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  • Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code.9.
  • Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 104 of the Indian Penal Code,
  • SECTION 25 EVIDENCE ACT
  • Indian Police Act. 5 of 1861
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code.9.
  • Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 104 of the Indian Penal Code,
  • SECTION 25 EVIDENCE ACT
  • Indian Police Act. 5 of 1861
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — R.N. Misra, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant was convicted of murder by the Additional Sessions Judge, Dhenkanal, and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life. The First Information Report was lodged by P.W.1, the local Grama Rakshi, on 26-2-1974 stating that between midnight and 1 a.m. the previous night he was led to the scene where he found the deceased, Gundicha (also spelt Gundioha/Gundicha in the record), with multiple cut injuries and tied by the waist to a small tree. The informant reported that the deceased had stolen a she-goat from the appellant's (named in places as Bhaja Pradhan/Bihaja) cattle shed and had been pursued; the deceased later succumbed to his injuries by daybreak.

After investigation the appellant was tried for murdering the deceased by means of a tangia (marked M.O. I). The prosecution relied primarily on a dying declaration, an extra-judicial confession (both supported by P.W.1), recoveries including M.O. I (tangia), M.O. II (lathi), M.O. III (rope), recovery of the she-goat from a gunny bag, and chemical evidence of human blood on seized articles. The defence pleaded complete denial and alleged false implication due to a land dispute with P.W.1.

The trial court accepted P.W.1 as a reliable witness, accepted the dying declaration and the extra-judicial confession, rejected the claim that the confession was inadmissible under Section 25 of the Evidence Act because P.W.1 was a police officer, disallowed the claim of private defence of property, convicted the appellant under Section 302 IPC, and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The appellant appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the extra-judicial confession made to P.W.1 (the Grama Rakshi) is admissible in evidence, given the prohibition in Section 25 of the Evidence Act against confessions made to a "police officer" (i.e., whether a Grama Rakshi qualifies as a police officer for this purpose).
  2. Whether the appellant was entitled to invoke the right of private defence of property (and if so, whether the injuries causing the deceased's death constituted lawful exercise of that right, an excess of that right, or amounted to murder) — i.e., whether the conviction should stand under Section 302 IPC or be altered to an offence under Section 304 IPC.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant denied the prosecution case and claimed false implication motivated by a land dispute with the Grama Rakshi (P.W.1).
  • Counsel argued that the extra-judicial confession should be inadmissible because P.W.1, the Grama Rakshi, performs duties and exercises powers that render him effectively a "police officer" within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act; hence the confession should be excluded.
  • The appellant claimed the right of private defence of property under Section 104 IPC applied: that injuries were inflicted while exercising that right and the death was unintended, or at most an excess of that right, and therefore the appropriate conviction should be under Section 304 IPC rather than Section 302 IPC.

Prosecution's Case (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The prosecution relied on the dying declaration of the deceased, the extra-judicial confession recorded by P.W.1, recoveries of weapons (tangia, lathi), discovery of the rope, recovery of the she-goat from a gunny bag, chemical evidence of human blood on seized articles, and medical opinion that injuries were caused by a tangia-like instrument.
  • These pieces of evidence were presented to establish that the appellant delivered the fatal blows that caused the death.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in distinct steps:

  1. Admissibility of the extra-judicial confession:

    The appellant urged that a Grama Rakshi should be treated as a police officer and that any confession made to him would be inadmissible under Section 25 of the Evidence Act ("No confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence"). The judgment notes that whether a Grama Rakshi qualifies as a police officer under relevant statutes (including consideration of duties and powers) had been examined by a Full Bench of the Court and had not been finally disposed of. The appellate court, however, declined to decide this question conclusively because it held that even if the extra-judicial confession were excluded, the remaining evidence was sufficient to support the prosecution case. Thus the court did not resolve the legal characterization of a Grama Rakshi as a "police officer." This avoidance was based on judicial economy: the confession's admissibility was unnecessary to the final result.

  2. Reliability of the dying declaration and corroboration:

    Counsel for the appellant did not challenge the acceptability of P.W.1's evidence. P.W.1 had stated that the deceased identified the appellant as the person who struck him. The trial judge had carefully considered whether the deceased was in a position to make a dying declaration and concluded that the declaration was true. The appellate court accepted that conclusion. Recognizing that oral dying declarations require corroboration for assurance, the court examined circumstantial corroboration: (a) the lathi, lungi and rope were chemically found stained with human blood; (b) the doctor testified that injuries were caused by a tangia-like instrument; and (c) the seizure of the dead goat from within a gunny bag provided contextual background consistent with the prosecution's account. On this basis the court considered the finding that the appellant gave the fatal blows to be unassailable on the record before it.

  3. Right of private defence of property (Sections 103 and 104 IPC):

    The decisive legal issue addressed at length was whether the appellant could avail himself of the right of private defence of property. Section 104 IPC was cited, which ordinarily restricts the right to cause death where the offence occasioning the exercise of private defence is theft, mischief or criminal trespass (except in certain specified circumstances under Section 103 where causing death may be justified). The appellant argued that he had been exercising his right of private defence when he struck the fleeing thief and that any death was unintended or, if intentional, should at most be treated as excess of private defence not amounting to murder.

