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Case Number

Original Jurn. Case No. 2134 of 1989

Attorney(S)

Jayant Das

Judges

H.L Agrawal, C.J
G.B Patnaik
L. Rath, JJ.*

Acts

provisions of Article 212
sub-rule (4) of R. 7

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Smart Summary

Opinion Summary — Orissa High Court (Larger Bench)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, a Member of the Orissa Legislative Assembly, was served with a notice (Annexure-1) enclosing a petition by another MLA (Shri Satya Bhusan Sahu) under the Members of Orissa Legislative Assembly (Disqualification on ground of Defection) Rules, 1987 ("the Rules"). The notice requested comments within seven days, but the petitioner did not respond within that time.

The petitioner later received another communication (Annexure-3) advising that the Committee of Privileges (Opposite Party No. 4) would examine him concerning the petition. The petitioner filed a petition to the Speaker (Annexure-4) asserting that the Speaker's reference to the Committee was illegal, alleging non-compliance with R.7 and contending that Shri Sahu's petition was not maintainable. He also appeared before the Committee and raised jurisdictional objections. The Committee continued its proceedings.

The petitioner approached the High Court seeking three reliefs:

Quash Annexure-1 and subsequent proceedings arising from it;
Injunction restraining Opposite Party No. 4 (the Committee of Privileges) from proceeding with the enquiry; and
Declaration that the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution is ultra vires.

The matter was placed before a larger Bench because an important question about the Court's jurisdiction to entertain challenges to legislative proceedings on grounds of alleged irregularity was raised.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether, in light of para 6(2) of the Tenth Schedule and Article 212 of the Constitution, the High Court has jurisdiction under Article 226 to examine the validity of a proceeding in the State Legislature on grounds of procedural irregularity or related challenges.
Whether the petition filed by Shri Satya Bhusan Sahu was maintainable when it was addressed to the Secretary instead of the Speaker as required by R.6 of the Rules, and whether that infirmity renders the petition a nullity that the Court can entertain.
Whether the Speaker had jurisdiction to refer the matter to the Committee of Privileges under sub‑rule (4) of R.7 when the earlier stages in R.7(1)–(3) were not, according to the petitioner, complied with.
Whether the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution (including para 7) is constitutionally invalid (i.e., whether it violates the basic structure and other constitutional provisions) and, if so, whether the High Court can adjudicate that question in this writ petition.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as presented by Mr. Das)

The petition filed by Shri Sahu was addressed to the Secretary and not to the Speaker as required by R.6 of the Rules, rendering it illegal and not maintainable.
The Speaker lacked jurisdiction to refer the matter to the Committee of Privileges under sub‑rule (4) of R.7 because prior stages in R.7(1)–(3) had not been complied with; therefore the reference was unlawful.
Although conceding that the Speaker has jurisdiction to decide qualification issues, Mr. Das contended that procedural infirmities (addressing the petition to the Secretary; failure to follow R.7 stages) amounted to illegality that the Court could and should examine.
On constitutional grounds Mr. Das urged that the Tenth Schedule violates the basic structure of the Constitution and is repugnant to Article 388 (as alleged in his submissions) and should be struck down; he relied on decisions including the Punjab & Haryana High Court Full Bench in Prakash Singh Badal v. Union of India (AIR 1987 Punj & Har 263) and the Supreme Court's In re Art. 143 (AIR 1965 SC 745).
Mr. Das also relied on various Supreme Court authorities (Mannalal Khetan v. Kedar Nath Khetan; A.K. Roy v. State of Punjab; Ram Autar Singh Bhadauria v. Ram Gopal Singh) to support the contention that mandatory procedural requirements, if not complied with, render a petition incompetent.

