishes between appeals (sub‑sections (1), (2) and (3)) and revision (sub‑section (4)(a)), and expressly provides for second appeals to the Sales Tax Tribunal under section 23(3).
  2. Distinction between appeal and revision: The court emphasized the well-known legal distinction — an appeal is a continuation of proceedings where the entire proceedings are before the appellate authority, while revisional jurisdiction is different in nature and purpose.
  3. Interpretation of rules vis-à-vis statute: The court reiterated the principle that rules made under an Act cannot override specific statutory provisions and must be read, if possible, to be consistent with the Act; if inconsistent, the rule must yield to the statute.
  4. Meaning of "subject to such rules": Because sub‑section (4)(a) begins with the words "subject to such rules as may be made", the court concluded that rule 80 cannot enlarge the revisional power beyond what sub‑section (4)(a) provides; rule 80 does not confer any extra power of revision to the Commissioner.
  5. Construction of "any order": The court considered whether the phrase "any order" in sub‑section (4)(a) and in rule 80 includes appellate orders passed under section 23(2). The court held that such an interpretation would be contrary to the scheme of section 23, which expressly provides a remedy by way of second appeal to the Tribunal against first appellate orders. Allowing revisional jurisdiction to displace the second appeal would permit a short‑circuiting of the appellate forum and be inconsistent with the statutory scheme.
  6. Role of provisos and limitations: The court pointed to the proviso in sub‑section (4)(a) — which bars the Commissioner from entertaining revision where the person had a remedy by way of appeal under sub‑section (1) or (3) but did not avail it — and to the proviso in rule 80 — which precludes revision where an appeal against the order is pending. These restrictions, the court said, demonstrate that the Commissioner cannot properly revisit appellate orders made under section 23(2).
  7. Application to facts: The Assistant Commissioner (first appellate authority) had partly set aside the assessment for 1992‑93 and annulled the assessment for 1993‑94. Those appellate orders were capable of being challenged by the Revenue by a second appeal but the Revenue did not do so. Consequently, those orders became final. The Commissioner (Additional) therefore lacked jurisdiction to issue the impugned suo motu revision notices purporting to revise those first appellate orders.
  8. On the authority relied upon by the Revenue: The court examined the cited Supreme Court decision (State of Andhra Pradesh v. T.G. Lakshmaiah Setty & Sons) and found it inapposite because it dealt with a different provision and did not address whether revisional jurisdiction could be used to assail a first appellate order without pursuing the second appeal. Hence that precedent did not support the Revenue's position.
  9. Conclusion of analysis: For these reasons, the court concluded that the impugned notices issued by the Additional Commissioner were without jurisdiction and therefore liable to be quashed.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The writ petitions are allowed; the impugned notices dated June 9, 1995 issued by the Additional Commissioner of Sales Tax (purporting to invoke revision under section 23(4)(a) read with rule 80) are quashed as being without jurisdiction.

Direct implications for the parties:

  • The first appellate orders of the Assistant Commissioner (partly setting aside the assessment for 1992‑93 and annulling the assessment for 1993‑94) stand as final, insofar as the Revenue elected not to pursue second appeals.
  • The Additional Commissioner's attempts to revise those first appellate orders by issuing the impugned suo motu notices were invalid and cannot operate to nullify the appellate orders.
  • No order as to costs was made by the court.

Broader legal implication identified by the court:

The judgment establishes that, under the statutory scheme of section 23 read with rule 80, the Commissioner cannot employ suo motu revisional power to revise or set aside an appellate order made under section 23(2) in circumstances where the statutory appellate remedy (second appeal to the Tribunal under section 23(3)) was available but not pursued by the Revenue. Rule 80 cannot be read so as to enlarge the revisional power to override the specific appellate provisions in section 23.

Order recorded: both judges agreed; the writ petitions were allowed and the impugned notices were quashed (D.P. Mohapatra, A.C.J. concurred).

