Hansaria, C.J:— The significant question to be decided in this writ petition is whether the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, have application to newspaper employees other than working journalists. This question has arisen on these facts. The petitioner was initially appointed as a stringer at Puri by opposite party 1 General Manager, United News of India, on a consolidated honorarium of Rs. 40 per month. This was in 1973. After completion of the probationary period, he was confirmed in service. Thereafter, his name was included in the mailing list as district correspondent. Having been treated as a correspondent, his honorarium was raised to Rs. 75 per month. He continued to discharge this function. In the meantime, Palekar Tribunal was constituted under the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Working Journalists Act) to fix wages in respect of working journalists. The Tribunal gave its award on 12 August, 1980. The case of the petitioner is that on the basis of the said award he became entitled to higher wages and accordingly, he sent representation to his employer, who did not respond. Suddenly, by a letter, dated 25 August, 1983, the service of the petitioner was terminated with effect from 15 September, 1983.

2. An industrial dispute was raised relating to the termination on the petitioner's service on the ground that the same amounted to retrenchment but was ordered without complying with the requirements of S. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The dispute was referred for adjudication by the Labour Court. A preliminary objection was raised relating to maintainability of the reference on the ground that the petitioner was not a working journalist and as such not a “workman” as defined by S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The learned Labour Court has held that the reference is not maintainable and has answered the reference accordingly. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner has approached this Court.

3. A perusal of the impugned award shows that the petitioner was not regarded as a working journalist as he was a part-time correspondent, because of which it was held that the same was not his principal avocation. It was then opined that as the petitioner was not a working journalist, he could not be regarded as a “workman” under the Industrial Disputes Act.

4. In assailing the view taken by the Labour Court, Sri Dhal contends that to be a working journalist, it is not necessary that the principal avocation of a correspondent must be that of a journalist. To appreciate the contention of the learned counsel, we have to know the definition of “working journalist” given in S. 2(f) of the Working Journalists Act, which reads as below:

“2. Definitions.— In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires—

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(f) working journalist means a person whose principal avocation is that of a journalist and who is employed as such in, or in relation to, any newspaper establishment and includes an editor, a leader-writer, news-editor, sub-editor, feature-writer, copy-tester, reporter, correspondent, cartoonist, news photographer and proof-reader, but docs not include any such person who—

(i) is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or

(ii) being employed in a supervisory capacity, performs, cither by the nature of the duties attached to his office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature.”

5. By referring to the aforesaid definition, it is contended that as mention about “correspondent” has been made in the inclusive part of the definition, the first part would not be required to be satisfied qua him. The Labour Court, however, took the contrary view placing reliance on Express Newspapers, Ltd. v. B. Somayajulu [A.I.R 1964 S.C 279]. A reading of this decision would no doubt support the view taken by the Labour Court. According to this decision, the categories of persons mentioned in the inclusive part of the definition only remove the doubt as to whether the person specified in the said clause are journalists or not. But then, to claim the status of “working journalists,” they will have to further show that journalism, is their principal avocation.

6. Despite the above undisputed position, Sri Dhal contends that a later decision of the Supreme Court in Management Of Daily Pratap v. Katibs 73], would show that for a person in the inclusive category, the requirement that his principal avocation must be that of a journalist would not apply. In this connection, the following observation finding place in Para. 22, at page 77 of the judgment, wherein the aforesaid decision in Somayajulu was noted, is pressed into service:

“… It is a matter of considerable doubt whether one of the conditions to be satisfied as laid down by this Court that he must be a person whose principal avocation is that of a journalist when interpreting the inclusive part of the definition as contained in S. 2(f) of the Act will still apply…”

Despite this, we would be hesitant to hold that the first part of the definition is not required to be satisfied for those categories of persons who come in the inclusive clause for two reasons: First, in the above-noted portion of the judgment, only a doubt has been expressed on the proposition which had found favour with the Court in Somayajulu [A.I.R 1964 S.C 279] (vide supra). There is no decision on this point. Secondly, the Court in Daily Pratap case (vide supra), was considering the question whether a calligraphist would not be regarded as a “working journalist” if his principal avocation would not be journalism even though the Wage Board had defined a “calligraphist” as coming within the definition of a “working journalist.” We do not have before us any decision of any authority like the Wage Board to state that a correspondent would be a “working journalist” even if his principal avocation be not that of a journalist.

7. The aforesaid, however, is not the end of the journey inasmuch as Sri Dhal's next contention is that even if the petitioner be not a working journalist, he could still be a “workman” under the provision of the Industrial Disputes Act. As to this contention, the reply of Sri Mohantly appearing for opposite party 1 is that the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act would apply only to working journalists and to no other categories of newspaper employees. This submission is advanced on the basis of what has been provided in S. 3 of the Working Journalists Act, which is in the following language:

“3. Act 14 of 1947 to apply to working journalists.— (1) The provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as in force for the time being, shall, subject to the modification specified in Sub-sec. (2), apply to, or in relation to, working journalists as they apply to, or in relation to, workmen within the meaning of that Act.