The opinion does not record detailed responsive submissions from the opposite parties; the Court's reasoning and prior authorities respond to the petitioner's contentions.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
M.S.M. Sharma v. Dr. Shree Krishna Sinha, AIR 1960 SC 1186	The validity of proceedings inside the Legislature cannot be called in question on the allegation that the prescribed procedure was not strictly followed; courts should not intrude on matters within the special jurisdiction of the Legislature.	The Court relied on this principle to hold that procedural irregularities in a legislative proceeding (including those alleged here) are matters sealed from judicial scrutiny under Article 212 and that the application was premature while the Speaker/Committee had not given a final decision.
In re (under Art. 143, Constitution of India), AIR 1965 SC 745	Discusses the scope of advisory jurisdiction under Art. 143; the majority emphasized limits to the answers rendered, e.g., confined to contempt by non-members outside the chamber (as observed in the opinion).	The Court found this decision not helpful to the petitioner on the facts: it was distinguished and held not to assist the challenge to the legislative proceeding under Article 226/212.
Prakash Singh Badal v. Union of India, AIR 1987 Punj & Har 263 (Full Bench)	Full Bench decision (referred to by petitioner) that struck down para 7 of the Tenth Schedule (as stated in the opinion).	The Court noted the decision but observed that an appeal from that Full Bench judgment was pending before the Supreme Court and that the Supreme Court had withdrawn related High Court matters; accordingly, the High Court did not proceed on that basis and left open a separate constitutional challenge to be pursued appropriately.
Saradhakar Supakar v. Speaker, Orissa Legislative Assembly, AIR 1952 Orissa 234; Godavaris Misra v. Nandakisore Das, AIR 1953 Orissa 111; Surendra Mohanty v. Nabakrishna Choudhury, AIR 1958 Orissa 168	Earlier Orissa High Court authorities holding that the High Court will have no jurisdiction under Art. 226 to decide the legality of a proceeding in the State Legislature.	The Bench relied on these prior High Court decisions as supporting the conclusion that the High Court should not entertain the petition to decide the legality of a legislative proceeding under the Tenth Schedule/Article 212.
Mannalal Khetan v. Kedar Nath Khetan, AIR 1977 SC 536; A.K. Roy v. State of Punjab, AIR 1986 SC 2160; Ram Autar Singh Bhadauria v. Ram Gopal Singh, AIR 1975 SC 2182	Authorities cited by petitioner to argue that mandatory procedural requirements must be complied with and failure to do so can render a proceeding incompetent.	The Court acknowledged these authorities as relied upon by Mr. Das but concluded that procedural rules framed under para 8 cannot curtail the substantive power vested in the Speaker by para 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule; thus those authorities did not alter the conclusion that the High Court was barred from examining such internal legislative irregularities under Art. 212.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in a series of legal steps tied closely to the constitutional text and the interplay between the Tenth Schedule and Article 212:

The Court noted that Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule vests power in the Speaker to determine whether a member has become subject to disqualification and that para 6(2) expressly deems a proceeding under para 6(1) to be a proceeding in the Legislature of the State for the purposes of Article 212.
Article 212(1) bars judicial scrutiny of the validity of a proceeding in the Legislature on the ground of irregularity of procedure; Article 212(2) provides immunity to officers or members for acts done in exercise of powers vested by or under the Constitution. In consequence, the Court concluded that the impugned disqualification proceeding fell within the protection of Article 212.
The petitioner conceded that the Speaker has jurisdiction to decide qualification issues but argued procedural infirmities (petition addressed to the Secretary; failure to follow R.7 stages) rendered the proceeding illegal and reviewable by the Court. The Court held that such alleged infirmities concern procedure in a proceeding that is, by constitutional deeming, "inside the Legislature," and therefore fall within the special jurisdiction of the Legislature and are not judicially examinable under Article 212.
The Court relied on the Supreme Court's observation in M.S.M. Sharma (AIR 1960 SC 1186) that courts cannot inquire into the validity of proceedings inside the Legislature on grounds of non-strict compliance with procedural requirements, because the Legislature has the power to conduct its own business.
The Court further observed that the Speaker had not yet taken a final decision; he had referred the matter to the Committee of Privileges and would take a final decision on receipt of the Committee's report. Given that no final legislative determination had been made and the internal inquiry was ongoing, the High Court's intervention would be premature.
Regarding the petition's being addressed to the Secretary rather than to the Speaker, the Court (and particularly the concurring judgment of L. Rath, J.) reasoned that: (a) the petition, once placed before the Speaker and acted upon by him, was within the Speaker's seisin; (b) the substantive power to decide disqualification is vested in the Speaker by para 6(1) and operates independently (proprio vigore) of procedural rules framed under para 8; and (c) rules such as R.6 and R.7 regulate procedure but cannot nullify or fetter the constitutional authority of the Speaker to decide the dispute.
The Court acknowledged that in some cases issues of fundamental rights or clear illegality might require judicial scrutiny of legislative acts, but held that no such illegality or fundamental-rights breach was established on the material before it in this case.
On the constitutional challenge to the Tenth Schedule, the Court noted that a Full Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court had struck down para 7 and that an appeal against that decision was pending in the Supreme Court; further, the Supreme Court had withdrawn related High Court matters. Consequently, the Court considered that the appropriate forum for an attack on the Schedule was the Supreme Court or a fresh petition properly focused on constitutionality, rather than deciding the constitutional issue incidentally in these proceedings.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ application was dismissed. The Bench declined to quash Annexure-1 or to injunct the Committee's proceedings on the grounds urged, and it did not adjudicate the constitutional validity of the Tenth Schedule in this petition.