    Halari Store v. Commissioner Of Sales Tax, Orissa And Another

    R.K Patra, J.:— Both the writ petitions are directed against the notices dated June 9, 1995 (annexure 1) issued by the Additional Commissioner of Sales Tax, Orissa, Cuttack—opposite party No. 2 under section 23(4)(a) of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) read with rule 80 of the Orissa Sales Tax Rules, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as “the Rules”) for suo motu revision of the first appellate orders passed by the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Cuttack I Range, Cuttack. The impugned notices in both the cases are identically worded. O.J.C No. 4496 of 1995 relates to the assessment year ending 1993-94, the order of assessment of the concerned Sales Tax Officer is dated June 22, 1994 and the order of the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax passed in appeal is dated September 14, 1994. O.J.C No. 4497 of 1995 relates to the assessment year ending 1992-93, the order of assessment of the Sales Tax Officer is dated August 6, 1993 and the order of the Assistant Commissioner, Sales Tax passed in appeal is dated May 3, 1994. Parties in both the cases being common and the point involved being the same, they were heard together and are disposed of by this judgment.

    2. Petitioner M/s. Halari Store is a registered dealer under the Act. It carries on wholesale business in purchase and sale of betel-nuts at Malgodown, Cuttack. In response to notices issued under section 12(4) of the Act, the petitioner appeared before the concerned Sales Tax Officer and produced the books of accounts for the relevant years for verification. According to the petitioner, the Sales Tax Officer without properly examining the purchase and sale accounts, purchase invoices and sales memos rejected the books of accounts illegally and completed the assessment to the best of his judgment. Aggrieved by the assessment orders, the petitioner filed appeals before the first appellate authority, i.e, the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Cuttack I Range, Cuttack under section 23(1) of the Act. The said appellate authority by making elaborate discussion in the orders referred to above allowed the appeal in part for the year 1992-93 and in full for the year 1993-94. The allegation of the petitioner is that the Revenue did not choose to challenge the orders of the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax by filing second appeals within the time stipulated and, instead, has resorted to unauthorised means by issuing the impugned notices through the Additional Commissioner of Sales Tax to nullify the first appellate orders which have become final.

    3. We may extract the impugned notices below:

    In O.J.C No. 4496 of 1995:

    “Whereas it appears that the order dated September 14, 1994, passed by the learned Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Cuttack I Range, Cuttack for the year. 1993-94 is erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interest of Revenue for the reasons given below:

    (i) The allegation of suppression although established was not properly appreciated by the learned Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax. The order passed by him on September 14, 1994 is detrimental to the interest of the Revenue.

    (ii) There is reason to believe that you have under-invoiced the purchase as well as the sale price of the commodities dealt by you.

    (iii) There is apparent mistake in calculation.

    You are therefore directed to appear before the undersigned on July 20, 1995 at 11.15 A.M with the relevant books of accounts to defend your case failing which action will be taken as per materials available in record.”

    In O.J.C No. 4497 of 1995:

    “Whereas it appears that the order dated May 3, 1994 passed by the learned Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Cuttack I Range, Cuttack for the year 1992-93 is erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interest of Revenue for the reasons given below.

    You have returned a sale price for your commodities which is comparatively less than the prevalent market price under invoicing of sale price is further supported by exhibition of low profit. That is why the appeal order is to be revised under section 23(4)(a) read with rule 80 of the Orissa Sales Tax Rules, 1947.

    You are therefore directed to appear before the undersigned on July 20, 1995 at 11.15 A.M along with books of accounts to defend your case failing which the case will be decided ex parte basing on available materials in record.”

    4. Shri A.K Ray, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax who is the competent authority to decide the first appeals has disposed of the appeals and those appellate orders could have been challenged by the Revenue by filing second appeals as provided in section 23(3) of the Act and without taking recourse to the same, the Additional Commissioner of Sales Tax is not competent to invoke suo motu jurisdiction under section 23(4) of the Act by issuing the impugned notices and set at naught the orders of the first appellate authority which have otherwise become final. Counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the opposite parties contending, inter alia, that under the scheme of the Act no right accrues to any person until proceeding attains finality and the exercise of statutory power of suo motu revision was necessitated as the appellate orders of the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax were erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue.