    The court examined the factual matrix: the thief entered the cattle shed at night, stole a she-goat, and was carrying it in a gunny bag when the appellant ran from behind and struck him with blows from a deadly weapon. Some blows were to vital parts, including the head. The court acknowledged the appellant's point that it was a dark night and the appellant may not have been able to aim precisely at non-vital parts; that seven successive blows may have been excessive. On balance the court concluded that the appellant acted to undo the mischief and pursued the fleeing wrongdoer and struck him, but that it would be inappropriate to characterize the conduct as murder. Instead, the court found that the right of private defence had been exceeded: the appellant was entitled to claim private defence of property, but he had no right to voluntarily cause death. Therefore the legally appropriate characterization was culpable homicide not amounting to murder (i.e., excess of private defence), not murder under Section 302 IPC.

  4. Sentencing rationale:

    Given the court's finding that the appellant's actions amounted to an excess of the right of private defence (culpable homicide not amounting to murder), the appropriate conviction was under Section 304 IPC. Considering the facts and circumstances, the court determined that a sentence of ten years' rigorous imprisonment would meet the ends of justice. Accordingly, the court set aside the conviction under Section 302 IPC and convicted under Section 304 IPC, substituting the life sentence with ten years' rigorous imprisonment.

  5. Concurrence and procedural disposition:

    Justice Das concurred with the judgment. The appeal was dismissed subject to the modifications indicated (i.e., substitution of conviction and reduction of sentence).

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The Court set aside the conviction under Section 302 IPC and instead convicted the appellant under Section 304 IPC, substituting the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for life with a sentence of ten years' rigorous imprisonment.

Implications and immediate effects:

  • The appellant's conviction for murder (Section 302 IPC) was quashed and replaced by a conviction for culpable homicide not amounting to murder (Section 304 IPC).
  • The appellant's sentence was reduced from rigorous imprisonment for life to ten years' rigorous imprisonment.
  • The appeal was otherwise dismissed subject to these modifications, and Justice Das concurred with the order.
  • The opinion expressly refrained from making a conclusive legal determination about whether a Grama Rakshi is a "police officer" for the purpose of Section 25 Evidence Act; the court did not set a new precedent on that specific point because it found it unnecessary to resolve the issue for the outcome of the case.

This summary is drawn exclusively from the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or legal conclusions beyond the text.

    Bhaja Pradhan v. State Of Orissa .

    R.N Misra, J.:— The appellant has been convicted for the offence of murder and has been sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life by the learned Additional Sessions Judge of Dhenkanal.

    2. P.W 1, the local Grama Rakshi, lodged First Information Report at about 9 a.m on 26-2-1974 with the Officer-in-charge of the Sader Police Station at Dhenkanal that between 12 midnight and 1 a.m in the previous night while he was sleeping on the verandah of his house in the village, one Loohan Pradhan asked him to come running as they had caught a thief, Lochan led him to a Mahul tree near about.

    3. He found that there were several cut injuries on Gundioha and blood was oozing out His waist had been tied by a rope to a small tree near about. Several persons were present at the occurrence. On enquiry, the informant was told by Gundicha that he had stolen a she-goat from accused Bhaja Pradhan's cattle shed and was going away. Bihaja ran from behind and gave him cut injuries. As a result of it, he dropped the goat which was then in a big jute bag. By daybreak, Gundicha succumbed to his injuries After due investigation, the appellant was sent up for trial for murdering the deceased Gundicha by means of a tangia (M.O I).

    4. The defence plea is one of complete denial of the prosecution case and the appellant claimed that he had been falsely implicated on account of land dispute with the Grama Rakshi (P.W 1).

    5. There is no eye-witness to the occurrence and prosecution mainly relies upon the dying declaration as also the extra-judicial confession supported by P.W 1 and, the production of the tangia M.O.I, the lathi M.O II by the appellant giving discovery of the rope M.O III from beneath the thatch heap and the circumstantial evidence of recovery of a she-goat from a gunny bag. Reliance has also been placed on human blood having been found on the lathi, The lungi and the rope. The learned trial Judge accepted P.W 1 to be a disinterested and reliable witness and, therefore, also accepted the dying declaration. He also accepted the extra-judicial confession by rejecting the defence stand that Grama Rakshi being a police officer. Section 25 of the Evidence Act would not permit the alleged confessional statement of the appellant to be received in evidence. The learned trial Judge next examined the claim of right of private defence of property and was not prepared to uphold the claim of right of private defence Accordingly he found the appellant guilty of murder and convicted him under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him in the manner already indicated,

    6. Before us, counsel for the appellant reiterates the contention that the extra-judicial confession is not admissible because P.W 1 the Grama Rakshi is a police officer. Reliance, is placed on the nature of duties assigned to a Grama Rakshi and powers vested in him and it is claimed that though P.W 1 holds the post of Grama Rakshi he is no other than a police offieer

    Section 25 of the Evidence Act provides:—

    “No confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence,”

    The definition of police officer’ occurring in the Indian Police Act. 5 of 1861 is not exhaustive and in the absence of a statutory definition and apart from all authority, one would be tempted to say that a police officer is a person whom any statute or other provision of law calls such, or, on whom it confers all or substantially all the powers and imposes on him the duties of a police officer. If he is expressly called a police officer there is no difficulty whatsoever. If he is not so-called, then the next step to ask is, what does the law require him to do? What are the duties imposed on him and what are the powers conferred on him?