Implications:

The direct effect is that the disqualification proceedings before the Speaker/Committee may continue; the High Court will not interpose at this stage to examine alleged procedural irregularities because the matter is deemed to be a proceeding in the Legislature and is therefore barred from judicial scrutiny under Article 212 insofar as procedural irregularity is concerned.
The petitioner was granted liberty to file a separate petition if he sought to challenge the constitutional validity of the Tenth Schedule; the Court observed that the issue is before the Supreme Court in related cases, and the High Court declined to decide that constitutional question incidentally in this matter.
The Court dismissed the petition without any order as to costs.
No new, broad precedent displacing Article 212's bar was established by this decision; the Bench applied existing constitutional provisions and relevant precedents to reach the conclusion that judicial intervention was not appropriate in the circumstances of this case.

Disposition: Petition dismissed. Agrawal C.J. agreed with the judgment of G.B. Patnaik, J.; L. Rath, J. concurred and supplemented the reasoning.

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Bhajaman Bobera v. Speaker, Orissa Legislative Assembly And Others

G.B Patnaik, J.:— This writ application was listed before a larger Bench for consideration of its admission, in view of the fact that an important question regarding the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain a petition to decide the validity of a proceeding in the Legislature of a State on the ground of alleged irregularity was raised. The petitioner, a Member of the Orissa Legislative Assembly, was served with notice (Annexure-1) along with the enclosures and was requested to offer his comments within seven days from the date of the receipt of the said notice. The enclosure was a petition by another member of the Legislative Assembly filed under the provisions of the Members of Orissa, Legislative Assembly (Disqualification on ground of Defection) Rules, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as the “Rules”). The petitioner did not offer any comments within the time as stipulated under Annexure-1. The petitioner then received another letter under Annexure-3, whereunder he was intimated that the Committee of Privileges had decided to examine him on matters arising out of a petition filed by Shri Satya Bhusan Sahu, a Member of the Orissa Legislative Assembly, against the petitioner. The petitioner then filed a petition before the Speaker as per Annexure-4 contending that the reference made by the Speaker to the Committee of Privileges was illegal and not in accordance with law, inasmuch as it was not in accordance with the procedure laid down in R. 7 of the Rules and also contended that the petition filed by Shri Satya Bhusan Sahu was not maintainable. The petitioner asserts that to the best of his knowledge, the Speaker sent a note to opposite party No. 4, the Committee of Privileges, indicating that the issues raised by the petitioner could be gone into by the said opposite party No. 4 in the process of proceedings. The petitioner thereafter also appeared before opposite party No. 4 and contended that the application filed by Shri Sahu was not maintainable and the Committee had no jurisdiction to determine the issue. When the Committee continued its proceedings, the petitioner approached this Court for the following reliefs:—

(a) to quash Annexure-1 and the sub-sequent proceedings arising out of the said Annexure-1;

(b) to injunct opposite party No. 4 not to proceed with the enquiry; and

2. Mr. Das, the learned Counsel for the petitioner contends, that the petition filed by Sri Sahu being addressed to the Secretary and not to the speaker as required under R. 6 of the Rules is illegal and thus not maintainable. He further contends that the speaker had no jurisdiction to refer the matter to the Committee for making a preliminary enquiry under sub-rule (4) of R. 7 since the prior stages contained in sub-rules (1), (2) and (3) have not been complied with. On the question of constitutional validity, Mr. Das urges that the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution violates the basic structure of the Constitution and is repugnant to Art. 388 and, therefore, must be struck down. On the question whether a petition is maintainable in view of Art. 212 of the Constitution, the learned Counsel cites a number of authorities and strongly relies upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Prakash Singh Badal v. Union of India, AIR 1987 Punj & Har 263 (Full Bench) and another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of In re, under Art. 143, Constitution of India, AIR 1965 SC 745.

3. Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution vests the power with the Speaker of the State Legislature to determine the question whether a member has become subject to disqualification. Para 6(2) of the Tenth Schedule unequivocally states that a proceeding under para 6(1) shall be deemed to be a proceeding in the Legislature of the State within the meaning of Art. 212. Article 212(1) of the Constitution prohibits scrutiny by Court with regard to the validity of any proceeding in the Legislature of a State on the ground of irregularity of procedure. Article 212(2) makes an officer or member of the Legislature of a State immune from the jurisdiction of the Court on whom powers are vested by or under the Constitution in respect of exercise of those powers by him. In view of para 6(2) of the Tenth Schedule, the impugned proceedings against the petitioner must be held to be a proceeding in the Legislature of the State, within the meaning of Art. 212 of the Constitution and, therefore, the bar of jurisdiction contained in Art. 212 of the Constitution would apply. Mr. Das appearing for the petitioner concedes that the speaker has the jurisdiction to decide the question of qualification of a Member of the Legislative Assembly, but he contends that the infirmities pointed out by him make the proceeding illegal inasmuch as the procedure laid dawn by law has not been followed and, therefor, this Court will have jurisdiction to entertain and decide the matter. According to Mr. Das, the infirmities are that the petition was addressed to the Secretary and that the Speaker referred the matter to the Committee of Privileges without following the procedure contained in R. 7(2) and (3) of the Rules. It is also not disputed by Mr. Das that though the application was addressed to the Secretary, yet it is the Speaker who is in seisin of the matter and has referred the same to the Committee. In my considered opinion, the alleged infirmities are pertaining to the procedure in relation to a proceeding inside the Legislature of a State since the disqualification proceeding by operation of Constitutional provision has been deemed to be a proceeding inside the Legislature of a State. That being so, the Court will have no jurisdiction to go into the question of validity of such proceeding which is within the special jurisdiction of the Legislature itself. It would be sufficient for the purpose of this case to notice an observation of the Supreme Court in this connection in the case of M.S.M Sharma v. Dr. Shree Krishna Sinha, AIR 1960 SC 1186, which is as follows (Paragraph 10):—

“The validity of the proceedings inside the Legislature of a State cannot be called in question on the allegation that the procedure laid down by the law had not been strictly followed. No Court can go into those questions which are within the special jurisdiction of the Legislature itself, which has the power to conduct its own business.”

(quoted from the headnote)

Further, the speaker who has jurisdiction to take a decision in the matter has not yet taken a final decision and has merely referred the matter to the Committee for enquiry and report on receipt of which he will take a final decision. The Committee also is yet to conclude its proceeding. In that view of the matter, as has been observed in M.S.M Sharma's case (supra) by the Supreme Court, the present application is yet premature.

14. Mr. Das appearing for the petitioner strongly, relies upon the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1965 SC 745 (In re, under Art. 143, Constitution of India), wherein a reference made by the President under Art. 143 of the Constitution was answered by the Supreme Court. I am of the considered opinion that the aforesaid decision is of no assistance to the petitioner in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Further, Gajendragadkar, C.J, speaking for the majority in that case while answering the five questions referred to the Court by the President clearly stated (at p. 791):—

“In rendering our answer to this question which is very broadly worded, we ought to preface our answer with the observation that the answer is confined to cases in relation to contempt alleged to have been committed by a citizen who is not a member of the House outside the four walls of the legislative chamber….”