    5. To appreciate the contention involved in the matter, it is necessary to read section 23 of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. Section 23 deals with appeals and revisions. Sub-section (1) thereof provides, inter alia, that any dealer or person may appeal to the prescribed authority against an order of assessment under section 12, 12-A or 12-B or an order directing payment of interest under section 12(4-a) or an order ifriposing penalty under section 9-B(3) or 11(3). sub-section (2) of section 23 deals with the power of the appellate authority in disposing of appeal preferred under sub-section (1). Sub-section (3)(a) of section 23 deals with second appeals which provides, inter alia, that any dealer or State Government, as the case may be, dissatisfied with an appellate order may appeal to the Sales Tax Tribunal against such order. Since the scope and ambit of section 23(4)(a) and rule 80 are involved, it would be appropriate to quote them. They are as follows:

    “23. Appeals and revision.—

    (1) ………………………….

    (2) …………………………

    (3) …………………………

    (4) (a) Subject to such rules as may be made and for reasons to be recorded in writing, the Commissioner may, upon application by a dealer (or person) or on his own motion revise any order made under this Act or the rules made thereunder by any person other than the Tribunal, appointed under Sub-section (3) of section 3 to assist him:

    Provided that the Commissioner shall not entertain any such application for revision if the dealer (or the person) filing the same having a remedy by way of appeal under sub-section (1), or sub-section (3) did not avail of such remedy or the application is not filed within the prescribed period.”

    “80. Revision by the Commissioner suo motu.—The Commissioner may on his own motion at any time within three years from the date of passing of any order by the Sales Tax Officer or within two years from the date of passing of any order by the Additional Commissioner, Special Additional Commissioner or Assistant Commissioner, as the case may be, call for records of the proceedings in which such order was passed and if he considers that any order passed therein is erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interest of the revenue he may after giving the dealer an opportunity of being heard and after making or causing to be made such enquiry as he deems necessary revise any such order:

    Provided that the Commissioner shall not revise any order under this rule—

    (1) Where an appeal against the order is pending before the appellate authority under section 23, or

    (2) Where time-limit for filing an appeal under section 23 has not expired.”

    6. We may state here that when the familiar words of “appeal” and “revision” are found mentioned in section 23, it would be reasonable to assume that the well-known distinction between the appellate and the revisional jurisdiction was also accepted by the Legislature. An appeal being a continuation of the proceedings, the entire proceedings are before the appellate authority who is competent to dispose of the appeal subject to the statutory limitation, if any, prescribed. As we find, the appellate authorities, viz., the first appellate authority as well as the second appellate authority may confirm, reduce, enhance or annul the assessment or the penalty or interest or set aside the assessment or the penalty or interest and direct the assessing authority to pass a fresh order after such other enquiry as may be directed. The aforesaid being the position, the question that arises for our consideration is whether the Commissioner in exercise of revisional power, be it at the instance of the Revenue or suo motu can revise an order passed by the first appellate authority under sub-section (2) of section 23 of the Act.

    7. At this stage, we may consider the position of rule 80 which deals with the suo motu revisional jurisdiction of the Commissioner vis-a-vis section 23(4)(a). It is now fairly settled that the rules made under an Act cannot override the specific provisions of the Act. If the rule is in excess of the provision of the Act or in contravention of or inconsistent with such provision it must be declared as ultra vires. Before declaring so, the court must endeavour to reconcile them that is to say, the rule may be so read if the phraseology permits it, as to make it consistent with the specific provision. In the event, the rule comes into conflict with the specific provision of the Act, the former must yield to the latter. It may now be noticed that sub-section (4)(a) of section 23 starts with the expression “subject to such rules as may be made……………” from which it follows that rule 80 cannot override sub-section (4)(a) of section 23. To put it pithily, the said, rule does not enlarge or confer any extra power of revision to the Commissioner.