    It is claimed by Mr. Dhall for the appellant that if the matter is examined from these standpoints, the only conclusion that can be reached is that’ a Grama Rakshi is a police officer. The question was examined by a Full Bench of this Court specifically with reference to a Grama Rakshi and the question does not appear to have been still finally disposed of We are of the view that it is unnecessary to examine this aspect of the matter because even if the extra-judicial confession is excluded, there is sufficient evidence to support the prosecution case. We accordingly do not propose to conclusively decide as to whether a confession made before a Grama Rakshi would be hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act.

    7. Mr. Dihall for the appellant does not challenge the acceptability of the evidence of P.W 1. P.W 1 has made a categorical statement that the deceased stated to him that it was the appellant who gave the blows. The learned trial Judge has elaborately dealt with the evidence of P.W 1 as also the other attendant circumstances to find out whether the deceased was in a position to make a dying declaration at the relevant time and has come to the conclusion that the dying declaration was true. It is unnecessary for us to reiterate the evidence in support of the conclusion because before us Mr. Dhall does not dispute the position that the prosecution has been able to prove the dying declaration. Undoubtedly a dying declaration based upon oral evidence, as in this case, requires further evidence to lend assurance to the matter, not because the dying declaration is not true or could not form the basis of conviction, but because the judicial mind would be clear that mistakes are eschewed out. The learned trial Judge has rightly looked for corroboration from various circumstantial evidence. The lathi, lungi and rope have been found on chemical examination to be stained with human blood. The doctor has found the injuries to have been caused by a tangia like M.O.I The seizure of the dead goat from within a gunny bag has added assurance of truth as furnishing the background of the episode. We do not think, the finding of the learned trial Judge that it is the appellant who gave the fatal blows on the deceased can be disputed.

    8. The only question which has been canvassed before us at some length is as to whether the appellant would be entitled to right of private defence of property. Reliance is placed on Section 104 of the Indian Penal Code, which provides:—

    “If the offence, the committing of which or the attempting to commit which occasions the exercise of the right of private defence, be theft, mischief, or criminal trespass, not of any of the descriptions enumerated in the last preceding section, that right does not extend to the voluntary causing of death, but does extend subject to the restrictions mentioned in Section 99, to the voluntary causing \ to the wrong-doer of any harm other than death.”

    Under Section 103, under the specified circumstances, the right of private defence of property has been extended to the voluntary causing of death while under Section 104 of the Code, the right extends to causing to the wrong-doer of any harm other than death. Counsel for the appellant claims that in the facts of the case, the right under Section 104 of the Indian Penal Code was available to the appellant and while he was exercising this right, injuries inflicted upon the deceased have brought about unintended death. Therefore, the appellant is protected under Section 104 of the Code or if it is found that death was really voluntarily caused, it must be taken to be a case of excess of right of private defence not amounting to murder and, therefore, the conviction should be under Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code.

    9. The circumstances in which the appellant gave the blows are clearly available on the record. At dead of night, deceased stealthily entered into the cattle shed of the appellant and removed a she goat and after killing it was carrying the same in a gunny bag. The appellant ran from behind and gave the blows. The blows were with a deadly weapon and some of them were on the vital parts including the head. The statement made by the deceased before P.W 1 shows that he was still carrying the gunny bag containing the she goat when the injuries were inflicted. Admittedly it was a dark night and it is not easy to dispel the submission of Mr. Dhall for the appellant that placed under the circumstances as the appellant was, he was not able to know which parts of the body of the deceased he was striking. In these circumstances, merely because injuries were caused to vital parts of the body, it may not be possible to hold that the appellant intended to cause death of the deceased Seven successive blows were probably not called for. Yet, from the circumstances established, it would not be appropriate to conclude that it is a case of murder.

    10. On the other hand, it is reasonable to infer from the proved facts that the appellant was anxious to undo the mischief done to him and finding that the thief was running away chased him and caused the injuries indicated. On these facts, we are prepared to extend the bene fit of S. 104 of the Indian Penal Code to the appellant but would hold that the appellant had no right to voluntarily cause death to the wrongdoer i.e the deceased. This, in our opinion, therefore, is a case where the right of private defence has been exceeded. The proper provision under which the appellant should be punished, therefore, is under S. 304 of the Indian Penal Code. Keeping the facts and circumstances of the case in view, we think, the sentence of ten years' rigorous imprisonment would meet the ends of justice. We, therefore, set aside the conviction under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and convict the appellant under Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code and in lieu of the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for life impose the sentence of ten years' rigorous imprisonment. The appeal is dismissed subject to the modifications indicated above.

    Das, J.:— I agree.

    11. Order accordingly.

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    Comments

    Bhaja Pradhan v. State Of Orissa .
    (Dec 9, 1975)