So far as this Court is concerned, there are three earlier Bench decisions on the point, namely the High Court will have no jurisdiction to entertain an application under Art. 226 to decide the legality of a proceeding in the Legislature of the State. (See Saradhakar Supakar v. Speaker, Orissa Legislative Assembly and Secretary, Orissa Legislature Assembly, AIR 1952 Orissa 234; Godavaris Misra v. Nandakisore Das, AIR 1953 Orissa 111; and Surendra Mohanty v. Nabakrishna Choudhury, AIR 1958 Orissa 168). In the premises, as aforesaid, and in view of my conclusion that the infirmities alleged by the petitioner can at best be said to be an irregularity of procedure and not a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction or an illegality touching the jurisdiction, I am not inclined to entertain this application to decide the legality of the notices served on the petitioner in course of a proceeding initiated for disqualification of the petitioner under the Rules.

5. So far as the question regarding constitutionality of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution is concerned, Mr. Das, relying upon the decision of the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court (AIR 1987 Punj & Har 263) (supra) contends that the said Full Bench has struck down para 7 of the Tenth Schedule and, therefore, this Court Should entertain the application. It transpires that the Government has carried an appeal to the Supreme Court against the aforesaid decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court which is now pending before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court itself on the request of the Central Government has withdrawn all cases pending in various High Courts wherein the constitutionality of the Tenth Schedule had been challenged and all these petitions are pending before the Supreme Court. In that view of the matter, I would observe that it would be open for the petitioner to move the Supreme Court assailing the constitutional validity of the Tenth Schedule. Since in the present application, the main prayer was to quash the disqualification proceeding, which I am not inclined to entertain and the constitutional validity was challenged incidentally, I also leave it open for the petitioner, if so advised, to make a fresh application to this Court only assailing the constitutional validity of the Tenth Schedule.

6. With these observations, I would dismiss the writ application, but without any order as to costs.

Agrawal, C.J:— 7. I agree.

L. Rath, J. (Concurring):— 8. This case has come before a larger Bench for consideration on the question of admission having been referred by a Division Bench of which I was a member. Even at the admission stage both before the Division Bench and as before us, the question regarding the authority of this Court to issue notice to the Speaker of the Orissa Legislative Assembly regarding a proceeding initiated, before him for determination of the disqualification of a Member of the Assembly under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution, was argued at great length. Because of the importance of the question involved, I would, while, fully concurring with the decision of my learned brother Justice Shri G.B Patnaik, like to add few words to supplement the same.

9. It is not disputed by Mr. Das, in view of para 6(2) of the Tenth Schedule, that a proceeding under para 6(1) of the same Schedule, namely, a proceeding to resolve the question as to whether or not a member has become subject to disqualification is a proceeding in the Legislature of the State to which the provisions of Art. 212 of the Constitution are attracted. It is his submission, however, that notwithstanding such applicability of Article 212, yet so far as the petitioner's challenge is concerned, it is not in relation to a proceeding in the Assembly but questions the very commencement and maintainability of the proceeding on the petition of the Opp. party No. 6, to which the bar under Art. 212 would not apply. It is further contended that the bar under Art. 212 extends only to irregularities inside the House but not to illegalities. It is also contended by him that the infractions the petitioner has complained of regarding the entertainment of the petition and the manner of its dealing with are not only irregularities but are illegalities which it is open for the petitioner to challenge before this Court. So far as the first submission is concerned, the matter has been dealt with in the judgment prepared by Hon'ble Justice Patnaik. The main plank of Mr. Das's submission in that regard is that the petition was ab initio still-born having not been addressed to the Speaker as required under R. 6(2) of the Rules framed under the Tenth Schedule but having been merely addressed to the Secretary of the Assembly. The submission is that the provisions of R. 6(2) are mandatory having laid down a command in a negative form that no reference shall be made except in the manner as declared in the rule and that the manner is that so far as a member is concerned, the petition relating to his disqualification is to be presented to the Speaker alone. Only when the allegation is against the Speaker himself, the petition has to be addressed to the Secretary. Mr. Das relying upon AIR 1977 SC 536 (Mannalal Khetan v. Kedar Nath Khetan); AIR 1986 SC 2160 (A.K Roy v. State of Punjab) and AIR 1975 SC 2182, (Ram Autar Singh Bhadauria v. Ram Gopal Singh), has argued that since the rule itself requires in a compulsory manner the presentation of the petition to be in one manner, its presentation in another manner must be held to be inherently incompetent for which reason the petition ought not to have been entertained at all and should have been rejected in limine. It has also been contended by Mr. Das that on receipt of such an application, the Speaker should not have referred the matter to the Committee of Privileges without first examining whether the petition complied with the requirement of R. 6 and was under obligation under R. 7(2) to dismiss the petition once it was pointed out that the petition does not comply with the provisions of R. 6.