(2) Section 25-F of the aforesaid Act, in its application to working journalists, shall be construed as if in Cl. (a) thereof, for the period of notice referred to therein in relation to the retrenchment of a working journalist had been substituted, namely—

(a) six months, in the case of an editor; and

(b) three months, in the case of any other working journalist.”

It would also be apposite in this connection to note the definition of “newspaper employee” as given in S. 2(c) of the Act which reads as below:

“‘newspaper employee’ means any working journalist, and includes any other person employed to do any work in, or in relation to, any newspaper establishment.”

8. It is further contended by the learned counsel that in so far as other newspaper employees are concerned, provisions have been made in Ss. 14 and 15 of the Working Journalists Act regarding application of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, and the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952. Our attention is also invited in this connection by Sri Mohanty to S. 17(2) of the Working Journalists Act which has stated that if any question arises as to the amount due under this Act to a newspaper employee from his employer, the State Government may refer the question to any Labour Court constituted by it under the Industrial Disputes Act and the said Act shall have effect in relation to the Labour Court as if the question so referred were a matter referred to that Court for adjudication under that Act.

9. Let us note these provisions:

“14. Act 20 of 1946 to apply to newspaper establishments.— The provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, as in force for the time being, shall apply to every newspaper establishment wherein twenty or more newspaper employees are employed or were employed on any day of the preceding twelve months as if such newspaper establishment were an industrial establishment to which the aforesaid Act has been applied by a notification under Sub-sec.(3) of S. 1 thereof, and as if a newspaper employee were a workman within the meaning of that Act.

15. Act 19 of 1952 to apply to newspaper establishment.— The Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952, as in force for the time being, shall apply to every newspaper establishment in which twenty or more persons are employed on any day, as if such newspaper establishment were a factory to which the aforesaid Act had been applied by a notification of the Central Government under Sub-sec. (3) of S. 1 thereof, and as if a newspaper employee were an employee within the meaning of that Act.”

17. Recovery of money due from an employer — (1) Where any amount is due under this Act to a newspaper employee from an employer, the newspaper employee himself, or any person authorised by him in writing in this behalf, or in the case of the death of the employee, any member of his family may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make an application to the State Government for the recovery of the amount due to him, and if the State Government, or such authority as the State Government may specify in this behalf, is satisfied that any amount is so due, it shall issue a certificate for that amount to the Collector, and the Collector shall proceed to recover that amount in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue.

(2) If any question arises as to the amount due under this Act to a newspaper employee from his employer, the State Government may, on its own motion or upon application made to it, refer the question to any Labour Court constituted by it under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, or under any corresponding law relating to investigation and settlement of industrial disputes in force in the State and the said Act or law shall have effect in relation to the Labour Court as if the question so referred were a matter referred to the Labour Court for adjudication under that Act or law.”

10. Relying on these provisions, it is urged that in so far as newspaper employees other than working journalists are concerned, they can take advantage of the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, or the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952, or, if they have a grievance about any amount due to them from their employer, they may apply to the State Government for referring the question to the Labour Court for adjudication. It, therefore, follows, according to the learned counsel, that a newspaper employee other than a working journalist would not be a “workman” under the Industrial Disputes Act and he cannot take advantage of the provisions of that Act.

11. We have duly considered the aforesaid submission of Sri Mohanty and, according to us, it would be difficult to say that the benefit of the Industrial Dispute Act would not be available to newspaper employees other than working journalists even if they be workmen within the meaning of that Act. As to S. 3(1) of the Working Journalist Act, we would say that the provision in that section making the Industrial Disputes, Act applicable to working journalists cannot be taken to be that the said Act would not apply to other newspaper employees. S. 3(1) might have been enacted to make it abundantly clear that the Industrial Disputes Act would apply to working journalists even if they may not satisfy the definition of “workman” as given in the Industrial Disputes Act. It is worth pointing out in this connection that a working journalist as defined in Section. 2(f) of the Working Journalists Act may not be a “workman” if the definition of that expression as given in the Industrial Disputes Act were to apply to him. The Legislature, however, wanted the benefits of the Industrial Disputes Act to be made available to working journalists and it is perhaps because of this that S. 3(1) was inserted in the Act. This apart, reference to S. 3(1) shows that certain modifications were made in the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act in their application to working journalists. We do not think if we would be justified in denying the benefits of a statute as important as the Industrial Disputes Act to other categories of newspaper employees, if otherwise they be workmen within the meaning of that Act, because of what has been provided in S. 3(1) of the Working Journalists Act.