    8. Now coming back to the issue involved we find that sub-section (4)(a) of section 23 empowers the Commissioner to revise any order made under the Act or the rules made thereunder by any person other than the Tribunal appointed under sub-section (3) of section 23 to assist him. Rule 80 provides that the Commissioner may suo motu call for the records of the proceedings in which any order was passed by the Sales Tax Officer or the Assistant Commissioner or the Additional Commissioner or the Special Additional Commissioner and may revise such order. The question is whether the words “any order” in sub-section (4)(a) of section 23 and rule 80 mean an appellate order passed by the appellate authority under sub-section (2) of section 23. We have in the preceding paragraph indicated the scheme of section 23 which provides that an order of assessment [since the cases at hand deal with the orders of assessment, we have not referred to other orders which are appealable under sub-section (I) of section 23] is appealable and the appellate authority may dispose of the appeal by confirming, reducing, enhancing or annulling the assessment or set aside the assessment and direct the assessing authority to pass fresh order after such further enquiry as may be directed. Such order passed by the appellate authority is further appealable to the Tribunal. The statute having mentioned a clear and specific provision for filing second appeal to the Tribunal against the order of the first appellate authority passed under section 23(2), the aggrieved party cannot by-pass the appellate forum and follow a short-circuit by invoking the revisional jurisdiction of the Commissioner. We state that the expression “any order” in sub-section (4)(a) of section 23 and rule 80 does not mean an appellate order made under sub-section (2) of section 23. Any other construction would run contrary to the scheme of section 23 and such construction should be avoided. It is well-known that the provision should be considered to ensure consistency within the law as a whole and to avoid undesirable consequences. The Commissioner in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under sub-section (4)(a) of section 23 and under rule 80 cannot revise an appellate order made by the appellate authority under sub-section (2) of section 23 is apparent from the restrictions contained in the proviso to subsection (4)(a) as well as the proviso contained in rule 80. The proviso to sub--section (4)(a) of section 23 states that the Commissioner shall not entertain any such application for revision if the dealer or the person filing such revision having remedy by way of appeal under sub-section (1), or sub-section (3) did not avail of such remedy. The proviso to rule 80 further clarifies by stating that the Commissioner shall not revise an order where an appeal against such order is pending before the appellate authority under section 23. The appellate authority here includes the first appellate authority as well as the second appellate authority.

    9. In view of the aforesaid, let us examine whether the Commissioner (Additional) was within his bounds to issue the impugned notices purported to be in exercise of his revisional power under sub-section (4)(a) of section 23 read with rule 80. It is not disputed before us that the first appellate authority, i.e, the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax in exercise of his powers conferred under sub-section (2) of section 23 has partly set aside the order of assessment for the year 1992-93 and annulled the entire assessment for the year 1993-94. Both the orders passed by him as per annexure 3 were available to be appealed against under sub-section (3) of section 23, but the Revenue did not prefer any appeal. Consequently, those orders have become final and they are not available to be intermeddled with by the Commissioner in purported exercise of his revisional power under sub-section (4)(a) of section 23 read with rule 80.

    10. Shri Lal, learned Standing Counsel for the Commercial Department has referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. T.G Lakshmaiah Setty & Sons, [1994] 94 STC 190 in support of his submission that the Commissioner is competent to issue the impugned notices. We have carefully perused the said decision and found that the ratio of that case has no application to the case at hand. The question that arose for consideration before the apex Court in that case was whether an assessee can file revision under section 20(2) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957. By interpreting the said provision, the court hold that assessee cannot invoke the suo motu power of the authorities under section 20. In that case, the question as to whether revisional jurisdiction can be invoked to assail the order of the first appellate authority without challenging the said order in the second appeal did not come up for consideration. Accordingly, the said decision is of little assistance to the learned Standing Counsel. For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the impugned notices, annexure 1 in both the petitions issued by the Additional Commissioner of Sales Tax are without jurisdiction and are accordingly quashed.

    11. In the result, both the writ petitions are allowed. There will be no order as to costs.

    D.P Mohapatra, A.C.J:— I agree.

    12. Writ petitions allowed.

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    Halari Store v. Commissioner Of Sales Tax, Orissa And Another
    (Feb 12, 1996)