10. A proceeding inside the House remains a proceeding as such either at its commencement or during its continuance. The proceeding regarding determination of the disqualification is, under a deeming provision of the Tenth Schedule, made a proceeding in the House. The proceeding commences on the presentation of the petition to determine the dispute. Once the proceeding is commenced, the deeming provision would operate and from that stage onwards it would be a proceeding inside the House and would be sealed from the scrutiny of this Court. There just can be no submission that this Court can entertain a petition to find out the illegality of the entertainment of the petition before the speaker since that question itself is one which is available to be decided by the Speaker himself at the first instance. Applying an analogy, if the speaker's functions are compared to a Tribunal for the purpose, yep every Tribunal has the jurisdiction to decide the matter of its own assumption of jurisdiction to decide the question before it and this Court would not rush in all cases where an initial lack of jurisdiction in the Tribunal is pleaded such question will differ from case to case depending on the facts and circumstances of each case.

11. This also leads me to the other submission raised by Mr. Das i.e, the petition was liable to be thrown out at the threshold having been addressed to the Secretary of the Assembly. It has been admitted by Mr. Das that in fact the petition of the Opp. party No. 6 was placed before the Speaker who directed the same to be examined by the Privileges Committee, the Opp. party No. 4. Para 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule vests the power exclusively in the speaker to decide, when a dispute is raised whether any member has become subject to disqualification, the issue and his decision on that count is final. Para 7 of the same Schedule also specifically excludes the jurisdiction of any Court in respect of any matter connected with the disqualification of a Member of the House. The rules on which reliance is placed by Mr. Das have been framed under para 8 which vests the rule-making power in the speaker who may make rules for giving effect to the provisions of the Schedule. Such rules may provide, inter alia, regarding the proceeding for deciding the questions referred to in para 6(1) including the procedure of the inquiry which may be made. The substantive provision vesting the power in the Speaker is para 6 whereas the rules under para 8 are only to regulate the procedure. The power under para 6(1) is absolute and without any rider. While no doubt R. 6(1) has a mandatory cast yet such mandatory character would not have the sweep to restrict the scope and ambit of the power vested under para 6(1) in the Speaker since the substantive provision of law would not be stiffled by the procedural regulation. The exercise of the power by the Speaker under para 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule is not dependent upon the framing of rules under para 8 and even in the absence of the rules framed for the purpose, the Speaker has the authority to resolve the dispute if raised before him. The authority of the Speaker operates proprio vigore without any fetter being clamped on his power by the rules. As admittedly the petition was dealt with as one addressed to the Speaker, and the Speaker has considered the same and dealt with it, the mere fact that it was addressed differently would not deprive the Speaker from exercising the powers vested in him by the Constitution.

12. Since I reach such conclusions it is not necessary to go into the further question regarding the authority of this Court to examine illegalities inside the House as distinct from only irregularities relating thereto. I do not find any illegality to have been committed in the matter of presentation of the petition. Referring the petition to the privileges committee or other such questions raised are merely matter relating to procedural irregularities. As admitted by Mr. Das and as the provisions of Article 212 itself are, this Court has no jurisdiction to examine any question relating to irregularities in respect of proceedings in the House. Doubtless a question may arise, as was decided in AIR 1960 SC 1186 (M.S.M Sharma v. Dr. Shree Krishna Sinha) and AIR 1965 SC 745 cited by Mr. Das, whether, when the issue is one affecting a citizen's fundamental right or an illegality or unconstitutionality, the scrutiny by the Higher Courts is taken away, but however such question does not arise here for a detail examination.

13. Being of that view I also dismiss this petition with liberty to the petitioner, if he is so advised, to raise the constitutionality of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution in a separate petition.

Petition dismissed.

Bhajaman Bobera v. Speaker, Orissa Legislative Assembly And Others

Opinion Summary — Orissa High Court (Larger Bench)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as presented by Mr. Das)

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Bhajaman Bobera v. Speaker, Orissa Legislative Assembly And Others

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