12. As to the application of the two specific Acts to newspaper employees because of what has been provided in Ss. 14 and 15 of the Working Journalists Act, we would say that these two sections were enacted to make the two Acts in question applicable to newspaper establishments because de hors these provisions, those Acts might not have applied to such establishments. The Legislature, however, wanted to give the benefit of those Acts to all newspaper employees. It may be pointed out that Ss. 14 and 15 have referred to the application of the two Acts in question to “every newspaper establishment” and not to “newspaper employees.” Of course, by making these two Acts applicable to all newspaper establishments, the benefits of the same were conferred on all newspaper employees. This does not mean that the Legislature wanted to rob the newspaper employees of the benefits of other Acts. According to us, no such conclusion can be drawn on the basis of what has been provided in Ss. 14 and 15 of the Working Journalists Act.

13. What has been provided in S. 17(2) of the Working Journalists Act is also an additional benefit made available to a newspaper employee, because, but for this provision, it would not have been open to a newspaper employee to get his matter relating to any amount due under the Act referred for adjudication by the Labour Court. It is known that the provision finding place in S. 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act does not permit a Labour Court to enter into disputed questions relating to any amount due to an employee from his employer, as that provision is mainly related to computation of the amount due, rather than adjudication of the entitlement to the amount due. So, but for what is stated in S. 17(2) of the Working Journalists Act, a newspaper employee could not have got his matter relating to entitlement of any amount due from his employer adjudicated by the Labour Courts.

14. Though Sri Dhal has referred in this connection to S. 25-J of the Industrial Disputes Act, that section is not relevant to decide the controversy at hand, as what is laid down therein is that the provisions of Chap. V A of that Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law. But for the provisions of Chap. VA to apply, the Act itself must be first applicable, which would be so if the concerned employee be a “workman.” To this, answer has to be found from provisions other than those finding place in Chap. V-A of the aforesaid Act.

15. However, in view of what is stated above, we would reject the contention advanced by Sri Mohanty and hold that the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act would not cease to apply to a newspaper employee if he be otherwise covered by the provisions of that Act which would be so if he would be a “workman” as defined in S. 2(s) of that Act.

16. Sri Mohanty has something to say on this aspect of the matter also. According to him, the petitioner could not be regarded as a ‘“workman” within the definition of S. 2 (s) of the Industrial Disputes Act inasmuch as there is nothing to show if opposite party 1 was exercising any control and supervision over the work of the petitioner. It is submitted that the relationship of employer and employee would not exist between the parties unless one be in a position to control and supervise the work of the other. For the disposal of this case, we would agree with Sri Mohanty that for the relationship of an employer and his employee to come into existence, it should be shown that the employer was in a position to control and supervise the work of the employee. This is the view expressed in Dharangadhara Chemical Works, Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra [A.I.R 1957 S.C 264], which was cited with approval in Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh [A.I.R 1958 S.C 388]. It may, however, be pointed out that there is no rigid test to determine the question of “control and supervision.” The answer in every case would ultimately turn on its own circumstances.

17. In the case at hand, there is no application of mind by the Labour Court to the aforesaid aspect of the matter though it has been observed in the impugned award that the management never exercised any control over the work of the petitioner. This is, however, a half-hearted observation. Having come to the conclusion that the petitioner being not a working journalist, it was not available to him to contend that he was a “workman” under the Industrial Disputes Acts, the Labour Court did not really apply its full mind to the question as to whether the petitioner would not be a “workman” as defined in S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act because of lack of control and supervision exercised by opposite party 1. It is urged by Sri Mohanty by referring to Newspapers, Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1980 F.L.R 348], that if there would be no control over a correspondent, he cannot be called an employee. Though this is so, but every case would depend on its own facts. In the case at hand, there is very scantly treatment of this subject. The entire matter has been disposed of in two sentences. Parties were not called upon to substantiate their cases on this aspect. We would, therefore, desire a proper adjudication of this point.

18. In view of what is stated above, we set aside the impugned award and remit the matter back to the Labour Court for fresh disposal in the light of the observations made above. While taking up the matter afresh, the Labour Court would allow the parties to lead evidence on the question of maintainability as well as on merits. Further, the learned Court would not merely decide the preliminary point relating to the maintainability of the reference but would also enter into the merits of the controversy. We have given this direction keeping in view the decision of the Supreme Court in D.P Maheshwari v. Delhi Administration [1984 — I L.L.N 1], in which it was held that Tribunals entrusted with the task of adjudicating labour disputes, where delay may lead to misery, should decide all issues in dispute at the same time without trying some of them as preliminary issues.

19. The petition is allowed accordingly. We, however, make no order as to costs.

20. A.K Padhi, J.:— I agree.